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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis is a sodo-historical analysis of the ways in which the 
myth of the Internal Threatening Other influences national politics and 
culture and inter-ethnic relations between the majority group (the 
dominant ethnic nation) and the minority (perceived as the foremost 
Threatening Other). The case-study under examination is that of the 
Polish Jewish minority vis-a vis the Polish ethnic majority from the rise 
of fully-fledged Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalism in the 1880s up to 
the year 1968 which marks a final watershed in the history of Polish 
Jews - the purge and exile of most of its post-war remnants. 
The thesis examines the multi-faceted structure of the myth, its 
persistence and adaptability to different historical and socio-political 
conditions, and the variety of its uses in political culture: such as the 
purification of the state and dominant nation from the influence and 
presence of an ethnic minority; its role in anti-minority violence; in 
raising national cohesion; and in the delegitimisation of political 
enemies. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter 
explores some theoretical issues which underlie the analysis of the 
thesis; the second chapter examines the roots of the myth, its nascent 
pre-1880 forms and its development as a fully-fledged myth from the 
1880s up to 1939; the third chapter examines the impact of the myth on 
the rationalisation and justification of anti-Jewish violence between 
1918 and 1939: the fourth chapter examines the presence of the myth 
within the underground state and society during the Second World 
War; the fifth chapter examines the presence of the myth within 
political elites and non-elites in the early post-war Communist period 
1945-1948 and the last chapter examines the use of the myth by the 
Communist state betwen 1967 and 1968. 
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ehaptert 
General Causes and Functions of Myths of the Threatening Other. 
The central issue addressed in this thesis is that of our 
understanding of the impact of the myth of the Threatening Other on 
national communities in the modem era. Although the problem of 
antagonism towards Others is among the most studied in the 
disciplines of sociology and history, the impact of the myth of the 
Threatening Other on nations and on inter-ethnic relations between 
majority nations and minorities seems relatively unexplored. One of 
the reasons for the marginalisation of this subject may be the fact that 
the notion of the Threatening Other manifests itself in multifarious 
forms and intensities, and that its role fluctuates from one national 
community to another. 1 Perhaps this explains the reluctance of 
scholars to investigate why the myth of the Threatening Other is so 
central to some national communities and yet completely irrelevant to 
others. 
It can generally be agreed that, for many national communities, 
the Threatening Other is a marginal phenomenon that attains public 
importance only at the time of an actual threat, e. g. invasion by an 
External Threatening Other (neighbouring nations), or irredentism 
from an Internal Threatening Other (ethnic minorities). Otherwise, 
their national discourse is free from references to the Threatening 
Other. For other nations, particularly ethnic nations, the Threatening 
Other has a more permanent impact on their national discourse. In 
this latter group, mythologies of the Threatening Other are constructed 
and used for a variety of ends such as raising national cohesion and for 
social and political mobilisation by the in-groupýs nationalist elites. 
This phenomenon can continue regardless of the reality of the threat 
posed. In some cases, continuous dissemination of such mythologies 
may lead in times of political and social upheavals to what has been 
described as a 'moral panic' towards the Other. One of the most 
extreme manifestations of such 'moral panics" are attempts to purify 
the nation from the Internal Threatening Other when the 
ethnic/ -national minority in question represents in fact an insignificant 
percentage of the population and poses no real threat to the nation- 
state and its people. Such phenomena are sometimes referred to as 
lSee Leonard W. Doob, Patriotism And Nationalism. Their PsychologLcal 
Foundations (New Haven and London, 1964), 256-257. Hereafter Doob, Patriotism 
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'parmo-lir o)-r--p5ao ogical' forms of ethno-nationalism, descriptive 
terms which are not helpful from an analytical point of view. 2 
Statement ofAims 
This study is concerned with questions of the ways and extent 
to which the myth of the Internal Threatening Other influences 
national politics and culture, and inter-ethnic relations, between the 
majority nation and the ethnic/ national minority, in a nation based on 
a matrix of ethno-nationalism. 3 The main questions posed here are as 
follows: What are the main beliefs encoded in the myth of the Internal 
Threatening Other ? What is the impact of such a myth on attitudes 
towards and treatment of an ethnic minority categorised as the 
Threatening Other ? And what is the impact of this myth on the 
political culture of the majority nation whose effino-nationalist elites 
construct and disseminate such a myth ? 
The case-study under examination is that of the Jewish minority 
in Poland. The period in question starts with the rise of modem Polish 
exclusivist ethno-nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and ends in the year of 1968, a date which constitutes the final 
watershed in the history of this minority - the purge and exile of most 
of its post-war remnants. I shall, however, have to go back briefly to 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to trace the roots of Polish 
ethno-nationalism and its attitudes to Jews in Poland. 
I have chosen to examine this particular case firstly because it 
can provide interesting insights into the following three issues: 
1. The development, persistence and longevity of the myth of 
the Internal Threatening Other. 
2. The damaging impact of this myth on the ethnic minority 
perceived as the Threatening Other. 
3. The damaging impact on the majority nation, a significant 
segment of whose elites and non-elites upholds such a myth as 'social 
truth'. 
29ee, for example, John Crowley, 'Minorities and Majoritarian Democracy: the 
Nation-State and Beyond, ' in: Keebel vGn Benda-Beckman and Maykel Verkuyten 
eds., Nationalism, Ethnicijy And Cultural Identi1y In EurojLe (Utrecht, 1995), 155. 
31 recognise that in practise real -world nationalisms usually combine ethnic and 
civic claims. However one type of nationalism is usually dominant in the process of 
the conceiving of modem nations. For a general historical development of modem 
civic and ethnic nations see, for example, Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to 
Modern4 (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992-), 89-184 and 275-386. 
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After all the Jewish presence can be shown to have constituted a 
permanent element of the Polish collective memory and one that has 
been continuously evaluated in a Polish collective mind in strongly 
negative terms in the national context. 4 The extreme version of this 
evaluation is sometimes referred to as'anti-jewish paranoia, 'an 
obsession with Jewish omnipresence and omnipotence, and an 
accusation of Jewish harmfulness to the ethnic Polish community. 5 It 
has also been referred to as 'antisemitism without Jews' since its 
presence has continued well into the post-1945 period, characterised by 
the gradual decline of the remaining Polish Jewish community into an 
insignificant number and by a correspondingly high level of Jewish 
acculturation to Polish culture. The most recent term used to descdbe 
the contemporary and extreme version of this phenomenon is 
'antisemitism without antisemites, ' since the dissemination of anti- 
Jewish statements is frequently accompanied by denial of any anti- 
Jewish prejudice on the part of those individuals disseminating them. 6 
Such a situation in itself suggests the need for a scholarly investigation 
The second reason I have cliosen to examine this case is that 
very little research has actually been carried out in this area, although 
continuity of anti-Jewish themes in Polish national discourse has been 
indicated in a substantial bulk of literature on Polish-Jewish relations. 7 
The importance of such research for an understanding of the actual 
impact of anti-Jewish themes on Polish national discourse has been 
suggested by Frank GoIczewski in his article 'Antisemitic Literature in 
Poland Before the First World War': 
4See Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Neutralising Memoly. The Tew in ContemRorgjy Poland 
(New Brunswick and Oxford, 1989), 1-15. Hereafter Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, 
Neutralising. 
50n this issue see, for example, Andre W. M. Gerrits, 'Paradox of Freedom: the 
'Jewish Question' in Post-Communist East Central Europe. ' in: Ian M. Cuthbertson 
and Jane Leibowitz, eds., Minorities: The New EmEopes Old Issues (Prague, 1993), 
88-109. Hereafter Gernits, 'Paradox. ' and hereafter Cuthberston and Leibowitz, eds., 
Minorities. 
6'Me expression'antisemitism without antisemites'was put forward by Polish 
journalist Jerzy Slawomir Mac, 'Antysemityzm bez antysen-dtow, 'Wprost 27 
February, 2000,38-39. 
7See, for example, Yisrael Gutman, 'Historiography on Polish-Jewish relations, ' in: 
Abramsky, Jachimczyk, Polonsky, eds., The Jews in Poland (Oxford, 1986), 179. 
Hereafter Gutman, 'Historiography. '; Marcin Kula, 'Problem postkomunistvc-zny czy 
historvcznie uksztaltowanv volski problemT Biuletyn 2ydowskiego lnsbýtutu 
HistojycznegowPqlsce, No-4,1991,22-23. Hereafter Kula, Troblem. ' and 
KonstantyA. Jelenski, 'OdEndekowDoStalinistow. ' Kultura, No. 9,1956,14-15 
(6migr6journal. basedinParis). Hereafter jelen'ski, 'Od Endek6w. ' 
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'Playing down the anti-Jewish theme in Polish political thinking 
limits our understanding of some crucial aspects of Polish history. 
Twentieth-century antisemitic measures were explained merely as 
peculiar peripheral acts of unimportant personalities, although these 
phenomena were in fact a response to a quite important tradition in 
Polish political thought. At whatever point you look at modem Polish 
history, a specific 'Judeocentrism' (not always the same as 
antisemitism. ) can be observed - most of all in the National Democrats, 
but in other political groups as well., 8 
This thesis aims to investigate this neglected area of study by 
conducting an analysis of the myth of the Jew as the foremost 
Threatening Other in its historical context. This myth, an independent 
variable, constitutes the conceptual framework of this investigation. I 
shall establish its presence in ethno-nationalist press, political 
programmes and writings, various state documents and interviews. 
The decision to examine the impact of the myth over different 
historical periods is in accordance with the general proposition that 
such a myth once accepted as 'social truth' can be persistent, long- 
lived and difficult to challenge and eradicate. 
My main objective is to examine the mytWs origin, its 
multifarious elements and themes, and its social functions. 
Concerning the latter I concentrate on the four particular aspects most 
crucial, in my opinion, in terms of the impact of this myth both on the 
Jewish minority and on Polish ethno-nationalist political culture: 
1. The use of the myth in the rationahsation of the project of 
purification of the Jewish minority from the realm. of the Polish nation 
(by means of emigration). 
2. The use of the myth in the rationalisation and justification of 
anti-Jewish violence. 
3. The use of the myth in the raising of national cohesion and 
political and social mobilisation. 
4. The use of the myth in the discrediting of political opponents. 
Analysis of the myth is conducted in chronological order and 
concentrates on the following six distinct historical periods; 
1. the seventeenth century to the 1880s -a period of the origin of 
the myth. 
8Frank GoIczewski, 'Amfisernitic Literature in Poland before the First World War, ' 
Polin, Vol. 4,1989,88. Hereafter Golczewsid, 'Antisemitic. ' 
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2. the late pre-independence period, 1880s -1918 -a period of 
emergence of modem ethno-nationalist movements and parties, and of 
the myth in its fully-fledged form. 
3. the post-independence period, 1918-1939 -a period of 
intensified support for effinic nationalisation of the Polish nation-state; 
4. the Second World War, 1939-1945 - the period of German 
occupation of the Polish state - 
5. the early post-war Communist period, 1945-1949 -a period of 
consolidation of power by the Communist camp supported by the 
Soviet Union. 
6.1967- 1968 -a period of intensified fusion of Polish extreme 
ethno-nationalism and Communism. 
Although this thesis focuses mainly on the presence of the myth 
among effmo-nationalist elites of various kinds and intensities, some of 
the cited data and issues raised here support the inference that the 
myth has also been absorbed, over a long period of time, and to a 
varying degree, by a significant segment of non-elites. 
The presence of a myth of the Threatening Other in national 
communities cannot be categorised as a subject for the satisfaction of 
inteliectual curiosity only. Thus the point of this thesis is not to 
pretend to an ethical detachment about the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other in Poland, but to maintain at all times a critical 
stance towards the subject while being morally engaged with it. This 
thesis is written from the liberal position of recognition of the rights of 
an ethnic minority to the maintenance its ethno-cultural make-up and 
of recognition of such a minority as a integral part of the national 
community (in the civic sense). 9 
My intention in undertaking this study is to provide new and 
more adequate interpretations of the damaging impact of anti-Jewish 
themes on Polish ethno-national culture and on the Polish Jewish 
minority in the modem era and, by so doing, to contribute to a better 
understanding of the character and specificity of modem Polish 
antisemitism. of an exclusivist ethno-nationalist origin. I hope that the 
thesis will also contribute to the understanding of the damaging 
impact of the myth of the Internal Threatening Other on national 
90n the subject of communitarian rights in liberal thought, see Wiff Kymlicka, ed., 
The Rights of Nlinori! y Cultures (Oxford, 1995) and Will Kymlicka, Liberalism 
Comnýunily And Culture (Oxford, 1989). 
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communities and on inter-ethnic relations between a majority nation 
and its ethnic minority perceived as the Threatening Other. 
This thesis is not claiming to be a general history of Polish- 
Jewish relations and hardly touches on internal affairs of the Jewish 
community and its responses to the myth. It is not a study of the 
Catholic Church and the State per se, nor of changing class, social, and 
gender relations, nor of other ethnic minorities in Poland. 
Terminology and Approach 
At the heart of this research is the myth of the Threatening 
Other. As far as I am aware there has been no major investigation of 
this myth in a national context. In fact two important works on 
national mythologies, by George Schopflin and Anthony D. Smith 
respectively, do not treat this myth as one of the essential national 
myths a nation lives by. 10 This omission springs from the fact, that as 
I have already stated, the myth is important only for some nations 
(primarily those characterised by exclusivist ethno-nationalism ), while 
irrelevant to others - 
My understanding of the foRowing terms - the Internal 
Threatening Other, myth, and ethnic nationalism, is as follows: 
By the term Internal Threatening Other, I mean here a type of 
Other (ethnic/ national minority with a distinctive ethno-cultural 
make-up) whose qualities and activities are evaluated by the in-group 
(majority nation) in a predominantly negative way. The in-group 
perceives such an ethnic minority as its enemy, and evaluates it as a 
source of its misfortunes - past, present and future - and therefore aims 
to exclude it from its realm. The Internal Threatening Other is 
perceived as the polluter of the nation; in contrast to the External 
Threatening Other (neighbouring nations) perceived as an enemy 
threatening to 'wipe out' the nation. 11 The perception of an ethnic 
minority as a polluter is based on a -negative evaluation of a minority' s 
qualities - its language, religion, culture, ethnicity - and of its social and 
economic activities within society. The Internal Threatening Other is 
10See Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, 1986), 86-100. 
Hereafter Smith, The Ethnic. and George Schopflin, The Functions of Myth and a 
Taxonomy of Myths, 'in: Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds., Wths and 
Nationhood (London, 1997), 19-35. Hereafter Schopflin, 'The Functions. ' 
1 1This distinction was made by Anna Triandafylhdou, 'Nationalism and the 
Threatening Other. the Case of Greece, ' ASEN Bulletin, No. 13,1997,18-19. 
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perceived as a polluter of all aspects of national Iffe - pohtical, social, 
economic and cultural. 
Of course, in the case of the Jewish minority, the terms 
Threatening Other and polluter have already been applied in scholarly 
studies on the perception of this minority by different social agents in 
both pre-modem and modem societies. 12 Given the scope and 
longevity of such perceptions one can argue that the Jews represent a 
special case of a minority evaluated in such a prejudiced way in 
various historical and socio-political. contexts . 
13 
Looking at cases of the presence of the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other in modem societies, I recognise that such a 
perception is not only limited to nations shaped on the basis of ethnic 
nationalism with weak civic elements of self-image such as Poland, but 
also to nations based on civic nationalism with some ethnic elements in 
its self-image such as France. Nevertheless, the position taken in this 
thesis is that the longevity of such a myth, and its damaging impact on 
the ethnic minority and political culture of the dominant nation, is 
usually much stronger in nations of an ethnic type with strong 
exclusivist ethnic nationalist tendencies than on nations of civic type in 
which exclusivist ethnic nationalist tendencies are mitigated by civic 
nationalism. 
The term myth has several meanings and can be seen as having 
a variety of roles, functions and purposes. By the term myth I 
understand here a set of beliefs, constructed and held by collectivities - 
in this context a nation - which convey emotional conviction and are 
experienced as social truth by those who believe in them. And myth 
constitutes an important cultural force within a nation. 14 What 
120n the perception of the Jews as the Threatening Other and polluter in twelfth 
century Europe, see Roger 1. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Soci! Lly (Oxford, 
1994), 34-45. Hereafter Moore, The Formation.; On similar perceptions of the Jews in 
English popular culture of the early modern period, see Frank Felsenstein, 
Antisemitic Stereftpes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English 12opmlar culture. 
(London, 1995); On the perception of the Jews as the Threatening Other and polluter 
in twentieth century Europe see, the collection of articles, Robert. S. Wistrich, ed., 
Demonising the Other. Antisemitism, Racism, and Xenophobia (Jerusalem, 1999). 
131he scope of this research does not allow for comparisons with other ethnic 
minorities perceived as the Threatening Other, such as the Armenians or Roma 
group. In my opinion, such comparative analysis could be useful in terms of 
assessing similarities and differences in the perception of various ethnic minorities as 
the Threatening Other. 
140n myth and its social functions, see, for example, Schopflirt, "rhe Functions. ' 18 - 
19; and William G. Doty, Wthogral2by. The Study of L4 ths and Rituals (Alabama, 
1981), 11-25. Hereafter Doty, L4kythogjaphy. 
Y 
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matters in the myth is not historically validated truth but its emotional 
content which may be biased and prejudiced. "Yet, myth is also a way 
of delimiting the cognitive field. '1,5 If the message conveyed in a myth 
is primarily incongruent with reality, then such a myth can be 
damaging for the national community which subscribes to it. 16 Such 
damaging impact can also affect intellectual discourse conducted 
within such a community, as it is recognised that scholars and other 
social groups can be influenced by myths purporting to represent 
social truths in their societies. 17 1 shall argue that this is exactly so in 
the case of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other in Polish 
national discourse. 
In terms of its structure, the myth consists of a network of 
elements and themes usually expressed in narrative. The narrative can 
be expressed in more or less elaborated and intensified forms, and can 
undergo addition and expansion as well as deletion and 
substitution. 18 Its individual mythical elements may contradictor 
overlap each other but this does not affect the myth in terms of its 
persistence and emotive power. Its mythical themes and elements can 
also be interrelated with other myths. For example, I shall argue that 
the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other towards the Polish state 
and its people is closely interrelated with other more general Polish 
national myths such as the myth of the decline and suffering of the 
Polish nation. 
Next, the myth is characterised by adaptability to different 
historical and socio-political. contexts and by functional vitality. Its 
role is usually polyfunctional - the myth can act as storage and source 
of information (in this case information about the Jewish minority and 
its history), and as a means of offering explanation and interpretation 
of events taking place in a nation. Besides these functions, I shall argue 
that the myth of the Threatening Other can play a specific role in 
political culture such as providing rationalisation. and justification for 
the purification of a nation from a minority perceived as the 
Threatening Other, and for violence directed against such a minority 
by radical myth-makers. lt can also play an important role in raising 
national cohesion, in political and social mobilisation, and in 
15Schopflin, 'The Functions. ' 23. 
16ibid., 22. 
17See Baffows Dunham, Man against Myth (London, 1948), 23. 
18Doty, MythogrApb3L 12-13. 
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discrediting political opponents by labelling them as representing the 
interest of the Threatening Other. 
By the term and with reference to notions of nationalism I 
adhere to the Anglo-Saxon typology - rather than the continental 
typology that provides a much narrower definition of nationalism only 
as a right-wing ideology and movement. In particular I rely on 
definitions of nationalism put forward by Anthony D. Smith. 19 
Following his typology, I refer to ethno-nationalism as an ideology and 
movement according to which national membership lies in genealogy 
and in a common vernacular culture and history. This is in contrast to 
the principles of territorial civic nationalism where the main national 
criterion lies in a territory, in a common legal code, and in common 
public culture for all citizens. In the ethno-nationalist world-view, 
eflinicity equals nation and is seen as the main constituting element of 
the state. 
Vernacular cultures, notably language and customs, are more 
highly prized than legal equality, and popular mobilisation more than 
citizenship... in place of a civic, mass culture, ethnic nationalisms extol 
native history and a more circumscribed ethnic culture. ' 20 
Furthermore, the ethnic nationalism of a dominant nation 
frequently shows an exclusivist tendency towards other ethno-cultural 
groups, which dwell on the same territory. Such minorities are singled 
out and categorised as a threat to the very essence of the people and 
the polity. This is exactly how the Jewish minority has been perceived 
by Polish ethno-nationalists. In my opinion, the application of this 
typology can be helpful in clarifying the development and the broader 
impact of exclusivist ethnic nationalism on Polish political culture and 
the society as a whole. I-Estorical and social studies that apply the 
narrower definition of nationalism ignore the extent to which 
exclusivist ethnic nationalism with its strong anti-Jewish theme has 
influenced modem national discourse and inter-ethnic relations 
between Poles and Polish Jews. 21 
19See Anthony D. Smith, 'Ethnic Nationalism and the Plight of Minorities, ' Tournal of 
Refugee Studies, Vol. 7, No. 213,1994,187-189. Hereafter Smith, 'Ethnic. ' 
20ibid., 188. 
21Tbe prevaihng tendency in historical studies of the Polish nation, its nationalism 
and ethnic minorities, is the application of the narrower definition of nationalism. 
For a recent debate on the use of the continental and Anglo-Saxon definitions of 
nationalism in Polish scholarly discourse, see the special issue of Znak, No. 3,1997,4- 
94. 
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Historical and Sociological Reasons For The Emergence of the Threatening 
Other 
In clarifying my own perspective on the reasons for the 
emergence of the myth of the Threatening Other I have drawn on 
Leonard W. Doob's Patriotism And Nationalism. Their Psychological 
Foundations, and Aleksander Hertz's The Tews in Polish Culture, both 
published in 1964, and Hertz's earlier article 'Insiders Against 
Outsiders", published in 1934, and on other works with relevance to 
the internal consistency of my position. 99 
Doob's and Hertz"s conceptualisation of the Threatening Other 
are not only similar but in fact complementary. Both of them define 
the Other as a psychosocial category that is historically conditioned 
and manifested in different forms and intensity. They both also 
recognise that the notion of the Threatening Other can be a powerful 
driving force in modem society. The chief difference between the two 
scholars, besides their terminology is that Hertz's conceptualisation of 
the Threatening Other frequently refers to the history of nationalism 
and of ethnic minorities (particularly the Jewish minority in Eastern 
Europe), whereas Doob presents a more general picture. 
How does the Other become the Threatening Other - the enemy 
of the nation ? Both Doob and Hertz argue that the evaluation of the 
Other as the enemy may have absolutely no basis in reality but may be 
rooted in bias and prejudice. Furthermore, emotional conviction and 
(what is commonly understood) as non-rationality can play an 
important role in the evaluation of an out-group as enemy. Hertz also 
emphasises that the mythologisation of the Other as the enemy can 
continue regardless of the actual social position and the numerical size 
of the mythologised subject 23 A similar perspective is presented by 
the sociologist James Aho. In his study The TI-dn& of Darkness. A 
2y Aho also argues t an enemy is often one's Sociology of the Enem tha 
own construction and that such a construction once assembled and 
accepted as social truth can be difficult if not impossible to 
22AIeksander Hertz, The lews in Polish Culture (Evanston, IL, 1988) (First 
published in Polish in 1964). Hereafter Hertz, The Tews. and Aleksander Hertz, 
'Swoi przeciwko obcym, 'in: Jan Garewicz, ed., Aleksander Hertz S!? gjolggjA 
yb6r publkysjyki (Warszawa, 1992), 145-164. The article was niMrzedawniona. LAI 
first published in Wiedza i Zycie, No. 6,1934,458-469. Hereafter Hertz, 'Swoi. ' 
23Hertz, 'Swoi. ' 158-159. 
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deconstruct. 24 This perspective indicates that the perception of an out- 
group as the Threatening Other can be independent of its qualities and 
activities per se, but instead is dependent on the process of its 
evaluation by an in-group, which may be prejudiced and non-rational. 
This perspective, which I take up in this thesis, is in sharp 
opposition to the claim that the perception of an out-group as an 
enemy is rooted in its inherent qualities and activities, a claim that is 
frequently applied to the studies of middleman minorities - of which 
the Jewish minority is a good example. According to Walter Zenner, 
such a claim is itself rooted in the anti-middleman sentiments and 
stereotypes of its advocates. 25 
Such a daim is detectable in intellectual discourse in Poland on 
the social and economic role of the Jewish minority in Polish society 
throughout history, a discourse which basically claims that the 
presence of Jews has constituted a problem or impediment to the 
development of ethnic Poles. 26 In my opinion, this proposition 
cannot be seen as an objective means of evaluating the role of the 
Jewish minority within Polish society, particularly as this minority 
never had any irredentist tendencies towards the Polish polity. But 
rather it is an expression of prejudice and of the absorption of an 
ethno-nationalist perspective on economy and society which can be 
seen as an important factor shaping such a position. 
Why do nations need the Threatening Other ? 
This question has occupied many scholars since the early twentieth 
century. The sociologist William G. Sumner was probably the first to 
claim that hatred of the Other and cohesion of the in-group are 
correlative to each other. Sumner's proposition has been accepted and 
developed by many scholars up to the recent period. For example, 
Dusan Kecmanovic, in his recent study of ethno-nationalism, 
emphasises that the use of the Threatening Other as a means of raising 
national cohesion is particularly prominent in nations ridden by social 
antagonisms. 
'The fact is that the identification of the group enemy smoothes, 
buffers or completely neutralises; intra-group antagonisms. 
24ir 
James Aho, The Thing of Darkness. A Sociology of the 
Enemy (London, 1994), 3- 
15. 
25'See Walter P. Zenner, Minorities in the Middle. A Cross-Cultural Analysis (New 
York, 1991), 48-49. 
26See Irwin-Zarecka, Neutralising.. 175-186. 
15 
Discriminative aggressiveness against strangers and the strengthening 
of bonds among group members go hand in hand and mutually 
reinforce each other., 27 
Both Doob and Hertz are in agreement with Sumner's 
proposition that the Other provides an effective spur for in-group 
cohesion - Doob stresses that raising cohesiveness is especially 
important when the nation is going through social, political and 
economic crises. 28 During such periods, the Threatening Other serves 
as a scapegoat for all the ills inflicted on the nation. Doob also notes 
that in such situations, scapegoating not only increases national 
cohesion but makes the nation feel superior to the group perceived as 
the Threatening Other. 29 In times such as a war, occupation of the 
polity by a foreign state, or continuous economic and social crises, 
scapegoating is always on the rise. It makes the nation feel good about 
itself as the blame for experienced misfortunes is transferred onto the 
out-group which may not be in fact responsible for such a crisis at all. 
This pattern is dearly noticeable in the case of the scapegoating 
of Polish Jews for all varieties of crises experienced by the Polish state: 
i. e. the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century; the weak 
development of an ethnic Polish bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century; 
all social and economic problems of the inter-war period including the 
problem of labour for the largest social group, the peasants; the 
Communist take-over of power in the early post-war period; and the 
social and economic weaknesses of the Communist system, 
particularly strongly expressed by the ethno-nationahst Communist 
groups in 1968. 
Doob also links the perception of the Other as an enemy to the 
level of insecurities felt by the in-group. According to him, the more a 
nation feels insecure, inadequate and disappointed with its 
achievements, the more it tends to refer to the Threatening Other. He 
writes thus: 
'The threat posed by the out-group, consequently, may be 
psychological in nature and hence as dependent upon people's 
27Dusan Kecmanovic, The Mass P§ychology Of Ethno-nationalism (New York and 
London, 1996), 36. 
280n the subject of war and the raising of national cohesiveness in such situations, 
see, for example, Anthony D. Smith, 'Warfare in the formation, self-images and 
cohesion of ethnic communities, ' Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 4, No. 4,1981. 
Hereafter Smith, 'Warfare. ' 
29Doob, Patriotism. 249-253. 
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interpretation of a situation as upon reality itself . If they feel generally 
secure or if they are especially satisfied with their society, they are less 
likely to feel inclined to take vigorous action either to preserve or 
expand the power and culture of their nation; they may disregard even 
hostile out-groups. Under such conditions, their anxiety must first be 
aroused before they will acknowledge the threat and hence be stirred 
to nationalist activity., 30 
From Doob's explanation it is evident that the major factors 
behind perceiving a Threatening Other can be found in historical and 
socio-political conditions. A nation that experiences a political, social 
or economic crisis shows a greater tendency to refer to the Threatening 
Other than a nation that undergoes a stable development The sources 
of crisis are various. They may refer to major social and cultural 
changes within the nation. They may also refer to being in or 
remembering a state of war, partitions or occupation by a foreign state. 
Whatever the factors, the evaluation of a particular group as the 
Threatening Other can lack a realistic basis. 
National insecurities, social conflicts, and various crises are also 
key-elements in Aleksander Hertz's conceptualisation of the need for 
the Threatening Other whom he refers to as the ahen-enemy. To 
Hertz, like Doob, the presence of the phenomenon of the Threatening 
Other within a community is a sign of insecurities, and deep moral and 
social crisis. Thus he states: 
'An alien is an intruder among us. He encroaches on our 
life.. And if - as in the case to a remarkable degree in our civilisation - 
we ourselves are in a state of disharmony and disarray within the 
compass of the values we profess, the alien becomes all the more 
threatening and disturbing. If an environment that is coherent and 
stable rejects the alien, it never treats him as hysterically as an 
environment that is inwardly disturbed and uncertain of its values. It 
was not a matter of chance that our era has been marked by the most 
dramatic and fanatic manifestations of hatred towards aliens. This is 
an era of terrible socialand cultural sickness. The growth of 
antisemitism and the forms that it took in many European countries 
were symptoms of the profound illness of entire communities., 31 
30ibid., 254. 
3lHertz, The lews. 53, 
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In this thesis, I shall also suggest that the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other 'speaks more' about the crisis in Polish ethno- 
national political culture and about the insecurities of Polish ethno- 
nationalism than about the Polish-Jewish ethnic minority. 
In The lews in Polish Culture, Hertz states another reason why 
some ethnic minorities can be evaluated as the alien-enemy. 
According to him, such an evaluation can be related to the fact that the 
out-group (ethnic/ national minority) may be viewed as carrier and 
representative of new values that are feared by the in-group (majority 
nation) wl-dch is uncertain of their own system of values. 
'Human communities in a state of deep inner conflict, uncertain 
of their own values and disturbed by their own weakness, regarded 
with all the greater alarm those who might introduce new values 
threatening the old. Whether those aliens really bore some new and 
different values was given no thought. Alien-enemies, bearers of 
corruption, were, seen everywhere., 32 
The explanation for such anxiety can be found in Mary 
Douglas's classic work Purijy and Danger in which she shows that the 
concept of polluter is attributed to social groups whose functions 
within society give them much greater importance than is reflected in 
their status and influence. 33 This is a position which could also be 
applicable to the Jewish minority as the agent of modernisation in 
societies in which segments of the in-group show little aptitude for 
such a change - such as in the nineteenth century Polish society. 
I shall argue here that the notion of pollution has been an 
important feature of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other 
towards the Polish state and its people throughout its development, 
since the Jew has been persistently perceived as the carrier of new 
ideas, values and doctrines - categorised by Polish ethno-nationalists of 
various kinds as alien and threatening to Polish national traditions. 
Hertz also points out that in some circumstances, the more the 
Other absorbs the cultural values of the in-group the more it is 
perceived as the Threatening Other. He gives a couple of general 
illustrations of such a phenomenon, Blacks in the Southern states of the 
32ibid., 53. 
33Mary Douglas, Pmpft and Danger (London, 1966), especially, 140-158. This theory 
has been applied by the historian Roger 1. Moore in his analysis of the perceptions of 
Jews in medieval Europe, Moore, The Formation. 100-102. 
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USA, and Jews in post-eighteenth century continental Europe. He 
states: 
"In the American South hostility toward Blacks increased during 
the period when Blacks were becoming increasingly like whites and 
had fully accepted white values and aspirations. The more American a 
Black became, the more alien and hostile he was felt to be by white 
Southerners. The same, and to no less a degree, can be said of Jews. 
Anti-Semitism assumed its most acute forms when the assimilation of 
Jews to non-Jews, speaking objectively, had become an unquestionable 
fact., 34 
This proposition, of course cannot be viewed as applicable to all 
members of an ethnic minority, as in general the majority of them 
wish to maintain their moral-cultural codes. Nevertheless, I shall 
argue that this proposition is feasible in the case of the culturally 
assimilated Polish Jews with strong or even total self-identification as 
Poles, as they too were perceived by ethno-nationalists as polluters of 
Polish culture and of the Polish moral code. 
Exclusivist Ethno-Nationalism and the Threatening Other 
In the previously mentioned article "Insiders Against 
Outsiders, 'Hertz provides a good insight into the historical context 
within which the notion of the Threatening Other had begun to 
flourish in modem national discourse. He links this category to the 
new type of nationalism that had originated in Europe in the 1870s. 35 
According to Hertz, the category of the Threatening Other had never 
before been used with the same degree of emotional intensity and 
conviction as by the ethno-nationalists in the 1870s. From this period, 
both the discourse and the vocabulary of nationalism were to be 
influenced by the Threatening Other, and the mythologisation of the 
Threatening Other was to become an element of nationalist doctrine 
and practice. 36 Slogans of 'national egoism' and 'national wilY, 
intertwined with catch-phrases about threatening aliens, were 
continuously disseminated by the ethno-national press all over the 
34Hertz, The Tews. 144. 
3,50n the development of late nineteenth century nationalism also described as 
ethno-linguistic or integral nationalism, see, for example, Anthony D. Smith, Theories 
of Nationalism (Oxford, 1982), chapter 5; and Eric J. Hobsbawn, N-ations and 
Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge, 1994), 101-162. 
36Hertz, 'Swoi. ' 159. 
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continent and particularly in East-Central and Eastern Europe where 
this type of nationalism was to exert a strong and long-lasting grip 
over national politics and culture. 37 
Hertz also points out that this trend was not limited only to 
politics but was also to be found in the intellectual discourse of the late 
nineteenth century, since social sciences, for example, encouraged this 
type of thinking about the Other. He gives two examples of such 
sociological theories - Ludwik Gurnplowiczs and Ratzenhofer's 
theories of inter-group relation&38 According to Hertz, Gumplowiczs 
theory asserted that antagonism between an in-group and an out- 
group was a result of real biological and cultural differences and that 
therefore a member of an out-group could not obtain membership of 
an in-group. Ratzenhofer's theory asserted that antagonism against an 
out-group provided an objective basis for shaping the cohesion of an 
in-group, and therefore that hatred towards out-groups should be 
perceived as a positive aspect in facilitating in-group solidarity. Both 
works had provided a rationale for the newly established nationalist 
movements in East-Central Europe, and their influence was to have a 
long lasting effect on the understanding of the character of nationalism 
and national identity in the region. 
Hertz's argument about the importance of the polarisation 
between 'us' and "them' in ethno-national discourse is persuasive. 
Looking at the political and social writings that have been emerging in 
Poland since the 1880s there is no doubt that polarisation between us 
(ethnic Poles) and them (Jews) has been the most central theme in the 
ethno-nationalist vision of the modem Polish nation-to-be. One can in 
fact argue that this dichotomy has constituted the back-bone of the 
myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other and has provided a powerful 
explanation as to why Polish Jews as a collectivity were never in 
practice accepted into the realm of the Polish nation. 
Exclusion of the Jewish ethnic minority from the Polish state by 
ettmo-nationalists - and particularly the role of the myth in this process 
of exclusion - constitutes the central issue of this thesis. In discussing 
the broader socio-historical problem of exclusion of eflu-dc minorities, I 
have been aided mainly by two works, Rogers Brubakers's article 
37See Ehe Kedourie, Nationalism JOxford U-K, and Cambridge, USA, 1993), 100-102. 
Hereafter Kedourie, Nationalism. 
38Hertz, 'Swoi. ' 156-159. 
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entitled 'Nationalising states in the old "New Europe' - and the new' 
and Anthony D. SmiWs previously mentioned artide'Edu-dc 
Nationalism and the Plight of Nfinorities'. 
In the article 'Ethnic Nationalism and the Plight of Minorities, ' 
Smith states that the tendency towards exclusion and homogenisation 
is by no means a product of ethnic nationalism alone. However, as he 
argues, when exclusivist and homogenising attitudes mingle with 
ethno-nationalism, the repercussions for ethnic minorities singled out 
and categorised as the Threatening Other can be most severe. Such 
repercussions are brought about by two mechanisms of authentication 
and purification of a nation. As a result, the exdusivist ethno- 
nationalism of a majority nation tends to show a low tolerance of 
internal diversity. This feature is noticeable at different stages of the 
development of exclusivist ethno-nationahsm, including both the pre- 
independence and post-independence phases. 39 
At the pre-independence stage the immediate actual 
Threatening Others are usually neighbouring national communities, 
yet other ethno-cultural groups living within the nation can also be 
perceived as the Threatening Other in a variety of ways in conjunction 
with the external Threatening Other, e. g. the Jewish minority perceived 
as the agent of 'Germanisation' by Czech ethno-nationalists at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and the Jewish minority perceived 
as the agent of both 'Gennanisatioe and "Russificationý by Polish 
ethno-nationalists of the same period. 40 
In the post-independence phase, exclusivist tendencies towards 
ethnic minorities expand, as ethno-nationalists embark on a new and 
grand-scale project of purification, described by Brubaker as the ethnic 
nationalisation of the state. 41 Ethnic nationalisation includes areas of 
politics, the economy and culture, and can vary greatly from one state 
to another depending on the position of the ethno-nationahsts within 
the state and the spread of the doctrine among the populace. 
However, from Brubaker's description, it is dear that there is one main 
conviction behind all forms of ethnic nationalisation - the view that the 
39Rogers Brubaker, 'Nationalising states in the old 'New Europe' - and the new, ' 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2,1996,415. Hereafter Brubaker, 
'Nationabsing. ' 
4()The issue of the perception of Jews as agents of Germanisation by Czech ethno- 
nationalists has been pointed out by Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe. Enemies, 
Neighbours -Friends. (New York, Oxford, 1996), 147. 41 Brubaker, 'Nationalising. '414. 
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nation has experienced unfair treatment and been weakened by other 
ethno-national groups in the past. 42 As a rule, the claim of 
mistreatment refers to the entire socio-economic and cultural 
development of the nation. Therefore, to compensate for these wrongs, 
ethno-nationalists have the right to exclude any minorities that have in 
their judgement contaminated the nation, and that as bearers of non- 
national values might presently divide the nation-state and weaken its 
national essence once again. In other words, ethno-nationalists as 
guardians of the nation have a duty to purify it from all alien elements 
perceived as threatening. 
Brubaker also points out that ethnic nationalisation of the post- 
independent stage has a much more diffuse character than that of the 
pre-independent phase. Thus he states: 
'Consequently, it is harder to pinpoint what is specifically 
'nationalist' about politics in such states. In such settings, nationalism 
becomes an 'aspect! of politics, embracing both formal policies and 
informal practices and existing both wid-dn and outside the state., 43 
The processes of purification usually begin with culture. 44 
Vernacular language, national history and literature are those areas 
that have to be thoroughly cleansed from alien elements by ethno- 
nationalists. Yet the purification process in ethnic nations does not 
Emit itself only to culture - but also includes the population itself. In 
turn, this 'cleansing' of the people entails two different but inter-li nked 
strategies: the first focusing on the in-group - majority nation itself 
since the ethno-nationalists are never satisfied with the state of 
national morale among the core ethnic nation, and the second 
concentrating on the out-groups - ethnic minorities perceived as the 
Tbreatening Other. 
The purification of the nation from a minority can take the 
following forms: the first and mildest is assimilation which aims at the 
establishment of a homogenous society in which members of the 
minority abandon their traditions, culture and use of their language in 
favour of the traditions, culture and language of the dominant natiom 
The second is separation, aimed at keeping the minority separate and 
in a position of inferiority. The third and fourth forms are pressured 
42ibid., 414 
43ibid., 416. 
44See Smith, 'Ethnic. ' 191-192. 
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emigration and the expulsion of minorities (recently named 'ethnic 
cleansing'), both of which aim at disposing of a minority by expelling 
them from the polity; and the final form is genocide aimed at the 
physical elimination of the minority. 45 The latter is generally 
confined only to those cases where ethnic nationalism is strongly 
intertwined with biological racism and produces policies of 
dehumanisation of the ethnic minority, as in the case of German 
nationalism and the Jewish minority during the Second World War. 46 
In general, most cases of national self-purification from 
minorities are confined to the first four projects. I shall also argue that 
the choice of the form of purification of a nation of its minority 
depends on the kind of the evaluation of the ethnic minority as the 
Threatening Other. A minority evaluated as mildly Threatening Other 
(benign) would be considered a fit subject for assimilation, while a 
minority evaluated as a foremost Threatening Other (malign) would be 
considered a fit subject for separation, emigration and ethnic cleansing 
or even genocide. 
One should bear in mind that the exclusion of the Jews from the 
realm of the modern Polish nation is a complex and difficult issue, and 
particularly as it was achieved, not so much by Polish ethno- 
nationalists, but to an infinitely greater degree by the German 
occupiers within the borders of the Polish state during the Second 
World War. Up until the outbreak of the Second World War, Polish 
ethno-nationalists, despite enjoying a high level of support within the 
populace for their project of Jewish mass emigration from Poland, did 
not succeed in implementing the exclusion of the Jews from Poland by 
emigration. Furthermore, the form of purification used by the 
Germans towards Polish Jews, as well as towards other European 
Jewish communities, was that of genocide, a strategy never 
450f course, within the tradition of thought which originated within late eighteenth 
century discourse, assimilation is viewed as a means of inclusion of a minority into 
the nation. This position is rejected in this thesis since assimilation generally leads to 
the disappearance of an ethnic minority. In contemporary literature on ethnic 
minorities it is agreed that the most acceptable forms of inclusion of an ethnic 
minority within a nation are by policies of pluralism and integration, both aiming at 
the unity of various groups within a society, while allowing the ethnic minorities to 
maintain their characteristics. See Ivan Gyurcsik, 'New Legal Ramifications of the 
Question of National Nfinorities, ' in: Cuthberston and Leibowitz, eds, Minorities. 1- 
49. 
46Smith., 'Ethnic. ' 195. 
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contemplated by the Polish ethno-nationalist camp - with the exception 
of an insignificant political groups in the inter-war period. 
Overall, emigration had been the chief form for excluding the 
Jewish ethnic minority from the realm of the Polish polity, advocated 
in different historical periods by ethno-nationalists of various kinds 
and intensity, including Communist ethno-nationalists. This latter 
group, which was to hold political power in the 1960s, succeeded in the 
implementation of the policy of emigration of the remaining Polish 
Jews. 
In this thesis, I shall argue that the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other provided the rationale for the project of the 
emigration of Jews from the Polish polity in all the periods under 
examination. Separation of the Jewish minority from the ethnic Polish 
community was also advocated within the ethno-nationalist camp 
from the late 1880s up until 1939, but it was not as popular as the 
emigration project. It was also treated as a measure for the separation 
of the ethnic Polish community from the Jewish minority and 
therefore, preserving the authenticity and purity of Polish morale and 
culture. The myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other provided a 
rationale for this project also. 
Polish National Discourse and the Threatening Other 
Poland is a good example of a society in which the division 
between 'ourselves' (szvoi) and 'the Other' (obcy) has been an important 
feature of collective memory and identification up to the recent period. 
This fact has generally been acknowledged by scholars of various 
disciplines, including historians, sociologists and specialists in Polish 
literature. For example, Stefan Traugutt, a well-known literary critic of 
the 1980s notes that attitudes towards the Others constituted an 
important element of the development of Polish collective identity. 47 
The first major sociological studies concerning the division 
between 'us' and 'therný in Polish society were conducted in the inter- 
war period. Studies by authors such as Jan Stanislaw Bystron, 
Aleksander Hertz and Stanislaw Ossowski revealed the importance of 
the division between "us' and 'them' with reference to Polish national 
identity, and gave voice to their criticism of the creation of distinct 
47Stefan Traugutt, ' Posibwie do Swojskos'ci i Cudzoziemszczyzny, ' in: Maria 
Prussak ed., Geniusz Mdziedziczony. Studia Romanlyczne i Navoleoiiskie 
(Warszawa, 1990), 428. 
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borders between'us' and'thern' in multi-national societies, and of the 
use of the Other (evaluated as a Threatening Other) in political culture 
for the purpose of increasing national cohesion. 48 
Studies conducted in post-1945 Poland have shown that the 
categories of 'us' and 'them' have continued to be relevant to national 
identification and collective memory, although Polish society post-1945 
has become a nearly homogenous national community in which ethnic 
minorities constitute only an insignificant number. 49 
Sociological works of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s have 
revealed a particular and continuous pattern in national self- 
identification and attitudes towards Others, and one which is 
characteristic of a significant cross-section of Polish society. The main 
aspects of this pattern are as follows: 
1. Modem Polish national identity is modelled on the matrix of 
ethno-nationalism in which the notions of legal equality and 
citizenship are by definition of little importance. Thus to be a Pole 
means to have genealogical ethnic Polish roots, to speak the Polish 
language, to follow Polish tradition and culture as defined in an ethnic 
sense, and to be of Catholic denomination. 50 
2. Cathohdsm has long been an important feature of Polish 
national identity, and manifests itself in what can be described as a 
peculiar form. According to the sociologist Ewa Nowicka, Polish 
Catholicism takes on the form of a national religion in which the 
national set of values is of greater importance than the universal 
Catholic set of values, and where the 'Catholic Go& is viewed as an 
'effinic Polish God., 51 TIds can be seen as rooted in two myths - the 
seventeenth century myth of antemurale - Poland as the rampart of 
48For a summary of works by Jan Stanislaw BystroA and Stanislaw Ossowski, see 
Ewa Nowicka, 'Wprowadzenie. Inny Jako Obcy/ in Ewa Nowicka, ed., Religia a 
I obcosc' (Krakow, 1991), 19-20. Hereafter Nowicka, 'Wprowadzenie. ' 
49See, for example, two works by the historian TadeusvLepkowski, LJVarte trwanie 
12olskos'ci (Warszawa, 1989), 67-68. HereaftevEepkowski, U12arte. and 'Historyczne 
Kryteria Polskosci, ' in Antonina Moskowska, ed., Oblicza Polsko9ci (Warszawa, 
g1szosclowa I 1990), 88-99; Zdzislaw Mach and Andrzej K. Paluch, eds., SyNagja mni *ý' 
toýsamoS'C' (Krak6w, 1,992), 11 -18; and the sociological study by Ewa Nowicka, 
'Narodowe samookreslenie Polak6w, ' in Ewa Nowicka, ed., Swoi i g-bQý 
(Warszawa, 1990), 55-100. 
5()Tadeusz, Lepkowski, My; li o historii Polski i Polakow (Warszawa, 1983), 35-39. 
ys Hereafter, tepkowski, M W. 
-51Ewa Nowicka, Polak-Katolik. 0 Zwiazkach Polskosci z Katolicyzmem w 
Spo&ecznej 9wiadomosci Polakow, ' in Nowicka, ed., Religia. 117-123. Hereafter 
Nowicka, 'Polak. ' 122. 
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Christian Europe, and the romantic myth of the choseness of Poland as 
'Christ's natioW - long-lived myths in the Polish collective mind. 52 
The strong connection between Catholic and ethno-national 
identity, rather than adherence to a universal Catholic set of values, 
has also been pointed out in the study entitled Religiousness of the 
Polish People 1991, edited by Lucjan Adamczuk and Reverend Witold 
Zdaniewicz. 53 The result of such a peculiar fusion of Catholicism and 
ethno-nationalism is that firstly, there is a noticeable difficulty within 
segments of Polish society in perceiving a person of any denomination 
other than Catholic as a Pole. 54 Secondly, that such a phenomenon 
has also a negative effect on the sense of belonging to the Polish nation 
by persons of denominations other than Catholic, who together 
constitute approximately four per cent of the entire population. For 
example, in a study of the Protestant religious minority whose largest 
concentration is in the capital, Warsaw, Ewa Nowicka and Magdalena 
Majewska conclude that the Warsaw Lutherans see themselves as a 
collectivity as citizens of a lesser category than Catholic Poles, and feel 
social disapproval as far as the national context is concerned. 55 
3. Ethno-cultural homogeneity is generally evaluated as a 
positive feature within Polish contemporary society. 56 Furthermore, 
society as a collectivity is characterised by what sociologists describe as 
"low internal tolerance' towards national minorities living within the 
Polish polity, and a higher 'external tolerance' towards foreign 
visitors. 57 As a result, according to the Report on the Situation of 
Persons Belonging to National and Edmic Minorities in Poland 
conducted in 1994, among the main obstacles to the improvement of 
520n the importance of the myth of Poland as Rampart in Polish collective mind, see 
Janusz Tazbir, Poland as the Rg=art! 2f Christian Euro e. -M 12 Xjhs and 
Historical 
Reali! y (Warsaw, 1983). On the romantic myth of ebosennes of Poland as Christ's 
nation, see, for example, Andrzej Walicki, 'The Three Traditions in Polish Patriotism, ' 
in: Stanislaw Gomulka and Antony Polonsky, eds., Polish Paradoxes (London and 
New York, 1990) 28-29. Hereafter Walicki, 'Three, ' and hereafter Gomulka and 
Polonsky, eds., Polish. 
53Lucjan Adamczuk and Witold Zdaniewicz; eds., Religiousness of the Polish People 
1991 (Warszawa, 1993), 49. 
*ee, Nowicka, Religia. 
55Ewa Nowicka, Magdalena Majewska, Obgy u Siebie. Luteranie Warszawscy 
(Warszawa, 1983), 151. 
'-%See Treneusz Krzeminski's introduction to Treneusz Krzeminski, ed., Czy Polacy sa 
aniysemitami ? ftniki badania sondaýowegO (Warszawa, 1996), 23. Hereafter 
Krzeminský ed., Q-, y Polagy. 
57Nowicka, 'Wprowadzenie. '23-25. 
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the position of minorities in Poland were 'increasingly nationalist 
behaviour and attitudes, and excessively lenient treatment of the 
perpetrators [of various anti-minorities actions] on the part of Polish 
society and governmental bodies' and 'intolerance of 'others. 59 
4. Among the many Others evaluated as the Threatening Other, 
the Jew stands out as the foremost Threatening Other in the national 
context. As I have previously mentioned, the Jews feature strongly in 
the Polish collective memory and their evaluation within the national 
context past and present among various segments of the society has 
been primarily negative. This holds even for those segments that 
cannot be categorised as subscribing to the tradition of the core ethno- 
nationalist political parties - parties which existed in the pre-1939 
period and which were officially revived in the post-1989 period. In 
the second chapter, I shall describe the strongest anct most recent 
evaluation of the Jews as the Threatening Other and discuss the 
reasons for the evaluation of the Jewish minority as the foremost 
Threatening Other. 
The subject of the Other and the division between 'us" and 
'themý in the Polish national context is one of the most challenging and 
least popular issues within public discourse. This fact has been 
indicated by the discussion of such issues by some authors, reflected 
even in the titles of their works, for example, Stefan Amsterdarnski and 
Tadeusz Kowalik, The SuW Jects We Do Not Like to Think About, 
Ngaýmel , About Some Dilemmas of National E[inc . 2§ 
(0 czym myýleC 
nie lubimy czy1i o niektbrych dylematach zasady narodozvej), and Jan 
Stanislaw Bystron, 'National Megalomania' (Megalonwnia Narodowa) in 
a volume entitled, The LuAbects I Was Discouraged to Write About 
(Tematy Wre mi odradzano). 60 
The subject of the Jew as the foremost Threatening Other in the 
national context is perhaps the least popular and most challenging of 
all such issues. Although there has been a revival of interest in Polish 
Jews and their history in the 1980s and early 1990s in Poland, judging 
by the number of publications and public debates, some topics related 
59See Grzegosz Janusz, Rel2grt on the Situation of Persons Belon&g to National and 
Ethnic Minorities in Poland (Warszawa, 1994), 17. (This report was sponsored by the 
Phare Program-me of the European Communities and Open Society Institute) 
60See Stefan Amsterdamski and Tadeusz Kowalik, 0 garn My; leý nie lubimy guh o 
niekt6j: ých dylematach zasady narodowe* (Warszawa, 1980), 11-18; and fan 
Stanislaw Bystron, 'Megalomania Narodowa' in: Temagy kt6re mi odradzano 
(Warszawa, 1980). 
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to Polish attitudes towards the Jewish minority have been omitted or 
presented in a distorted version that contains elements of the 
perception of the Jew as the TI-treatening Other. Such a situation is not 
limited only to general public discourse but is also present in 
intellectual discourse. 
With the exception of works which explicitly recycle anti-Jewish 
themes, the manner in which the perception of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other is manifested in mainstream intellectual discussion 
is in a moderate form, and limited to the evoking of the subtle premise 
that it is the Jews - as an unassimilated ethno-cultural collectivity - that 
has constituted the 'problem' within Polish society, and that there has 
always been an incompatibility between Polish and Jewish interests. 
The sodologist Iwona Irwin-Zarecka was perhaps the first to 
discuss this phenomenon in detail and to point out its intricacies and 
prejudiced character in her earlier cited work on perceptions and 
memory of Jews in contemporary Poland, entitled Neutralising 
Memory. The Tew in ConteMRorgýa Poland, where she notes that the 
concept of the Jews as a problem: 
'has erýoyed wide currency over the last years, its grip on the 
structure of discourse about things Jewish in Poland extends beyond 
the realm of the generally expected ... the notion that Jews constitute a 
problem by their very presence is one of the core premises of any 
analysis of the 'Jewish question, " past and present. ' 60 
The prominence and extent of this phenomenon lies in the fact 
that this notion is also expressed by individuals and groups who 
engage in condemning antisemitism. and who support the so-called 
'pro-jewish' position. According to the sociologist Marcin Kula, the so- 
called 'philosemitic voices' represent positions, which cannot be 
accepted as neutral in any critical inquiry into attitudes towards the 
Jews within Polish society. 61 Furthermore, he also notes that among 
these voices there is a wide-spread 'silent assumption' that Jews, even 
those Jews most assimilated into Polish culture, not only fail to be the 
same as ethnic Poles, but constitute a lesser category of citizenship. 
This, as I shall argue, can be seen as a reflection of strong 
homogenising tendencies and low tolerance of internal diversity in 
society, tendencies which have an affect on all minorities. Moreover, it 
6OIrwin-Zarecka, Neutralising. 165. 
61Kula, 'Problem, ' 27. 
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can also be viewed as a symptom of a lack of acceptance of the 
principles of pluralism and integration in relation to the position of 
minorities within society. In the next chapter, I shall demonstrate that 
these tendencies are not new, but were already present within the 
liberal elites at the end of the nineteenth century. 
This phenomenon is most dearly noticeable in historical works, 
which as Irwin- Zarecka correctly notes, is particularly troubling, since 
historians play an important role in forging public opinion in Poland. 
In my own research, I have come across historical works conveying the 
notion of the Jew 'as a problem' in a variety of ways, including those 
studies condemning the violent and aggressive type of antisemitism 
represented by the core ethno-nationahst political movements of the 
inter-war period. 62 Furthermore, some historical works also present 
the more elaborated themes of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening 
Other as perfectly objective facts, a point also noted by hwin-Zarecka: 
'What is troubling is not their presence [images of 'Jewish 
crimes'] in the writings of the nationalistic Right, but their prominent 
position within what appear as perfectly objective historical studies., 63 
Another important issue concerning the presentation in 
historical studies of negative evaluations of Jews in Polish society is the 
omission of those topics seen as throwing a bad light on Polish society, 
a fact noted by the Polish historian ferzy Tomaszewski, one of the main 
contemporary experts on the history of Jewish and other minorities in 
Poland. In his article 'Polish Society Through Jewish Eyes, he 
discusses the way some historians deal with the negative side of 
relations with Polish Jews of the inter-war period. Tomaszewski notes: 
'One does come across cases of Polish authors trying to deny 
facts, but one is more likely to come across Polish historians not 
mentioning certain facts, presenting them imprecisely or treating them 
as marginal, even if they have won notoriety throughout the world. 
This type of attitudes causes indignation among many Jewish 
journalists and only strengthens stereotypes unfavourable to our 
country., 64 
62A good example of such is Roman Wapi'ski's, Polska i mate ojgzyzLi! Y Polakow 
(Wroetaw, Warszawa, 1994), 152-192. Hereafter Wapm'sýi, Polsisa.. - and Olaf 
Bergmann, Narodowa Demokraýja Wobec 12roblema! yki Zydowskiej w latach 1918- 
1929 (Poznan, 1998). 
63hwin-Zarecka, Neutralising. 172. 
64jerzy Tomaszewski, 'Polish Society Through Jewish Eyes, ' in: Andrzej K Paluch, 
ed., The Tews in Poland Vol. 1, (Cracow, 1992), 417. Hereafter Paluch, The lews. 
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In his review of a collection of documents concerning the 
history of the Jewish minority in the post-1945 period, Tomaszewski 
also conveys the same criticism: 
'I arn constantly surprised to read opinions of serious people 
who suggest that there had in fact been no antisemitism in Polish 
society after World War 11, or that it turned out to be only a transient 
phenomenon, provoked, what is more, by external forces. '65 
The final point which must now be raised is that the lack of 
scholarly objectivity in reference to important anti-Jewish themes is 
linked with the normative and axiomatic stance of the defence of 
national honour, as pointed out by the well-known historian Jerzy 
JedhcId: 
'The Polish intelligentsia, historians included, for years seems to 
have been incapable of dealing with the problem of mass antisemitism 
in Poland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I hardly have in 
mind its inheritors - they are not interesting. I mean those who despise 
antisemitism, who witnessed its outbursts with anguish and tried to 
fight it whenever they could. Even so, many of them are inclined to 
believe and argue that antisemitism. in Poland was merely a product of 
extreme chauvinist demagogy or mob prejudice which never 
penetrated the healthy core of the nation. All evidence to the contrary 
is so easily passed over in silence, and, sometimes even worse, it is 
expurgated from published documents. Why is this done by those 
who bear no guilt ? ... We do this because we are especially sensitive on 
this point which painfully offends our moral consciousness ... Our 
permanent dodge, avoiding the subject or misrepresenting it with 
phrases, the inability to investigate the truth objectively and present it 
as it is, seems not so much a political operation as a defence reaction 
which over the years has become established as a response to the 
generalised accusing stereotype. For it seems to be a general law that 
an honest and unrelenting evaluation of ones past is most difficult to 
make when it is the object of accusations from outside., 66 
This explanation reveals that adherence to national values and 
traditions - even those far removed from subscribing to the tradition of 
65jerzy Tomaszewski, 'The History of Jews in Poland 1944-1968, ' Midrasz (The best 
of Midrasz), 1998,47. Hereafter Tomaszewski, The History. ' 
66jerzy jedhcki, 'Heritage and Collective Responsibility, ' in: Ian Maclean, Alan 
Montefiore and Peter Winch eds., The Political Resl2onsibft of Intellectuals 
(Cambridge, 1990), 57-58. 
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the core exdusivist ethno-nationalist political movements - is an 
important obstacle to any critical scholarly investigation of the 
negative perception and treatment of the Jewish minority in Poland. 
This suggests an inability on the part of the historical profession to be 
objective and dispassionate as far as the subject of negative attitudes 
and perceptions towards the Jewish minority is concerned in the Polish 
national context. 
The most troubling part of this perspective is the notion that any 
position that challenges the accepted point of view is seen as an 
outsider's attack on national values and traditions, and is in fact made 
the justification for taking up such a defensive position in the first 
place. 67 This also implies that anyone who presents a critical 
evaluation of the negative side of Polish relations with the Jewish 
community is himself / herself to blame for such attitudes, a highly 
disturbing notion indeed, and one leading to the accusation of being 
anti-Polish. In chapter four, where I discuss in more detail the 
presentation in post-war Polish historiography of anti-Jewish attitudes 
during the Holocaust, I show that it is not only outsiders but also Poles 
such as Professor Jan Blonski accused of anti-polonism, when they 
present critical approach to this subject. 
In short, one can see that a community whose national identity 
has been shaped on the matrix of ethno-nationalism may have great 
difficulty in exercising tolerance towards Others (the Internal Others) 
and in the acceptance of the Others" moral-cultural codes. 
Furthermore, such a community (both elites and non-elites) may be 
prone to a negative evaluation of the Others as the Threatening Other. 
This has been the case in Poland where the Jewish minority has been 
evaluated as the foremost Threatening Other in contrast to and above 
all other minorities. The way in which the perception of the Jew as the 
Other developed into the myth of the Threatening Other, (used in a 
more or less elaborated form), and the damaging results of this myth 
on the Jewish minority and the Polish ethnic nation, will be discussed 
in the following chapters. 
670n the issue of national honour and society's lack of capacity for critical self- 
examination in various national communities including Poland, see Twona Irwin- 
Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance (New Brunswick and London, 1994), 8-82. 
Hereafter, Irwin-Zarecka, Frames. 
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Sources and Structure of the Thesis 
In my choice of primary sources for the analysis I have included 
samples of the ethno-nationalist press (particularly its core segment), 
its political programmes and writings, as well as various state 
documents and political and social writings and interviews that 
illuminate the scope of exclusivist ethno-nationalist thinking about the 
Jewish minority, among various elites (and non-elites) from the 1880s 
up to the year of 1968. 
Given the fact that I have aimed at providing a "global picture' 
of the longevity and impact of the perception of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other on modem Polish political culture throughout 
different historical periods, I have relied on the findings of recent 
scholarly research with reference to particular issues discussed in the 
thesis. 
In cited Polish titles I have preserved the original orthography. 
All Polish words in the main text are written in Italic style. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters that analyse the myth of 
the Jew as the Tbreatening Other and its functions over five distinct 
historical periods. 
This first and introductory chapter explored the theoretical 
issues which underlie the socio-historical analysis of this study - such 
as the importance of the Threatening Other in the ideology of 
exclusivist ethno-nationalism, the historical and psychosocial reasons 
for the emergence of the Threatening Other, and the concept of 
purification of the nation from the Threatening Other. It also 
introduced the problem of the Threatening Other in Polish national 
culture. 
The second diapter explores the roots of the myth going back to 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its nascent forms prior to the 
1880s, and its development into a fully-fledged form in the late pre - 
independence period of the 1880s to 1914 and the post-independence 
period 1918 to 1939. It discusses the polyfunctionality of the myth, 
particularly focusing on the inter-war period when a variety of uses of 
the myth are dearly detectable. 
The third chapter examines the role of the myth in the 
rationalisation and justification of anti-Jewish violence of the inter-war 
period and looks at the serious damaging effect of such violence on 
inter-ethnic relations between the two communities. 
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The fourth chapter explores the presence of the myth in Nazi 
occupied Poland during the Second World War and this in fact is a 
central chapter of the thesis since it investigates the continuity of the 
myth in a radically different set of socio-political contexts where the 
minority perceived as the Threatening Other is actually being 
eliminated by an external social agent - the German occupier. Here 
attention is focused on two aspects - the presence of the myth among 
underground Polish elites and non-elites, and the impact of this myth 
on the witnessing by Poles of the extermination of Polish Jews by the 
Germans. 
The fifth chapter analyses the presence of the myth among the 
anti-Communist pohtical elites, the emergence of the myth within the 
Communist political movement, and the role of the myth in anti- 
Jewish violence during the early post-war Communist period. 
The sixth and final chapter explores the presence of the myth 
and its particular version and uses by the so-called ethno-nationalist 
Communist elites between 1967 and 1968. In terms of the impact of the 
myth on the Polish-Jewish minority, this chapter looks at 1968 as the 
final realisation, of the ethno-nationalists" main objective of excluding 
the Jewish minority from the realm of the Polish nation-state. 
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Chapter 11. 
The Myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other from its Origin up to 
1939. 
'There is a very little knowledge of Jews and Jewish matters In Poland 
today. In this respect the Polish soul and mentality is full of prejudice and 
bias and the entire attitude is based on 'magical thinking': the most hideous, 
stupid and outrageous ideas are accepted as truth without being 
questioned ... Thus it is too easy to make generalisations about Jewish matters 
without seeing the diversity oflewish life and to use the Jewish issue for the 
purpose of political demagoguery ... Indeed, Dmowski's methods reveal just 
how easily this can be done. ' 
Ludwik Oberlaender, "Ruchy nacjonalistyczne a anlysemityzm, " Miesi$Lzn 
ýy4Qwski, No. 7-8,1932. 
Introduction 
One of the developments accompanying the political and 
economic transformation of Poland in 1989 and 1990 was a strong 
outburst of anti-Jewish beliefs and sentiments in public life. References 
to Jews as aliens and as a menace to the Polish nation, and slogans that 
Poland was 'falling into Jewish hands' and that 'Jews rule and want to 
rule Poland' were disseminated by the various newly established 
national parties and a segment of the Polish Catholic Church. 1 The 
Solidarity movement was itself also affected by this trend. After its 
split into two factions in May 1990, the right wing faction Center 
Alliance accused the members of the left wing Solidarity faction the 
Citizens Movement For Democratic Action of not being true Poles 
(prawdziwi Polacy). At the same time some communist groups 
continued to claim that the political camp under the banner of 
Solidarity represented anti-national interests, that is to say Jewish 
interests. 
In various press statements and in public speeches the following 
themes came to the fore: of the Jew being responsible for previous 
declines of Poland, particularly during the Communist period, of the 
10n the subject, see, for example, Kula, 'Problem. '23; and Kinga Dunin-Horkawicz, 
Malgorzata Melchior, '2yd i antysemita. in: Marek Czyiewski et al., Analiza 
dys qrsu pubficznego w PoIsce (Warszawa, 1991) 37-78 and Kinga Dunin- 
Horkawir-z, 'Jakniebyc'antysen'titiwPoisce? Antysemityzmwdyskursie 
publicznym' StudiaSo oloL-iczne, No. 3/4,1991,125-141. 
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Jew hindering the present political and economic transformation of 
Poland, and of potentially preventing the future development of a 
great Polish nation. In short, the Jew was referred to as the enemy of 
the Polish people and of its culture; as the exponent of international 
finance; as a carrier of cosmopolitan and spiritually-debased Western 
values; and as the creator of the imposed post-War Communist system. 
Anti-jewish beliefs were particularly intensified during the first 
free presidential election of late 1990. The presidential candidate 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki the chief opponent of Lech Walýsa and himself a 
leading Solidarity man and a Catholic, was labelled a Jew and 
subjected to a Church investigation into his family genealogical tree in 
search of alleged Jewish ancestry. 2 Various surveys conducted at the 
time showed that anti-Jewish slogans and beliefs had a high public 
acceptance. For example, according to a survey concerning the 
presidential campaign, fifty per cent of Lech Wafýsa's electorate and 
twenty-five per cent of Tadeusz MazowiecId's electorate were 
convinced that 'Jews had too much power in Poland., 3 The conviction 
that the Jews wanted to govern. Poland was found even among 
schoolchildren who for obvious reasons had never had any interaction 
with Polish Jews and who could only have acquired such beliefs 
through parents, schools and the mass media. 4 
To some observers both in Poland and in the West such an anti- 
Jewish mood in a state where the Jewish minority numbers only 
approximately five thousand within a thirty eight and a half million 
population, came as a shock. 5 Overall, it was claimed that these anti - 
Jewish beliefs and sentiments had resulted from the re-emergence of 
nationalist political movements and parties, and that they had a self- 
2Kula, 'Problem. ' 23. 
3Konstanty Gebert, 'Antisemitism in the 1990 Polish Presidential Election! Social 
Research, No. 58,1991,727. 
4According to a poll conducted in three Warsaw schools, twenty-five per cent of 
school children expressed that opinion. Tuszyn'ska Agata, Nie jestem rasist4' 
Kultura, No. 513, June 1990,3-26. For an account of similar opinions among college 
students and secondary school pupils see, Krystyna Daniel, 'Me Schools, the Church 
and Antisemitism. Among Polish Youth. ' in: Paluch, The Jews. 429-434. 
5'Me figure of five thousand constitutes an actual number of Jews affiliated to 
existing Jewish organisations in contemporary Poland. The highest figure for the 
Jewish community including individuals of mixed marriages is ýeStimated at fifteen 
thousand. See, Alina Cga and Helena Datner-ýpiewak, Dziejg Zydow w PoIsce 1944- 
1968. Teksly irbdtowe. (Warszawa, 1997), 176. Hereafter Cala and Datner-Spiewak, 
pzký 
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reproducing character. A historical connection with the inter-war 
period was also drawn. 6 
I shall argue that this entire phenomenon can be classified as the 
strongest and most recent manifestation of the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other which had first emerged fully-fledged 
approximately a hundred years earlier and had since frequently 
reoccurred with greater or lesser intensity in the context of Polish 
national discourse. What transpired in this manifestation, as in the 
previous ones, was the presence of a variety of mythical themes and 
components as described above. Furthermore, the polyfunctionality of 
the myth was also evident. As in the past, the myth was used to raise 
political and social mobilisation and national cohesion, to discredit 
political opponents, and to provide a biased source of information 
about the Jewish minority and its history in Poland. Without over- 
statement it can be said that this manifestation revealed that the myth 
of the Jew as the Threatening Other was still a living force in Polish 
society of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
In this chapter I set out to discuss the roots of this myth, its 
nascent form prior to the 1880s, and its development in a fully-fledged 
form in the late pre-independence period 1880s-1914 and post- 
independence period 1918 to 1939.1 consider such discussion to be 
important historical background to further analysis. I focus on the 
following two questions: How did this long-lived myth come about ? 
And what are its main components and social functions ? 
To begin with, it must be stressed that I categorise the myth as 
primarily a nineteenth century social construction which had been a 
part of modem Polish nation-building based on ethnic nationalism of 
the exclusivist type. And therefore I treat the myth as a good indicator 
of the persistence and emotive power of exclusivist ethno-national 
traditions in Poland. 
Of course, being a nineteenth century phenomenon the myth 
had exerted little impact on the first six hundred years of Jewish 
dwelling in pre-modern Poland which began in the eleventh century 
and which was marked by the gradual development of a distinguished 
and culturally assertive Polish Jewish community. 7 Nevertheless, I 
6Marcin Kula, 'Problem. ' 45-49. 
7Historical sources inform us that contact between Jews and Poles goes back to the 
tenth century when the first Polish entity was established. Early evidence of 
permanent Jewish settlements in Poland, mainly in Silesia, is dated at the twelfth 
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argue that its roots can be traced back to the pre-modem period, 
particularly to notions concerning the Jews which had developed 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The Roots of the Myth 
Looking at pre-modem Poland we have to bear in mind the two 
general aspects important to this study: firstly, that during the first 
three centuries of Jewish settlements in Poland, the ethnic composition 
and boundaries of the polity differed significantly from the ethnic 
make-up and boundaries of Poland of the seventeenth century. The 
Polish Kingdom ruled by the first dynasty of the Piasts between 996 
and 1370 was a rather ethnically and religiously uniform state and its 
boundaries were closely similar to those of post-1945 Poland. 
The last Piast ruler Casimir 111 (1333-1370) known as Casin-dr the 
Great (Kazimierz III, Wielki) for his contribution to the economic and 
political development of the state, is recognised as the medieval ruler 
who was the most favourably disposed to Jewish settlement in Polish 
territories. He ratified and implemented, throughout the entire Polish 
Kingdom, the charter of rights that had been granted in 1264 to the 
Jews of Great Poland(Wielkopolska) by Boleslaw the Pious (Bole-4aw 
Poboiny), one of the major documents determining the legal and social 
status of the Jews in pre-1795 Poland. 8 
Secondly, that under the ruling of the second dynasty of the 
Jagiellonians, which began in 1386 and lasted until 1572, Poland 
became a multi-national and multi-religious polity. Ethnic Poles, 
whose language, customs and mores had developed by the end of 
sixteenth century constituted approximately forty per cent of the entire 
population which also included Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, 
Jews, Germans, Armenians and Tatars. 9 The state" s boundaries 
centu-ry. Despite the presence of theories claiming non-Western sources for Jewish 
immigration to Poland, it is generally accepted that immigration was primarily 
Western European in origin, from Bohemia and the German and Austrian territories. 
See for example, Bernard D. Weinryb, The Jews of Poland: a Social and Economic 
Histoly of the lewish Communily in Poland from 1100 jo IS 0 (Philadelphia, 1973), 
10-20. Hereafter Bernard D. Weinryb, The Tews. 
80n the various c-harters, of rights granted to the Jews in medieval Poland and the 
reaction of Polish statesmen, political thinkers, historians and Catholic clergy at 
various times, see the important article by Shmuel A. Cygielman, 'Me Basic 
Privileges Of The Jews Of Great Poland As Reflected In Polish Historiography. ' 
Polin, Vol. 1,1986,117- 133. 
9Bernard D. Weinryb, The Tews. 107. 
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dramatically expanded and Poland became territorially the second 
largest state in Europe as a result of the final union of 1569 between 
Poland and Lithuania. 
The state's noticeable presence on the political map of Europe 
accompanied by economic growth, and particularly by its agricultural 
potential and cultural dynamism, led to the later general perception of 
late jagiellonian Poland as the Golden Age of Polish history. This 
Golden Age coincides with what came to be described as the Golden 
Age in the social and cultural history of the Polish Jews, who having 
been granted a unique communal autonomy in religious and legal 
matters (the kahal system) by the last Jagiellonian monarch Sigismund 
August (1548-1572), came to perceive Poland as their refuge, relatively 
free from persecution in comparison to other European states of the 
time. 
It should be noted here that with the extinction of the 
Jagiellonian dynasty, Poland's prestige in the international arena 
gradually faded away. Unlike in other European countries where 
political power was concentrated in the monarch, Poland became 'the 
noble republic'. The entire legislative power was shifted onto the 
nobility (szIachta) which in effect became, to use the words of Elie 
Kedourie, the Polish state. 10 Every new king elected by the nobility 
was bound by a set of agreements (pacta conventa) by which his powers 
were frequently ceded to the nobles. 
The seventeenth century witnessed the first major reaction of 
ethnic Poles to the Jagiellonian concept of a multi-ethnic and multi- 
religious Poland. The reaction of Catholic clergy, nobility and burgher 
estates was predominantly negative and was followed by an expressed 
wish to curb internal differences. Religious diversity came to be the 
first target of such a reaction. 
The century was marked by a growing fusion of Polishness and 
Catholicism manifested in the crowning of the Virgin Mary as the 
Queen of Poland in 1656 and in the general triumph of the Counter- 
Reformation which was to strongly undermine the concept of religious 
tolerance endorsed by the state in the previous century and which led 
in turn to a substantial re-Catholicisation of the nobility who had 
converted to Calvinism in large numbers under the short-lived 
10EIie Kedourie, Nationalism (Oxford UK, Cambridge USA, 1994), 113. Hereafter 
Kedourie Nationalism. 
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influence of the Reformation. 11 The 'open' society of the sixteenth 
century was transforming itself into a 'close& society, a process very 
much aggravated by a series of foreign invasions on Polish 
territories. 12 Thus it can be argued that Polish ethno-cultural identity 
had come, for the first time, into conflict with the concept of the multi- 
ethnic and multi-religious Polish state. 
In this social climate, there was a rapid outpouring of "a series of 
specifically Jew-baiting books and pamphlets'. Of course, this was not 
the first time in which anti-Jewish themes had appeared in the writings 
of Polish political writers, thinkers and clergymen. However, as 
pointed out by Salo W. Baron, in these particular anti-Jewish writings 
the emphasis was placed on 'the purported misdeeds and crimes of 
contemporary Jewry in their relations with Christians' and not on the 
theological differences between Judaism and Christianity which 
constituted the main feature of the early medieval anti-Jewish works-13 
Another aspect of these anti-Jewish writings was that their authors 
were not confined only to Catholic clergymen and certain circles of 
nobility but came also from the burgher plebeian estate which enjoyed 
the support of the Catholic Church. 
During the seventeenth century references to the Jews as an 
internal enemy (wezvngtrzny wrog) or the foreigner among us (obcy 
wsr6d swozch) were frequently made in the writings of the Polish 
burgher plebeian estate . 
14 In these writings next to the earlier 
theologically based references to the Jews as God's killers, the Jews 
came to be described as social parasites, as 'insects eating Poland from 
within', as spies for foreign entities, and as 'God"s plague' threatening 
the economy of the burghers. 
110n the importance of the Counter-Reformation in shaping seventeenth century 
Polish society, see Henryk Samsonowicz, et al., Polska. Losy PaAstwa I Narodu 
(Warszawa, 1992), 209-211. Hereafter Henryk Sarnsonowicz, et al., Polska. 
120n the foreign invasions and wars the Polish state fought in the seventeenth 
century, see Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price Of Freedom (London and New York, 1993), 
99-104. Hereafter Wandycz, The Price. 
13See Salo W. Baron, A Social and Religious Histojy of Tews Vol. 16, (New York, 
1976), 138-139. Hereafter Salo W. Baron, A Social. 
14See Urszula Augustyniak, Koncel2de narodu i sRofeczenstwa w literaturze 
plebejskiej od konca XVI do konca XVII wieku (Warszawa, 1989), 57. Hereafter 
Augustyniak, Koncel2de. and Jacob Goldberg, 'Poles and Jews in the 17th and 18th 
Centuries: Rejection or Acceptance/ in: lahrbucher fur Geschichte Ost Europas, 
Band. 22, Heft. 2.1974,250-251. 
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Close economic ties between the Jews and the nobility, 
Particularly the magnates, were heavily criticised. 15 Moreover, these 
writings reveal that the Jews were attributed more blame for the lack of 
a strong urban economy than the nobility itself, which was after all the 
chief opponent of the urban economy and had the political power to 
hold back the development of the towns. To the Jews was also 
attributed responsibility for corruption on the part of the nobility and 
lack of concern for the state, and therefore for the increasing 
impoverishment of the Polish polity: 
"You tricked the nobility and rich magnates. And now suddenly 
you have impoverished all our estates. '16 
Interestingly, Jews who converted to Catholicism were also 
viewed as outsiders who could not be trusted and accepted as 
members of the Polish community. A popular plebeian proverb of the 
time was: 'a converted Jew like a domesticated wolf is a two-faced 
friend. '17 
This points to the presence of a nascent racial element in the 
perception of the Jews which was later to feature strongly in modern 
evaluations of converted Polish Jews. 
The idea of the exclusion of the Jews and other heretics from the 
realm of the state was also contemplated in the burgher literary genre. 
The expulsion of the Jews from Spain in the fifteenth century was 
praised as was the contemporary Russian policy of excluding Jews 
from the Russian state: 'Moscow is wiser ... she neither stands a Jew 
nor a foreigner. 18 
In short, one can see here that the Pohsh burghers' view of the 
Jews as economic competitors had clear ethnocentric, xenophobic 
overtones. Although these views did not exert much influence on 
contemporary political and cultural affairs of state, it is important to 
note that they were discovered and recycled by modem ethnic 
nationalists in the late nineteenth, and first three decades of the 
twentieth century. In fact, these modem ethnic nationalists referred to 
these burgher writers as one of the two estates in pre-modern Poland, 
150n the economic ties between the nobility and the Jewish community see, for 
example, Hillel, Levine, Economic Origins of Antisemitism. Poland and Its fews in 
the Early Modern Period (New Haven and London, 1991), 10-11. Hereafter Levine, 
Economic. 
16Hajduk Miklosz Odmienia Art u Zyda Cited in Augustyniak KonceRýe- 62. 
17ibid., 62. 
18jan jurkowski, Poselstwo z dzikich Rot. Cited in Augustyniak, Koncepoe. 58. 
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which, in contrast to the nobility, showed concerns for the Polish 
national interest. 19 The second highly appraised estate was the pre- 
modem Catholic clergy - seen as the true defender of the Polish nation 
against the Jewish invasion. 
'In pre-modem Poland anti-Jewish activities were guided by the 
Catholic Church which knew well the Jewish soul and Jewish goals. 
The Church warned Polish society against the destructive activities of 
the Jews and was in charge of fighting against the Jewish invasion. '20 
The idea, popular among the seventeenth century burghers, of 
learning from and imitating medieval SpaWs policy of the expulsion 
of the Jews, was repeated by Roman Dmowski in his so-called 'bible' of 
modem Polish nationalism Thoughts of A Modem Pole (Myýli 
Nozvoczesnego Polaka). 21 It was also frequently recycled by the ethno- 
nationalist press of the inter-war period: 
'All Poland" s troubles are the result of centuries of Jewish 
invasion. If we want to be a great independent nation, we must get rid 
of the Jews as the Spaniards did in the fifteenth century'. 22 
The eighteenth century was marked by the rapid political, 
economic and territorial decline of the polity followed by its total 
disintegration. During this century, the general population doubled 
from six million to eleven and a half million, and the Jewish 
community came to constitute six per cent of the entire population. 
Under such conditions a negative evaluation of both the Jewish 
economic position and of its ethno-cultural composition took on a 
more solid and advanced form. 23 This was particularly visible in 
political writings and public debate in the second part of the century 
when a desperate attempt was made to reform the state's political, 
social and economic systems. The main critics of the Jews were the 
underdeveloped ethnic Polish burghers and Catholic clergy, but they 
19See, for example, Teodor jeske-Choiýski, Pozngji ; 
jyda. (Warszawa, 1912), 190-192. 
20Stanislaw Tworkowski, Polska bez ýZdýw (Warszawa, 1939), 30. Hereafter 
Tworkowski, Polska. 
21Roman Dmowski, Lfts'li Nowoczesnego Polaka (Lwo'w, 1904), 216. 
22Gazeta Warszawsk 19 April, 1935. Cited in Harry M. Rabinowicz, The Legaýy of 
Polish Jewly (New York, London, 1965), 194. Hereafter Rabinowicz, The Legagy. 
23According to Hillel Levine: 'from the second half of the eighteenth century there 
was an upsurge in the allegations that Jews are unproductive ... impeding development for other members of the society; or conversely, that they are too 
enterprising, standing at the avant-garde, disrespectful of the traditional ways 'we' 
insiders do things. ' Hillel Levine, Economic. 238. 
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were also joined by a significant number of the noblemen. 24 Inthe 
latter case most of the critical voices came from the growing 
pauperised segment (gotbta), which unlike the large landowners, did 
not see in the Jew a useful and necessary administrator of an estate (the 
arenda system ) and a middle man in economic terms. 25 Instead, like 
the burgher class, the landless nobles saw in the Jew a skilful economic 
competitor. Their views concerning the Jews were also influenced by 
Catholic teachings, particularly by the Jesuits who were in charge of 
the Catholic educational system. 26 
It should be noted at this point that eighteenth century Catholic 
clergymen writers, like the Catholic priests of the previous century, 
concentrated on disseminating an image of the Jew who was harmful 
to the contemporary Christian community. 27 Not only was such 
harmfulness defined in economic, cultural and theological terms, but 
also in physical terms. Accusations of ritual murders of Christians, 
particularly of Christian children, were widely circulated in their 
writings. The expression that 'freedom cannot exist without liberurn 
veto and Jewish matzo cannot exist without Christian blood', coined 
by the rural priest Jedrzej Kitowicz, is a good example of blood libel 
presented as social truth, contrary to the stance of the Apostolic See of 
that time. 28 The comparison of alleged ritual murder to liberum veto 
which was the principle of unanimous vote, a real parliamentary 
practice introduced in 1589, well reflects the biased way of thinking of 
the Polish Catholic clergy, thinking which was to persist even into the 
first half of the twentieth century. 
Characteristically, in the eighteenth centLuy's political and social 
writings and debates, the Jew was made into a scapegoat responsible 
for all contemporary political, social and economic ills experienced by 
24For a good summary of this problem see, Krystyna Zieýkowska, 'Stereotyp Zyda 
W Publicystyce Polskiej W Drugiej Potowie XVIII wieku, ' in: Jerzy Michalski ed., 
Lud kydowski W Narodzie Polskim (Warszawa, 1994), 81-98. Hereafter 
Zienkowska, 'Stereotyp. ' 
25See Gershon D. Hundert, 'Some Basic Characteristics of The Jewish Experience In 
Poland. ' Polin, Vol. 1,1986,31. 
260n the impact of Jesuit education on the nobility in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, see, for example, Anatol Leszczynski, Sejrn 
ýydow Koronv. 1623-1764 
(Warszawa, 1994), 31-33. On the Jesuit educational system, see Henryk Sarnsonowicz 
et al., Polska, 217-219. 
27See Salo W. Baron, A Social. 138. 
280n the history of the accusation of blood libel in pre-modern Poland, see Zenon 
Guldon and Jacek Wijaczka, 'The Accusation of Ritual Murder in Poland, 1500-1800. ' 
Polin, Vol. 10,1997,99-140. 
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the state: political corruption and treason, financial fraud, 
impoverishme, nt of towns, industry and villages, the spread of 
alcoholism among the peasantry, and the materialism and egoism of 
the nobility, particularly of the magnates. As in the previous century, 
the Jew was accused of hindering the Polish urban economy and was 
also blamed for the -negative attitude of the nobility towards 
commerce. TI-ds pattern of accusing the Jews for all misfortunes 
incurred by the Poles and the Polish state was to feature as one of the 
main themes of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other 
throughout the modem period. 
Reading these writings one can clearly see that such reasoning 
was based on ignorance and prejudice towards the Jews, and was 
aimed at transferring the blame for major political, social and economic 
problems onto a group which was perceived as a powerful and 
contemptible alien. To give one particular example, the logic behind 
the notion that the Jews were responsible for negative attitudes 
towards commerce was reasoned thus: the Jews whose main 
occupation was commerce were the most contemptible nation in the 
world, therefore the commerce that they conducted was also worthy 
only of contempt and explained the general repulsion towards 
commerce in Poland. 29 Such an explanation completely ignored the 
basic fact that the nobility's evaluation of commerce as dirty and low 
profession sprang from its ethos of knighthood. 30 
Moreover, in this body of writing, tenns used to describe the 
Jewish community have a strong connotation of dirt and pollution: 
'the Jews poison the air with their stirW, 'the Jews rot the air of 
towns'. Thus we can observe here the emergence of the nascent 
concept of the Jew as a spoider and polluter of the country, a concept 
later to become an important element of the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other. 
Fina. Uy, at the end of the eighteenth century, and for the first 
time, a distinction between the Polish nation and the Jews had been 
made in political and social writings. 31 And the nascent idea of 
antagonism between the Jewish and Polish ethno-cultural identities 
29Zienkowska, 'Stereotyp. ' 92. 
30janusz Tazbir, S'wiat Panow Paskow (kodi, 1986), 225. 
31The emergence of this distinction was first suggested by Zieýkowska, 'Stereotyp. ' 
97. 
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had also been raised. And it had influenced the debate on the 
emancipation of the Jews. 
The works of Stanislaw Staszic (1755-1826), one of the leading 
figures of the Polish Enlightenment, and a precursor of the ethno- 
linguistic model of the Polish nation, serve as a good illustration of 
such a perspective. 32 In his main work, Warnings for Poland 
(Przestrogi d1a Polski) published in 1790, Staszic categorises the Jewish 
community as harmful locusts destroying Polish towns and villages. 
What is evident in his approach is a high level of contempt towards the 
Jews mixed with a recognition of their dynamism and assertiveness as 
a community. Therefore Staszic advocated forcible assimilation of 
Jews into the Polish mores, customs and language as the only means of 
harmonious existence between them and ethnic Poles, and as a pre- 
requisite for granting the Jews some - but not full equality - of civic 
rights. 33 His perspective on the Jews was not an isolated one but was 
shared by many members of the Polish political elite of the time. An 
opposite perspective that argued both that the Jews could be a valuable 
part of society and should be granted emancipation unconditionally 
was championed by a small minority, mainly by one writer, the 
Jacobin J6zef Pawlikowski. 34 
Perhaps this situation explains why the project of the 
emancipation of the Jews in late pre-partitioned Poland, in fact not 
realised before the final partitioning in 1795, lacked that enthusiasm 
which accompanied the first phase of the emancipation of Jews in 
Western and Central European states. 35 
What was the reaction of the Jewish community of the time to 
such a negative evaluation ? Overall, historical records attest that the 
community or at least its public representatives expressed a strong 
sense of connection to Poland, viewed themselves as loyal to its 
320n the precursors of Polish ethno-nationalism, see Andrzej Walicki, The 
Enlightenment and the Birth of Modem Nationhood (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1989), 
80-88. Hereafter Walickiý The Enlightenment. 
330n the stance of the leading figures of the Polish Enlightenment towards the Jews, 
see, for example, Zdzislaw Libera, Rozwazania 0 Wieku Toleran! ji Rozumu I Gustu 
(Warszawa, 1994), 75-94, and the monumental study of Artur Eisenbach, The 
Emancipation of the Jews in Poland 1780-1870 (Oxford, 1991), 91-102. Hereafter 
Eisenbach, Emancipation. 
34See Jacob Goldberg, 'Me Changes In The Attitude Of Polish Society Toward The 
Jews In The 18th Century' Polin. . 1,1986,42. , Vol 350n the phases of the Emancipation, see Jacob Katz, Emancipation and 
Assimilation: Studies in Modern fewish History (Franborough, 1972), 22. 
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monarch, and wished to be involved in the political and social affairs 
of the state. 36 The loyalty was not undermined by the failure of the 
proposal for their emancipation in the Four Year Parliament of 1788- 
1792. A good illustration of such loyalty was the participation of a 
segment of Polish Jews in the KoSciuszko insurectionary movement of 
1794, and their presence in the legions of Henryk Dýbrowski. 
Concerning the issue of cultural polonisation as a prerequisite to 
emancipation, the traditional religious Orthodox majority objected to 
it, claiming that their cultural distinctiveness was not incompatible 
with loyalty to the Polish monarch and state. Whereas a small 
Haskalah movement supported the programme of cultural 
assimilation. 
In short, one can see that in the eighteenth century, the concept 
of the harmfulness of the Jews, based on prejudice and ignorance of the 
nature of Jewish beliefs, customs and habits, took a strong hold on 
Polish political and social thought. And in fact this concept gradually 
rose to a national level as the idea of an opposition between the Polish 
nation and the Jews emerged during the late Enlightenment, a time of 
the crystallisation of the nascent ethnic type of modem Polish 
nationalism. 37 At which stage, the earlier pre-modem prejudiced 
perceptions of the moral-cultural code of the Jews - as inferior and 
harmful to Christian ethos - came to be intertwined with the nascent 
concept of the incompatibility of the Polish and Jewish moral-cultural 
codes as defined in the national context. The singling out of the Jew as 
the harmful Other was based on the prejudiced perception of Jewish 
religion, Jewish language, culture and ethnic make-up, and on the 
social and economic function of the Jew as the middleman group in 
Polish society. 
Significantly, no other ethno-cultural group dwelling on the 
territories of the Polish pofity was evaluated in such a way in Polish 
political and social thought. For example, in the case of the largest 
Christian Slavic groups inhabiting the Eastern part of the Polish state, 
it was generally assumed that they were part of the Polish nation and 
would assimilate into Polish culture on a voluntary basis as they 
360n the issue of responses of the late pre-modem Polish-Jewish community to the 
Polish discourse on Jewish emancipation and cultural assimilation, see Eisenbach, 
Emancipation. 125-145. 
37The historian Andrzej Walicki attributes this development to the disintegration of 
the Polish state. See Waticki, The Enlightenment. 89. 
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would recognise the supremacy of Polish civilisation. 38 The smallest 
ethno-cultural groups, such as the Armenians and the Muslim 
community of Tatars, were also treated without much ambivalence as 
part of the Polish nation. The reason for such a situation was the fact 
that they had become rather 'invisible' as ethno-cultural groups due to 
the extensive cultural polonisation they had undergone by the end of 
the eighteenth century. For example, by this time, both these groups 
had lost the use of their respective languages in daily life . 
39 In the 
case of the Armenians, their organised communal life had also 
disintegrated. 40 This indicates that the late pre-modem Polish culture 
was already characterised by strong homogenising tendencies and by a 
low tolerance of internal difference, contrary to the popular modem 
Polish self-perception of the nation as historically tolerant and open to 
foreigners. 
From the Concept of the Harmfulness of Jews to the Myth of the Jew as the 
Chief Threatening Other 1795 -1880s 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, which was marked by 
insurrectionary attempts at regaining sovereignty and by the 
development of Polish nationalism in its romantic form, the concept of 
the harmfulness of the Jews continued to constitute an undercurrent in 
political and social discourse among the political elites both in stateless 
Poland and in exile in France and England. A dose look at this 
discourse shows that neither the romantic liberal ethos encompassed in 
the slogan "for your freedom and ours, ' nor the particularly powerful 
positive images of Jews created by the eminent Polish romantic poet 
Adam Nfickiewicz (1798-1855), had exerted much attenuating influence 
over the perception of the Jew as a harmful alien. 41 
With the exception of small left-wing circles, biased views 
towards the Jews were not recognised as such but were held as social 
truth by both the Conservative and the mainstream democratic liberal 
movements. A good representative example of biased views in the 
latter group is that of Maurycy Mochnacki (1804-34), one of the leading 
38ibid., 75. 
39Wieslaw Wladyka, ed., Inni ws'r6d swoich (Warszawa, 1994), 75,107. 
4OMiroslawa Zakrzewska-Dubasowa, Ormianie w dawnej PoIsce (Lublin, 1982), 311. 
41For a discussion of these images see Magdalena Opalski and Israel Bartal, Poles 
and Jews. A Failed Brotherhood (Hanover and London, 1992), 19-21. Hereafter 
Opalski and Bartal, Poles. 
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figures of the illegal political organisationfhe Patriotic Association 
(Tozvarzyshvo Patriotyczne). 42 In his work on the Polish insurrection of 
1830-31, MochnacJd did not treat the Jews as equal members of Polish 
society, but instead as a 'powerful alien element' with intrinsic faults 
developed as a result of living in exile. For him the Jews were also a 
powerful economic group wielding "the spectre of Mammon. " 
Therefore he advocated that it was better to neutralise them or win 
them over to the independence struggle but he did not recommend 
granting them equal rights in a future independent Poland. 43 
Such a situation suggests that while the exclusionary project of 
removing the Jews from the realm of the Polish nation was not yet 
formulated, exclusionary ideas concerning the Jewish community were 
already present in Polish political and social thought and manifested 
themselves in attitudes towards the concept of equality of the Jews 
within Polish society. In a sense, one can argue, that with the 
disintegration of the pre-modem multi-effinic Polish state in which the 
Jews had constituted a part of the social landscape, their position was 
becoming increasingly precarious vis -a-vis the Polish nation defined 
in an ethnic sense. 
The romantic period also shows, that within some ethnicafly 
pure Polish circles, exclusionary ideas were already being extended 
onto those persons and their offspring who had given up their Jewish 
ethno-cultural identity and converted to Catholicism. TI-ds 
undercurrent was particularly visible in the evaluation of the first and 
second generation of Frankists who had originally constituted an 
offshoot of the eighteenth century Jewish mystical movement. 44 By 
the first two decades of the nineteenth century the first and the second 
generations of Frankists were Catholics and noblemen who had 
produced a number of prominent thinkers and military figures 
committed to the Polish cause. Yet such persons were not perceived 
the same way as ethnically pure Poles, but were viewed with suspicion 
and fear. They were seen as a dangerous social group who by 
penetration into the pure ethnic Polish core group, could successfully 
conspire against it. Such views were presented in the pamphlet My 
42See Samsonowicz et al., Polska. 318-319. 
43Maurycy Mochnacki, Powstanie narodu 12olskiego w roku 1830 i 1831, Cited in 
Wapinski, Polska. 156. It is interesting that this respected historian does not recognise 
that such views as Mochnacki's on Jews are prejudiced. 
440n the history of the Frankist movement, see Weinryb, The Jews. 237-240. 
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Discovery of the Israelite Way of Thinking (0 2ydach i judaizmte, czy1i 
wykrycie zasad moralnych tudziei rozumowan lzraelltow przez I) published 
in SiedIce in 1820, and in the well-known drama The Undivine 
Comedy (Nieboska komedia) (1835) written by Zygmunt Krasinski (1812- 
59), one of the most important romantic Polish writers next to Adam 
Nfickiewicz. 45 
Two important studies, The Emancil2ation of the Tews in Poland, 
1780-1870 by Artur Eisenbach, and Poles and Jews. A Failed 
Brotherhood by Magdalena Opalski and Israel Bartal, point out that 
the pre-modem perception of the Jew as a harmful alien was absorbed 
in different degrees by a wide segment of the political and intellectual 
elites throughout the first seven decades of the nineteenth century. 
Not only was this perception reflected in public debate, political 
writing and social journalism, but also in Polish literature, even in the 
writings of those such as J6zef Ignacy Kraszewski (1812-1887) who had 
at an earlier stage exhibited an open attitude towards the Jews and 
who himself had been harassed by his own family for making dose 
professional links with Jews. 46 
This belief in the Jew as a harmful alien cleafly impacted on 
Polish political and military discussions on the inclusion of Jews in the 
insurrectionary movements, on the projects of integration of the Jews 
into the Polish nation, and on their emancipation. 47 In fact it 
contributed to a vast number of contradictions conceniing all three 
issues. 
Furthermore, within that segment of already culturally 
assimilated Polish Jews, this perception caused disappointment, 
bitterness and frustration as illustrated by the following: 
'For centuries, with glowing hearts 
Our fathers shed blood for [Poland's] freedom 
why are we today rejected with contempt ?... 
45Short fragments of the pamphlet About fews and Tudaism -a DiscovM of the 
Israelite Wgy of ýý by 1. are cited in Mateusz Nfieses, Z rodu gydowskiego 
(Warszawa, 1991) (reprinted from 1938), 18. On Krasinski's perspective on Jewish 
converts, see Opalski and Bartal, Poles. 19. 
46Kraszewski was accused by his own family of serving Jewish capital when he 
decided to leave the Warsaw Gazette and started to work for the Dgift Gazette 
(Gazeta Codzienna) owned by the Jewish entrepreneur Ludwik Kronenberg. See, 
Alina Kowalczykowa, 'Kraszewski w Warszawie' ' 
Rocznik Warszawski, 1992,206. 
On the evolution of Kraszewski's perception towards the Jews, see Opalski and 
Bartal, ro es. 64-65. 
47See Eisenbach, Emancipation and Opalski and Bartal, Poles. 15-18. 
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Why do our compatriots renounce the Jew ? 
Why do they not see in him a friend and a brother ? 
And deny him all human rights ? 48 
While, within the large segment of the traditional Orthodox 
Jewish community, this perception led to suspicion and a lack of 
confidence in the Polish elites. 49 
In the case of the participation of the Jewish community in 
nineteenth century insurrectionary movements, Jewish commitment to 
the Polish cause was invariably questioned, dismissed and looked 
upon with mistrust or disdain. The two-fold tendency was first to 
focus on flaws within the Jewish community, particularly cases of 
betrayal and lack of support for the national cause, and secondly to 
undermine or reject any Jewish military, auxiliary and financial 
participation in the struggle for the liberation of the Polish state. 50 
Importantly, this perspective was to become the dominant pattern of 
perceiving the Jews with regard to those wars Poland fought after 
regaining her statehood in 1918. 
Perhaps the one exception to this pattern was the more 
generally positive evaluation of the Jewish community's efforts in the 
Polish Uprising of 1863-64 against Tsarist Russia. The scale of 
involvement of both culturally assimilated and traditional Orthodox 
Jews was so publicly visible, particularly in Warsaw, that it could not 
be easily dismissed or undermined at the time. 51 However, in the 
aftermath of the crushed insurrection followed by an intensified 
russification, this historical moment of so-called Polish-Jewish 
brotherhood was obliterated from public memory. 
Contradictory attitudes of a prejudiced nature were exhibited in 
the Polish approach to cultural assimilation. Of course, cultural 
assimilation was not a uniquely Polish practice, most of the dominant 
nations of Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
expected to integrate their subordinate groups through cultural 
48AIeksander Kraushar'Przez wieki. 'Cited in Opalski and Bartal, Poles. 17. 
49T, his problem has been well discussed by Opalski and Bartal, Poles. 78-84. 
5OSee Eisenbach, Emancipation. 248-255. On Jewish participation in insurrectionary 
Polish movements, see also Hanna Wegrzynek, 'Ludnosc zydowska wobec 
c pow-stania listopadowego. ' and Krzysztof Makowski, 'Ludnos'iydowska wobec 
wydarzen' Wiosny Lud6w na. ziemiach polskich. ' in: Zydzi w Obronie 
Rzegzypoýpgl "t (Warszawa, 1996), 31-42,4a-64. 
510n the perception of Jews during the 1863-64 Insurrection, see Opalski and Bartal, 
Poles. 58- 77. 
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assimilation. In fact, this can be viewed as a common expression of 
ethnocentric and homogenising tendencies characteristic of those 
nascent national states and led to a high degree of confusion around 
issues of Jewish emancipation, assimilation and integration. 52 
Nevertheless, there was a significant difference between the Polish and 
Western European approaches to cultural assimilation and 
emancipation. In the case of Western European nation-states, the 
project of cultural assimilation was generally accompanied by the 
granting of equality of rights to Jews as individuals. Whereas in the 
Polish case such equality of rights for Jews was rejected on principle by 
a vast majority of the ehtes. 53 
The exception was a rather small group consisting of democratic 
left-wing activists and writers such as Wawrzyniec Surowiedd and 
Jan L. Zukowski. 54 This group which also included acculturated 
Polish Jews, advocated that the Jews were to be recognised as Poles in 
a civic sense and therefore propagated the concept of the Pole of the 
Mosaic Persuasion (Polak Mojieszowego Wyznania) - the Polish 
equivalent of the concept of the Frenchman of Mosaic Persuasion. 
Moreover, with the beginning of the next century, the Polish 
project of cultural assimilation of Jews became highly problematic. It 
was marred on the one hand by a lack of recognition of the minority's 
rights to preserve its cultural characteristics, and on the other hand by 
an exclusivist tendency towards already assimilated Jews. Thus more 
demands were made for total assimilation into Polish moral- cultural 
codes, a demand not acceptable to the vast majority of Polish Jews who 
wanted to preserve their morale-cultural make-up, while at the same 
time the small but steadily growing group of culturally assimilated 
third generation Jews were being evaluated as 'incorrect' Poles. 55 
Here, the national homogenising tendencies and the very low 
acceptance of internal diversity, two prominent features of Polish 
ethno-national culture, become transparent. Only a small minority of 
the political and cultural elites recognised the prejudiced nature of 
520n the political theory of Jewish emancipation, see Amos Funkenstein, 
Percel2tions of Jewish Histoj: y (Berkeley, Oxford, 1993), 991-222. 
ipation. 519-527. 53See conclusions in Eisenbach, EmMd 
a 54See Janusz Detka, Zydowska Kwestia' in jo' zef Bachorz, Ahna Kowalczykowa, 
eds., Slownik Literatgxy Pols&ej XIX Wieku (Warszawa, Wroclaw, 1991), 1051. 
55on the development of this problem in the last three decades of the nineteenth 
century, see Alina Cala, Asin-dla! ýa 
kydow w Kr6lestwie Polskim. (1864-1897) 
(Warszawa, 1989), 216-267,279-303. Hereafter Cala, Asimilada. 
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such perspectives. For example, in a work entitled Antisemtism. and 
the Jewish Question (An tysemi tyzm i kzvestia ýydowska), published in 
1907, the little known author Adam Boryna questioned the concept of 
the polonisation of Jews : 
'Treating'the Jewish Question'without prejudice and without 
illusion, first of all we have to abandon our hopes for the expansion of 
the assimilation of the Jews in the name of moral principles ... This 
principle cannot be regarded as non controversial and infallible 
because it would be very hard to deny the Jews the right to cultivate 
their national distinctiveness. In fact if we consequently follow such a 
principle to its logical conclusion it would mean that we ourselves 
would have to demand from our own emigrants [ethnic Poles] total 
assimilation into the nations among whom they dwell. Thus their 
moral duty would be to abandon their Polishness and to assimilate 
into the American or Brasilian nations., 56 
A good example of the extent of the proliferation of these 
national homogenising tendencies and very low acceptance of internal 
diversity is the fact that these perspectives took hold even over 
members of the main liberal group - the short-lived movement of 
Warsaw Positivists led by Aleksander Swiýtochowski (1849-1938). 57 
Although in the 1860s and 1870s the positivists had supported the 
inclusion of the Jews into Polish society and granting them (as 
individuals) equal rights, yet by the 1890s they started to evaluate the 
Jewish minority primarily in negative terms. The biased nature of the 
positivists' attitude towards the Jewish minority lay in the fact that 
they regarded only one type of Jew - namely the entirely polonised Jew 
- as "humanised' and therefore as worthy of inclusion into the Polish 
nation, while the rest of the Jews they viewed with varied degrees of 
contempt and disrespect, and categorised as a type of 'social disease' 
which needed to be cured. In time, the realisation that the majority of 
Jews did not intend to give up their ethno-cultural identity led the 
positivists towards adopting a position claiming that the Jews were 
I 56Adam Boryna, AMsemiiyzm a kwestia jydowska. Cited in Adolf Nowaczynski, 
Mocarstwo Anonirnowe (ankieta w sl2rawie jydowskiej) (Warszawa, 1921), 237. 
Hereafter Nowaczyn'ski, Mocarstwo. 
57The positivists advocated a program of 'organic work and emphasised the 
importance of cultural and economic progress. The movement first developed in the 
Prussian partitioned zone in the fifties. An important thorough investigation of the 
evolution of the positivists' attitudes towards the Jews was conducted by Ahna Cata. 
See Cata, Asimilada. 216-267. 
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basically a foreign and harmful group towards Polish society. This 
alleged harmfulness of the Jews was attributed to the qualities of their 
character. Here is one typical illustration of such a position expressed 
by the leading member of this group, the writer Boleslaw Prus (1847- 
1912): 
'The Jews in Galicia [the Austrian partitioned zone] constitute 
one tenth of the entire population. They are characterised by poverty, 
ignorance, separatism and by their harmfulness towards the rest of the 
inhabitants. Therefore the people feel resentment towards them., 58 
Equality of rights for the Jewish population, introduced at 
different times and in different forms in the three partitioned zones by 
the Prussian, Austrian and Russian states, was particularly resented by 
ethnic Poles who had not played any part in the introduction of such 
legislation, except in the Russian partitioned zone where the legislation 
had been drafted by a Pole Margrave Aleksander Wielopolski, 
chairman of the Russian-controlled civil government. 59 The chain of 
critical responses to Wieloposki's Emancipatory Act of 1862, expressed 
in various Polish press statements, testifies that equality of Jews before 
the law was perceived not only as an economic threat but also as an 
insult directed at Catholic culture and as a disaster in terms of the 
national interest of ethnic Poles. 60 
Once again, the premise for such an evaluation of Jewish 
emancipation lay in the perception of the Jews as contemptible and 
hamiful aliens and in the almost total lack of questioning or 
challenging of this pattern. Instead, this prejudiced perception 
continued to be treated as social truth. Therefore it was recycled and 
transformed into a contemporary form of social and economic criticism 
of present-day Jews. 
Importantly, from the middle of the century, the size of the 
Jewish community itself came to be perceived as a threat to the ethnic 
Poles whose number had increased from ten million in 1870 to 
fourteen million five hundred thousand by 1900.61 Various 
tendentious demographic forecasts exaggerated the numbers and 
birth-rate of the Jewish community, which like the rest of the 
-58Bolestaw Prus, Kroniki Vol. 16, (Warszawa, 1965), 419. 
, 59See Eisenbach, Emancil2ation. 517-521. 
60Clear illustrations of such reaction are provided in Eisenbach, Emancipation. 520- 
521 and in the previously mentioned article by GoIczewski, 'Anfi-Semific. '93-95. 
61Sft Samsonowicz et A Polska. 379. 
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population was undoubtedly increasing in numbers throughout the 
second half of the century. 62 In these forecasts, the exaggerated size of 
the Jewish community was given as evidence that the Jews constituted 
a dangerous group able in the future to 'physically 'swallow the ethnic 
Polish community. 63 Such a doomsday vision was accompanied by 
the appearance of new expressions such as judeo-Polonia. Next to 
their numbers, the economic role of the Jews within society was also 
perceived as highly dangerous. 
In the middle of the century the expression 'Jewish bondage' 
(niewola lydozvska) entered the vocabulary of social and economic 
discourse. 64 It was used by members of the Agrarian Association 
(Towarzyst7vo Rolnicze), an institution representing the most influential 
segment of the Polish nobility, and was propagated by The Warsaw 
Gazette (Gazeta Warszawska), an important conservative daily later to 
be named as the precursor of Polish nationalism by the core exclusivist 
ethno-nationalist movement, the Endecja. In the words of the Endek 
Jedrzej Giertych: 
'[The Warsaw Gazette] was the leading national paper which 
advocated the preservation of Polish national culture, fought against 
the Jewish influence, and warned against the German threat long 
before the birth of Roman Dmowski., 65 
It was in this paper that vicious attacks full of invective and 
knov, rn as the so-called Jewish war was launched in 1859.66 The main 
object of the attack was the expanding and successful Jewish 
bourgeoisie whose role in the industrialisation of the country and in 
62According to available data, the highest concentration both of the ethnic Polish and 
Jewish populations lived in the Russian partitioned zone and the lowest 
concentration of both populations was in the Prussian partitioned zone. By the end 
of the nineteenth century the number of Jews living in the Russian partitioned zone 
was one million two hundred and seventy-one thousand which constituted fourteen 
per cent of the entire population, in the Austrian partitioned zone it was eight 
hundred thousand which constituted ten per cent of the entire population, and in the 
Prussian partitioned zone it was fifty thousand which constituted two per cent. See 
Piotr Wrobel, Zalys Dziej6w kyd6w na Ziemiach Polskich W Latach 1880-1918 
(Warszawa, 1991), 10-11. Hereafter Wr6bel, Zggys. 
630n the discussion of some of these forecasts, see Eisenbauch, Emanpý2ation. 259- 
262. 
640palski and Bartal, Poles. 16. 
65jedrzej Giertych, Polski Ob6z Narodo3yy (Warszawa, 1990), 30. Hereafter 
Giertych, Polski. 
66For a short summary of the event see Eisenbach, Emancipation. 398-400. 
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the development of a contemporary form of capitalism was 
unquestionable. 
Why was the Jewish bourgeoisie attacked rather than being 
praised for playing a large part in the modernisation of a society which 
was still basically half-feudal and pre-industrial ? 
The explanation of this phenomenon lies in a combination of 
inter-linked factors. Firstly, as stated earlier, the Jewish bourgeoisie 
was viewed as a harmful alien in the eyes of a large segment of Polish 
elites which were still in their greater majority of gentry origin- 67 
Secondly, the Jewish bourgeoisie was also viewed as a powerful 
economic competitor representing capitalism, an economic model that 
the Polish gentry was traditionally highly critical of. Thirdly, the 
Jewish bourgeoisie gradually came to be perceived as the carrier of a 
system of values which were identified as anti-Polish: the reason being 
that the Polish national ethos of that time, shaped by the nobility, was 
characterised by conservatism, traditionalism, nativism and the 
glorification of the rural idyll and by a corresponding disapproval of 
the system of values associated with the culture of capitalism, 
industrialisation and urbanisation. 68 In fact this ethos did not 
undergo major changes even after the process of 'embourgeoisement' 
of ethnic Poles that began in the 1870s. Catholicism, conservatism and 
traditionalism still continued to be identified as the pillars of 
Polishness. Moreover, the representatives of the new ethnic Polish 
bourgeoisie were to some extent influenced by the nobility's 
perception of capitalism and its ethos. And they claimed that while 
Jewish capitalist activities were directed against society, their own 
capitalist activities would result in an improvement in the wen-being 
of the entire Polish society. 69 Thus it is not difficult to see how under 
such circumstances the Jewish bourgeoisie came to be objectified as 
representative of anti-Polish values and its achievements in the 
modernising of the country to be discounted and dismissed. 
670n the importance of the gentry and its ethos in shaping modem Polish elites, see 
Walicki, 'The Three. ' 27-28. 
68C)n the importance of Catholicism, conservatism and traditionalism in Polish 
national traditions of the nineteenth century, see Walicki, 'The three. ', 29-31; and 
Lepkowski, U12arte. 30-31. On the negative perceptions of the capitalist West by 
Polish elites of the first half of the nineteenth century, see Jerzy Jedlicki, 'A Stereotype 
of the West in Post-partition Poland' Social Rese Vol. 59, No. 2 1992r 345-364. 
69A good example of this way of thinking is presented in Jan jeleniski, Zydzi, Niemgy 
jMX (Warszawa, 1880), 34-35. 
54 
Moreover, by the first decade of the twentieth century, the 
perception of the Jew as a carrier of anti-Polish values was to be further 
elaborated as new ideas such as free thinking, Western liberalism, 
Socialism and Communism were added to the group of doctrines, 
ideas and values categorised as anti-Polish by a large segment of the 
conservative and catholic elites. 70 Here the Jew was frequently made 
the embodiment of all these values. This was a part of the 
mythologisation of the Jew as the enemy of Poland and of its people, a 
process about to have long-lasting consequences on the relations 
between the ethnic Polish majority and the Polish Jewish minority in 
the modem era. 
The Emergence of the Fully-Fledged Myth between 1880s and 1918 
The final formulation of the myth of the Jew as the chief 
Threatening Other took place in the late pre-independence period 
between the 1880s and the year 1918. In general this period was 
marked by the rise of modem Polish political movements and parties 
in all three partitioned zones, and social and economic changes in 
Polish society resulting in increasing urbanisation and the emergence 
of the proletariat class. The process of modernisation also affected the 
culture and internal structure of Polish Jewty. As a result a Jewish 
intelligentsia and proletariat developed, and ideas of secularisation, 
Jewish socialism and above all the concept of Jewish nationalism began 
to penetrate the traditional orthodox community. 71 
The late pre-independence period was important in terms of the 
defining and moulding of the Polish nation-to-be. It was during this 
time that the most potent form of modern Polish nationalism, the 
ethnic type of integral form, was fully fledged and thus the process of 
nation building on a matrix of exclusivist ethnic nationalism entered a 
new intensified phase. 
The myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other was both an 
element and a product of this process, with the premise of the myth 
based on the earlier well-established concept of the Jew as the harmful 
700n the categorisation of free thinking, Western liberalism, Socialism and I Communism as anti-Polish doctrines, see -Lepkowski, Mysh. 36-37; and NfichatShwa, 
Polska mysl poli! yczna wI 12olowie XX wieku (Wroctaw, 1993), 239-254. Hereafter 
§hwa, Polska. 
71See, for example, David Vital, A People Apart. The Jews In Europe 1789-1939 
(Oxford, 1999), 353. Hereafter Vital, A People. 
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and contemptible alien recycled and reformulated into the concept of 
the Jew as the chief enemy of Poland and of its people. I shall argue 
here, that from the moment the concept of harmfulness of Jews was 
reformulated along exclusivist ethnic nationalist lines, the precarious 
position of Jews vis-a-vis the majority of ethnic Poles was aggravated 
to a level incomparable with past experience. 
In singling out the Jew as the chief enemy of Poland and its 
people, the Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalists were acting no 
differently to contemporary Frendi, German, Hungarian and 
Romanian exclusivist ethno-nationalists who also categorised the Jew 
as the Threatening Other. 72 As the scope of this thesis does not allow 
for making comparisons I can only state that close similarities can be 
found between all these cases in terms of the content of the myth ( its 
major themes and elements). At the same time, it is important to bear 
in mind that there has been a considerable variation in terms of the 
development and impact of the myth on each of the nations, and on 
the interactions with their respective Jewish communities. 
Singling out the Jew as foremost alien to the Polish historical 
culture-community meant that the civic status and belonging of Jews 
in Polish society was not only questioned but in fact totally dismissed 
and denied. In the ethno-nationalist world-view, mid-nineteenth 
century terms such as Pole of the Mosaic Persuasion, the Polish Citizen 
of the Mosaic Persuasion (Obywatel polski wyznanw mojieszozvego) and 
Pole - Israelite (Polak Izraelita) were simply seen as mutually exclusive. 
The implications of this perspective were to become fully 
apparent in the post-independence phase starting in 1918 when 
various manifestations of belonging to Poland on the part of the 
members of the Polish Jewish community were constantly challenged 
in public by ethno-nationalists. Generally, Jews who called themselves 
Poles in a civic sense were verbally abused and reminded that they 
were Jews and Jews only - not Poles. 
Historical records attest that tl-ds pattem of treatment was not 
only limited to ordinary members of the Jewish community, but also to 
politicians, and members of the Polish parliament and municipal 
720n. the various developments of exclusivist ethnic nationalism and pohtical 
antisernitism in Europe, see Shmuel Ahnog, Nationalism And Antisemitism In 
Modern Europe 1815-1945 (Oxford, 1990), 66-72 and Jacob Katz, From Prejudice To 
Destruction. Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994), 260-300. 
Hereafter Almog, Nationalism. 
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councils. For example, at meetings of the Lodz Municipal Council the 
slogan 'Jews Out! ' (prem z Zydaml) was frequently shouted by core 
ethno-nationalists, the Endeks during speeches of Jewish councillors. 73 
Polish Jewish artists, including even those who were highly culturally 
assimilated, were also denied the right by core ethno-nationalists to 
call themselves Polish artists. Such was the case of Julian Tuwim 
(1894-1954), one of the best-known Polish poets of the inter-war period, 
who was under constant attack by the Endecja press which claimed 
that he had no right to consider himself a Polish poet. 74 
The emergence of the myth can be chronologically located with 
a fair degree of precision because it is reflected both in the vocabulary 
and argumentation used in public discourse. From the 1880s it is 
possible to observe a substantial increase in the use of terms such as 
'enemy' (wrOg) and 'foreigner(obcokrajozviec) to describe the Jews as a 
collectivity. The earlier eighteenth century reference to the Jew as a 
polluter and spoiler of the country had become elaborated in a national 
context. Thus the Jews were portrayed as a kind of sickness, a social, 
economic and cultural disease that the Polish nation had been 
enduring for a long time. A typical middle -of -the- road opinion was 
as follows: 
"The Jewish Questioný in Poland is like gout, we cannot get rid 
of it, but we have to make sure that it causes us a minimum of 
discomfort., 75 
Terms such as swamp (bagno), mean locusts (szarancza podia), 
filthy insects (plugazve robactzvo), weeds (chwasty), Jewish plague (plaga 
iydowska) and enslavement by Jews (niezvola iydozvska) came to 
comprise the basic ethno-nationalist vocabulary in describing the 
Jewish presence. 76 
Common arguments presented in this anti-Jewish discourse 
were the following: firstly, that the Jews were not suited for 
integration into the Polish nation because they were culturally and 
73See, for example, Minutes of theLodz Municipal Council Meetings of 8 and 16 
ýdi Archivesý, ýONo. 12759.1 am grateful to Dr February 1939,74-75 and 83-85. The -hO 
Jacek Walicki of the 16d! Archives for providing me with this material. 
74See Magnus J. Kryn'ski, 'Politics And Poetry: The Case Of Julian Tuwim. ' The 
Polish Review No. 4,1974,11-14. 
7-ý`This opinion was expressed by Stanislaw Koýmian, a representative of a 
conservative political group based in Cracow, in his review of Theodor Herzl's Der 
Judenstaat (1896). Cited in Nowaczynski, Mocarstwo. 232. 
76See Krzysztof Stepnik, 'Powieýc antysemicka w ostatnich latach Kongresowski' 
Kjaka, No. 39,1992,88-90. 
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ethnically alien and that furthermore they were an older and more 
powerful people than the Poles. Secondly, that alone among the ethno- 
cultural groups inhabiting the Polish territories, the Jews constituted a 
unique case, one that had in the past and could yet have in the future a 
disastrous impact on the Polish state and Polish national 'well -being'. 
That in fact, they were permanently engaged in the process of the 
Judaisation (zaiydzenie) of the Polish universe including its territory, 
economy, language, customs and traditions. That the Jews were also 
traitors to Polish national causes as they frequently represented foreign 
interests, especially those of the chief external Polish enemies, the 
Germans and the Russians. That they were carriers of anti-Polish 
doctrines, values and norms such as free thinking, Socialism and 
Communism. That Poland was an innocent and suffering victim of the 
Jewish invasion. Finally, that Poles should defend themselves in a 
more organised and effective way so as to show the Jews that they 
were the true and sole owners of Poland. And in fact that the Jews 
were not suited to reside among the Poles but should look for a 
homeland elsewhere. 
In this argumentation the Jew was always characterised as the 
perpetrator vis-a-vis the Pole as the victim, and as a threat to all 
aspects of national life. Here the concept of Jewish economic threat can 
be seen to be based on the interpretation of economic competition in a 
collectivist way. The wide acceptance of this interpretation of 
economic realities had its roots in the lark of a strong Western liberal 
perspective in Polish political and social thought, and in the 
dominance of the ethno-nationalist perspective on economic 
competition. 77 The concept of Jewish political and cultural threat can 
be viewed as based on a biased interpretation of political and cultural 
realities, in which the realities are falsely exploited to fit the ethno- 
national world view. 78 Such perspectives were to have very important 
long-lasting effects on evaluations of, and interactions with, Polish 
Jewry in modem Poland. 
The predisposition to slip into such a distorted perception can 
be seen to be reinforced by two other factors: firstly, by the myth of 
770n the low acceptance of Western liberal thought in Poland, see Jerzy Szacki, 
Liberalizm Po Komunizrnie (Krak6w, 1994), 62-78. 
780n the ethno-nationalist ideological misinterpretations of realities, see George 
Schopflin, 'The politics of national identities. ' in: Nfichael Branch ed., National 
History and Identi! y (Helsinki, 1999), 59-60. 
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victirnhood, which exerted a powerful psychological effect on Polish 
national consciousness during the nineteenth century; secondly, in the 
earlier pre-modem pattern of the moulding of Polish ethno-cultural 
identity. 79 In medieval period, the alien was an important element of 
the crystallisation of Polish identity during a time when the Poles were 
engaged in a struggle for ethnic survival against the then real alien 
threat of the German rulers in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and 
the Teutonic Knights in the fifteenth century. 80 However these two 
factors alone cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of why the Jew 
was singled out as the foremost Threatening Other. 
Complex and highly emotionally charged narratives based on 
the argumentation presented above came to be woven into the myth of 
the Jew as the Threatening Other. These narratives were propagated 
by persons who I define as myth-makers. They came from different 
social groups including the pauperised nobility and intelligentsia of 
gentry origin, and the new bourgeoisie. By profession they were 
journalists, writers, lawyers, pedagogues, politicians, and Catholic 
priests. All can be viewed as ethno-nationalists of different varieties 
and intensities. What historical analysis tells us is that their anti- 
Jewish views were popular within a broad segment of Polish society. 81 
What all these myth-makers had in common was the claim of 
representing and defending both the national and the Catholic 
interests which by that time had become irreversibly intertwined. This 
was due to the fact that during the nineteenth century the Catholic 
clergy was involved in national uprisings and activities aiming at the 
preserving Polish language and culture, thereby reinforcing the 
seventeenth century concept of the Catholic Church as guardian of the 
Polish nation and depository of national traditions. 82 
790n the importance of the sense of victinihood in Polish nineteenth century culture, 
see Jerzy JedlicRi, 'Holy ideals and prosaic life, or the Devil's alternatives. ' in: 
Gomulka, Polonsky, eds., Polish. 45-47. 
8OSee Paul W. Knoll., 'National Consciousness in Medieval Poland', Ethnic Studies, 
Vol. 10,1993,67. 
81The popularity of such opinions within the Polish middle classes was pointed out 
by Andrzej Jaszczuk, S12br Pgzyiywist6w Z Konserwaiystami 0 szlosi Polski 
1870-1903 (Warszawa, 1986), 207-208. Hereafter Jaszczuk, 54 Lor. 
820n the importance of Catholicism in shaping Polish nationalism and national 
identity, see Z. Anthony Kruszewski, 'Nationahsm And Politics: Poland! in George 
Klein, Milan J. Reban, eds., The Politics Of Ethnift In Eastern Europe (New York, 
1981), 151. Hereafter Kruszewski, 'Nationalism. ' Hereafter Klein, Reban, eds., The 
Politics. 
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Among the most prolific and significant myth-makers of the late 
pre-independence period, with works frequently re-printed both 
before and after 1918,1 include the following three authors: 
First, Jan Jeleiiski (1845-1909) -a conservative catholic and self - 
made businessman from the pauperised nobility who propagated the 
myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other on a large scale through his 
own populist press: the two weeklies Soil (Rola), published first in 1883 
and in circulation for next thirty years, and the News for Eveubgjdy 
(Dziennik Dla Wszystkich) set up in 1905, as well as through his 
pamphlets and the setting-up of libraries directed at the Polish non- 
elites. 83 Jelenski can be considered as the first writer to suggest, that in 
the best interest of Poles, the Jews should first be isolated and then 
should disappear through emigration from all the Polish territories. 
He can also be regarded as the propagator of such popular catchy 
phrases as 'do not buy at Jewish shops' (nie kupUl u Zyda), "be aware of 
the Jew` (strzei siC Zyda) and "bread for our own people' (chleb d1a 
swoich). After the social revolution of 1905, which swept through cities 
of the Russian partitioned zone, Jelenski accused the Jews of causing 
social unrest. In his pamphlet entitled To the Enemies of Their Own 
Homeland (Wrogom u4asnej 01czyzny) , he categorised the Jews and 
socialists as the 'killers' of Poland, and voiced his support for the 
political movement of the Endecja. According to him this was the 
party that 'all honest and just' Poles should suppor 1!. 84 
Secondly, Teodor Jeske-CholnSki (1854-1920) -an ex-positivist 
turned conservative, and of German ethnic origin, who was a more 
sophisticated writer of anti-Jewish themes than Jelenski and whose 
works were aimed at a more educated stratum of Polish society. In the 
eighties and nineties he wrote for various conservative papers 
including the afore mentioned Jeleýski's Soil. 85 His most important 
work Let's Get To Know the few (Poznaj 2yda) published in 1912, can 
be viewed as the most elaborated single representative of the myth of 
the Jew as the Threatening Other. It includes the theme of the Jew as 
responsible for all past and present Polish misfortunes and 
83For a good summary of jelenski's anti-Jewish activities, see jaszczuk, 5. Rgr. 212- 
220, and Caka, A§yMflagia. 278-284. 
84jan jeleýski, Wrogom w-tasnej ojgzyzLiy (Warszawa, 1906), 6-10. 
850n jeske-Chom'ski see, WIadyslaw, Niemirycz and Wactaw Olszak, eds., Polski 
Stownik BiogxAficzny Vol. 10, (Wrodaw, 1978), 194-195. Hereafter, Niemirycz, 
Olszak, eds., Polski. 
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weaknesses, the theme of the Jew as a threat to all aspects of Polish life, 
and the theme of the Jew as the 'internal plague, " the polluter of 
Poland, who alone has the power to prevent a future rebirth of the 
Polish state. 
Finally, Andrzej J. Niemojewski (1864-1921), an ex-socialist 
known as the enfant terrible of the Polish intelligentsia, who in contrast 
to the previous two myth-makers fashioned himself on various anti- 
Jewish Russian and Lithuanian writers, the Judeophobes, who 
categorised the Jewish religion as a source of all social evil. 86 
Niemojewski is known for categorising the Jew as the fifth partitioning 
power of Poland in his major work The Structure and the March of the 
Army of the Fifth Partition [of Poland] (Sk? ad i Poch6d Armji Piftego 
Zaboru) published in 1911. He also propagated the myth of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other in his own press IndeRendent Thogght (MyS 
Niepodlegta) which emerged in 1906 and in a series of lectures 
published as booklets including The Jewish Soul in the Nfirror of the 
Talmud (Dusza ýydowska w s'wietle Talmudu) and The Ethics of Talmud 
(Etyka Talmudu). In the latter he stated: 
'Polish Democracy and Patriotism in relation to Judaism and 
Semitism is like culture and civilisation in relation to slavery and 
despotism. It is also like rationalism and free thought in relation to 
revelation and dogmatism. Thus to be a Polish Democrat means to be 
the enemy of Jewishness, in other words, to be an antisemite., 87 
In generaL we can state that from the 1880s onwards the myth 
was propagated in political writings, literary works, and in a 
significant number of publications of conservative, conservative radical 
and catholic provenance. 88 Within the catholic press, the Jesuit 
monthly Common Review (Przeglad Powszechny), edited by Marian 
Morawski (1845-1901) professor of philosophy at the Jagiellonian 
University, was one of the major propagators of the myth of the Jew as 
the enemy both of Catholicism and of the Polish nation. The only 
major exception was the liberal press which was free of images of the 
Jew as the enemy of Poland and of its people. 
86See Niemojewski's defence of the Lithuanian priest Justyn Pranajtis included in the 
booklet SkIad i Pochod Amý Piatego Zaboru (Warszawa, 1911), 3-8. On 
Niemojewski, see Niemirycz, Otszak, Polski. 3-10. 
87Andrzej Niemojewski, Elyka Talmudu (Warszawa, 1917), 127. 
88See Wrobel, Zgas. 22-23. 
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This shows that an important part of late nineteenth century 
Polish political and cultural thought was characterised by a dear anti- 
Jewish theme, a fact generally played down in Polish historiography. 89 
If the subject is discussed at all, it is not submitted to a proper critical 
analysis but rather to a limited explanation placing its roots at 'the 
sense of threat and political, cultural and economic inadequacies 
strongly felt by the underdeveloped Polish middle classes, the 
inefficient bourgeoisie and pauperised intelligentsia', doubtless an 
important part of the nineteenth century Polish experience. 90 Such an 
intellectual position, which is dictated by a considerable degree to the 
saving of national honour, obscures our understanding both of the 
prejudiced nature of the anti-Jewish position and of the importance of 
the exclusivist ethno- nationalist perspective in modem Polish political 
culture. 
The Myth and the Endecja 
In 1897 the myth entered the realm of modem Polish politics. 
This was the year in which the chief and purest exponent of modem 
Polish ethnic nationalism in its integral form, the National Democrats 
movement (Narodowa Demokracja) was set up in Warsaw byRoman 
Dmowski (1864-1939) who became the movemenes unquestioned 
leader. From the outset, the National Democrats movement, 
commonly called Endecja, rejected the actuality of the pre-modern 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious Jagiellonian Poland and advocated the 
concept of a 'powerful' Poland (Polska mocarst7vozva) which was to 
resemble the model of Piast Poland. 91 
The National Democrats movement was diaracterised by its 
rapid development in all three partitioned zones. This was particularly 
visible in the variety of press circulated by the Ende(ja and by its for- 
runner the National League (Liga Narodowa), including papers for the 
youth, intelligentsia, and peasantry, as well as papers for the 6migr6 
89Tbe consequences of such a position were well stated by Frank GoIczewski. 
Goiczewsld, 'Antisemitic. '88. 
90For example, the distinguished Polish historian Krystyna Kersten presents such 
point of view in her otherwise revealing article 'Tbe 'Jewish Communism' 
Stereotype. (The Polish case)' in: Andre Gerrits, Nanci Adler, eds., The Vampires 
Unstaked. National Images. Stereo! ypes and Myths in East Central Eurgj2e 
(Amsterdam, Oxford, 1995), 146. 
91See Andrzej Walicki, The three. ' in: Gomulka, Polonsky, eds., Polish. 34-35. 
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ethnic Polish community in France and the United States. 92 Although 
the membership was initially small, the party's simple political 
message that it was the national party representing the interest of all 
ethnic Poles, was soon to bring a substantial level of popularity within 
different social groups and in all three partitioned zones. 93 In the 
words of a contemporary observer, a Polish Jew Wilhelm Feldman: 
'The National Democrats [was] not a party but a clearly defined 
moral-political movement powerful throughout the whole of 
poland., 94 
The myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other was fast absorbed 
and elaborated in the political writings of the Endecja. And in fact it 
was employed as one of the core elements of its ideology. 95 This 
differentiated Endecja from other emerging political movements such 
as the peasant movement which like Endecja became a party of mass 
support. 96 To the ideologues and politicians of the Polish Peasant 
Party (Polskie Stronninctzvo Ludowe, PSL), the myth constituted more an 
underlying than a central concept in their ideology, and was therefore 
used less frequently and in a more moderate way; whereas the Endecja 
and its associated organisations became the chief and the most 
outspoken disseminator of the myth in its most vulgar and aggressive 
form. 97 In the next chapter, I shall discuss in more detail the 
vocabulary employed by Endecja in reference to the Jew as the 
Threatening Other. 
It is important to emphasise here that the Polish Socialist Party 
(Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS), founded among others by Jozef 
Pilsudski (1867-1935) in 1892, was the only major emerging political 
movement which did not use anti-Jewish themes in its political 
writings and programmes. 98 Despitecontradictory attitudes towards 
Jewish cultural assimilation and minority rights, the PPS ideologues 
92See Bogumif Groff, Naýjonahzrq Chrzegcija: 6ski (Krakow, 1991), 11-20. Hereafter 
Croft, Nadonahzm, 
930n the early development of the Endecja, see Grott, Nadonahzm.. 11-16. 
94Wilhelm Feldman, Rzecz o Narodowej Demokradi (Krak6w, 1902), 4. 
950n anti-Jewish thought in the National Democrats party, see Andrzej Friszke, 
'Pytania o polski nacjonalisnY Wi4eL No. 11,1993,74-85. 
96See Grott, Na! do 67-69 and Norman Davies, 'Polish National Mythologies! 
in: Geoffrey Hosking, George Schopflin eds., Wths, 151. 
97See Edward D. Wynot, 'The Polish Peasant Party and the Jews, 1918-1939. ' in: 
Yisrael Gutman et al..,, The lews of Poland between Two World Wars (Hanover, 
London, 1989), 39-41. Hereafter Gutman et al-, eds. The Jews. 
980n the founders and development of PPS, see 
ýIiwa Polska. 22-37. 
63 
and politicians, having had a strong attachment to the traditions of 
Jagiellonian Poland, saw the Jews as an integral part of Polish 
society - 
99 This manifested itself in PPS support for the concept of 
equality of rights for all citizens of a future Poland regardless of their 
religion and ethnic background. 
Importantly, I argue that there was a qualitative difference 
between the Endecja's anti-Jewish stance and its anti-German position 
which also played an important role in its ideology. In the latter case 
the perception of the Germans as the Threatening Other can be seen as 
based on real historical experiences going back to the medieval period 
when the Polish Kingdom had to defend itself against the German 
policy of Drang nach Osten, and also on the more recent experience of 
the forced Germanisation of ethnic Poles in the Prussian (German) 
partitioned zone, a policy introduced by Chancellor Bismarck of the 
newly united German state (1871). 100 The difference is that in the 
former case the perception of the Jews as the Threatening Other can be 
identified as primarily based on prejudice. 
Furthermore, comparing the image of the Germans against that 
of the Polish Jews as the enemies of Poland, we can see that the former 
image was definitely more static and much more limited in its content 
as the reality obviated any need for elaborated mythologised stories. 
Importantly, in contrast to the Jews, the Germans were not perceived 
as the polluters of national life in all its aspects - political, economic 
and cultural. 
This perspective was reflected in the Polish treatment of the 
German minority in inter-war Poland, where the principle of 
marginalisation. and tit for tat was generally advocated by the Polish 
ethno-nationalists who viewed the German minority through the 
perspective of relations between the Second Republic and the Weimar 
Republic and subsequently the Third Reich. 101 
99See Michal ýIiwa, 'The Jewish Problem in Polish Socialist Thought. ' Polin. Vol. 9, 
1996,26. Hereafter Sliwa, The Jewish! 
1000n the importance of the long historical conflict with Germany in shaping 
modem Polish nationalism, see Kruszewski, 'Nationalism. ' 147-149. On the policy of 
Kulturkampf, see Piotr S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland 1795-1918 
(Seattle and London, 1984), 233-235. 
101For a good summary of the Polish ethno-nationahsts' attitudes and policies 
towards the German ethnic minority, see WIodzimierz Mich, Obgy w 12olskim domu 
(Lublin, 1994), 114-120. Hereafter Mich, QLxy. 
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In the ethno-nationahst view, the Jew, by the sheer fact of who 
he was, was evaluated as the competitor who could only hinder the 
development of the Polish nation. The perception of the Jew as a 
competitor always aiming to undermine Polish national causes was 
reinforced by the demands for equality of rights and communal 
minority rights voiced by the newly established secular Jewish 
movements of both Zionist and socialist orientations. 102 
From 1905 onwards the notion of conflict between Jewish and 
Polish economic interests and between the moral-cultural codes of the 
two communities was continuously stressed in Endecja appeals to the 
ethnic Poles for a national awakening (przebudzenie Polakow) . 
103 
Appeals for a national awakening were particularly intensified in the 
aftermath of the fourth Russian State Duma election of 1912 in which 
the Polish Socialist Party, greatly aided by the Jewish vote, defeated 
Endecja. 104 Although relatively obscure, the PPS candidate 
Eugeniusz Jagiello was widely recognised as 'the only Christian [on 
the electoral list] that was not an antisemite. '105 In the aftermath of 
this election, Endecja's defeated candidate Roman Dmowski 
proclaimed a socialand economic boycott of the Jewish population in 
the Russian partitioned zone, and urged the Poles to unite and rise 
against their internal enemy. The key slogan 'Do not buy at Jewish 
shops' (Nie kupuj u 2yda) was presented by Dmowski as a national 
commandment (nakaz narodozvy). In the press supported by the 
Endecja, that section of the Polish population that did not approve of 
the economic boycott was accused of violating "the most holy national 
principle', whereas Poles who supported it were praised for being 
truly patriotic and Catholic. This development can be viewed as one of 
the first step towards the exclusion of the Jews from the realm of the 
Polish nation. 
1020n Zionist and Bundist aspirations for equality of rights and minority rights for 
the Jews, see Vital, A Peol2le, 610-616. 
103Michael C. Steinlauf argues that the concept of national conflict between Jews and 
Poles gave Polish antisemitism a unique logic that made it different from other 
European antisemitic movements. Michael Steinlauf, Bondage To The Dead. Poland 
and the MemoU of the Holocaust. (New York, 1997), 14. Hereafter Steinlauf, 
Bondage. 
1040n the Endecja's anti-Jewish stance during and after the fourth Duma election in 
Warsaw in 1912, see Stephen D. Corrisin, 'The Jews, the Left, and the State Duma 
Election in Warsaw in 1912: Selected Sources! Polin, Vol. 9,19%, 45-54. Hereafter 
Corrisin, The Jews! 
105Report from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Warsaw Oberpolitseirneister no. 
11379,29 Oct. / 11 Nov. 1912. Cited in Corrisin, 'The Jews. ' 54. 
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The impact of such a practice of social mobilisation through the 
argument of conflict and threat was corTectly analysed two decades 
later by one of the most discen-ting critics of exclusivist ethno - 
nationalism in inter-war Poland, the Polish Jew Ludwik Oberlaender. 
In the Polish-language Zionist journal The lewish Montl-dy (Miesiýcznik 
2ydozvski) Oberlaender states: 
'The ideology of antisemitism, constructed and used by 
Dmowski as a means of awakening " creative powers' within the 
ethnic Polish community, has arrested the development of these 
powers over a long period of time, and is subsequently developing 
into a separate phenomenon. '106 
More recent sociological study shows that this practice has had 
a much longer-lasting effect on Polish national identity. According to a 
survey conducted in Poland in May 1992, the Jews were still viewed as 
competitors in a moral-cultural sense. 107 
The use of the notion of the Jewish threat can also be viewed as 
an important element of the Endeks's process of raising national 
cohesiveness among ethnic Poles of different social classes with 
conflicting social and economic interests. One has to remember here 
that not every social class within Polish society had a fully developed 
Polish national awareness in the 1900s. The gentry, intelligentsia of 
gentry origin, and the bourgeoisie had a strong national awareness, 
whereas the peasantry, the largest social group, was characterised by 
the weakest sense of national awareness and a strong local identity. 108 
In fact a significant segment of the peasantry of this period still 
associated the concept of Polishness with the Polish gentry and the 
serfdom system, and therefore feared it. 109 In such a social context, 
the notion of the je-oAsh threat can be seen as a useful tool for the 
unifying of otherwise conflicting groups -a useful tool of molding the 
modem Polish nation-to-be. 
106Ludwik Oberlaender, 'twolucja pogljd6w Narodowej Demokracji w sprawie 
iydowskiej. ' Nfiesiýcznik Zydowski No. 1,1931,5-6. 
107Krzemin'ski, ed., Czy Polagy. 19-20. 
1080n various levels of national awareness within Polish society, see Lepkowski, 
Uparte. 24-28. 
1090n the lack of development of national consciousness among peasantry in the 
early twentieth century, see Jan Jerschina, 'rhe Catholic Church, The Communist 
State, and the Polish people. ' in Gomu4ka, Polonsky, eds., Polish. 93-95. On the 
peasants' association of Polishness with the gentry and serfdom, see Wapinski, 
Polska. 145-147. 
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A discussion on the role of Endecia in disseminating the myth of 
the Jew as the Threatening Other in the late pre-independence period 
would be incomplete without a brief look at the legacy of Dmowski 
whose role after 1914 as a Polish statesman and politician exceeded in 
importance his earlier role as leader of his party. After all he has 
generally been viewed as the founder of modem Polish nationalism. 
In his views concerning Jews, Dmowski may be regarded as a Polish 
Edouard Drumont (1844-1917) whose own writings was meticulously 
elaborated the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other. 110 
In his first major and later to be most popular work, the 
previously mentioned Thoughts of A Modem Pole, which purported 
to represent the voice of the modem Polish nation-to-be, Dmowski 
elaborates the theme of the Jew as the cause of all past and present 
misfortunes and weaknesses of the Polish nation - including the lack of 
a strong ethnic Polish bourgeoisie, a position strongly modelled on the 
eighteenth century bourgeois thinker Stanislaw Staszic. 
He also elaborates the theme of the Jew as threat to the present 
and future Polish nation and provides a carefully constructed 
explanation as to why the Jews could not be considered as part of the 
Polish nation-to-be. Here a sense of fear of the Other, intertwined with 
a sense of inferiority and superiority toward the Other, becomes 
apparent: 
'We have to come alive and expand our existence [as a nation] 
in all aspects. Our aim should be to become a strong nation, one which 
cannot be defeated. Where we can, we should civilise foreign elements 
and expand our potential by absorbing these elements into our nation. 
Not only do we have a right to do so but this is also our duty .... Our 
national organism should absorb only those [foreign elements] which 
it is capable of assimilating, elements which should serve to expand 
our growth and collective potential -a category Jews do not fall into. 
Their distinctive individuality developed over hundreds of years does 
not allow us to assimilate the majority of them into our nation. The 
reason being that our nation is too young and our national character 
not yet fully formed. In fact it is the Jews who are in a better position 
to assimilate our majority into their culture and even to assimilate a 
part of us in a physical sense. [The other reason we cannot assimilate 
1100n Edouard Drumont, see, for example, Pierre Birnbaum, 'Gregoire, Dreyfus, 
Drancy and the Rue Copernic: Jews at the Heart of French History/ in: Pierra Nora, 
ed., Realms of Memogy. Vol. 1, (New York, 1996), 381-387. 
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them] lies in the character of their race which has never lived in the 
way in which a society of our type has lived. [The Jews] have far too 
many characteristics that are alien to our moral code and that would 
play a destructive role in our lives. Mingling with the majority of them 
would lead to our destruction: the young and creative elements on 
which the foundation of our future existence depends would be 
dissolved by the Jewish elements. 'l 11 
In The Tewish Ouestion Part 1: Sel2aratism in the Case of the 
Tews and Its Source (Kwestia iydowska, czesc L Separatyzm 2ydýw i jego 
ýrodia), published in 1909, Dmowski divides the Jewish community 
into two sections - the first and larger section comprised of Jews who 
were either religious or secular, both Socialist and Zionist, and the 
second smaller group comprised of culturally assimilated Jews. 
Dmowski evaluates the whole of the first group as a hostile camp that 
has consciously 'embarked on a battle" with the Polish nation, while 
the second group of assimilated Jews he criticises for failing to 
transform themselves into 'proper, rightful Poles", whose Polishness is 
shabby and whose Jewishness is obvious in their entire world outlook 
and who additionally dare to force upon Polish society their ideas and 
values. 
'With the fast growing numbers of Jewish intelligentsia, the 
number of assimilated Jews has been expanding but has been losing its 
quality. This great production of assimilated Jews has shown signs 
characteristic of mass production, namely in forms superficial and 
shallow. The numbers of Poles of Jewish origin have increased 
enormously but they have been shabby second-rate Poles ... This 
intelligentsia has created its own Jewish sphere with a separate soul 
and separate attitude. Moreover, it has felt its power growing and 
therefore it has come to desire to force its own values and aspirations 
upon Polish society. '112 
In The Fall of Conservative Thought in Poland (Upadek mys'lz 
konserzvatywnej'w PoIsce), published in 1914, he re-states his previous 
position and emphasises that all categories of Jews constitute a force 
directed against the Polish nation. 
0 lllRoman Dmowski, Mýysli Nowor-zesnego Polaka (Lwow, 1904) 2nd ed., 214-215. 
112Roman Dmowski, Kwestia kydowska. Sel2aralyzm jyd6w i jeSo ir6dla. 
(Warszawa, 1909), 29. 
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CharacteristicaUy, Dmowski insists that his views towards Jews 
have not been shaped by prejudice but by concerns over Poland: 
'In spite of everything, I can honestly say that I do not feel 
hatred towards the Jews. And in general I am not guided in politics by 
hatred. I only care about Poland and its well-being, and regard it as 
my duty not to allow anyone to cause my country any harm. '113 
By this strategy he suggests that firstly there were 'objective 
grounds' for considering Jews as the Threatening Other, and secondly, 
that it was the Jews themselves who were responsible for their being 
categorised as the enemy. 
It is important to stress here that such reasoning was used in the 
rationalisation and justification of the notion of antisemitism as 
national self-defence. Here it was the Jew who was himself to blame 
for the emergence of antisemitism and for those antisemitic activities 
directed against him. A good illustration of this position can be found 
in the previously mentioned work of Teodor Jeske-Choinski Lef s Get 
To Know the Tew (Poznaj Zyda): 
"Antisemitism is simply a form of self-defence by Christians 
against the active hatred directed against them by Jews. Antisemitism 
will cease to exist when the Jew finally understands that living in 
someone else's home means learning how to be an acceptable guest 
and how neither to aspire to the role of the host nor to harm the host 
.... After all our Christian culture is humanitarian. ' 
114 
Although such a defining of antisemitism was not limited only 
to the Polish case but also had European dimensions, it still had its 
own particular internal history in Poland. In general, Polish ethno- 
nationalists were convinced that their own nation among all European 
Christian nations was the one most threatened by the Jews and 
therefore that their own self-defence against this 'enormous threae was 
primarily a necessity and could not be evaluated as morally and 
socially wrong. Such a position was widely elaborated: 
'The self-defence of Christian nations against Jews is not only 
desirable but is also a duty dictated by the instinct for self - 
preservation. At present, as in no other periods of time, fulfilling this 
duty is so urgent because Jews, having been granting equality, are 
113Roman Dmowski, 'Speech of 1 October 1912. ' Cited in Adolf NowaczyAski, 
Mocarstwo. 238. 
114Teodor jeske-Choinski, Pozngj Zyda (Warszawa, 1912), 238. 
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powerful and dangerous on an incredible scale just as they were before 
the destruction of the Temple ... Self-defence has to be both material 
and spiritual. Not only it is important to defend the material culture 
and the right to exist, but also to defend the Christian soul which has 
been poisoned by the Jewish press and to defend the Christian 
conscience which has been mocked by Jewish cynicism and 
commercial shrewdness ... All this is of primary relevance to us Poles, 
whom the Jews have come to be particularly fond of , so particularly in 
fact that we are on the verge of suffocation ... [The Jews speak thusj' If 
you do not allow us to establish a 'Judeo-Polonia state' and a nation of 
judeo-Polish people, ' we will strangle you. 'l 15 
Generally, it can be seen that on the eve of the First World War, 
when the 'dream! of Poland regaining its independence was coming 
closer to realisation, that the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other 
was already an important element of ethno-national political culture. 
Here the myth emerged as provider of answers to all the significant 
questions and problems of Polish national existence. This was to 
continue during the inter-war period, a turning-point in terms of the 
impact this social construction was to exert both on society and 
political culture in the modem era. 
The Myth and Political Culture 1918-1939 
The newly resurrected Second Polish Republic of 1918 was still 
a multi-national state whose ethnic make-up closely resembled that of 
the pre-partitioned First Republic. According to the census of 1931, the 
ethnic Polish population numbered approximately sixty-five per cent; 
the Ukrainians as the largest minority sixteen per cent; the Jews ten per 
cent; the Belorussians six per cent; and the Germans three per cent. 
Approximately sixty-five per cent of the entire population declared 
affiliation to the Catholic denomination. 116 
Although Poland, as the first among the eight newly created 
states of Eastern Europe, signed the Minorities Treaty, this act was not 
conducted in good faith but under the tremendous pressure of the 
Great Powers. In practice, ethno-nationalists of all varieties could not 
stomach this document. To them, the Nfinority Treaty meant on 
115ibid., 238-239. 
116Data cited in juliusz Bardach Boguslaw Lesnodorski and Michal Pietr-zak ed., 
Historia ustroju i prawa 12olskiego (Warszawa, 1994), 468 -467. Hereafter Bardach 
et A Historia. 
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principle an act of invasion into the domestic policies of the Polish 
state, while Jewish minority rights in particular were viewed as a kind 
of insult and attempted crime against the Polish state and its 
people. 117 Such an evaluation of Jewish minority rights was wide - 
spread despite the fact that the various and ideological-ly diverse 
Jewish pohtical parties, demanding such rights, had pledged loyalty to 
the Polish state after it regained its independence. 118 Furthermore, in 
Endecja circles, International and Polish Jewry was frequently held 
responsible for Poland being forced to sign this 'hun-dhating treaty' 
which was finally renounced in September 1934 by Foreign Nfinister 
Jozef Beck. 119 
in general, the popularity of ethno-national attitudes towards 
minorities resulted in an increasing ineptitude on the part of the Polish 
state in handling its minorities. 120 In the case of the Ukrainian and 
Belorussian minorities, which after all had been treated as part of the 
same Slavic family, this was manifested in an increasing support for 
their polonisation, openly advocated in the thirties. In the case of the 
Jewish minority, which significantly was the only large minority not to 
have irredentist territorial aspirations towards the newly 'resurrected' 
Polish state, this was manifested in a number of ways of which the 
endorsement of the project of exclusion of Polish Jewry through 
emigration can be viewed as the most significant. 
Likewise during the late pre-independence period, Polish Jewry, 
unlike any other minority, found itself at the centre of ethno-nationahst 
attention. Polish Jewry was placed in the limelight of any debate 
concerning the state and its people. As early as at the beginning of the 
Second Republic, when the EndecJa held one third of all seats in the 
first Polish parliament, the Endeks declared that the Jews were in a 
state of war with the true owners of the Polish state - the Polish 
majority. The aim of such rhetoric was to create an atmosphere of 
social panic and anti-Jewish hostility, particularly among the poor, 
117C)n the history of the Minorities Treaty in Poland, see Salo Baron, Ethnic Minoft 
Rj&ts (Oxford, 1985), 1-45. 
118For various statements of loyalty to the Polish state expressed by various Jewish 
political parties in the inter-war Polish Jewish press, see, for example, the collection 
Ten Years of Poland's Independence In the Polish-Tewish Press (Warsaw, 1931). 
119See, for example, Tworkowski, Polska. 36 and JOZef Kruszyn'ski, Zýydzi i kwestia 
iydowska (W4oclawek, 1920), 100-101. 
120Anthony Kruszewski states that 'Poles could not understand, except for a few 
politicians on the Socialist Left, the re-awakening of national aspirations of the 
Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. ' Kruszewskiý 'Nationalism. ' 158. 
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uneducated and credulous masses and youths. Judging by their 
involvement in outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence, these were the social 
groups most susceptible to the Endecja's crude and emotionally 
charged propaganda. 
One of the most conspicuous indicators of the persistence of 
such early perceptions of Jews on the part of the inter-war political 
elites, was the fact that equality of rights, in fact guaranteed by the 
Polish constitution of March 1921, continued to be perceived in terms 
of Jewish privilege, a perception deeply rooted in the pre-modern way 
of thinking. A year after the March constitution became the binding 
law of the state this phenomenon was observed by the Zionist 
journalist Apolinary Hartglas. In his pamphlet The Yellow Patch (Z61ta 
Lata), Hartglas compares contemporary Polish perceptions of equality 
of rights for Jews to the common perceptions during the late 
eighteenth century Four Year Parliament (1788-1792), and notes a clear 
discrepancy between the official endorsement of the concept of 
equality of rights, and its practice in relation to the treatment of Polish 
Jewish citizens. In particular he refers to various discriminatory pieces 
of legislation that the new Polish state had inherited from its 
partitioned political powers. Legislations which, still applied 
commonly by Polish state officials, violated the principle of equality of 
rights for Jews. 
'A few advocates of Jewish equality of rights state that all 
legal restrictions should be abolished in order to speed up the 
integration of Jews by assimilation into Polish society. A much larger 
group claims that even equality granted on paper should be made 
conditional on the level of integration and assimilation of Jews into the 
Polish [ethnic] nation. At the same time it is dear to them that three 
million Polish Jews cannot and do not wish to be assimilated in such a 
way. Overall there is a lack of support for true equality of rights for 
jews. '121 
Looking closely at ethno-nationalist approaches to the issue of 
equality of rights for the Jews one can see that Hartglas' observations 
were both discerning and accurate. Ethno-nationahsts of all varieties 
and intensities frequently referred to such equality of rights as an 
attempt at gaining privileges by Jews for Jews. In fact many prominent 
I 121Apolinary Hartglas, 'iolta4ata (Splawa ogramczenprawnych). Part F in: Yitzhak 
Gruenbaurn ed., Mate1jaly w spra .e zydowskiej w PoIsce, Vol. 5 (Warszawa, 1922), 
8. 
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politicians used such references in their parliamentary speeches, such 
as Wincenty Witos (1874-1945), the unquestioned leader of the so- 
called moderate wing of the Peasant movement and three-time Prime 
Minister in the inter-war period, and General PAadyslaw Sikorski 
(1881-1943), short-term Prime Minister from 1922 to the first half of 
1923 and Prime Minister-to-be during the Second World War. 122 
Here are two illustrations. On January 19 1923 Premier Sikorski stated 
in parliament: 
"The Jewish minority undoubtedly believes that the rights which 
Poland has voluntarily granted it will be safe-guarded by the 
goverrunent. But a note of warning is necessary here, because too 
often the defence of its justified interests has been turned by the Jewish 
side into a struggle for privilege. '123 
On 17 October 1923, the newly appointed Premier Witos stated 
the following: 
'Here with full responsibility, I must say that Polish society in 
general is, in many areas, still a long way from possessing what the 
Jews in Poland possess. Constitutional rights apply to everyone 
equally, and if the honourable deputy [the Zionist W, Dr Reich] were 
to review all the areas of life and objectively draw the necessary 
conclusions, he would arrive at the conviction that Poland ranks first in 
Europe in tolerance; it is a country where Jews, above all others, fare 
best. '124 
References to equality of rights as an attempt by Jews at gaining 
privileges frequently featured in the political programmes of various 
political parties. 125 Here are two examples. The first extract comes 
from the political programme of the National Workers' Party 
(Narodowa Partia Robotnicza, NPR) led by Karol Popiel, which merged 
with the Christian Democratic Party (Stronnictzvo Chrzes'cijaýskiej 
Demokracji) into the Labour Party (Stronnictzvo Pracy) in 1937. The 
second extract comes from the political programme of one of the 
122For a discussion of Polish politicians' parliamentary speeches concerning Jews, 
see Isaac Lewin, The fewish Communijy in Poland (New York, 1985), 216-240. 
123ibid., 221. 
124ibid., 225. 
125For a detailed description of various Polish political parties approaches to the 
position of Jews in inter-war Poland, see Anna Laudau-Czajka, W jednym stali 
domu ... KonceRcje rozwiazania 
kwestii ýýdowskAi w 12ublicysiyce 12ol 
(Warszawa, 1998), 240-2N. Hereafter Laudau-Czajka W jeanym. and Jerzy Holzer, 
'Polish Political Parties and Antisemitism. ' Polin, Vol. 8,1994,194-205. Hereafter 
Holzer'Polish. ' 
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smaller Christian Democratic parties, the Polish Catholic and People's 
Union (Polskie Stronnictwo Katolicko-Ludowe, PSKL). 
1. 'The National Workers' Party does not recognise the Jews as a 
separate national minority and denies their jargon [Yiddish] the right 
to be considered as an official language .... Recognising the equality of 
rights and duties of all citizens of the Polish State, the NPR opposes all 
sorts of attempts of gaining privileges on the part of the Jewish 
community at the expense of the Christian population, namely, 
attempts at receiving rights, and attempts at abstaining from fulfilling 
their duties towards the State., 126 
2. 'Concen-ting the Jewish mass of several millions, the Polish 
Catholic and People's Union upholds the ground of traditional Polish 
religious toleration, which is guaranteed by the Constitution, and on 
the grounds of social and civic justice. However, the Party is not going 
to tolerate the privileged position of Jews in any aspect of life ... Our 
point of view is that there are definitely too many Jews in Poland and 
that their influence on our life is generally negative and harmful, and 
that the saturation of Polish cities with Jews also causes poverty 
among the Jews themselves. PSKL wholeheartedly supports the 
emigration of Jews from Poland to other countries and will defend the 
Polish state from the new Jewish invasion from the East. Although we 
grant the Jews equal rights with other citizens and condemn anti- 
Jewish excesses on the part of irresponsible elements - we will not 
allow the Jews to create a state within a state and will concentrate all 
our efforts against Jewish parties acting against the Polish state and its 
sovereignty. ' 127 
These examples exemplify the fact that there was a positive 
correlation between the perception of the Jew as the Threatening Other 
and the negative approach towards the concept of equality of rights for 
Jews. Such a situation was in fact registered by Polish Jews at the time. 
In February 1939 the Zionist leader Moshe Kleinbaurn stated: 
'From a formal point of view the Jews were citizens enjoying 
equal rights; in reality they are treated as a 'foreign and harmful 
element'. It is in the nature of life to destroy all things that are untrue, 
126Programme of the National Workers' Party in- Ewa Orlof, Andrzej Pasternak eds., 
Progi: a! py partii i stronnictw p2li! ycznych w Polsce w latach 1918-1939 (Rzesz6w, 
1993), 143. Hereafter Orlof, Pasternak, ProgAmy. 
127Programme of the Pohsh Cathotic and People's Union. Orlof, Pasternak, 
Progrgmy 180. 
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founded on fiction and on an internal he. There wiU therefore have to 
come a radical change in the attitude of the Polish government to the 
Jews: for good or for ill, as true citizens or as 'pernicious aliens. " One 
way or the other. '128 
The negative impact of the myth on approaches towards 
equality of rights for Jews became increasingly apparent in the second 
half of the thirties when the Polish state actively embarked on a 
curtailment of such equality. Here a particular trend is discernible. 
Unlike, in states such as Germany, Hungary and Romania, where anti- 
Jewish legislation was openly and decisively introduced, the Polish 
state was characterised by a degree of reluctance towards the open 
implementation of such legislation. 129 Thus, with the exception of 
some laws directed explicitly against the Jewish community, such as 
the restriction on ritual slaughter (shechitah), the general practice was to 
introduce bills which formally looked as though they would affect all 
citizens and thus could not be categorised as discriminatory against the 
Jewish minority. 130 However, these laws were in practice directed 
against the religious, social and economic rights of Jews. 
Recent historical research conducted on different political 
parties, organisations and social institutions reveals that as exclusivist 
ethnic nationalism increased and became the driving force in the 
political culture, the Endecja's anti-Jewish perspective found 
increasingly common support among a large segment of otherwise 
ideologically diverse political elites, the Church, and society at 
large. 131 
128MOshe Sneh (Kleinbaum), 'Hoser omez ba-zad ha-yehudi. ' Cited in Vital, People. 
799. 
129For a concise summary of the treatment of the Jewish minority in Eastern 
European states, see Ezra Mendelsohn, 'German and Jewish Minorities in the 
European Successor States Between the World Wars - Some Comparative Remarks. ' 
in: Ezra Mendelsohn, Chone ShmeruR, eds., Studies in Polish Te3yry (jerusalerrt, 
1987), 51-64. Hereafter Mendelsohn, 'German. ' 
1300n the problem of the violation and curtailment of the principle of equality of 
rights for Jews in inter-war Poland, see Bernard D. Weinryb, Tewish Epjmcýipation 
Under Attack (New York, 1942), 32-34,63-64; and Jerzy Tomaszewski, 'The Civil 
Rights of Jews in Poland. ' Polin, Vol. 8,1994,115-128. 
1310n similarities of political perspective on Jews among otherwise ideologically 
diverse political parties, see, for example, WIodzimierz Mich, Qbgy. 25-27. For an 
detailed analysis of anti-Jewish positions within the conservative movement, i see 
the 
monograph by Wlodzimierz Mich, Problem Mniejszoýci Narodo3yych w Wsli 
Poli! ycznej Polskiego Ruchu Konserwaiywnego (1918-1939) (Lublin, 1992), 59-154. 
Hereafter Mich, Problem. 
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The myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other was increasingly 
adopted in various forms and to a varying degree by the Peasant 
movement, the Christian Democrats, the conservatives, the 
monarchists, and by many other smaller political parties. Prominent 
figures such as the afore mentioned Wincenty Witos of the Peasant 
movement, Wojciech Korfanty of the Christian-Democratic movement, 
and Wladyslaw Studnicki of the conservative movement, frequently 
expressed the myth in a more or less restrained form. For example, in 
his work The Polish-Tewish Issue (Sprazva Polsko-Zydozvska), Studnicki 
categorised the Jews as 'parasites on the healthy branch of the Polish 
tree' and blamed them for the disintegration of pre-modem Poland. 132 
As a rule, the only main pohtical camps to reject the myth were 
the Polish Socialist Party, and Joseph Pilsudski's Independence Camp, 
established after Pilsudski left the ideal of Socialism for the ideal of 
Independence. 133 However, even within some sections of these two 
political camps, the presence of the myth came to be noticeable, 
particularly in the thirties. 
In the case of the PPS, dear evidence that a small group of its 
active members were susceptible to the exclusivist ethno-national 
perspective was the publication of Jan M. Borski! s pamphlet The 
Tewish Issue and Socialism: Polemics with the Bund (Sprawa Zydozvska 
a socjalism: Polemika z Bundem) by the official PPS publishing house 
The Worker (Robotnik) in 1937. In this pamphlet, Borski, the editor of 
the main PPS paper The Worker (Robotnik), categorised the Jews as 
spiritually and emotionally alien to Poles and called for the emigration 
of Jews from Poland. However, it is important to stress here that 
Borski's pamphlet was primarily a reaction to his party"s recognition of 
the principle of minority rights for Jews, and was met with strong 
criticism on the part of influential ppS politicians. 134 
132Wadyslaw Studnicki, S12rawa Polsko-ivdowska (Warszawa, 1936), 5,. For a 
contemporary critical review of Studnicki's work, see Sprajýý Narodowoýciowe, 
No. 3,1936,319-320. 
133Pilsudski's gradual ideological evolution towards the ideal of Independence 
began during the first decade ?f the twentieth century, see Alina Kowalczykowa, 
Pilsudski i Trady! ýa (Chotomow, 1991), 119. On Pilsudski's attitude towards the PPS 
in 1918, see Daria Nalecz, Sen o wlada. Inteligenda wobec niel2odlegio; ci 
(Warszawa, 1994), 76. 
1340n the PPS position on issues concerning the Jewish minority in the inter-war 
period, see Sliwa 'Tbe Jewish. ' 14-31 and Antony Polonsky, 'Me Bund in Polish 
Political Life, 1935-1939. ' in: Ezra Mendelsohn ed., Essential Papers on Jews and the 
Left (New York, London, 1997), 166-197. 
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In the case of the Independence Camp, the absorption of the 
myth by a distinguished number of its members was particularly 
significant because out of this movement emerged the so-called 
Sanacja, which constituted the governing body from the time of 
Pilsudski's coup d'6tat in May 1926 until the outbreak of the Second 
World War in September 1939.135 In general, the Sanacia, opposed by 
both the Endecia and the Left-wing political parties, was itself divided 
into two sections, the left-wing and the right-wing. 136 In time the 
latter constituted its politically most prominent part. 
A good illustration of the relatively early spread of the 
exclusivist ethno-nationalist perspective on Jews within the Sanacýa 
government was a speech by the N4P Boguglaw Nfiedzin'ski during the 
parliamentary Budget Conm-dssion session of February 1934. In his 
speech, Nfiedzinski made remarks about the Jewish community similar 
to those commonly found among Endecýa M[Ps: that he was personally 
disappointed that three million Jews lived in Poland and that Polish 
cities were occupied by huge Jewish masses and that everyone would 
prefer that all of them be gone. 137 Unsurprisingly, his remarks, which 
caused a degree of embarrassment to the government of the time 
which was still supportive of the inclusion of Jews in the polity, 
received unprecedented applause from the Endecja Ws. 
Importantly, after the death of the Marshal in 1935, exclusivist 
ethno-nationalism found a growing number of supporters among the 
right-wing Sanacja. In fact, in the post-1935 reality, the right-wing 
Sanacja came very dose in its perception and evaluation of the Polish 
Jews to that of the Endecja. This was particularly visible in the newly 
set up political organisation, the so-called Camp of National Unity 
(Ob6z Zjednoczenia Narodowego, OZON) which emerged in February 
1937. In the OZON, headed by Colonel Adam Koc and under the 
patronage of the President of State Ignacy Moscicki (1867-1946) and 
1351n fact, as a result of the parliamentary election of 1930, Sanacja gained a majority 
of seats (forty-six point eight per cent), and on forming the government became 
independent of their political opponents. The Endeýja became the main party of 
opposition with twelve point seven per cent. See Szymon Rudnicki, Oboz; 
Narodowo-Radyk&y. Geneza i dzialalnosc' (Warszawa, 1985), 58-59. Hereafter 
Rudnicki, Oboz. 
136The term Sanacia means healing or restoration and comes from the Latin sanatio. 
It refer-red to Pilsudski's aim of restoring health to the political, social, and moral life 
of Poland after his coup of May 1926. 
1370n Boguslaw Mýedzm'ski's speech at the Budget Commission session on 10 i February 1934, see 'Zydzi W Sejmie. ' Spraiyy NarodowoSciowe, No. 1,1934,89-90. 
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P Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigýy, the exclusivist ethno-nationalist 
position came to be the most explicit, as the organisation represented 
an attempt at an official merging of PAsudski"s Independence ethos 
with that of the Endecja. 138 As a result, in May 1938, the Supreme 
Council of OZON adopted a thirteen paragraph resolution on "the 
Jewish Questiori! in which the myth of the Jew as the chief Threatening 
Other served as a rationale for the proposal of the mass emigration of 
Jews from Poland. 139 
It is worth noting here that both OZON and the Endecja 
constituted mass movements. OZON reached the figure of one 
hundred thousand members in 1938, while the Endecja numbered 
approximately two hundred thousand members in 1939, a figure 
higher than both the membership of the Polish Peasant Party and the 
PPS combined. 140 
The Catholic Church and the Myth 
Characteristically, the myth was also absorbed by the Polish 
Catholic Church which over and above all other social institutions in 
inter-war Poland had a real impact on the minds of the population, 
particularly on the largest segment, the Polish peasantry, who 
constituted approximately three quarters of the entire population. 141 
Important recent historical research on the Catholic Church clearly 
shows that the anti-Jewish position was dearly manifested in the inter- 
war Catholic press by a large segment of the Catholic clergy, both 
among both its lower and upper ranks. 142 Apart from a small 
1380n the merging of Pilsudski's ethos with that of Endecja within the OZON camp 
whose membership was only open to ethnic Poles, see Grott, Naýjonahzm. 61-63. 
139See Emanuel Melzer, 'Antisemitism in the Last Years of the Second Polish 
Republic. ' in: Gutman et al., eds., The Jews, 126-140. Hereafter Melzer, 
'Antisemitism. ' 
1400n the endorsement of Endecja' programme by the late Sanacja government, see, 
for example, Bogurnil Grott, Nacjonalizm, 62-63 and Yisrael Gutman, 'Polish 
Antisernitism between the Wars: An Overview. ' in: Gutman et al. eds., The Tews, 
103-106. Hereafter Gutman, 'Polish. ' 
AlSee Gutman'Polish. '152. 
1420n the Catholic Church's position on Jews as reflected in the Catholic press, see 
Ronald Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism. Poland, 1933-1939 (Chur, 
1994), 79-87, Hereafter, Modras, The Catholic; Ronald Modras, The Catholic Press in 
Inter-War Poland and the 'Jewish Question': Metaphor and the Developing Rhetoric 
of Exclusion. ' East European lewish Affairs Vol. 24, No. 1,1994,49-69; Anna 
Laudau-Czajka, 'The Image of the Jew in the Catholic Press during the Second 
Republic. ' Polin, Vol. 8,1994,146-175. Hereafter Laudau-Czajka, 'The Image. '; 
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number of exceptions, such as the paper Trend (Prqd) of the Cathohc 
youth movement Rebirth (Odrodzenie), the Cathohc press propagated 
in various ways the myth of the Jew as the enemy of the Polish nation 
and of Catholicism. Taking into account the fact that the Catholic press 
of that time constituted twenty-three per cent of the entire Pohsh press, 
and that press was the main medium of mass communication, this 
indicates the extent to which the Cathohc population was exposed 
through the Cathohc medium to the exclusivist ethno-nationalist 
perspective on Jews. 143 
Articles, rhymes and poems in forms resembling prayers 
expressed the myth. For example, the previously mentioned monthly 
Jesuit Common Review which was directed at sophisticated readers, 
published, in December of 1922, the following poem entitled 'Yet we 
are bhnd !' (A mysmy ... slepi! ). Here is a short extract: 
jewry is contaminating Poland thoroughly: 
It scandalises the young, destroys the unity of the common 
people. 
By means of the atheistic press it poisons the spirit, 
Incites to evil, provokes, divides... 
A terrible gangrene has infiltrated our body 
Yet we ... are blind 
The Jews have gained control of Polish business, 
As though we are imbeciles, 
And they cheat, extort, and steal... '144 
Like the Endecia's press, the Catholic press was dynamic and 
enjoyed a good sized readership. A good illustration of the popularity 
of some of the Catholic papers was the Franciscan Little D& (Maty 
Dziennik), which first appeared in the summer of 1935 in eight 
thousand copies, and which reached an unprecedented one hundred 
and forty thousand and six hundred and fifty copies by the end of the 
and Franciszek Adarnski, 'Me Jewish Question in Polish Religious Periodicals in the 
Second Republic: The Case of the PrzeSlad katohcki. ' Polin, Vol. 8,1994,129-146. 
Hereafter Adamski, 'The Jewish! 
143Data concerning the percentage of the Catholic press in inter-war Poland is cited 
in Andrzej Paczkowski, Prasa p2lska 1918-1939 (Warszawa, 1980), 222-223. 
Hereafter Paczkowski, Prasa. 292-293. 
144"A mysmy ... slepi.! ', Przegl4d Powszechny, 7 Dec. 1922. Cited in Laudau-Czajka, 'The Image. ' 169. Similar rhyming poems were published in the radical ethno- 
nationalist monthly for university students Alma Mater, See, for example, Alma 
Mater, No. 10,1938,7. 
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same year. 145 In this paper, directed at the unsophisticated reader, 
simple stories of the individual lives of Catholic Poles were published 
on a regular basis. As a rule, in such stories, the Jew was always made 
responsible for the hardship and misery of their hves. 146 The Jew was 
the perpetrator, and the Catholic Pole - the long suffering victim. 
Looking at the relationship between the Catholic Church and 
the core ethno-nationalist party the Endecja, two issues have to be 
bome in mind. Firstly, that despite some ideological problems and 
disagreements, there was a dose link between the two as far as the 
issue of the Polish state and nation were concerned. The Endecja 
adhered to the Catholic ethos and emphasised the importance of the 
place of the Catholic Church in the state, as expressed in the concept of 
the Catholic state of the Polish nation (KatollCkie pan'stwo narodu 
polskiego). hi exchange, the Endecja enjoyed a substantial level of 
popularity among the Catholic clergy who identified themselves with 
the ideology of ethno-nationalism. 147 The Catholic press often stated 
that 'healthy nationalism .... is a natural supporter of Catholicism and 
that Catholics have a duty to nurture nationalism., 148 
In my opinion, in the relationship between the Catholic Church 
and the Endecja one can see a particular fusion of exclusivist ethno- 
nationalism and religion, a fusion resulting in a highly Catholic ethno- 
nationalism and highly ethno-nationalist Catholicism. The second 
issue is that with regard to the perception of Jews as the chief 
Threatening Other, the Ende4ja used Catholicism to justify its ideas 
and programmes. Here, Catholicism was also used as an argument 
against associating the Polish ethno-nationalist position on Polish Jews 
with that of the Nazi position on German Jews. The Endeks 
continuously insisted that their own perspective was not based on 
racist grounds like the Nazi one, but was rooted in concerns over the 
fate of the Polish nation, a notion that, as I have already shown, 
1450n the popularity and circulation of M* Dziennik , see Paczkowsld, Prasa. 22-2-223. 
146See, for example, stories such as 'Incredible Relationships in the Jewish Factory. ' 
MaIy Dziennik, No. 72,28. June, 1935, and 'Jewish Educators Poison Our Children 
with the Venom of Hatred and Atheism! M* Dziennik, No. 69,25 June 1935,3. 
1470n the links between the Endecja and the Catholic Church, see Grott, 
Nagjonahzm. 89-93. On the importance of the Catholic Church in Polish society of 
inter-war Poland, see Kruszewski, 'Nationahsrn-', 150 -152. 
148See, for example, Rev. Fanciszek BtotnicK ýKosciol- Narod i Panstwo. ' Pro 
Christo, No. 3, March, 1937,42. This article was reprinted from another catholic 
paper Gazeta Ko9cietna. No. 3,17 January 1937. 
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emerged in the pre-independence period. A good illustration of such a 
position is the article 'Catholicism, Racism and the Jewish Question" 
(Katolicizm, raslZm i sprawa zydo7vska), published in the chief theoretical 
paper of the Endecja National Thought (Mysl Narodowa) on 15 
December 1935. Here are some extracts: 
'Our ideology is older than Flitler's ideology .... In our treatment 
of Jews we never found ourselves in conflict with the Church .. We are 
not racists ... our main goal is to serve the nation. There is no conflict 
between our nationalism and Catholicism. We define the Jews as the 
enemy of our nation and as a foreign element which has caused the 
degeneration of European culture and civilisation ... the battle of the 
Polish nation with the Jews does not stand in conflict with the Catholic 
Church, but in fact, serves her interest. '149 
This type of reasoning, which, clearly involved a high level of 
rationalisation of the Jew as the enemy of the Polish nation, allowed 
the core Polish ethno-nationalists to completely dismiss some striking 
similarities to that of the Nazi perspective of German Jews as the chief 
Threatening Other of the German nation. 150 
Characteristically, this high level of rationalisation of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other, and of the Poles as long suffering victims, a 
principle applicable not only to the Endeks but to all kinds of Polish 
ethno-nationalists, prevented them from critically examining their 
position concerning the Polish Jewish minority. Such lack of 
questioning of their position, already present in previous periods, was 
also evident in those ethno-nationalists who were opposed to the use 
of anti-Jewish violence as a means of "solving the Jewish Question' in 
inter-war Poland. While they could recognise anti-Jewish violence as 
socially and morally wrong, they entirely rejected the possibility of 
their views being prejudiced, both socially and morally. A good 
illustration of such a phenomenon was OZON's ideological declaration 
published in the majority of papers in 1937: 
149'Katolicizm, rasizm i sprawa zydowska'. Mysl Narodowa, No. 51,15 December 
1935,1-2. 
150on the perception of Jews as the chief Threatening Other of the German nation 
and state during the inter-war period, see an important article by Omer Bartov, 
'Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust. ' American 
Historical Review, Vol. 13, No. 3,1998,771-816. Hereafter Bartov, 'Defining. ' For a 
comparison of Polish and German political antisemitism prior to 1939, see William H. 
Hagen, 'Before the "Final Solution": Toward a Comparative Analysis of Political 
Antisemitism in Inter-War Germany and Poland! The Journal of Modem Histojy, 
No. 68,1996,351-381. 
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'With regard to the Jewish population our position is this: we 
value too highly the standard and content of our cultural life and the 
public peace, law, and order that no state can dispense with to approve 
acts of licence or brutal anti-Jewish reactions which hurt the prestige 
and dignity of a great nation. On the other hand, the instinct for 
cultural self-defence is understandable and the tendency of Polish 
society to economic independence is natural. '151 
The fact that a substantial segment of the political elites and the 
Catholic Church propagated the myth allows us to infer that the myth 
was to some degree absorbed by a significant segment of Polish 
society. The large circulation of local and national press disseminating 
the myth serves as evidence of this. Even in a region such as 
Pomerania where Jews constituted less than seven-tenths of one per 
cent of the population, the local population was I)ombarded' with 
publications expressing the myth. 152 
Among the more significant groups publicly condemning the 
evaluation of the Jews as the enemy of Poland and of its people were 
the small break-away left-wing of SanacJa, the Democratic Party 
(Stronnicftvo Demokratyczne), the PPS, and those political and social 
organisations whose majority of members adhered to the PPS and 
Democratic Party ethos such as the Association of Polish Teachers 
(Zwia, zekNauczycielsftvaPolskiego). 153 Among the better known 
individuals were intellectuals of progressive, liberal views such as the 
philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Nfichal ý&chalowicz, Director of the 
Child-ren Clinic at the Joseph Pilsudski University of Warsaw, and 
Piotr Gqpszyniec, Professor of the University of Jan Kazimierz in L'viv 
(Lwow). 154 Asa rule these organisations and individuals were 
labelled as traitors to the Polish nation and as servants of the Jews, and 
were commonly referred to as 'shabbes goys" (szabejsgoje) and 'Jewish 
uncles' (zydowscy wujkozvie) in the Endecja press. 155 
1-511deowo-pohticzna deklaracja plk. A. Koca, Przesýd katolicki, 1937. Cited in 
Adamskiýjewish. ' 
152Ryszard Michalski, Obraz 4da I Narodu Zydowskiego Nazamach Polsiski 
Pra§y Pomorskigj W Latach 1920-1939 (Torun, 1997), 26-30. 
1530n the PPS and Democratic Party's different forms of opposition to antisemitism, 
see Melzer, 'Antisemitism. ' 133. 
1-94 On the opposition of Polish intellectuals to antisemitic actions, see, for 
example, Rabinowicz, The Legagy. 104-106. 
1551n. Yiddish, a shabbes goy is a Gentile who is asked by Orthodox Jews to light a 
fire, put out candles, or perform a chore on the Sabbath- See Leo Rosten, The Tas of 
Yiddish (London, 1988), 331. 
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Development of the Myth betzveen 1918 and 1939 
As in the late pre-independence era, during the inter-war years 
the myth proved to be a versatile and many faceted phenomenon. Its 
main narrative on the destructive nature of the Jewish presence within 
the Polish polity, which as I have already shown, was already fully 
developed by 1918, intensified in free independent Poland. 
Furthermore, the myth was skilfully adapted to contemporary 
political, social and economic circumstances. As a result, every event 
and development of Polish national life was incorporated into the 
narrative of the destructiveness of the Jewish impact on the Polish state 
and nation. 
For example, the Jews were even made responsible for the 
surplus emigration of the largest social group, the Polish peasants, who 
were leaving Poland in search of better economic and social conditions. 
Ethno-nationalist papers of various kinds frequently stressed that 
'eight million Poles are forced to live outside their homeland, while 
four million Jews occupy Poland' and that 'Polish peasants, instead of 
emigrating to foreign countries in search of bread and work, should 
find such bread and work in the towns and cities of their homeland. 
We demand this in the name of simple justice. '156 
In the late thirties this vision was endorsed by the state. The 
state had failed to conduct any agrarian reforms because of opposition 
from powerful landowners, and saw, in the project of replacing the 
Jewish population of towns and cities with the peasant population, the 
best solution of dealing with the difficult social and economic situation 
in the countryside and of achieving the desired polonisation of the 
urban areas. Here the logic of exclusivist ethno-nationalist thinking in 
solving labour market and housing problems is clearly visible. The 
peasants were viewed as the 'soil of the country', an integral part of the 
Polish people with a right to employment, while the Polish Jews were 
simply viewed as an alien element whose presence constituted an 
obstacle to the development of ethnic Poles, and who therefore had no 
right to keep their occupations and homes. 
Throughout the entire period, the myth's main repeated 
elements continued to be similar to those of the previous pre- 
independence phase: that the Jews were the greatest enemy of the 
156AInja Mater No. 6-7, May, 1938,14 and M& Dziennik, No. 18.2 June, 1935,3. 
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Polish religion, Catholicism, and of its moral code; that the Jews were 
behind freemasonry and wanting to rule over the Polish state; that the 
Jews were the exponents of international finance harmful to the Polish 
economy; that the Jews were moral degenerates who exercised a 
demoralising effect on Polish culture and on its people; that the Jews 
were inventors and propagators of free thinking, liberalism, Socialism, 
Communism and Bolshevism - ideologies alien and harmful to the 
Polish national cause; and that they conspired with other enemies of 
Poland against her. 
The fact that some of these elements not only overlapped but 
also contradicted each other was of no significance to the myth-makers 
and disseminators, because different elements of the myth were used 
at different times to cope with different challenges: such as opposing 
communism, socialism and free thinking. And yet in some cases many 
elements of the myth were simultaneously emphasised. For example, 
the image of the Jew as a Communist was frequently accompanied by 
the image of the Jew as a cultural and moral degenerate whose mind 
was occupied with pornography, moral dirt and filth. A good 
illustration of the simultaneous use of different elements of the myth is 
a letter of May 1936 by Cardinal August Mond, the long serving 
Primate of Poland between 1926 and 1948: 
'It is a fact Jews oppose the Catholic Church, are steeped in free- 
thinking, and represent the avant-garde of the atheist movement, the 
Bolshevik movement, and subversive action. The Jews have a 
disastrous effect on morality and their publishing-houses dispense 
pornography. It is true that the Jews commit frauds, practise usury 
and deal in while slavery. It is true that in schools, the influence of the 
Jewish youth upon the Catholic youth is generally evil...., 157 
Between 1918 and 1939 many Polish Jewish artists, and Polish 
artists of Jewish origin, including those who had in fact lost touch with 
the Jewish community, were labelled in such a way. Furthermore, 
those ethnic Polish artists who associated themselves professionally 
with their Jewish peers were portrayed in a similar way. For example, 
members of the literary group Skamander, which included among 
others, writers and poets such as Julian Tuwim., Antoni Slonimski, Jan 
Wierzynski and Jerzy Iwaszkiewicz, were accused of being 
157, G3os Prymasa Polski. ' Rycerz Niel2okalgRe May 1936. Cited in Landau-Czajka, 
'The Image/ 170. 
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"Bolsheviks', 'moral perverts' and 'pathological erotomaniacs'. On 13 
March 1921 The Warsaw Courier (Kurier Warszawski) wrote the 
following about Skamander's literary programme: 
'Me Jews want to destroy the national ideal, logic, faith and all 
aesthetic values .... The new poetry is nothing more than Jewish 
conspiracy .... rooted in bolshevism. '1,58 
Characteristically, the themes of Judeo-Communism 
(zydokomuna) and Judeo-Bolshevism (iydo-boIszezvizm) were intensified 
during the inter-war period. One of the main reasons behind this 
intensification was the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and 
the subsequent establishment of the first Communist state - Soviet 
Russia. These two events raised the fear of Communism, a fear 
noticeable not only in Poland but also in many other European states. 
In Polish ethno-nationahst press of various kinds, the Soviet 
Communist political system was categorised as Judeo-Bolshevik and 
was persistently held up as a major political threat endangering the 
existence of the Polish nation and that of other nations. For example, 
even before the start of the Bolshevik War of 1920 between Poland and 
Soviet Russia, a substantial bulk of literature had already emerged that 
categorised Bolshevism as a Jewish conspiracy aimed at oppressing the 
Russian people and conquering the entire world. 159 The Bolshevik 
War of 1920 was itself used to enhance the credibility of the myth of 
Judeo-Bolshevism, as various ethno-nationalists insisted that this event 
exposed the Jews as a harmful element to the Polish state. A good 
illustration of this position is the following statement of Rev. Stanislaw 
Trzeciak, one of the most prolific propagators of the myth of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other in inter-war Poland. 
'The Jews betrayed the Polish Army. Not only did they not 
participate in the defence of L'viv, but they constituted ninety-nine per 
cent of those who acted against the Polish state during the Bolshevik 
War. Between ninety-eight and a hundred per cent of Jews are 
communist revolutionaries. '160 
158Kurier Warszawski, No. 72,13 March 1921,9. 
159For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Irena Kaminska-Szmaj, Tudzi, zohydza, 
ze czci odziera. Týak 12roRagandy 12olilyczngj w 12rasie 1919-1923 (Wroclaw, 1994), 
143-149. 
160Rev. Stanislaw Trzeciak, 'W oblicz u grozy. ' Pro Christo No. 3, March, 1937,1. 
Hereafter Trzeciak, 'W obliczu' 
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In 1936, the Youth Press Conunittee (Komitet Prasy Mlodych ), 
made up of fifteen different radical ethno-nationalist, conservative and 
Catholic papers, was set up to fight Communism and to promote the 
ideology of exclusivist ethno-nationalism. 161 Once again, one of the 
main messages disseminated by this organisation was that fighting 
against Communism equalled fighting against Jewry. 
Significantly, the Communist Party of Poland (Komunistyczna 
Partia Polski, KPP), set up in December 1918, was consistently labelled 
as a judeo-Communist movement supported by the Jewish minority. 
Was the notion of Judeo-Communism correct in reference to the KPP 
and its supporters ? Looking at the membership profile of the KPP, 
which was the only pro-Soviet party and one with a non-national 
agenda in inter-war Poland, one can indeed see a high number of non- 
ethnic Poles, namely Jews, Belorussians and Ukrainians, many of 
whom were attracted to the KPP because of its consistent position 
opposing discrimination against ethnic minorities. 
However, this does not mean that the KPP was essentially a 
Jewish party supported by the Jewish minority. On average, the Jews 
constituted between one-third and one-fourth of the whole Communist 
movement and without doubt played an important role in the KPP, 
whidi I will discuss later. 162 The highest figure for Jewish 
membership of the entire Communist movement in the 1930s is 
estimated at approximately ten thousand individuals. Taking into 
account the fact that the Jewish community numbered approximately 
three million, we can dearly see that only a very small segment of the 
Jewish minority was attracted to Communism. Even if one takes into 
account the Communist claim of significant victory in the 
parliamentary elections of 1928 and that two-fifths of all votes cast for 
the Communist movement at that time were Jewish, this would still 
show that only five per cent of the entire Jewish community were 
supporters of Communism. 163 
The conclusion one may reach here is that there was an 
extensive linking of the Jews to the anti-national forces of Communism 
MlRudnickiý Oboz. 300-303. 
1620n the number of Jews in the KPP and their role in the party , see Jaff Schatz, The Generation. The Rise and Fall of the Tewish Communists of Poland (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, Oxford, 1991), 75-102. Hereafter Schatz, The Generation. 
163The data for the Jewish voters' support for the communist movement in 1928 is 
cited in Schatz, The Generation. 98. 
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and Bolshevism. Typically, all Jews as a collectivity, and thus 
regardless of their ideological affiliation or sympathies, were accused 
of being Communists and spreading Bolshevism. Such a conviction 
was voiced in the following slogan'not every Communist is a Jew, but 
every Jew is a Communist. ' 164 Of course, such prejudiced grounds 
were common in all other elements and themes of the myth. 
The theme of Jewish conspiracy against Poland was not limited 
only to the new external enemy the Soviet Union but also included the 
older external enemy Germany. These two themes were particularly 
apparent in the writings of the Ende0a and its extreme offshoot 
organisations. In the case of the Soviet Union, the Jew was generally 
portrayed as both the creator and chief executor of the external threat. 
In the case of Germany, the Jew was generally portrayed as the over 
zealous executor of anti-Polish policies. This latter theme continued to 
appear in the Endeks' writings after 1933 when Nazism had become 
the legitimate political power in Germany. One of its most absurd 
versions was the claim that Hitler, like previous heads of the German 
[Prussian] state, might use the Jews in order to destroy Poland and 
therefore it would not be expedient for him to destroy the German 
Jews. This type of thinking, which dearly reveals a high level of 
incongruity with reality, is visible in Roman Dmowski's late work 
published in 1936, entitled Chan Xe (Przezvrýt): 
'Concerning the German ambition to the East [of ruling over 
Poland] it is important to remember that Prussian politicians, 
beginning with the Frederick the Great, have always employed the 
Jews. The Jews have been their most precious tool. In the eighteenth 
century the Jews served as the main agents of the demoralisation and 
corruption of the First Republic's parliament, and acted as brokers and 
spies for the Prussians. Later on they constituted the pillar of Prussian 
power on invaded Polish territories. All of them publicly announced 
their identification with Germany and were keen to participate in the 
Germanisation [of the Poles ], in which they were even more insolent 
than the Germans themselves... 
The Jews constituted the fore-runners of German culture on 
Polish territories invaded by Austria and Russia. The entire Jewish 
population without exception served in the German Army when it 
164Tbis slogan comes from a lecture by Rev. Stanislaw Trzeciak cited in 
Dziennik, No. 263,22 March 1936,5. 
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entered the Congress Kingdom [a part of Central Poland in the Russian 
partitioned zone] many years ago [during the First World War] - 
If Poland did not have so many Jews the partitions of Poland 
would never have happened and Prussian eastern policy would not 
have been so triumphant. 
[The Germans] who are now advocating the same Prussian 
policy concerning the East, have to go hand in hand with the Jews - .r- there is no other option. If the Germans go with the Jews against 
Poland they can not therefore destroy the Jews in Germany. '165 
Social Functions of the Myth between 1918 and 1939 
A close examination of the inter-war period provides a rich 
source of data of the ways such a myth was used by ethno-nationalists. 
Firstly, on the level of national discourse the myth was intended to 
raise the collective cohesiveness of ethnic Poles and to provide 
simplistic explanations of the nation's past and present failures - in 
essence suggesting that Poland would be a great and prosperous 
nation if not for the presence of the Jews who had mistreated Poland - 
its host nation throughout the long course of its history. As a rule, this 
type of reasoning intensified at times of social, political and economic 
crisis: for example, during the first formative years of the Second 
Republic of 1918-1920 -a period of finahsing of the borders of the 
polity; from 1929 to 1931 -a period of major financial and political 
difficulties; and between 1936 and 1939 -a period of intense social and 
economic tension. It is not difficult to see how the use of the Jewish 
scapegoat in dealing with all past and present problems effectively 
blocked any rational enquiry into the real reasons behind national 
upheavals and social and economic crises, and how it came to offer an 
explanation of Polish national experience utterly incongruent with 
reality. 
Secondly, the myth was used to fulfil another functiori, namely 
that of asserting legitimacy and authority and of simultaneously 
discrediting political rivals. This type of discreditation, first used by 
the late nineteenth century myth-maker Jelenski who castigated as 
Jewish that entire section of the public which did not subscribe to his 
paper The Soil, proliferated on a large scale on the political scene of 
iI 
165Roman Dmowski Przewrot Cited in Roman Wapinski, ed., Roman Dmowski. 
LM (Warszawa, 1990023. 
. yb6r 12is 
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inter-war Poland. 166 For example, in the Endecja press, Joseph 
Pilsudski was frequently portrayed as a politician favoured by the 
enemies of Poland - the Jews along with the Germans and the 
Ukrainians. In the early thirties, the ruling Sanacja was often accused 
of representing the Jewish interest above that of Poles, while the PPS 
was continuously labelled as Jewish. 167 The discreditation of rivals 
by labelling them as Jews even went as far as mutual accusations 
between rival extreme ethno-nationalist organisations and various 
ethno-nationalist papers. 168 
The important point that must be made about this process is 
that a particular definition of Jew was applied here. The term Jew did 
not refer to actual Jews or persons of Jewish origin, but was treated 
instrumentally as a useful label to discredit any political figure, 
organisation or media in the eyes of the public. The term Jew became a 
term of political abuse. Jewish identity or the presence of Jews 
themselves were irrelevant to the labelling of people as Jewish. Such a 
strategy was to have a long-term impact on Polish political culture. In 
fact judging by its degree of application in contemporary Poland, this 
is the most persistent surviving function of the myth. 169 
Purification of the Polish Nation from the Jewish Polluter 
In terms of its impact on Polish Jewry in inter-war Poland, the 
myth can be seen as the prime rationale and justification for the 
project of the purification of the Polish nation from both the presence 
and influence of the Jewish community. The quest for achieving 
sameness within the Polish nation was one of the main goals of all 
kinds of ethno-nationalists, in particular the Endeks, and those of their 
supporters within the Catholic clergy who represented the most 
extreme views on how Polish society should think and act. Because of 
the categorisation of the Polish Jewish community as the chief 
Threatening Other, the Jews were seen as the chief polluter of the 
Polish nation and of Polish territories. Both groups of the traditional 
166Jaszczuk, 5por. 232. 
1670n the subject, see Jerzy Tomaszewskiý 'Dokumenty o zaburzeniach 
qntysemickich na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim na jesieni 1931 roku. ' Biuletvn 
Zydowskiego Instvtutu Mstorycznego, No. 2,1997,77 and Rud-nicki, Obýz. 112-113. 
168Such tactic were noted by Szymon Rudnicki, Oboz. 113. 
1690n the contemporary labelling of rival football teams in Poland as Jews, see Lidia 
Ostalbwska , Joanna Podolska, 
'MOI Murzyn Zawsze Bialy. ' Gazeta Wyborcza ,9 
February, 2000,20-21. 
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Orthodox Jews and more culturally assimilated Polish Jews were 
perceived as the chief polluters of the ethnic Polish community. The 
major difference was that the former group was perceived as the 
polluter of Polish economic and social realities but not of Polish 
culture, as it was seen, and in fact was, primarily maintaining its own 
separate culture; while the latter group was primarily perceived as the 
polluter of Polish culture because of its active engagement therein and 
contribution thereinto. 
Furthermore, as was the case in the nineteenth century, in 
certain circles within political and cultural elites, Jews who converted 
to Christianity were also viewed as polluters - of a very dangerous 
type - because of the level of their potential and actual 'infil tration' into 
the core ethnic Polish community through marriage. Here attitudes 
towards these converts was based on the concept of purity of blood 
(limpieza de sangre), similar to Spanish Catholic attitudes towards 
'Conversos' in the medieval period. 170 
In general, there was not a single uniformly agreed position 
among the excIusivist ethno-nationalist elites on the status of these 
converts as members of the Polish nation. Among groups which 
accepted the converted Jews as Catholics, but opposed the 
categorisation of them as members of the Polish nation, were various 
radical exclusivist ethno-nationahst groups, as well as some 
Conservative and Catholic groups. 171 The Marian Order monthly Pro 
Christo the weekly Culture (Kultura) published by the Central 
Institute of Catholic Action, and publicly known individuals such as 
the conservative writer Stanislaw Cat-Mackiewicz and the Catholic 
writer Zofia Kossak- Szczucka from Catholic Action (Akcja Katolicka), 
were outspoken representatives of such a position. 172 The basis for 
denying a converted Jew a place within the Polish national community 
was dearly racial. Here is one such illustration. On 27 September 
1936 in Kultura, Kossak- Szczucka (to whom I will return in my 
chapter on the Second World War) stated the following: 
1700n Spanish Catholic attitudes towards the'new Christians', see, for example, 
Almog, Nationalism. 3-4. 
171Records in the Catholic press of denying converted Jews a place in the Polish 
nation are described by Landau- Czajka, 'Image. ' 152-154. 
1720n some prominent conservative figures' negative approach to Jews converted to 
Catholicism, see Melzer, 'Antisemitsm. ' 135-136, Laudau-Czajka, W jedLiym. 251- 
252. 
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'Jews are so terribly alien to us, alien and unpleasant, that they 
are a race apart. They irritate us and all their traits grate against our 
sensibilities. Their oriental impetuosity, argumentativeness, specific 
mode of thought, the set of their eyes, the shape of their ears, the 
winking of their eyelids, the line of their lips, everything. In families of 
mixed blood we detect the traces of these features to the third or the 
fourth generation and beyond. '173 
Such a position shows that although Catholicism was one of the 
chief markers of Polish national identity, the conversion of Jews to 
Catholicism did not automatically mean inclusion into the Polish 
nation, for in the eyes of some exclusivist ethno-nationalists they were 
still perceived as alien and as a very dangerous type of polluter in their 
alleged threat to the biological make-up of ethnic Poles. 
In short, one can argue that the inter-war period shows that 
there was not even one single sub-group existed within Polish Jewry 
which could be categorised as acceptable and inclusive to the Polish 
nation. Unlike in the case of other ethnic minorities, neither 
acculturation nor complete polonisation constituted guarantors that 
members of the Jewish minority would be included without objection 
within the Polish nation. 174 Such a situation would become even 
more obvious in the post-war reality, when extensive cultural 
assimilation, including celebrations of Christian religious festivals, was 
to become a more common social experience among a section of Polish 
Jews remaining in Poland. 175 In the 1960s, that group of entirely 
polonised Jews and their off-spring would become one of the main 
targets of the exdusivist ethno-nationalist agenda. The basis for their 
exclusion would lie in the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other. I 
shall discuss this process later in chapter six. 
173Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, 'Nie istniejt sytuacje bez wyjscia, ' Kultura. 27 
September, 1936. Cited in Landau- Czajka, 'Image. ', 165-166. 
174Historical research informs us that linguistic and cultural assimilation among 
Polish Jews, particularly among the young generation, was on the increase during the 
post-independence phase 1918 -1939. In the 1921 census, a quarter of those who 
declared their religion as Jewish declared their nationality as Polish. See Ezra 
Mendelsohn, The lews of East Central Euroj2e Between the Two World Wars 
(Bloomington, 1983), 23,29. According to the same author, 'polonisation of the 
Jewish community certainly increased in the 1930s, and Polish became the main 
language of even Zionist publications, all this despite the dramatic rise of 
antisemitism. Mendelsohn, 'German. ' 60. See also Brubaker, 'Nationalising. ' 421 - 
425. 
175See Schatz, The Generation. 240-241. 
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Purification of Polish Culture 
The concept of Jews as poRuters of culture referred to various 
cultural institutions such as theatres, cinemas, film and radio 
industries, as well as to the vernacular Polish language, and Polish 
literature. Typically, Jewish presence in the arts was categorised as a 
spiritual disease (schorzenie duchozve) and abomination (ýydowskie 
paskudzftvo). The inter-war Endeks' zealous need to purify the national 
language and literature from alien elements resembled closely the 
trend advocated in late nineteenth century France by Charles Maurras 
(1868 - 1952). 
176 As a rule, the Endeks insisted that Polish Jewish 
artists who wrote in the Polish language were not creating Polish 
literature but simply using the language as a 'technical medium'for 
their works, which were categorised in any case as intrinsically alien to 
Polish spirituality. Here is a typical example of such a perception: 
'Tuwim does not write Polish poetry, he only uses the Polish 
language. His poetry does not represents the spirit of juhusz Slowadd 
but that of Heinrich Heine ... the soul of a merchant and Jewish poet-'177 
Articles expressing such a position were published in various 
ethno-nationalist papers including the previously mentioned Ende0a's 
ideological press organ National Thought, where a special column 'On 
Display'(Na Widowni) was dedicated to fighting the influences of 
judeo-Polish culture" - The chief writers of this column were Stanislaw 
Pienkowski, Jan Rembielinski and Zygmunt Wasilewski. 178 The most 
frequently attacked Polish Jews were the poets and writers Julian 
Tuwim, jozef Wittliri, Marian Hemar, Roman Brandstaetter, Janusz 
Korczak and the historian Marceli Handelsman who was the founder 
of the Historical Institute at the University of Warsaw. 179 
The core ethno-nationalists also insisted that the presence of the 
Jewish community was an obstacle to the self-purification of ethnic 
1760n the importance of language in ethno- nationalist projects of self-purification of 
a nation see, Kedourie Nationalism. 108-109 and Smith'Ethnic. ' 190-191. 
177KurierWarszawski No. 52,21 February, 1921,2. 
178See, for example, Stanislaw Pienkowski, 'Poezja kryptozydowska. ' No. 41,1926, 
234-236; Jan Rembielinski, 'Na Widowni', No. 45,1931,178-179 and No. 47.1931,209- 
210; and Zygmunt Wasilewski, 'Na Widowni'No. 10,1935,170-171. 
179The issue of ethno-nationalist attacks on Marceli Hendelsman is discussed by 
Monika Natkowska, Numerus clausus, gettokawkowe, numerus nullus, 12aragi 
m3jski. Anlysen-tilygm na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, 1931-1939 (Warszawa, 
1999), 59-74. 
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Poles. 180 From the moment Poland regained its independence the 
issue of self-cleansing was emphasised by the Endeks and the Catholic 
clergy who were not satisfied with the state of national morale and 
culture. In this respect the Jewish community was frequently made a 
scapegoat for the imperfections, weaknesses and shortcomings of 
ethnic Poles. The mere presence of Jews was allegedly responsible for 
polluting the mentality and soul of the Polish nation and preventing 
Poles from breathing in Polish spirit, 'in short from becoming better 
Poles'. 181 
This type of allegation revealed insecurities about Polish 
national identity on the part of the core ethno-nationalists. A typical 
elaborated example of the desire to improve the qualities of Polishness 
within the nation by getting rid of Jewish influence was the following: 
'Dejudaisation of the press and radio and therefore 
dejudaisation of the Polish mentality is as vital as dejudaisation of 
commerce, crafts and industry. In fact the work on the rebirth of the 
soul of the Nation should start with the dejudaisation of the Polish 
mentality because there is no Possibility of the dejudaisation of Poland 
without the dejudaisation of the Polish mentality. The true Polish 
national and catholic press can play an enormous role in this process. 
However we need to free it from Jewish influence and from the Jews 
themselves and the'white'Jews [Poles who co-operated with Jews]. 182 
Projects of Separation and Emigration 
The concept of social and cultural separateness, first advocated 
in the late nineteenth century by the Jesuit Marian Morawski, was 
regarded by ethno-nationalists of various intensities as a necessary step 
towards the purification of the Polish nation from the Jewish polluter. 
Separation of the two communities was particularly advocated in the 
areas of culture, education of the youth, and professional occupations 
such as medicine and law. This desire for separation was often 
expressed in sayings: 
1800n the importance of the self-purification of the core nation by its ethno- 
nationalists, see Smith, 'Ethnic. ', 193. 
181This kind of expression was, for example, used by Rev. Stefan Kaczorowski in Pro 
Christo, No. 7,1933, 
182Rev. Stanislaw Trzeciak, Pornogjafia narq4giem o! Lcych agentur. (Warszawa, 
1929), 45. 
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Jewish arts for Jews and Polish arts for the Poles. " 183 
'Jewish doctors for Jewish patients, Jewish lawyers for Jewish 
clients. '184 
'National tragedy - Jewish teachers in Polish schools'185 
Although inter-war ethno-nationalists failed to achieve a 
substantial separation between ethnic Poles and Polish Jews within the 
realm of Polish culture, they succeeded in achieving separation in 
some professional organisations. For example, in the late thirties, the 
so-called Aryan paragraph was introduced by the Union of Architects 
of the Polish Republic, the Union of Medical Doctors of Poland, and by 
the Polish Lawyers Association. 186 In both cases economic grounds, 
particularly the issue of the labour market, were provided as an 
explanation for introducing such a measure. A typically exclusivist 
ethno-nationalist position was applied here: the Jews had to be 
excluded from professional organisations in order to allow the Poles 
to reach full economic potential. 
In some cases the exclusivist ethno-national position concerning 
separation of the two peoples was not based on economic, social and 
cultural grounds alone but contained also a racial element which was 
perhaps most apparent in demands for the separation of Jewish youths 
from ethnic Polish youths in schools, children's organisations and 
other institutions of education. The need for the separation of Polish 
and Jewish children and youths was continuously voiced in ethno - 
nationalist papers and other publications. For example, in the pseudo- 
scholarly work 'Intellectual Abilities of Polish and Jewish Youths in 
Polish High Schools' (Poziom Intelektualny Mlodziezy Polskiej i 
Zydazvskiej W Naszych Gimnazjach), Professor Ludwik Jaxa- Bykowski, 
who was to become an important figure in the higher education system 
set up by the Polish Underground during the Second World War, 
demanded the separation of Jewish and Polish children on ethno- 
cultural and racial grounds. Jaxa-Bykowski claimed that contact 
between Jewish and Polish youths led to the degeneration of 
183A slogan promulgated by the writer and critic Karol Hubert Rostworowski. Cited 
in Tadeusz Bielecki, Zgas idei ýVo? eczno-j2oftczLiych (Warszawa, 1938), 15. 
184SIogan cited in Anna Landau- Czajka, W jeftm. 219-220. 
185M@jy Dziennik, No. 120,26, October, 1935,4. 
1860n the prominence of the extreme ethno-nationahst position in professional 
organisations, see Jan JOzef Lipski, KatolicIde Pan'stwo Narodu Polskiego (Londyn, 
1994), 139-140. Hereafter Lipski, Katolickie. 
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intellectual abilities among the latter, and that the Jewish biological 
and ethno-cultural make-up constituted a threat to Polish intellect and 
mental health. 187 At the same time he also stressed that youths from 
Slavic minorities did not exert any damaging impact on ethnic Polish 
youths. 
As already mentioned, the purification of the Jewish minority 
from the territory of Poland to be ad-deved by emigration, was the 
ultimate goal of all kinds of ettmo-nationalists. According to the 
ethno-nationalist world-view, the emigration of the Jews was essential 
if ethnic Poles were to attain full development. This belief was dearly 
based on the perception of the Jew as the chief Threatening Other who 
could cause only harni to ethnic Poles and their polity. Here are two 
illustrations of such a belief. The first is an extract from the Labour 
Party programme of 1938, a party which was to become an important 
member of the Polish governmental coalition during the Second World 
War. The second is an extract from an artide by the extreme 
excIusivist ethno-nationalist Rev. Stanislaw Trzeciak 'Facing the 
Impending Storm - Two Contradictory Worlds, ' (W obliczu grozy. Dwa 
przecavne ýwýty). 
1. Iln Poland] the Jewish issue has a separate and more extreme 
ramification. The well-being of our nation and of our Polish state has 
been harmed to a great extent by the over-sized Jewish population and 
its social and territorial spread. More importantly, the moral 
distinctiveness, and political and social trends within the Jewish 
community are seriously damaging to our economic, cultural and 
moral interest. The solution to this extremely topical Jewish issue lies 
primarily in support for Polish [ethnic Polish] economic and cultural 
development, modification of the capitalist system ... the development 
of Polish industries, businesses and free professions. -The Polish 
government and society at large should co-operate in the 
implementation of the mass emigration of the Jews. Such a legislation 
will provide the fastest nationalisation of Polish economic, political, 
cultural and social life. ' 188 
187Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowsld, 'Poziom Intelektualny Nflodziezy Polskiej i Zydowskiej 
W Naszych Gimnazjach. ' Esychometria No. 11933,1-27. On Professor Ludwik jaxa- 
Bykowski, see Tadeusz Bartoszewski, Warto byý 12rzyzwoiiym czlowiekiem. 
(Warszawa, 1990 ), 184. Hereafter BartoszewsK Warto. 
188Programme of the Labour Party of 1938. Cited in Olaf , Pasternak eds., Progra! ny. 190. 
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2. 'The harm that has been caused to the Polish nation by the 
granting of equal rights to the Jews must be put right. In the first 
instance, civic rights have to be removed from the Jews, and next, they 
themselves have to be removed from Poland. These are the 
indispensable requirements if Poland is to remain Poland and to free 
itself from economic captivity and the destructive intellectual influence 
of the Jewish world. It is high time that these incredible historical 
mistakes were reversed and that resolutions were made regarding all 
the harm the Jews have caused Poland. The most important enemy is 
the enemy within. '189 
The former statement clearly represents a more moderate 
version of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other, while the 
latter represents a more explicit and aggressive version of the myth 
and also expresses extreme ideas in favour of the removal of the Jews. 
It is worth noting here that political programmes generally expressed a 
more moderate version of the myth than that found in the press and 
other publications. 
By the middle of the thirties, with the exception of the 
Democratic Party, the PPS, and the KPP, a majority of political elites 
advocated the concept of the emigration of the Jews from Poland. Of 
course, among the more prominent parties and political groups, there 
was no uniform policy or programme on actual implementation of the 
project of emigration of Polish Jews. 190 Some political parties and 
politicians had a more detailed programme for the potential realisation 
of the emigration of Jews than others. There were some political 
parties including the post-1935 Sanacja government that opted for a 
kind of co-operation with Zionist organisations in order to speed up 
the emigration process, and who insisted that emigration would be a 
positive way of solving poverty among the Jewish community. 
Moreover, some political parties and politicians proposed plans for the 
gradual emigration of Jews, while others, particularly the extreme 
exclusivist ethno-nationalist organisations, demanded their total and 
instant removal. 
As a rule, the party which propagated the more aggressive and 
elaborated myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other proposed more 
189'rrzeciak, 'W obhczu. '7. 
190For a detailed description of emigration programmes advocated by various 
political parties, see Laudau- Czajka, W jeftm. 240-268 and Mich, QhQý. 55-67. 
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radical measures on how to implement the emigration and speed up 
the process. For example, the off-shoot radical organisation of the 
Endecja, the National Radical Camp (Oboz Narodozvo Radykalny, ONR), 
advocated instantly stripping the Polish Jews of all rights and not 
permitting them to take any of their financial assets abroad. According 
to the ONR, Jewish financial assets and properties belonged to the 
Poles from whom they were originally stolen. 191 The ONR 
programme of April 1935 stated: 
'A Jew can not be a citizen of the Polish state. Until the time of 
the completion of the mass emigration of Jews from Poland, the Jew 
should be given the status of 'attached person' to the state.... 'Ihe Jews 
are the ones that must emigrate from Poland - not the Polish workers 
and peasants. The "dejudaisation' of Polish towns and cities is a 
necessary requirement for the healthy development of the national 
economy. '192 
Characteristicafly, the main objective of exclusivist ethno- 
nationalists on Jewish emigration was firstly to achieve the 
polonisation of cities and towns where the Jewish minority, a 
traditionally strongly urbanised group, constituted an average of 
between thirty and forty per cent; secondly, to achieve the 
polonisation of commerce and industry, areas in which Polish Jews 
were traditionally active, and for which the Polish nobility and the 
peasants had shown little inclination or aptitude in previous 
periods. 193 One can here suggest that the inevitable process of the 
modernisation of Polish society which took place in the inter-war 
period, led to an intensified quest for the removal of the Polish Jew - 
the original agent of modernisation within nineteenth century Polish 
society. 
Unsurprisingly, the process of targeting the Jewish minority as a 
group obliged to leave Poland for the good of the host nation was 
rationalised to a high level. Most Polish politicians of the thirties 
insisted that the grounds for Jewish emigration were 'objective' - 
meaning economic and demographic, and therefore could not be 
categorised as prejudiced. However, they were basically a form of 
camouflage for prejudice towards Jews and the prevalent perception of 
191See LipsK Katolickie. 138-142. 
192Programme of the ONR. Cited in Olaf, Pasternak eds., ProgIgMy. 49. 
193For a short summary of Jewish demography and occupations in i-nter-war Poland, 
see Steinlauf, Bondage. 16-17. 
97 
them as the Threatening Other, the polluters of the state and the 
nation. A close look at some ethno-nationalist writings shows just 
how frequently was such camouflage unsuccessful. 
A dear example is the previously mentioned work The Polish- 
lewish Issue (Sprazva Polsko-ýydozvska) by the prominent inter-war 
conservative politician Wladyslaw Studi-dcki. 194 Studnicki proposed a 
detailed plan for the gradual emigration of one hundred thousand 
Jews a year, which according to him, would lead to the dejudaisation 
of Poland within thirty years. Unlike the more radical exclusivist 
ethno-nationalist politicians, Studnicki insisted that the Jews were 
entitled to take their financial assets with them. He also suggested that 
Poland should hold a protectorate over Palestine to which the Polish 
Jews were supposed to emigrate en masse. Although Studnicki 
insisted that his advocacy of the emigration of the Jews from Poland 
was based not on hatred but on statistics, his work contains references 
which directly point to the perception of the Jew as the Threatening 
Other in terms such as the 'dejudaisation of Poland', 'the Polish 
misfortune' and "parasites on the healthy branch of the Polish tree. '195 
In my opinion, the case of Studnicki points out the extent to which the 
myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other was rationalised by the 
political elites, and shows an equal lack of understanding of the nature 
of prejudice. 
It is worth adding here, that assertions by ethno-nationalist 
politicians of the inter-war period, of "objective' economic and social 
grounds for the emigration of the Jews from Poland, have been 
absorbed into contemporary Polish historiography. This phenomenon, 
noted and critically analysed by Ezra Mendelsohn in his article 'Inter- 
war Poland: good or bad for the Jews ?/ points to the presence of the 
exclusivist ethno-nationalist way of thinking in contemporary 
intellectual discourse. 196 
194See page 75 this chapter. 
19-5See S12ra3my Narodowosdowe. No. 3,1936,319-320. 
196'No one can deny that the large number of Polish Jews and their peculiar 
economic structure and role in the Polish economy had influenced attitudes toward 
them, just as no one can deny that Polish backwardness must be taken into account in 
any effort to understand the Polish state's Jewish policy. But it is surely misleading 
to assume that the condition of Polish Jewry and the backwardness of the Polish state 
rendered inevitable the state's policies and society's attitudes towards the Jewish 
minority. ' Ezra Mendelsolm 'Inter-war Poland: good or bad for the Jews T in 
Abramsky, Jachimczyk, Polonsky, eds. The Jews. 135-136. A similar critical point 
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Importantly, the project of emigration was perceived as a just 
means of disposing of the Jewish minority, and as compatible with the 
Catholic ethos. With the exception of a small group of extreme 
exclusivist ethno-nationalists who proposed a more radical form of 
disposing of the Jews by force, the majority of Polish ethno-nationalist 
political elites and of the Catholic Church insisted that they 'did not 
wish to harm the Jews but simply wanted them to leave Poland'. 
Their exclusivist ethno-nationalist ideological world-view prevented 
them from recognising that the removal from the Jewish minority of 
the right to Polish citizenship, and the consequent rendering of them as 
homeless, could be classified, in principle, as an unjust process. 197 
Conclusions 
In summary, my main goal in this cliapter was to discuss the 
roots of the myth, its nascent forms prior to the 1880s, and its 
development into a fully-fledged form in the late pre-independence 
period 1880s to 1914 and post-independence period 1918 to 1939.1 
have also analysed the polyfunctionality of the myth, particularly 
focusing on the inter-war period when exclusivist ethno-nationafism 
became the driving force of Polish political culture. 
Overall, I have demonstrated that the myth of the Jew as the 
foremost Threatening Other of Poland and its people is an important 
phenomenon, without an understanding of which it is difficult to 
grasp how the Polish Jewish minority was perceived and treated by the 
exclusivist ethno-nationahst political elites, their supporters and the 
Catholic Church in both periods 1880-1914 and 1918 -1939. 
This elaborated social construction had its roots in pre-modem 
ways of perceiving the Polish Jews as the harmful Other, a perception 
which became dearly noticeable in the political and social discourse of 
the seventeenth century, and which continued to develop during the 
following century when it became intertwined with emerging nascent 
notions of the incompatibility of co-existence between Poles and Jews 
and of the Jews a polluters of Polish life. Already at that time, the Jews 
were the only ethno-cultural group, among all other ethno-cultural 
was made by the Polish historian Jan Kofinan, Na! ýonalizm Gospqduczy - szansa 
gzy bariera, rozwojm (Warszawa, 1992), 80-81. 
1970n the way in which ethnic nationalists exclude minority groups from 
membership within a nation, see Brubaker, 'Nationalising. ' 430; and Smith, 'Ethnic. ' 
193. 
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groups living in the pre-modem Polish state, to have their qualities 
and socio-economic activities evaluated in such strongly negative 
terms in the national context. 
Furthermore, during the first eighty years of the nineteenth 
century, the notion of the Jew as the harmful Other to Polish Christian 
society did not decrease in prominence in political and social 
discourse, but had a substantial impact on the approaches by political 
elites to the emancipation of Jews and on their evaluation of Jews as 
members of Polish society. 
This is not to say that biased views of the Jews as the harniful 
Other to Polish Christian society were accepted by the entire political 
and cultural elites. On the contrary, some members of these elites, 
including prominent public figures such as the poet Adam Nfickiewicz 
treated the Jews as an inclusive part of the Polish stateless nation and 
advocated a positive evaluation of their socio-econon-dc role within 
society. However, they represented only a minority position and 
therefore did not succeed in challenging the dominant negative 
evaluation of Jews within national discourse. 
Yet it was not until the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, when modem Polish ethno-nationalism in its integral form 
emerged, that a major shift occurred in the evaluation of the Jewish 
minority in a national context. Beginning in the 1880s, the notion of 
the Jew as the harmful Other to Polish Christian society was 
transformed into the notion of the Jew as the chief Threatening Other 
towards the Polish polity, its people, and the people's essence. 
Complex narratives elaboring this notion were generated and woven 
into the myth of the Jew as the foremost Threatening Other. In its 
fully-fledged form, the myth was first to be found in political and 
literary writings of Conservative and Catholic ethno-nationahst elites, 
pre-dating the emergence in 1897 of the core ethno-nationalist 
movement the Endecja. For the Endecja, one of the fastest growing 
political movement of the time, the myth had become an important 
element of its ideology, and its politicians and supporters subsequently 
developed the most explicit, elaborated and aggressive version of the 
myth. 
The emergence and wide-spread acceptance of the fully-fledged 
myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other by significant segments of 
modem political elites was a crucial moment in the history of Polish 
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Jews, because it meant that the already precarious position of Jews vis- 
a-vis the majority of ethnic Poles was aggravated to an unprecedented 
level. Not only did this situation apply to the majority of traditional 
Orthodox Jews but also to the growing minority of highly culturally 
assimilated Jews with a strong self-identification as Poles. The 
negative consequences of this development on the position of Jews 
within society were noted even by those Polish authors who 
themselves held an ambivalent attitude towards the Jewish minority. 
'Wrong to be a Jew, wrong to be a convert ... Night is falling, a 
night in which everything looks gray and ambiguous'198 
'Regarding the 'Jewish Question', public opinion goes round 
and round in a magic circle and cannot find a way out. The 
unenlightened Jew in his dirty gaberdine cloth who exploits and 
poisons the peasants with vodka we call a scoundrel - and for him we 
have contempt. The Jew who has left his backward community, taken 
off his dirty gaberdine and has accepted European education and 
desires to work in a productive way we call an arrogant trickster - and 
for him we also have contempt. Finally, the Jew who has ceased to be 
a Jew, has cut off his links with his tribe, has converted to Christianity 
and has entered our society, him we call the 'meches'[a convert] - and 
for him we also have contempt. 199 
By the end of the pre-independence period, the myth had 
become a provider of answers to all problems and questions 
concerning national existence among ethno-nationalists of all kinds 
and intensities. In the post-independence period 1918-1939, the myth 
intensified and became widespread and accepted as social truth by a 
majority of political elites and the Catholic Church. As in the previous 
period, the myth was expressed in a variety of ways by different 
political parties and organisations. The most extreme form was 
expressed by the Endecja, its offshoot radical organisations, and their 
various supporters, while other political parties and organisations, and 
their supporters, expressed the myth in a more moderate and less 
intense version. On the other hand, in both the late pre-independence 
and post-independence periods, there was a segment of political and 
cultural elites questioning the myth. 
198Boleslaw Prus, Lalka Vol. 1, (Warszawa, Czytelnik, 1972), 202. The novel Lalka 
was first published as a serial in the paper Kurier codzienny between 1887-1889. 
199KIemens junosza-Szaniawski, Nasi Zydzi w miasteczkach i na wsiach 
(Warszawa, 1889), 124. Cited in Cara, A4Tiilagja. 213. 
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In general, the case of late pre-independence and post- 
independence Poland shows that an unchallenged long-term 
prejudiced perspective on a minority group perceived as a harmful 
Other can easily be reformulated into a myth of the foremost internal 
Threatening Other under the circumstances of thriving exclusivist 
ethnic nationalism. When such a myth becomes a widespread and 
accepted social truth -a means of delineating national reality and of 
perceiving the minority itself - it can prove extremely durable and 
unshakeable. Questioning and deconstructing such a myth can be 
extremely challenging and difficult. 
This is the basis and background of the refusal to accept the 
Jewish minority as part of the modem Polish nation, and for the anti- 
Jewish violence found in modem Poland, and for the persistent 
influence of the myth on Polish political and popular culture up to the 
recent period. 
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Chapter 111. 
The Myth and Anti-Jewish Violence in the Inter-War Period, 1918- 
1939. 
Introduction 
In scholarly literature exclusivist ethno-nationalism is viewed as 
one of the forces which can strain the bonds that sustain dvihty within 
ethnically mixed societies and as one that may frequently lead to inter- 
ethnic tensions, hatreds and eruptions of violence. It may also lead to 
flows of refugees and asylum-seekers from minority groups threatened 
by such violence. 1 
Anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by the extreme section of the 
exclusivist ethno-nationalists and their supporters in inter-war Poland 
can serve as a good illustration of some of these phenomena. This 
violence undoubtedly contributed to the deterioration of inter-effinic 
relations between the majority group, the Poles, and the minority 
group, the Polish Jews, on both local and national levels. Moreover, 
for some members of the Jewish community, it was also an important 
factor, next to Zionist convictions, in reaching the decision to emigrate 
from Poland for good. 2 
Most of the historical research conceming anti-Jewish violence 
between 1918 and 1939 can be viewed as descriptive, concentrating on 
a discussion of the entire period, or on single riots such as the Przytyk 
Pogrom of 9 March 1936, or on anti-Jewish excesses at universities. 3 
One of the least discussed issues is how the dissemination, by ethno- 
nationalists, of hostile images of Jews impacted on the instigation of 
violence. 
In this chapter I examine links between the myth of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other and eruptions of anti-Jewish excesses, 
concentrating on the extent to which this myth influenced the 
initiation, evaluation and justification of anti-Jewish violence. My 
ISee Smith, 'Ethnic. ' 196-198 and also Kecmanovic, The Mass. 132-150. 
20n the issue of the importance of various forms of hostility on inter-ethnic relations 
between Poles and Jews, and on the decision-making process of emigration from 
Poland within the Jewish community, see Emanuel Melzer, No Wgy Out. The 
Politics of Polish Ie3ýn 1935-1939 (Cincinnati, 1997) 53-80. Hereafter Melzer, ýýLo 
Aay. 53-80 and 131-153. See also Alina Cata, 'The Social Consciousness of Young 
Jews, ' Polin, Vol. 8,1994,42-65. 
3See, for example, Jolanta Zyndul, Zajs'cia A-ntLzydowskie W PoIsce W latach 1935- 
1937 (Warszawa, 1994). Hereafter 2yndul, Zaicia. ; Modras, The Catholic., 301-323 
and Melzer, No Way. 53-80. 
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main argument here is that a case such as the anti-Jewish violence in 
inter-war Poland shows that negative images of a minority perceived 
as the enemy of the state and of its people can play an important role 
in the legitimising of violence as national self-defence under conditions 
of thriving exclusivist ethno-nationalism. This process is characterised 
by four main stages: first mandating and justifying anti-minority riots; 
secondly, paying tribute to the perpetrators of the violence as national 
heroes; thirdly shifting the responsibility for such violence onto its 
victims; and finally, minimising its unethical and criminal nature. By 
the term violence, I understand here the following types of actions: 
inflicting damage on Jewish properties, including private homes, 
shops, institutions and synagogues, slander, physical harassment, 
assaults, and murder. 
Before moving into the main analysis I shall provide a brief 
outline of the socio-historical context in which anti-Jewish 
disturbances and riots occurred in inter-war Poland. 
Social and Historical Background to the Violence 
It is possible to differentiate four major waves of anti-Jewish 
violence that swept through inter-war Poland. Each of these waves 
was characterised by specific conditions and development; the first 
wave of 1918-1920 was rooted in the process of the formation of the 
new Polish nation-state; the second in 1930-1933 was primarily based 
at the universities; the third, which is the least researched, was linked 
to the emergence of the National Radical Camp in 1934; and the last, in 
1935-1937 was the most wide-spread and severe, engaging both 
university youths and members of the public in a number of villages 
and tovms. 
The first wave of violence began in 1918 and lasted until 1920, 
the end of the Bolshevik War. Territories most affected were the 
Eastern Provinces where heavy fighting was taking place between the 
Polish and the Ukrainian armies during the first two years of 
independence, and in parts of so-called Little Poland(Matopolska 
where a peasant revolt erupted in the spring of 1919.4 This first wave 
was characterised by the high number of mortalities reaching 
4See Witold Stankiewicz, Konfliktý spotegne na wsi 12olskigj 1918-1920 (Warszawa, 
1%3), 159-169. Hereafter Stankiewicz, Konflikly. ; Jerzy Tomaszewski, 'Trzeci maja 
1919 roku w Rzeszowie, ' Almanach Zydowski, 1996-1997,7-16, Hereafter 
Tornaszewský'Trzeci. ' 
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approximately two hundred and thirty. The reasons for such a high 
death toll was the fact that soldiers and officers of the two Polish 
armies of jozef Haller, the so-called Blue Army (Biekitna Armia) and the 
Army of Great-Poland (Annia Wielkopolskta) were the main perpetrators 
of this violence. 5 One can also argue that the war-time situation was 
itself a factor conducive to an increase in aggression and hostility 
toward a Jewish minority perceived as the Threatening Other and 
conspiring with Poland's enemies against her. 6 
The second major wave broke out at the universities during the 
first term of the academic year 1930/31 and twice re-occurred during 
the first term of the following two academic years. 7 During this 
phase, anti-Jewish excesses were frequently intertwined with 
demonstrations against the Sanacja govenunent, which, as I mentioned 
in the previous chapter, was labelled at the time by the Endecja as 
representing Jewish interests. 8 
Violence against Jewish students was advocated by the 
following organisations: the All Polish Youth (Mlodziei Wszechpolska, 
WO), the Youth Movement of the Camp for a Greater Poland (Ruch 
Mlodych Obozu Wielkiej Polski, OWP) and the student self-help 
associations (Bratnia Pomoc). 
Flistorical research tells us that these organisations, whose 
political and social ethos was basically Christian and exclusivist ethno- 
nationalist, were not marginal, but in fact enjoyed a significant level of 
popularity among university youths. 9 According to available data, 
approximately sixty per cent of all registered students at universities 
were members of student self-help associations in 1930. These 
associations were mostly controlled by the All Polish Youth, the 
Endek's longest established youth organisation. The only exception 
was the Jagiellonian University where membership of the student self - 
5 See, for example, Jerzy Tomaszewski, Tolskie 'Formacje Zbrojne wobec 7ydow 
191 & 1920, ' in: 4dzi w obronie Rzeczyl2ospolitei 97-111 and Zyndul, Zajscia . 9. 60n the importance of war as a factor in an increase of aggression and hostility 
towards ethnic minorities, see Panikos Panayi, 'Dominant Societies and Minorities in 
the Two World Wars. ' in Panikos Panayi ed., Minorities in Wartime 
(Oxford/ Providence, 1993), 3-23. Hereafter Panayiý 'Dominant! 
7See the reports on student anti-Jewish demonstrations in the volumes of Sprajyy 
I NarodowoSciowe, No. 6,1931,644-654; and No. 6,1932,698-703. 
80n the issue of the linking of anti-Jewish and anti-government actions by the 
Endecja in the early 1930s, see Rudnicki, 0b0'Z. 58-59. 
9See ibid.. 70-75. 
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help association was open also to Polish Jewish students. 10 The Youth 
Movement of the OWP, set up in 1927, was a dynamic section of the 
main OWP organisation which by 1933 had reached two hundred and 
fifty thousand members. 11 
Not only did these organisations advocate anti-Jewish violence, 
they were also the main suppliers of the perpetrators of such violence. 
And, in some cities, students of these organisations; were supported in 
these violent actions by high school pupils, who were also 
significantly influenced by the OWP and the Endecja. Clear evidence 
of Endecja's influence over high school pupils in inter-war Poland was 
the party's almost entire control over the Scout movement throughout 
the whole period. 12 
Importantly, these student organisations regarded such anti- 
Jewish actions as a viable way of putting pressure on the government 
to implement various anti-Jewish laws at universities - The first among 
such legislation was the policy of 'numerus clausus' consistently 
demanded by the All Polish Youth since its setting-up in 1922. 
'Numerus, clausus' was a policy aimed at limiting the number of 
Polish-Jewish students at Polish universities and institutions of higher 
education. Both Jewish students and a substantial section of Polish 
intellectual elites recognised it as a discriminatory policy and as a 
violation of the Polish constitution. 13 
The third wave of anti-Jewish violence was orchestrated by the 
National Radical Camp (ONR), set up in 1934 as an organisation to 
replace the disbanded OWP. The newly established National Radical 
Camp was responsible for anti-Jewish excesses that took place in April, 
May and during the first half of June of the same year. 14 The 
extremely violent nature of these excesses prompted the leaders of the 
100n the participation of various student organisations in anti-Jewish violence, see 
ibid., 72 - 75 and Szymon Rudnicki, From 'Numerus Claususý To 'Numerus Nullus, ' 
Pohn, Vol. 2,1987,246-268. Hereafter Rudnicki 'From 'Numerus. ' 
11The OWP was set up in 1926. It was joined by members of various political 
parties including the Christian-National Association, the Peasant Party -Piast, and the 
National Worker's Party, and the Endecja. Its leadership was in the hands of the 
extreme so-called Young group within the Endecja, which enjoyed the support of 
Roman Dmowski. The OWP was dissolved by the state administration in 1933 due to 
its extreme militant and anti-government programme. On the development of the 
OWP and on structural changes within the EndecJa, see Grott, Na! jonahzm.. 80-85. 
12See Rudnicki, Oboz. 73. 
130n reactions condemning the 'numerus clausus'policy, see, for example, 
Rabinowicz, The Legagy. 104-106. 
14See the report'ýydzi, ' 512ra3my Narodowos'ciowe, No. 4,1934,474. 
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Jewish community to begin talks on setting up an organisation for the 
monitoring of anti-Jewish events in Poland. 15 The Sanacja 
government of the time was alarmed by the ONR's strongly anti - 
Sanacja stance and by that party's extreme position on the issue of 
solving the 'Jewish Question! Given the explicitly fascist and militant 
nature of the ONR, on 12 May 1934, the Ministry of Interior Affairs 
decided to issue a set of special instructions against the excesses. 
Moreover in July of the same year, the government proclaimed the 
ONR to be an illegal organisation. However, this action did not put an 
end to the activities of the ONR since many of its members were also 
members of the legal Endecja. 
The fourth wave of anti-Jewish excesses occurred between 1935 
and 1937, amid sharply increasing popular support for the ethnic 
homogenisation of the Polish state . Once again violence broke out at 
the universities where the All Polish Youth and the ONR intensified 
their campaign in support of 'ghetto benches' for Jewish students. The 
activists and supporters of this campaign were easily identifiable by 
the wearing of the green ribbon. The campaign of "ghetto benches, 
aimed at the segregation of ethnic Polish and Polish Jewish students at 
universities and other institutions of higher education, was finally won 
by the extreme ethno-nationahsts in 1937. That year the government 
officially granted universities the power to regulate the seating of 
Polish and Jewish students, arguing that such a measure would bring 
an end to violent disturbances and would guarantee the maintenance 
of peace on campuses. 
However, campus violence continued to take place after "ghetto 
benches' were introduced by universities, and in some cases there was 
even an escalation of violence resulting in individual murders of 
Jewish students. 16 In many universities, extreme ethno-nationahst 
students used physical force to move Jewish students to the 
'segregated sections" of lecture halls. Historical records show that 
many Jewish students refused to accept the segregational system on 
the grounds that it violated their civic rights. The policy of 'ghetto 
benches' was also condemned by a significant number of Polish 
university professors and democratic Polish student organisations such 
as the Imperial Thought (Myýl Mocarst7vowa), a conservative student 
1,5 See ibid., 286. 
16See Melzer, No Wgy. 71-80. 
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organisation close to the left-wing Sanacja, and the Academic Civic 
Youth (Akademicka Miodztez Panstzvozva), a Sanarja student 
organisation, as well as by the international, academic community. 17 
According to the extreme ethno-nationalist programme, the 
'ghetto benchý system was but the first step on the road to forcing 
Polish Jewish students to leave Pohsh universities. In the late 1930s, 
the academic youth of the Endecja and of the ONR started their 
demand for a policy of 'numerus nullus, aimed at the complete 
'dejudaisation' of aH Polish institutions of higher education. 
Outside of the universities, anti-Jewish violence orchestrated by 
local sections of the Endecja took place in approximately one hundred 
and fifty towns and villages, the most frequent and intense rioting 
taking place in the central part of Poland where the Jewish minority 
was highly concentrated. However, it must be stressed, that violence 
erupted in all parts of the state regardless of the size of the local Jewish 
population living in a particular area. For example, in Silesia, where 
the Jews constituted just one point seven per cent of the entire 
population, attacks still took place. 18 It is estimated that between 1935 
and 1937, approximately two thousand Polish Jews were injured and 
between twenty and thirty killed. 19 
The wide-spread eruption of violence between 1935 and 1937 
can be seen as a direct result of the newly intensified anti-Jewish 
campaign launched in 1935 by the Endecja and the ONR. Both parties, 
moved by the visible recent popularity of fascism and exclusivist 
ethno-nationalism in other European countries, saw in anti-Jewish 
violence a viable and indispensable means of speeding the process of 
emigration of the Jews from Poland, and therefore of achieving the 
'dejudaisation of the Polish nation-state" (odiydzanie Polski. ). On 15 
November 1935 Endecja"s leading paper the Warsaw National Daily 
17For a list of foreign and domestic organisations and individuals protesting against 
the policy of 'ghetto benches' and anti-Jewish campus violence, see Memorandum on 
Anti-lewish Excesses (London, 1938), 1-3. Major works protesting against these 
practices and written by the Polish authors were Ryszard Ganszyniec, Ghetto 
--Lawkowe (Lw6w, 1937) and Antoni Gronowicz, Antisemi! yzm Rmjnuie M24 
Qýqgzyznp (Lwow, 1938). 
18See Jolanta ýyndul, 'Zajscia antyiydowskie 1935-1937. Geografia i formy, ' 
Biule! yn ZvdowskiKgo Inslytutu Ffistorycznego W PoIsce , No. 3,1991,69. Hereafter Zyndul, 'Zajscia. ' 
19jewish sources in Palestine presented higher figures of injured and killed to those 
presented in Polish sources. A discussion on these statistics and the numbers cited 
appears in 2yndul, 'Zajscia. ' 70-71. 
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(Warszawski Dziennik Narodozvy ), called for the expulsion of the Jews 
from the capital Warsaw as a first major step towards the complete 
'dejudaisatioW of Poland. 20 
A close examination of arguments of the time in support of anti- 
Jewish violence, shows that violence was not generally viewed as a 
means to the physical destruction of the Jewish community, but that its 
main objective was to make the daily life of the Polish Jews so odious 
and unbearable (obrzydzanie) that they would be 'persuaded' to 
'voluntarily' emigrate from the country. In fact, anti-Jewish rioting was 
viewed by the Endek instigators as a warning message to the Jews that 
the Poles were no longer willing to tolerate their presence within the 
Polish nation-state. 
On average, the outcome of a single outbreak of anti4ewish 
violence involving the civilian population in inter-war Poland was one 
or two deaths. For example, one person died in Strzyi6w on 21 April 
1919 and one in Baranow on 5 May 1919; and two were killed in 
Niebylec on 28 April 1919, in Grodno on 5 June 1936, and in Przytyk on 
9 March 1936. Among the highest figures killed by civilians was five 
dead in the Odrzywol, riot of 20 and 27 November 1935, and eight dead 
and one hundred injured in the riot in Kolbuszowa, Rzeszow district, 
on 6 May 1919.21 
Overall, in the inter-war period, the two most common forms of 
violence directed against Jews were the smashing of windows and 
plundering of shops and private homes, and the beating-up of 
inhabitants of villages and towns, students at universities and 
commuters on trains. At certain times on some of the suburban-lines 
such as Warsaw - Otwock, the police had to set up extra patrols in 
order to protect Jewish travellers. 22 Less common were the burning of 
Jewish shops and the bombing of Jewish institutions and synagogues, 
and throwing harmful chemicals at Jewish passers-by. 
The Myth as a Destructive Means of Communication 
As a rule, the message communicated in the myth of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other were formulated in highly emotive language. 
Primitivism, and aggressiveness were the two main characteristics of 
20See the report 'ýydzi, ' Sprahýy Narodowosciowe, No. 5,1935,481. On the problem 
of anti-Jewish. terror between 1935 and 1937, see also Mich, Qbýy- 84-89. 
21According to data cited in Stankiewicz, Kool 162. 
22See, 2yndul, 'Zajscia. ' 58. 
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its vocabulary since the myth had become deployed in both political 
propaganda and popular culture. The most frequent terms used by the 
Ende(ja to describe the Jewish Threatening Other were nouns 
expressing a high level of animosity, such as Jewish 'menace", "horde, 
'curse", 'flood' and 'tribe of parasites! The term Jew itself connoted a 
negative meaning in the narrative of the Jew as the Threatening Other. 
Moreover, this aggressiveness was reinforced by phrases 
stressing ideas of struggle, battle and even those of a war being fought 
against the Jews. The following examples from two inter-war monthly 
publications, the student Alma Mater and the catholic Pro Christo, 
illustrate the typical way these expressions were used: 'the struggle 
against the Jews is a national duV23; "the struggle against the Jews is 
also a struggle against the communist gangrene that is spreading 
around the country, it is a struggle for our true independence' 24; and 
'our existence is dependent, step by step, on how we fight the Jews., 25 
In the thirties, these phrases were overwhelmingly present in 
the political propaganda of the Endecja, the OVVP, the ONR and the All 
Polish Youth. In fact "the struggle against the Jews' (walka z 
iydami) 
became the key-slogan of the core ethno-nationalist press including a 
whole range of student, social, catholic and tabloid papers. The 
purpose of using such expressions was to convey the message that 
Polish-Jewish relations constituted a zero-sum conflict in which the 
Polish ethnic community had to take action to defend itself against the 
subjugation and destruction intended for it by the Jewish ethnic 
minority. 
The exact extent to which this anti-Jewish vocabulary was 
absorbed by the population at large is difficult to establish owing to the 
lack of a viable methodology. Nevertheless, it is possible to infer that 
the anti-Jewish vocabulary was absorbed to higher or lesser degree by 
members and supporters of the above parties and organisations, and 
also by the readers of their press and literature. Bearing in mind that 
this body of writing constituted a large and important part of aU 
publications in inter-war Poland, the level of absorption or at least the 
23St. p. 'W szrankach polemiki', Alma Mater, No. 3,1939,6-7. 
24Zbigniew Dymecki, 'W obliczu czerwonego niebezpieczenstwa. Agentury 
komunizmu w Polsce, ' Alma Mater, No. 6-7,1938,4. 
25Adolf Reutf s speech 'Rol a Polski Wsrod Innych Narodow Wielkich' published in 
Pro Christo, No. 11,1936,10-12. 
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popularity of such anti-Jewish propaganda cannot be seen as a 
marginal phenomenon. 
A perusal of the circulations of the anti-semitic tabloid 
newspapers that constituted the most extreme part of the core ethno- 
nationalist press shows that even these papers had a good-sized 
readership. In 1938 alone the total circulation of such papers exceeded 
one hundred thousand and equalled that of all weeklies dedicated to 
social and literary issues published in Poland at the time; two of these 
anti-Jewish weeklies, Under the Ban (Pod pqgierz) and The Self 
Defence of the Nation (Samoobrona Narodu) each reached a circulation 
of more than twenty five thousand the same year. 26 
Alongside the press, the same anti-Jewish language was 
employed in popular books on Jewish subjects. Prominent authors of 
this genre such as Stanislaw Trzeciak, Marian Morawski, and Henryk 
Rohcki (real name Tadeusz Gluzinski) were published in the so-called 
series 'Me Expert Jewish Library' (BibliOteka Zydoznawcza). This 
literature was generally advertised in the core ethno-nationahst press 
directed at both the more sophisticated as well as the popular market. 
For example, the Alma Mater directed at the catholic academic youth 
ran a special column on 'What Books To Read' (Co czytac? ) in which 
anti-Jewish and anti-communist works were highly recommended. 
Similar columns were published by the popular newspaper Little Daft 
Waty Dziennik) and the Pro Christo, which also published a list of 
recommended books on Jews entitled 'Literature On The Subject Of 
Jews' (Literatura Zydoznawcza). 
This kind of language was also deployed in lectures, seminars 
and discussions organised by the E-ndecja, and the All Polish Youth. 
Importantly, these events exemplify that the dissemination of the myth 
of the Jew as the Threatening Other in its vulgar and emotionally 
intense form was conducive to an increase in the level of hostility 
towards Jews. In fact, it can be argued that the dissemination of the 
myth's powerful message of Jewish destructiveness, was an important 
factor in the incitement to ethnic hatred and violence against members 
of the Jewish ethnic minority. Cases of spontaneous attacks on 
individual Jews after such events were reported in the Jewish and 
Polish press. Among more extreme examples was the knife attack by 
Jan Antczak on three Jewish men in Lodz in January 1937 committed 
26See Paczkowski, FrasL. 291-292. 
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on the way back from a lecture given by the Rev. Stanislaw Trzeciak. 
Two of three men were badly injured and the third died. 27 
Moreover, records of public participation in anti-Jewish violence 
demonstrate that such explicit anti-Jewish expressions were conducive 
to the incitement of aggression on the part of that section of the 
population drawn to it by speeches and slogans expressing the myth. 
The destructive nature of this type of communication is unquestionable 
since these events were characterised by a significant level of social 
mobilisation. Some of the riots, organised by the Endecja, attracted 
substantial crowds of people; the largest numbering the fifteen 
thousand who participated in anti-Jewish excesses in Czestochowa on 
19 June 1937.28 
Finally, we can also credit the dissemination of the narrative of 
Jewish destructiveness by core ethno-nationalists with creating what in 
sociological literature is described as 'a moral panic' towards a 
designated group perceived as a threat to the rest of society, in this 
case the Jewish ethnic minority. 29 This can be clearly be detected in 
the pattern of behaviour of the perpetrators and supporters of anti- 
Jewish violence. And the crucial elements of 'moral panic' can be 
found here: first, expressions of concern over the behaviour of the 
Jewish minority allegedly causing harm to the political, economic, 
social and cultural development of ethnic Poles; secondly, wildly 
exaggerated claims of this threat - such as the destruction of the Polish 
nation; thirdly consensus on the threat posed by the Jewish minority; 
fourthly, an increased level of hostility toward the Jewish minority; 
and finally outbursts of volatility directed at the Jewish minority. 
Another crucial element in this process is a sense of self-righteousness 
in justifying anti-Jewish violence as national self-defence. 
Violence as National Self-Defence 
A close examination of anti-Jewish violence in inter-war Poland 
shows that the legitimising of anti-Jewish riots and excesses as national 
ý7T'his case was reported in Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy, No. 31,1937. Cited in 
Zyndul, Zgýscia. 92. 
28ibid., 67-68. 
29Stanley Cohen was the first sociologist to use the term 'moral panic' and to notice 
its collective behaviour-like quality. On the subject of 'moral panic' anctits elements, 
see, Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction 
of Deviance (Oxford UIK, Cambridge USA, 1994), 31-53. Hereafter Goode and Ben- 
Yehuda, Moral. 
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self-defence was a strongly emphasised tendency on the part of the 
perpetrators of this violence and their supporters. This legitimisation 
was manifested in four main ways; firstly in mandating and justifying 
anti-Jewish riots and disturbances; secondly in paying tribute to the 
perpetrators of this violence and in making them to appear as national 
heroes; thirdly in shifting the guilt and responsibility for the violence 
onto the victim - the Jewish ethnic minority; and finally in minimising 
the unethical and criminal nature of the inter-ethnic violence itself. At 
the root of such legitimisation lay the myth of the Jew as the chief 
Threatening Other. Later on in this thesis I shall demonstrate that a 
similar legitimisation of anti-Jewish violence also occurTed in the early 
post-war period between 1945 and 1947. 
To understand how anti-Jewish violence could have been 
justified as national self-defence, one has to take into account the use, 
by Endecja, of a prominent theme in Polish national mythology - the 
myth of victinihood and unjust treatment by Others. As previously 
mentioned for obvious historical reasons, the theme of Pohsh 
victimhood had become prominent in Polish national mythology 
particularly since the partition of the First Polish Repubhc in the 
second half of the eighteenth century. In the Endek version of national 
history, that is to say the myth of Polish victimhood strongly 
intertwined with the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other, the Jew 
constitutes the most dangerous and sinister oppressor of the Polish 
nation, whereas the Pole is the long-suffering victim. The Endek 
version of the myth of national martyrdom stresses that Poles have 
been consistently marginalised and thwarted by Jews, that they have 
been relegated to the position of a minority in their own country, and 
that they have to fight back in order to regain their rightful position. 
The tendency of legidmising anti-Jewish violence as national 
self-defence was first to be found in the actions and pronouncements of 
the officers and soldiers of both the Haller and the Great Poland 
armies in the Eastern territories between 1918 and 1919. In general 
these officers and soldiers shared the conviction: that the Jews as a 
collectivity were the enemy of the Polish nation-state and that they 
collaborated with Poland's other enemies - the Ukrainians and the 
Bolsheviks. The chief accusation made against the Jews was of 
Bolshevism understood as Russian Communism. When it came to this 
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issue these armies treated all Jews as Communists despite the evident 
political diversity within the Polish Jewish community. 30 
The strong belief in the myth of the Jew as the chief Threatening 
Other resulted in two major mass killings of seventy Jews in Lviv 
between 22 and 24 November 1918, and of thirty Jews in Pinsk on 5 
April 1919. These murders caused an uproar in parliament where 
Ignacy Daszynski, one of the main leaders of the PPS, demanded an 
end to the excesses of the army, whom he referred to as hooligans in 
uniform. These condemnations, however, did not stop the men 
involved from believing that they had acted in national self-defence. 
For example, such a position is stated in the memoirs of the lieutenant 
Antoni Jakubowski who said of the Lviv killings: '... the Jewish perfidy 
was even bigger than the Ukrainian one .... the Jews were rightly 
punished. The whole suburb had to be pacified by military action..., 31 
The same arguments were used in relation to the peasant anti- 
Jewish riots in Little Poland (Malopolska) in April and May of 1919. 
Records of the investigation reveal that members of the Endecja 
justified the violence on the grounds that the Jews constituted a 
political threat to the nation. For example, Desydery Ostrowski, the 
headmaster of a local gymnasium and leader of the local section of the 
Endecja stated in the autumn of 1919: 
'... In my opinion the Jewish menace is one that is hostile to us, 
and Socialism - also hostile to us - is supported mainly by the Jews. 
During the war, we saw the Jews as they betrayed us and supported 
the Germans... 32 
The notion of national-self-defence was also used as grounds 
for the anti-Jewish student riots of the 1930s. In the aftermath of the 
first major rioting, the Chief Council of the Endecja passed on 22 
November 1931 the following resolution: 
'The numbers of Jews in this country and their strong position 
in its economic life, that has only but strengthened under the present 
government, is threatening our economic future. Their destructive 
influence on the populatioWs morals and on spiritual national life, and 
their hostile attitude towards the Polish raison d1tre proves that the 
30See, for example, Vital, A People. 798-820. 
3lTomaszewski, 'Polskie. '100. On attitudes within the Polish military elite towards 
the Jewish community, see also j8zef Lewandowski, Tfistory And Myth: Pinsk, April 
1919, ' Polin, Vol. 2,1987,50-72. 
32Statement of Dezydery Ostrowski. Cited in Tomaszewski, 'rr-Leci. ' 14. 
114 
rightful aim of Polish national politics has to be opposition to the 
Jewish Threat. 
Therefore, the Chief Council sees in the latest student 'events' 
signs of a battle for Polishness and a proof that the majority of Polish 
youth is highly patriotic. This, for us, serves as a reassurance that the 
political and cultural future of our Homeland will be secured and that 
the State will become an national [ethno-national] one..., 33 
Acting in national self-defence was also the justification used 
by Adam Doboszynski, the chief instigator of the 'march on 
Myslewice' (marsz na Myýlenice) on 22 and 23 June 1936. Under 
Doboszynski's command, one hundred and fifty people terrorised the 
local Jewish community and destroyed all its material goods. The 
Myslenice police could not stop the attack as they were disarmed by 
Doboszynski's men. Afterwards Doboszynski was proclaimed a 
national hero in circles of the Endecja and was later appointed to the 
position of vice-chairman of the party. 
It is worth adding here, that when the Second World War 
ended, it was Doboszynski who was placed in charge of restructuring 
the executive of the party after his return to Poland in December 
1946.34 
The same conviction was publicly expressed by the perpetrators 
of the Przytyk pogrom, and by their lawyers during the trial in June 
1936. The historian Joshua Rothenberg who investigated the Przytyk 
pogrom in detail, noted: 
'The Endek lawyers acting for the Polish defendants repeatedly 
attacked not only the Jewish defendants but the Jewish people as a 
whole. One of their most frequent accusations was that most Jews 
were communists and that the Jewish defendants were either 
communists or were manipulated by communists. The Jewish religion 
was also attacked. The question of the right of Jews to remain in 
Poland was raised on numerous occasions. 
According to several Jewish newspaper correspondents, the 
Polish defendants, and even more so the witnesses, conducted 
33From the political debate on student anti-Jewish riots in the autumn of 1931, 
reported in Spra3yy Narodowosciowe, No. 6,1931,651. 
34Andrzej Paczkowski, Zdobycie wfadzy 1945-1947 (Warszawa, 1993), 64. Hereafter 
Paczkowski, Zdo! 2ycie. 
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themselves defiantly, like heroes to whom the future of Poland was 
entrusted., 35 
Importantly, the sentences of the Przytyk defendants exemplify 
the common tendency to be more lenient to ethnic Poles participating 
in anti-Jewish riots than to Jewish co-defendants. Although they 
brought a wave of protest not only from the Jewish ethnic minority but 
also from Polish left-wing political and social organisations chiefly the 
PPS, the sentences were not revised. One can see in such cases that 
the judicial institution gave a clear impression of minin-tising the 
criminality of inter-ethnic violence, thereby making such violence 
socially acceptable. Jolanta 
ýyndul 
suggests that ideological reasons, 
such as acting in national self-defence, were classified by some judges 
as extenuating circumstance. 36 This in fact suggests that these judges 
subscribed to, or felt obliged to, support the EndecJa's position on anti- 
Jewish violence. 
The case of the Przytyk pogrom dearly exemplifies the 
phenomenon of shifting responsibility for anti-Jewish violence onto 
the Jewish ethnic minority itself and the minimising of the unethical 
and criminal nature of such violence. In fact, this was common 
practice among the Polish perpetrators and their lawyers, as well as 
among journalists representing the ethno-nationalist press of various 
kinds. For example, reports published by the Little Dey on the trial 
that took place after anti-Jewish excesses in Grodno in June 1935, can 
serve as a good illustration of these practices. Reporting on the trial of 
the perpetrators of the Grodno riots, which erupted after the funeral of 
a Pole killed by two Jews over a personal matter, the Little Dgily 
commented: 
"If the Jews of Grodno had condemned the murder of Kuszcza 
[the surname of the dead Pole] and joined in with his funeral 
procession, the excesses would not have taken place. Immediately 
after the murder a version of the story was circulated that it was 
committed over a woman at a dancing-hall. The Jews themselves are 
the ones responsible for these excesses. The streets on which the 
funeral procession took place and where an angry wave of people was 
walking was crowded during the evening hours. Therefore, it was 
35Zyndut, Zajscia. 92. See also Joshua Rothenberg, The Przytyk Pogrom, ' Soviet 
fewish Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2,1986,40. Hereafter Rothenberg, The Pr"k., 
36Rothenberg, 'The Przytyk. ' 39-43. 
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difficult to see and judge what people were doing ... Testimonies of 
Jewish witnesses should therefore be dismissed. '37 
Importantly, the shifting of responsibility for anti-Jewish 
violence onto the Jewish ethnic minority, was a tendency limited not 
only to the perpetrators and supporters of physical violence, but also to 
be found among some political groups and social institutions that in 
principle condernned the use of physical violence against the Jewish 
minority. The most salient example of tl-ds phenomenon is the Polish 
Catholic Church. Here are three examples of the Church's reaction to 
anti-Jewish violence; the response of Primate August Mond to the 
Przytyk pogrom of March 1936, the response of the Catholic Press 
Agency to the same pogrom, and the response of Cardinal Aleksander 
Kakowski to a delegation of rabbis in June 1934. 
In the aftermath of the Przytyk pogrom of March 1936, Cardinal 
August Mond and Bishop Sapieha of Cracow issued pastoral letters. 
These letters expressed, alongside a general statement of 
condemnation of physical violence, approval of an economic boycott of 
the Jewish ethnic minority. They also listed a number of accusations 
against Jews, such as spreading atheism, Bolshevism, corruption and 
the dissemination of pornography. Characteristically, those parts of 
the pastoral letters dedicated to the condemnation of violence were 
brief and vague, whereas the greater parts - concentrating on criticism 
of the Jews - were direct and explicit. These letters were commented 
on by the Polish - Jewish press of that time as statements that could 
only contribute to an increase of inter-ethnic hostility. 
The response of the Cathohc Press Agency (KatoliCka Agencja 
Praso, wa) to the Przytyk pogrom raised even more controversy. As in 
the case of the pastoral letters, this document condemned the physical 
attacks against Jews, but at the same time demanded the cultural 
separation of the Polish majority from the Jewish minority, and the 
social and economic emancipation of the ethnic Polish Population. 38 
In the third example, a delegation of rabbis from the Union of 
Rabbis of the Polish Republic (Zwiezek Rabinow Rzeczypospolitej) visited 
Cardinal Kakowski on 7 June 1934 and asked him to influence the 
youth of Endecja and the ONR to stop orchestrating anti-Jewish 
disturbances. Flis response was full of contradictions. On the one 
37'Dalszy ciag procesu grodzienskiego. Przemowienia stron. ' M* Dziennik, No. 
181,14 November, 1935,4. 
38Report on anti-Jewish excesses Spra3yy Narodowosiciowe, No. 1-2,1936,107-108. 
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hand he entirely condemned anti-Jewish riots, while on the other hand 
he spoke about Jewish provocation and charged the Jewish community 
with the crime of insulting Christian feelings, spreading atheism and 
supporting communism. 39 
What these examples reveal is that the Church, in its responses 
to anti-Jewish violence, condemned the use of such violence on the 
grounds of Christian teaching, while at the same time blaming Jews 
themselves for anti-Jewish incidents with reference to various themes 
of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other. 40 
Responses to anti-Jewish violence on the part of the OZON 
goverm-nent were similar to those of the Church. On the one hand, the 
representatives of the OZON government condemned anti-Jewish 
violence as socially destabilising incidents which could only slander 
the good name of Poland and of the nation. On the other hand, they 
insisted on the Polish natioWs right to self-defence against the Jewish 
minority. 
AU these cases provide good evidence that the rationalisation of 
the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other exerted a strong 
influence over perceptions of anti-Jewish violence on the part of 
institutions and organisations, which, in principle, objected to the use 
of violence against Jews as a means of accelerating the disappearance 
of Jews from Poland. Furthermore, they clearly show that the 
perception of the Jews as the Threatening Other by organisations 
which conden-ined anti-Jewish violence was similar to those 
organisations which advocated such violence. This explains why 
condemnations of anti-Jewish violence were not absolute and why the 
shifting of the responsibility for anti-Jewish violence onto the Jewish 
minority took place. 
39Reports from a visit of a delegation of the Union of Rabbis of the Polish Republic 
were published by the Union of The Rabbis of the Polish Republic and the Catholic 
Press Agency. See Spra1my Narodowo4ciowe, No. 2-3,1934,285-286 and No. 4,1934, 
474-475. In the aftermath of the meeting the Jewish community expressed shock and 
disillusion with the Cardinal's statement, while at the same time the Zionists 
condemned the delegation of rabbis for taking inappropriate action. 
40'ne pattern of the Church's attitudes towards the Jews from the earliest Councils 
and Popes was condemnation of violence against Jews (who had, after all, to be 
preserved as 'witnesses to the truth faith') mixed with condemantion of the perfidy 
of Jews. In the case of the Polish Catholic Church of the inter-war period, this 
position was heavily intermigled with the exclusivist ethno-nationahst position on 
the Jews. On the pattern of the Church's attitudes towards the Jews, see, for 
example, Moore, The Formation. 35-39; and Leon Poliakov, The Mran LAyth 
(London, 1974), 326-328. 
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It is worth noting here that Wiktor Adler, one of the main 
leaders of the Bund, the Jewish Socialist Party, noted sin-dlarities 
between perceptions of the Jews on the part the Endecýa and its 
offshoot radical organisations and on the part of those organisations 
and parties that advocated non-violence. In his work Economic 
Antisernitism in the Light of Statistics (Antysemityzm gospodarczy w 
swietle cyft), he refers to the former group as 'zoological antisemites' 
(zoologiczni antysemici), while the latter he calls "cultural antisernites' 
"The Endeks and its off-shoot radical organisations go straight to 
the point: we hate the Jews and do not wish to know them... They hate 
Jews in an obsessive and paranoid way .... Thus it is not suprising that 
this blind hatred ... is expressed by attacks on women, children and the 
elderly ...... Cultural antisemites' (primarily supporters of the Sanacia 
and the Peasant Party) condemn such excesses. They disagree with the 
means - the use of violence . However they agree with the content of 
the Endek message - the dejudaisation of Poland, and justify it with 
economic arguments., 41 
Even more controversial responses towards anti-Jewish violence 
can be found among well-known individuals including members of 
the cultural elites in inter-war Poland. For example, Aleksander 
Swiýtochowski, the writer and the founder of the previously 
mentioned Warsaw Positivist School, insisted in April 1937, that anti- 
Jewish violence within Polish society was "natural and understandable' 
because of the size and the social and cultural make-up of the Jewish 
minority dwelling on Polish territories. 42 He also criticised liberals 
for condemning anti-Jewish violence without providing a viable 
solution to the "Jewish Question'. And by doing so he implicitly 
shifted the responsibility for anti-Jewish violence onto the Jewish 
minority and minimised the criminal nature of this violence. 
'The Jews and their defenders ... unfold in vivid images the 
monstrosity of these [acts of anti-Jewish violence] acts; they remind the 
Polish people of a whole catechism of religious commandments and of 
a whole code of civil duties ... most people do not care ... they harbour 
I 41Wiktor Adler, A-n! ysemi! yzm gospodgLcz . le ý; yfr (Warszawa, 1937), 4. ýy w swiet 
42For a summary of Swiýtochowski's position towards the Jewish minority takenup 
in the discussion published in April in Wiadomosci Literackie, see Modras, The 
Catholic. 372. 
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open or quiet sympathy and recognition for the anti6emitic 
perpetrators., 43 
On the other hand, it must be stressed that progressive members 
of the Polish academic and literary communities unequivocally 
condemned anti-Jewish violence. Furthermore, the PPS and the 
Democratic Party, and organisations, which adhered to their ethos, 
engaged in active condemnation of the use of violence against the 
Polish Jews by organising lectures, days of solidarity with the Jewish 
community, and special fund-raising for victims of violence. 44 
Jewish Provocation 
The most salient element of justification for anti4ewish violence 
as national self-defence was alleged Jewish provocation. The concept 
of Jewish provocation, used as a direct explanation of Polish counter- 
attacks, was generally defined in the broadest sense to suit each 
particular situation. Looking at the historical data it appears that any 
social and political actions on the part of the Jewish ethnic minority 
could be classified as a provocation against the Polish nation. 
I have differentiated the following types of behaviour of the 
Jewish community, which were continuously defined as provocation 
against the Polish nation in the inter-war period: first, alleged support 
for foreign powers, particularly the Soviets, the Ukrainians and the 
Germans; secondly, participation in Communist and Socialist parties; 
thirdly, parliamentary speeches by Jewish NIPs" criticising actions of 
the Endecja and its offshoot radical organisations; fourthly, critical 
reactions of the Polish-Jewish press to anti-Jewish propaganda; and 
finally reactions of the Polish-jewish press to individual criminal acts 
committed by individual Jews. 
A particularly interesting case of alleged Jewish provocation 
was the election and the assassination of the first democratically 
elected President of Poland, Gabriel Narutowicz (1865-1922). 45 
Narutowicz, against whose candidature the Ende0a had vehemently 
protested from the start, was elected with the support of Jewish and 
other ethnic minorities representatives. Immediately afterwards, the 
I 43AIeksander Swiýtochowski, 'Antysemityzm, ' Wiadomoýci Literackie, 16 April, 
1937,3. 
440n active condemnation of anti-Jewish violence by Polish political organisations 
amd members of cultural elites, see, for example, Melzer, No Wgy Out, 64,71-80. 
450n the historical background to the election and assassination of Gabriel 
Narutowicz, see, for example, Wandycz, The Price 973-224. 
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Endecja organised a wave of anti-presidential demonstrations in the 
capital. The Endecja press insisted that Narutowicz was a President 
representing Jewish and not Polish interests. On 11 December 1922 the 
Warsaw Gazette stated: 
'Who would expect that the first elected President of the Polish 
Republic would be greeted with silence by the Polish parliament .... and 
with waves of protesting demonstrators on the streets ... Who would 
dare to think that the majority the Poles would not be responsible for 
casting the decisive vote on their Presidential candidate .... Among 
newspapers published in Polish only two expressed unreserved joy at 
the outcome of the presidential election: the Zionist Our Courier and 
Rosner's Polish Courier .... The Polish nation has to defend itself against 
this Jewish invasion. The Jews have made a terrible political mistake 
and therefore have provoked this outburst of anger against them. 
Poles who were unaware of this situation and thus allowed it to 
happen [the election of Narutowicz] have sinned against Poland., 46 
A few days after the presidential election Narutowicz was 
assassinated by an Endek supporter. Press affiliated to Ende0a 
insisted that the Jewish minority has provoked this outcome. The logic 
behind such reasoning was that it was primarily Jews that had voted 
for Narutowicz and that therefore he was the president of the Jews and 
other non-ethnic Poles, and not President of the Poles, the true owners 
of the newly independent Polish state; secondly, that as assassination 
of heads of state was rare in Polish history -a historical fact - it had to 
be the Jews who were responsible for this assassination; and that the 
Jews were responsible for provoking a reaction among Poles out of 
character with the Polish cultural matrix. Thus, the Jews bore 
responsibility for this crime. 
'The murder of the President of the Polish Republic is an event 
which stands outside political ramifications. This matter has to be seen 
through the aspect of national sentiments .... Outside of the political 
scene, this is a nation with an emotional body and one which has 
expressed its reactions, even reactions which are politically 
irresponsible-Our nation has been put under a terrible test, perhaps 
the most terrible in its entire history. At the moment when finally after 
years of captivity historical events have given our nation a chance of 
being an independent sovereign state, this chance has immediately 
46'po wyborze. 'Gazeta Warszawska, No. 338,11 December, 1922,1. 
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been jeopardised [the election of Narutowicz] with the support of 
Jewish votes. The Polish nation has been subjugated to a terrible 
dilemma: to be or not to be, to be sovereign, or to give over our 
sovereignty to the Jews., 47 
Violence and National Martyrdom 
Importantly, in the inter-war period, Polish individuals who 
were killed as a result of active participation in anti-Jewish riots were 
identified by supporters of Endeýa and its offshoot organisations as, 
national heroes and martyrs. The most obvious example is the case of 
Stanislaw Wadawski. 
Stanislaw Waclawski, a student of the law faculty at the 
University of Stefan Batory in Vilnius, was fatally injured on the 
second day of anti-Jewish excesses that began on the university 
campus on 9 November 1931.48 His funeral, attended by 
approximately two thousand students, turned into a national 
demonstration which had to be dispersed by the police. 49 In the 
propaganda of the All Polish Youth, Wadawski was instantly turned 
into a national martyr who had given up his life for the cause of the 
dejudaisation of Polish universities. News of his death travelled fast to 
other academic centres in L'viv, Poznan and Lublin - where combined 
anti-Jewish and anti-government demonstrations took place. Violence 
also spread to the provincial cities and towns of the Bialostok, Kielce, 
and Lodz districts, where agitated youths smashed windows of Jewish 
properties and propagated slogans such as q3eat up the Jews and Save 
Poland., 50 In many places, police arrested the most violent students 
as well as high school pupils of gymnasiums who had been drawn into 
the events by groups of older students. On 14 November, the biggest 
mass in commemoration of Wadawski's death, attended by seven 
thousand students was held in the church of St. Anne, in Warsaw . 
51 
One year later on the first anniversary of his death, anti-Jewish 
violence of varying degrees broke out in the major universities. The 
47'rragiczny konflikt. ' Gazeta Warszawska No. 344,17 December, 1922,1. 
48For a description of this event, see Rudnickt 'From 'Numerus', 246- 268. 
49To prevent further fighting the Rector closed down the university and issued a 
statement condemning anti-Jewish violence, according to the report 'Zajscia 
antyzydowskie, 'Sprahýy Narod-owos4ciowe, No. 6,1931,647. 
50ibid., 647. 
51 ibid., 646. 
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table below illustrates examples from the universities of Warsaw and 
I! viv. 52 
Date and Place 
9.11.1932 University of Warsaw 
Events 
Members of the 0WP from the 
Faculty of Law expel their Jewish 
colleagues out of the lecture halls; 
twenty Jewish students injured 
10.11.1932 University of Warsaw After the mass dedicated to S. 
Wadawski at St. Anne's Church, two 
thousand students gather in an 
academic hostel. Attempts at 
organising street demonstrations are 
prevented by the pohce 
14,17.111932 University of Warsaw Atmosphere of hostility at the 
Medical and Law Faculties; fights 
between Polish and Jewish students. 
Polish students from democratic 
student organisations sign a petition 
condemning the anti-Jewish actions 
of students associated with the 
Ende(ja53 
52Data based on the report 'Akademickie wystapienia Antyýydowskie, ' S12ra3my 
Narodowoýciowe, No. 6,1932,698-700. 
53The two democratic student organisations were the Imperial Thought and the 
Academic Civic Youth. 
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12-11.1932. University of L'viv 
(Lwow) 
13-11.1932. The University in L'viv 
After the mass approximately one 
thousand students form a march to 
the Technical House where a plaque 
commemorating Wadawski's death 
is to be unveiled. The police break 
up the crowd and confiscate the 
plaque. Students continue on to 
other parts of the city where they 
smash one hundred twenty windows 
of Jewish properties and beat up 
Jewish passers-by. Thirty-three 
students are arrested. Anti-jewish 
demonstrations last the whole day 
Anti-jewish demonstration take 
place throughout the day. Police 
arrest twenty-three Polish students. 
President of L'viv, Drojankowski, 
issues a statement condemning the 
anti-Jewish excesses 
Over the ensuing academic years, those students who were 
radical ethno-nationalists continued to refer to Waclawski as a symbol 
of the national struggle against the Jews, and as a martyr whose death 
should be avenged. One of the ONWs leaflets refers to him as a hero 
and explicitly incites the public to anti-Jewish violence: 'On the 
anniversary of Waclawski's death, Jewish blood must flow. On that 
day, Jewish homes and businesses acquired by wrongs done to Poles, 
and even by their deaths, must burn'. 54 
Jews as a Physical Threat to the Polish Nation 
In the context of the intensified anti-Jewish propaganda by the 
Ende0a and its offshoot radical organisations of the thirties, the Jewish 
ethnic minority was now to be categorised not only as an economic, 
political and cultural threat to the Polish nation but also as a physical 
C; 11- Such references to Waclawski appeared in leaflets and brochures. The above 
mentioned ONR leaflet was published in Czas, 2 November, 1936 and is cited in 
Rudnicki 'From 'Numerus. ' 266. 
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one. Characteristically, the core ethno-nationalists; interpreted 
individual murders of Poles by Jews as a sign of the strength and 
aggressiveness of the Jewish minority. And, as Emanuel Melzer 
correctly observed, the real motives behind these killings, such as self - 
defence or individual criminality, were completely discounted by the 
core ethno-nationahsts and that section of the public under their 
influence. 55 
Classifying cases of individual murders of ethnic Poles as part 
of the conflict between the Polish and Jewish communities was to 
touch a 'raw ethnic sentiment. It is not difficult to perceive how the 
notion of 'the Jew as the murderer of one of us' was to engender 
heated, spontaneous and violent reactions against the Jewish minority. 
And in fact one can argue that it was the dissemination of this notion 
that triggered the most brutal beatings and killings in the inter-war 
period. Here are three examples of such cases from the 1930s. 
On 26 November 1932 three Polish students were injured in a 
fight with Jewish artisans on the streets of L'viv. 56 One of them, Jan 
Grotkowski, a veterinary student was mortally wounded. The next 
day members of the student self-help association and of the OVVP 
urged their colleagues to avenge the death of Grotkowski with the 
slogan "blood for blood' (`krew za krew). The reaction to this was 
instant. Several hundred students from the University of Jan 
Kazimierz took to the streets, mercilessly beating up Jewish passers-by 
and smashing windows in Jewish shops. Further anti-Jewish excesses 
continued for another four days, despite police attempts to put an end 
to them and despite condemnations by the rector of the Lviv 
University and the Catholic Archbishops of the L'viv diocese. News of 
Grotkowski's death spread to other universities in the state, and in 
Warsaw and Krakow Jewish students were beaten up and thrown out 
of the universities. Other anti-Jewish demonstrations took place at 
academic centres in Krakow, Lublin, Poznan, Warsaw and Vilnius. 
In Przytyk on 9 March 1936, an initial dash between Jewish 
youths and gangs of young Poles attacking them, turned into a full- 
scale bloody riot after a Polish peasant Stanislaw Wieýniak was killed 
by a Jew Szolem Lesko. 57 The sight of Wiesniak's corpse being 
55Meizer, 'Antisemitism. '129. 
56See the report on Grotkowski's death and on student anti-jewrish demonstrations 
in S12raWy Narodowo; ciowe. No. 6,1932,700-703. 
57Rothenberg, ýMe Przytyk' 37. 
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publicly carried by his weeping family to the doctor's house, along 
with cries of 'they've killed one of us! ' enraged the crowd. In its anger 
the mob launched a large -scale attack on the two Jewish 
neighbourhoods of Podgajek and Zacheta. According to a conclusive 
statement issued by the deputy public prosecutor S. Dotkiewicz, the 
riot proceeded in the following way: 
'.... Here groups, twenty to thirty strong, armed mainly with 
stand-dons, ran along the street, forcing their way into houses. Dozens 
of Jewish apartments had windows and doors wrenched from their 
frames by metal bars, pegs, stones weighing twelve kilograms or more, 
and even shafts .... Inside the apartments and shops, furniture and 
goods were destroyed; some were looted, although these cases were 
rare. Some of those wronged maintained that their money from the 
fair was lost during the sacking. Where the inhabitants were caught, 
they were beaten up with shouts of: 'kill them; doWt forgive them for 
what they have done to our brother! -, 58 
As a result, one Jewish couple, the Minkowskis were killed, and 
their house completely wrecked. However their children, despite 
being seriously beaten were saved by their ethnic Polish neighbour. 59 
The violence ceased after police reinforcements were brought to 
Przytyk from Radom. 
In Nlinsk Mazowiecki, a riot lasting abnost four days occurred 
on 1 June 1936 after Judka Lejb Chaskielewicz shot Jan Bujak out of 
personal animosity. Only a few hours later a furious crowd smashed 
windows in all the Jewish shops and private houses. Fearing for their 
lives three thousand local Jews fled the town. Among the ones who 
stayed, forty-one were injured over the next two days and some Jewish 
houses were burned on the last day of the riot. 60 
The Endeýa propaganda that foRowed these two deaths was 
incorporated into a key-slogan: "the blood of Bujak and Wiesniak has 
divided Jews and Poles' ("kmw Bujaka i Wiesniaka dziell Zyda od 
Polakaj. 61 Such slogans aimed to show that there was no possibility 
58Document: Conclusions of the Investigation signed by the Public Prosecutor S. 
Dotkiewicz, edited by Adam Penkalla, 'The Przytyk Incidents' Of 9 March 1936 From 
Archival Documents, ' Polin, Vol. 5,1990,349. 
59AnctrzejPenkalla, 'Zajsciaprzytyckie9marcal936roku, 'Kultura, No. 9,1989,10. 
j 60Zyndul, 'Zajscia. ' 66. 
61Rudnicki, Obýz. 295. 
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of peaceful co-existence between the two ethnic groups, and that ethnic 
hatred and violence was a 'natural' element of Polish-Jewish relations. 
Conclusions 
My aim in this chapter was to demonstrate that from 1918 and 
1939 the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other played an important 
role in the legitimisation of anti-Jewish violence as national self - 
defence. I have shown that the myth constituted an important factor in 
mandating and justifying all forms of anti-Jewish violence and in 
minimising the unethical and criminal nature of this violence. 
Moreover, the myth provided grounds for the participants of such riots 
to be seen as national heroes and for shifting the guilt and 
responsibility for the violence onto the victims. I shall return to the 
issue of the impact of the myth on anti-Jewish violence, when 
discussing the early post-war period 1945-1947 in chapter five. 
Although anti-Jewish violence was advocated and orchestrated 
only by the radical section of political ethno-nationalist elites, its 
negative impact on inter-ethnic relations between Poles and Polish 
Jews is beyond question. The post-independence period (1918-1939) 
was the first historical period in which the Polish Jews experienced the 
full force of the most radical form of Polish exclusivist etlmo- 
nationalism in action. In the post-1935 period, this phenomenon was 
difficult to contain by the state, which having endorsed the myth of the 
Jew as the Threatening Other, was, on principle, against using violence 
as means of solving the so-called 'Jewish Question. ' It must also be 
stressed that anti-Jewish violence was unequivocally condemned by 
the PPS, the Democratic Party and a segment of the cultural elites. 
On a more general level, the case of anti-Jewish violence in 
inter-war Poland can serve as a good illustration that various forms of 
hostility against a minority group can be attributed to the long - 
established and rationalised perception of this minority as the 
Threatening Other. Radical exclusivist ethno-nationahsts who 
advocate extreme means of treating such a minority, may use the myth 
to instigate, rationalise and justify anti-minority violence as national 
self-defence. Under conditions of thriving exclusivist ethno- 
nationalism, this process may result in outbursts of severe anti- 
minority riots, difficult to contain by the state. 
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Chapter IV. 
Perceptions of the Jewish Minority during the Period of the German 
Occupation, 1939-1945. 
'For all honest Poles, the fate of the Jews going to heir death was bound to be 
exceedingly painful, since the dying-were people whom our people could not 
look straight in theface with a clear conscience. ' 
Jerzy Andrzejewski, 'Zagadnienia polskiego antysemltlZmu, ' Odrodzenie, 
No. 27,1946. 
Introduction 
As revealed in the two previous chapters, the inter-war period 
was a crucial era for the popularity and dissemination of the ideology 
of Polish exclusivist ethnic nationalism. By the end of the Second 
Republic, a significant section of the Polish political elites, the Catholic 
Church, and non-elites, perceived the Polish-Jewish minority as the 
chief 'objective" enemy of the Polish nation and as harmful to all 
aspects of its development: political, economic, social and cultural. 
The myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other, highly rationalised, 
became the prevalent way of thinking about Polish Jewry and became 
central both to Polish-Jewish relations and to the general debate on 
national life and nationhood. The myth provided a rationale for one of 
the most powerful beliefs of that time - that there was no possibility for 
peaceful co-existence between the ethnic Polish majority and the 
Jewish minority within the same polity, and that Polish Jewry's 
homeland lay abroad. Therefore, on the eve of the Second World War 
(WVVH), a broad consensus had been reached on the project of the 
exclusion of the Jewish ethnic minority from Poland by means of mass 
emigration. 
In this chapter I look closely at the continuity of this way of 
thinking during the years of WWH. Firstly, I examine the presence and 
the development of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other 
within the underground political elites. And secondly, I look at the 
impact of this myth on society at large in the German established so- 
called Generalgouvernement (Generaina Gubernia, GG). 1 Ifocuson 
1The Generalgouvernement was that part of Nazi occupied Poland not incorporated 
into the Reich, unlike the western regions of Danzig (Prusy Zachodnie i Gdansk) and 
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the following questions: To what extent did this myth continue to 
impact on Polish political discourse during WWU? Was it stiff relevant 
to plans for the shape of a future independent Polish nation-state even 
during the on-going Nazi genocide of Polish Jewry? And to what 
extent did this myth influence Polish attitudes toward Jews as victims 
of Nazi genocide ? 
I base my analysis on official documents and reports of the so- 
called underground Polish state and press of the various Polish 
political parties and sodal organisations that proliferated 
clandestinely, and on private diaries and memoirs. 2 
In my opinion, an analysis of the persistence of the myth of the 
Jew as the Threatening Other in war-time Poland can provide a better 
understanding of the main patterns of Polish relations and interactions 
with the Jewish minority during that period. In particular it can 
contribute to a more adequate explanation of two inter-related 
processes: first, the marginalisation. of Polish Jews within the so-called 
underground Polish state; and secondly, the indifference towards the 
Nazi extermination of the Jewish minority. 
On a more general level, I hope that this chapter will contribute 
to an understanding of the destructive influence of such myths on 
inter-ethnic relations in war-type circumstances: when a minority 
perceived as the Threatening Other is being exterminated by an 
external social actor, and a majority group is attributed the role of the 
by-stander. 3 
I absolutely reject the notion of ethnic Poles as the accomplices 
of the Nazi genocide of the Jews. And I treat the phenomena analysed 
here as occurring simultaneously, but primarily separately, to the Nazi 
genocide of European Jews. At the same time, I do not accept the 
thesis that Polish anti-Jewish perceptions and actions were basically 
Reighsgau Watherland (Kraj Warty). The territory of the GG was divided into four 
districts, each named after its major city, Warszawa, Krakow, Radom and Lublin. In 
August 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi authorities set 
up a fifth district, Galicia, with its centre in L'viv, where Jewish ghettos were 
established by the end of the same year. Hereafter GG. 2Many primary sources vital for an analysis of Polish attitudes towards the Polish 
Jews during WWH have been published in the last decade. See, for example, Pawef- 
Szapiro, ed., Wojna iydowsko-niemiecka Polska prasa konspirag3dria 1943-1944 o 
(Londyn, 1992). Hereafter Szapiro, Wojna. and 
Kazimierz Przybysz, ed., Wizje Polski ProgjgM polilyczne lat wojLiy i okupA! 411 
1939-1944 (Warszawa, 1992), Hereafter Przybysz, 11i4e. 
30n the subject of hostile perceptions by dominant nations of ethnic minorities in 
war-time, see Panayi, 'Dominant! 3-23. 
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the product of Nazi antisemitic propaganda. This argumentation, first 
presented in Polish underground circles, and later taken up by some 
historians, holds good only in respect of that very small segment of 
Polish society that collaborated with the Nazis for profit or that was 
directly influenced by German fascism. In such cases the impact of the 
Nazi concept that everything was allowed with regards to the Jews can 
be detected. 4 However, this argumentation does not hold as far the 
discourse on Polish Jews within the underground is concerned. 
Beyond some similarities of concepts, for example the linking of Jews 
and Communism in both the Nazi press and Polish clandestine 
publications, the main pattern of perceptions of Polish Jews among 
Polish political and military elites was basically "home -made' and 
rooted in the ideology of Polish exclusivist ethno-nationahsm. 
In this chapter my main argument is firstly that the dominant 
way of thinking about Polish Jews as the Threatening Other did not 
undergo re-evaluation during and after the Nazi destruction of ninety 
per cent of the Pohsh-jewish community, and that throughout WWR 
the myth was used by the significant segment of Polish underground 
as the main reference point in the discourse on the Jewish ethnic 
minority and its relation to the future Polish nation-state. Secondly, I 
argue that the myth of the Jew as the enemy of Poland influenced to 
some degree the way in which a significant segment of political elites 
and society at large related to the Nazi extermination of Jewry. In the 
context of the Holocaust, Polish Jews were primarily perceived as a 
group of suffering human-beings, but as outside of the 'universe of 
Polish national obligations". The suffering of the Jewish ethnic 
minority was not recognised as a part of the unfolding tragedy of the 
Polish nation-state and of its people, nor their deaths as a part of the 
same tragedy. This is not to say that there were no members of the 
government-in exile and underground, and members of non-elites, 
who thought of the Polish Jews as an intrinsic part of the Polish nation- 
state and their tragedy as a part of the Polish national tragedy. Rather 
both Polish and Jewish data attest that such views were representative 
only of a minority position. 
4For example, on the subject of the participation of Polish youth in violent attacks 
initiated by the Germans against Jews, see Helen Fein, Accounting For Genocide. 
NatiorialResl2onses and lewish Victimisation during the Holocaust. (Chicagoand 
London, 1984), 240-241. 
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Wars often strengthen ethnic self-consciousness and ethnic 
imagery but weaken or destroy the cohesion of multinational 
societies. 5 Such processes can be particularly intensified in societies in 
which'the core nation'shows a high level of support for the ethnic 
homogenisation of the nation-state and for the exclusion of a particular 
ethnic minority prior to the out-break of war. Poland between 1939 
and 1945 can be viewed as just such an illustration. 
Before moving into the analysis, I will briefly discuss the main 
perspectives on the subject of ethnic Poles' relations with Polish Jews 
during WVVH. I treat this discussion as a necessary introduction to my 
further analysis wl-dch will reveal the complexities and partisan 
representations in the post-war period. 
Academic research on Polish perceptions of its Jewish ethnic 
minority and on anti-Jewish attitudes, actions and indifference during 
the Holocaust comprises a relatively new field of study. Scholars who 
have contributed most to this field have acknowledged both the need 
for further analysis and the methodological challenges this subject 
poses. 
'Despite the fifty years which have elapsed since the end of the 
Second World War, historians still have a long way to go before they 
can be seen to have provided a full and objective representation of the 
intricate problems connected with the relations between the Polish 
underground and the Jewish populations during the most tragic 
period in its history., 6 
'We historians bear a heavy responsibility as witnesses to an 
epoch of bestiality. The challenge we face is difficult and sometimes 
even painful, but silence is tantamount to denying or avoiding the 
truth., 7 
The most important scliolarly investigation of the subject has 
been conducted by the historians Yisrael. Gutman, Shmuel Krakowski 
and David Engel, and the sociologist Nechama Tec. 8 The works of 
5Anthony D. Smith, 'Warfare in the formation, self-images and cohesion of ethnic 
communities, ' Ethnic and Racial Studies , Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1981,390. 6Shmuel Krakowski, 'Me Polish Underground and the Extermination of the Jews' in: 
Polin, Vol. 9,1996,138. 
7Gutman, 'Historiography. ' 189. 
8 See, Yisrael Gutman, Shmuel Krakowski, Unequal Victims. Poles and lews Dujins 
hLorld War Two (New York, 1986). Hereafter Gutman, Krakowski, Unequal. David 
Engel, In the Shadow of Auschwitz: The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Tews, 
1939-1942 (Chapel Hill N. C., 1987) and the same author, Facing The Holocaust. The 
Polish Government-in-Exile And The Jews. 1943-1945. (Chapel Hill N. C., 1993) 
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Gutman and Krakowski describe in detail anti-Jewish actions within 
the Polish underground institutions and organisations in Nazi 
occupied Poland. The work of Engel deals with a similar problem 
within the Polish government-in-exile. Whereas Tec's work analyses 
the social aspect, in particular the presence of anti-Jewish attitudes 
among rescuers of Jews. 
The problem of Polish anti-Jewish attitudes and actions during 
the Holocaust constitutes the most complex and sensitive aspect of 
Polish-Jewish studies. And one which still generates highly 
emotionally charged debates involving both scholars and the general 
public in Poland and international circles. These debates are usually 
marked by what Antony Polonsky has called 'a tragic dialogue of the 
deaf. "9 The reason for such an outcome is that the subject has 
frequently been treated in an unacademic and partisan way to suit 
particular normative and axiomatic positions. On the one hand, the 
majority of Polish scholars have been inclined to deny any wrong done 
to the Jews that might reflect negatively on the ethnic Polish 
community - the key witness to the Holocaust. On the other hand, 
some western media and writers have used these issue s in attempt to 
prove that the Poles were the collaborators of the Nazis in the 
annihilation of European Jewry. Both these positions have created an 
obstacle to a proper investigation of the problem. 
The Polish perspectives 
As already indicated there is a visible reluctance and opposition 
to discussing the subject both among Polish historians and the general 
Polish public. Looking closely at the bulk of Polish historical work 
both popular and scholarly on Polish-Jewish relations during WWH, it 
is obvious that in most cases they would rather not confront the 
subject. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between two types of 
approaches; the minority approach able to discuss the issue boldly, 
and the majority approach aimed at rejecting the issue as irrelevant. 
Hereafter Engel, In the Shadow. and hereafter Engel, Facing. ; Nechama Tec, When 
Light Pierced the Darkness: Christian Rescue of fews in Nazi-Occupied Poland 
(New York, 1986). Hereafter Tec, When Light. 
9Antony Polonsky, 'Polish-Jewish Relations And The Holocaust. ' Polin, Vol. 4,1989, 
227. Hereafter Polonsky, 'Polish-jewish. ' 
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The latter can be defined as the narrative of denial. 10 It is 
characterised by the following three aspects: a strong defensive stance 
on a national level ranging from a minimalisation of the issue to its 
complete dismissal; the thesis that the Polish nation and the Polish 
underground state acted in a principled way towards Polish Jews 
during the Holocaust; and charges of anti-polonism against both Polish 
and foreign authors who argue differently. 
Characteristically, inconsistent and clearly ambivalent 
statements about Jews can be detected in this narrative of denial. 
Acknowledgements of the destruction of Polish Jewry are intertwined 
with three types of accusations: lack of gratefulness on the part of 
Polish Jews towards those Poles who helped them; anti-Polish 
behaviour and actions on the part of Jews during WWH; and Jewish 
passivity in the face of the Nazi destruction of their own people. The 
character of these pronouncements is primarily ethno-nationalist. Jews 
are referred to not as part of the Polish nation-state, but as an alien 
group that has historically benefited from dwelling on the territory of 
Poland. 
Examples of this category of approach can be found in popular 
works of history written by former members of the underground 
Polish state, for example, books by Stefan Korbolýski, General Tadeusz 
136r-Komorowski, and Kazimierz Iranek-OsmecJd. 11 They can also be 
found in standard history textbooks for high-school and university 
students. 
The persistence of this approach over the last two decades has 
been discussed by the historian Andrzej Bryk and a team of scholars 
from the Jewish 1-listorical Institute in Warsaw. Bryk, who conducted a 
survey of history textbooks in use in Poland in the eighties reached the 
following conclusion: 'the description of the annihilation of the Jews 
on Polish territory is rather confusing and the subject of the relations 
between the Polish and the Jewish population is ridden with 
omissions, half truths and overt inaccuracies to say the least. " 12 
100n the narrative of denial, see Joanna Michlic, 'The Troubling Past: Polish 
Collective Memory of the Holocaust. An Overview, ' East Euroj2ean lewish Studies, 
Vol. 29, No. 1,1999,75-84. 
1ISee, for example, Stefan Korboýski, The Jews And The Poles In World War U 
(New York, 1989), Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, The Secret ýy (New York, 1951) Arm 
and Kazirnierz Iranek-Osmecki, He Who Saves One Life (New York, 1971). 
12Andrzej Bryk, 'Polish Society Today And The Memory Of The Holocaust, ' in 
Yehuda Bauer et al., Remembering For The Future. Theme III Vol. 3, (Oxford, 1988), 
2373. 
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Scholars of the Jewish IFEstorical Institute have reached similar 
conclusions about history textbooks for primary and high school 
education in use in Poland in the nineties. 13 
The persistent popularity of this approach can be observed also 
in two major public debates that took place in Poland in 1987 and in 
1994. The first debate was provoked by a short article by the 
prominent Polish literary critic Jan Blonski entitled 'The Poor Poles 
Look At The Ghetto' ('Biedn i Polacy patrzq na ghetto). 14 According to 
Antony Polonsky, the publication of the article in T . ygodnik 
Powszed2ny on 11 January 1987, 
'sparked off what has certainly been the most profound debate 
on the implications of the Holocaust in Poland since the Second World 
War. '15 
In the article Blonski raised the issue of the moral responsibility 
of Poles for the Holocaust and also plainly stated that pre-war anti- 
semitism had an impact on Polish attitudes towards the Jewish 
minority during VVWII. His views and ones similar were rejected by 
most Poles who participated in the debate. Similar criticism came from 
both the communist and right-wing Solidarity factions. Blonski was 
accused of the endorsement of anti-Polish propaganda and of 
betraying the Polish state and nation. Some voices even called for his 
prosecution under articles 178 and 270 of the Polish criminal code, for 
'slandering the Polish natioW. 16 
A similar outcome was visible in the second debate initiated by 
Nhchal'Cidiy" s article 'Poles and Jews: Black Pages in the Annals of the 
Warsaw Uprising' (Po1acy-ZydzI: Czarne Karty Powstania 
Warszawskiego') published in Gazeta 3Yyborcza 24, on 29 / 30 January 
13'rhe team's nine reports on h(? w the Holocaust is presented in history textbooks 
was published in the Biqlejyn Zydowskiego Ins! ytutu Mstoiycznego (BZIH), No. 3- 
4,1997. 
14 A representative sample of the debate was published in English in Aharon Weiss 
ed., Yad Vashern Studies, Vol. 19,1997, and in a compilation by Antony Polonsky. 
ed., W Brother's Keeper? Recent Polish Debates on the Holocaust (London, 1990). 
Hereafter Polonsky, * Brother's. On the debate, see Steinlauf, Bondage. 89-121; 
Antony Polonsky, 'Beyond Condernnation, Apologetics, and Apologies: On the 
Complexity of Polish Behaviour Toward the Jews During Second World War. ' in 
Jonathan Frankel, ed., Studies in ConteMporgy TeMgy , Vol. 13, Uerusalem, 1998), 190-224. Hereafter Polonsky, 'Beyond. '; and Shmuel Krakowski, 'Jews and Poles in 
Polish Historiography. ' Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. 19,1997,317-340. Hereafter 
Krakowski, 'Jews. ' 
15Polonsky, 'Polish-jewish. '231. 
16See Antony Polonsky's introduction to W Brother's Keeper? Recent Polish 
Debates on the Holocaust 14. 
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1994-17 In his article, Cichy discussed anti-Jewish attitudes and actions 
on the part of Polish military organisations and civilian population 
during the sixty-three day Warsaw Uprising launched against the 
Germans on 1 September 1944. In particular, he described well-known 
cases of individual and group murders of Jews, by the National Armed 
Forces (Narodowe Si? y Zbrojne), and by some units of the Home Army. 
Although Cichy's revealing of the 'dark side' of the Polish treatment of 
Jews during the Warsaw Uprising was carefully supported by three 
historians - Andrzej Paczkowski, Andrzej Friszke and Teresa 
Prekerowa, a majority of discussants dismissed the article as untrue. 
Furthermore, groups of ex-soldiers of the Home Army (AK) and 
representatives of the Polish intelligentsia signed protests against its 
publication. Gazeta 3Yyborcza was accused of anti-Polish and 'anti- 
goyish' tendencies and of re-introducing Stalinist propaganda against 
the Home Army. By way of defence of the good name of Poland and 
as a counter-measure to these claims, the issue of Jewish Communists 
and their crimes against the Polish nation in the post-war Communist 
period was repeatedly raised. 
A reluctance against an examination of the subject and a 
corresponding visible level of confusion can be observed also in that 
group of Poles who had a distinguished war-time record of aiding 
Jews and who additionally have played an important role in Polish- 
Jewish dialogue in the contemporary period. A case in point is 
Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, the historian and diplomat and former 
member of the Council for Aid to the Jews (Rada Pomocy Zydom, code 
name Zegota). 18 His writings on the subject present somewhat 
contradictory statements as far as the issues of pre-war and war-time 
attitudes are concerned. For example, in the artide'Pohsh-jewish 
relations in occupied Poland, 1939-1945, ' Bartoszewski first suggests 
that there was in fact no atmosphere of hostility towards Jews on the 
part of Poles during the Nazi genocide of Polish Jewry, and that the 
17The debate, including publication of letters and phone calls received by Gazeta 
3YXhorgza The responses by the , was published on 2,3,7,11 and 12 / 13 February. historians Andrzej Friszke, Andrzej Paczkowski and Teresa Prekerowa and 
Wlodzimierz Borodziej and Tomasz Strzembosz were published in the issue dated 
42rising Touches Raw 5/6 February. See Intelligence Report - Article on Warsaw P Nerve in Polish-lewish Relations No. 8, April 1994,1-2, published by the Institute of 
Jewish Affairs, (London, 1994). 
18For a critical discussion of Bartoszewski's major work Righteous Among the 
Nations, see Steinlauf, Bondage. 84 and Yisrael Gutman's 'Flistoriography on 
Polish-Jewish relations, ' in: Abramsky, Jachimczyk, Polonsky, eds., The Jews. 179. 
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thesis that maintains otherwise has been put forward by Western 
scholars who 'are not directly involved in the study of the problem'. 19 
Secondly, he states that 'the stand taken by the majority of the 
population was more humane than one might have expected, taking 
into consideration the pre-war antisernitic atmosphere". Thirdly, he 
states that during WWIIL the attitudes of the Polish intelligentsia and 
the Catholic Church were "quite principled and indeed sometimes 
highly principled' towards Polish Jews. Finally he moves the 
discussion into the area of the level of moral responsibility for the 
Holocaust and suggests that "'enough aid' was done for the Jews only 
by those in Poland and other European countries who died whilst 
giving aid. " By so doing, as pointed out by Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, he 
foreclosed any further discussion on the problem of Polish attitudes 
towards Polish Jews during the genocide. 20 
Why do a majority of Poles so vehemently oppose such a 
discussion? 
One explanation perhaps is that a common perception of the 
national past has been an important factor in the process of denial - as 
indicated by Jan Blonski in the previously noted article 'The Poor Poles 
Look At The Ghetto": 
'We (Polesl tend to dismiss Ithe issuel as impossible and 
unacceptable. After all, we did not stand by the side of the murderers. 
After all, we were next in line for the gas chambers. After all, even if 
not in the best way possible, we did live together with the Jews; if our 
relations were less than perfect, they themselves were also not entirely 
without blame. So do we have to remind ourselves of this all the 
time ? What will others think of us ? What about our self-respect ? 
What about the 'good name' of our society? ... To put it 
differently, 
when we consider the past, we want to derive moral advantages from 
it. Even when we condemn, we ourselves would like to be above - or 
beyond - condemnation. We want to be absolutely beyond any 
accusation, we want to be completely clean. We want to be also - and 
only - victims, 21 
19WIady-slaw Bartoszewski, 'Polish-Jewish relations in occupied Poland, 1939--1945, ' 
in: Abramsky, jachimczyk, Polonsky, eds., The Jews. 147-160. 
20[rwin-Zarecka, Neutralising., 69. 
21jan Blonsky, 'The Poor Poles Look At The Ghetto, ' (English Translation), Polin, 
Vol. 1,1986,328. 
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It is widely recognised and accepted in Poland that the Second 
World War has become an important element of Polish national history 
and a provider of memories and myths of heroism and greatness for 
post-War generations. According to the social historian Tomasz 
Szarota, even in the nineties, WWH is still looked upon as a time of 
national greatness in heroism and martyrdom. 22 In fact, the war, as 
no other period of the modem era, gives Poles reason to be proud of 
who they are as a nation, defined here in ethno-national terms. The 
memory of the exemplary Polish record of resistance in terms of both 
the armed struggle and the preservation of social institutions in Nazi 
occupied Europe provides material for sustaining the Polish heroic 
self-image; while the memory of the Nazi terror and discrimination, 
and the loss of ten per cent of the ethnic Polish population in German 
occupied Poland, as well as the sufferings incurred under the Soviet 
rule, sustains the self-image of Poles as martyrs. 23 
In this context, the problem of Polish anti-Jewish attitudes and 
actions during WWH appears to be the only major aspect that could 
seriously undermine the image of a great heroic and suffering Poland. 
So far, only a small minority of Poles, particularly from the circles of 
the left-wing and the progressive catholic intelligentsia, have been able 
to come to terms with the background to this problem and with the 
problem itself. 24 And it is only just recently that unbiased scholarly 
research on the issue has begun to take place. 25 On the other hand, in 
220n contemporary views on the status of WWH in the national consciousness and 
history, see Tomasz Szarota, 'Wojna na pocieszenie, ' Gazeta 3yyborcza 6 September 
19%, 14-15. 
23In general, challenging the image of great and heroic Poles and providing a more 
realistic variety of images has proved to be a difficult task, one taken up mostly by 
writers such as Kazimierz Brandys, Miron Bialoszewski and Andrzej Szczypiorski. 
For example, in an essay 'Notatki' published in Wiei, No. 11 / 12,1986, Szczypiorski 
writes: 'Me version of the war most accepted by us portrays the Pole as a knight 
beyond reproach, ardent patriot and underground fighter. This is a true portrait, but 
only one among many... Where is the faint-hearted Pole who thought only about 
survival and a hundred times a day cursed the underground for allegedly exposing 
everyone to risk ?... What about the Pole in a god-forsaken village, who sowed and 
ploughed, bred hogs, complied without murmur with compulsory deliveries to the 
Third Reich and the GG, drank illicitly distilled liquor with German gendarmes, and 
shopped in the city for Jewish-owned pianos, for he had somehow to invest the huge 
sums gained at the expense of someone else's plight T 24See, for example, parts of Jacek Kuron's autobiography recollecting the situation of 
Polish Jews in Warsaw during WWH. Wiara i Wina. Do i od Komunizmu (Warszawa, 
1990), 18-27. 
2' 'See Andrzej Bryk, 'The Hidden Complex Of The Polish Nfind: Polish-Jew-ish 
Relations during the Holocaust/ in: Polonsky, ed., L4y Brother's. 161-182. Hereafter 
Bryk, 'The Hidden. ' 
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the post-1989 period, groups of extreme Polish ethno-nationalists have 
used the issue as a way of reinforcing the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other, the enemy of Poland who continuously assaults the 
most precious elements of the national heritage. 26 
The Jewish perspective 
From the Jewish perspective, the issue of Polish anti-Jewish 
attitudes and actions during VVVM has been shocking and emotionally 
painful. After all, as stated by Yisrael Gutman, 'the majority of the 
Jews who have expressed an opinion on Polish-Jewish relations during 
the Nazi occupation reached their conclusions on the basis of their own 
experiences during the war., 27 Looking at the extensive body of their 
writing, it is clear that the most painful and difficult aspect for them 
has been the realisation that during the war their own community was 
perceived by the majority of ethnic Poles to be outside the fabric of 
Polish society. And that their own tragedy was not embraced into the 
Polish national tragedy but was met chiefly with indifference and 
acquiescence. This realisation has often manifested itself in strongly 
embittered statements about Polish lack of solidarity, at Polish betrayal 
of the Jewish minority, and the ill-concealed joy at seeing fellow Jewish 
citizens being murdered en masse by the Germans; a good illustration 
being the following by Alexander Donat: 
'For years the Poles have been dreaming of getting rid of the 
Jews and now at last Hitler does it for them ... at bottom they are 
delighted, however horrified by the inhuman cruelty. The Krauts 
devouring the Kikes: what could be sweeter. 28 
In cases in which survivors experienced blackmail and hostility 
on the part of ethnic Poles, or witnessed or were aware of killings of 
Jews by Poles, the comments are much harsher and basically equate 
the Poles with the Germans. This position gives an impression of Poles 
being directly associated with the Nazi extermination of Jews. And it 
26See publications of the Warsaw based publishing house Ojczyzna, available in 
book shops. For example, S. Bordacki Nie znamy 12rawdy o ogwiýcimskim Karmelu. 27yisrael Gutman, 'The Attitude Of The Poles to The Mass Deportations Of Jews 
From The Warsaw Ghetto In The Summer Of 1942' in: Rescue Attg=ts During he 
-L Holocaust. Proceedings of the Second Ad Vacuum International Historical 
Conference, Jerusalem, April 8-11,1977 (Jerusalem, 1977), 399. Hereafter, Gutman, 
'Me Attitude! 
28AIexander Donat, The Holocaust Kingdom (New York 1965), 542. Cited in 
George M. Kren and Leon Rappoport, The Holocaust And The Crisis Of Human 
Behaviour (New York, London, 1980), 91. 
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is exactly this position that has been used by some western media as 
the major point of reference in Poland's relations with its Jewish ethnic 
minority during the war. 
'Had it not been for the Poles, for their aid - active and passive - 
in the 'solution of the Jewish problem, " the Germans would never have 
been as successful as they were. It was the Poles who called 'Yid" at 
every Jew who escaped from the train transporting him to the gas 
chambers, it was they who caught these unfortunate wretches and who 
rejoiced at every Jewish misfortune. They were vile and 
contemptible. ' 29 
However, differentiation between 'bad Poles' zli Polacy and 
'good Poles' dobrzy Polacy or 'good Christians' dobrzy chrzeýcijanie 
can generally be found in the vast body of diaries, memoirs, 
testimonies and literary works. To the first category are ascribed Poles 
who were hostile to Jews in a variety of ways and under different 
circumstances. In the second category of 'good Poles" are ascribed 
people who were willing to help in any capadtyor were simply 
sympathetic to the plight of Polish Jews. Characteristically, it appears 
that every act of help or solidarity, every individual 'good Pole' has 
been remembered and registered. For example, in her testimony Sonia 
Orbach recollected: 
'... As we were sitting in the woods contemplating what to do 
next, a peasant appeared ... he approached us and said "I know your 
family and would like to help you. If you find a place for yourself in 
the deep woods I will be happy to bring you food... he came back 
without police and a great friendship started between us. What can I 
tell you... As they used to say fin Polandl ff that man was still alive I 
would wash his feet and drink the dirty water..., 30 
Undoubtedly, for many Polish Jews, their exclusion from the 
realm of Polish society during the German occupation of Poland and 
their experience of Polish indifference towards the Nazi extermination 
of their own kind has constituted a morally devastating experience. 
The need for an explanation and rationalisation of this phenomenon 
has been frequently expressed in works written both during and after 
the Holocaust. In September 1943, in one of his early essays on Polish- 
Jewish relations, the historian Emanuel Ringelblum revealed the extent 
29Mordekhai Tenenbaum-Tamaroff, Dal2im min hadelakah (rel Aviv, 1947), 49-50. 
Cited in Polonsky, 'Beyond. ' 194. 
30Yad Vashem Archives, 03/ 5268. Sonia Orbach's testimony (in Polish). 
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to which this issue was crucial to the then already much diminished 
remnants of Polish Jewry: 
'The Polish people and the Government of the Republic of 
Poland were not in a position to deflect the Nazi steam-roller from its 
anti-Jewish course. But it is reasonable to ask whether the attitude of 
the Polish people measured up to the scale of the catastrophe that 
befell their country's citizens. Was it inevitable that the last impression 
of the Jews, as they rode in the death trains speeding from different 
parts of the country to Trebhnka or other places of slaughter, should 
have been the indifference or even joy on the faces of their 
neighbours ? Last summer, when carts packed with captive Jewish 
men, women and children moved through the streets of the capital, 
was it really necessary for laughter from wild mobs to resound from 
the other side of the ghetto walls, was it really necessary for such blank 
indifference to prevail in the face of the greatest tragedy of all time ?A 
further question is whether some sympathy should not have been 
expressed during the slaughter of a whole people... We ask further, 
why was it possible to considerably reduce the evil of denunciations, 
spying and collaboration with the Germans within one's own 
community, while nothing was done to check the giant wave of 
blackmail and denunciation of the handful of Polish Jews that had 
survived the slaughter of a whole people ? These and similar 
questions are being asked every day by the remaining quarter-of-a- 
million Jews..., 31 
The relevance of Ringelblum"s questions for an inquiry into the 
Poles' relations with the Jewish minority during WVVU has been 
recently voiced by David Blatman. In his essay 'The Past Refuses to 
Vanish', Blatman discusses the methodological difficulties of such an 
inquiry but insists that scholars are 'duty-bound to investigate 
Ringelblum's final question: "why, even as they are being hauled away 
for extermination, are the Jews still "others' ? 32 
An analysis of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other in 
war-time Poland can, in my opinion, take us to the core of this 
problem. 
3'Emanuel Ringelblum, Polish-lewish Relations During the Second World War 
(Evanston, Blinois, 1992), 7-8. Hereafter Ringelblum, Polish-jewish. 
32David Blatman, ýFhe Past Refuses to Vanish, ' East European fewish Affairs, VoL 
27, No. 1,1997,57-60. Hereafter, Blatman, The Past. ' 
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The Jew as the Threatening Other in Political Discourse 
As previously indicated, the Polish underground state had a 
highly developed network of political, military and social 
institutions. 33 By the end of the war the number of all clandestine 
organisations reached three hundred. 34 Basically, they were divided 
into two major political camps; the non-Communist camp comprised 
of the majority of the pre-war political parties, and the Communist 
camp represented by one main party, the Polish Workers' Party (Polska 
Partia Robotnicza, PPR) supported by the Soviet Union. In the course 
of the war the Communist camp was to become the major political 
rival to the first camp. 
The analysis in this chapter concentrates on the non-Communist 
camp as this was the political camp identified by Poles as sovereign 
and as representing "the true Polish national interest! I shall focus on 
the Communist camp's perception of the Jews in the next chapter 
where I analyse the myth in the early post-war period. However, I will 
indicate here, that in the context of national politics, ambivalence and 
contradictions could already be found in the Communist approach 
towards the Jewish minority during WWH. On the one hand, the 
Communists, in the name of internationalism, workers' fraternity and 
brotherhood, pledged that they would guarantee the Polish Jews equal 
civic and political rights to those of ethnic Poles in a future Poland. On 
the other hand, some of their political declarations pledged support for 
an ethnically homogenous model of the Polish nation-state. 35 
However, this development was not yet significant for relations 
between the Communists and the Jews in the GG. On the whole, the 
PPR conden-Lned the Nazi genocide of Jews, and the Communist 
military force, People's Army (Armia Ludozva, AL), was positively 
disposed towards the Jewish fugitives. 
Ultimate authority over the non-Communist camp was wielded 
by the Pohsh govermnent-in-exile, based first in France and 
subsequently in London, after the French defeat in the summer of 1940. 
The government-in-exile, in its make-up, represented a break with the 
pre-war past. Its coalition consisted of the following four political 
33For a detailed study of the underground Polish state, see Jan Tomasz Gross, Polish 
Sociejy under Gennan Occupation: The GeneralSouvernment, 1939-1944 (Princeton, 
N. J., 1979), 259-291. Hereafter Gross, Polish. 
34Bardach, Lesnodorski and Pietrzak, Historia. 615. 
35See Krystyna Kersten, Miedzv Wvzwoleniem A Zniewoleniem Polska 1944-1956 
(Londyn, 1993), 11-12. Hereafter Kersten, Mied4y Mzwoleniem. 
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parties: the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludozve, SL ), the Labour Party 
(Stronnichvo Pracy, SP), the National Democrats (Stronnictwo Narodowe) 
the so-called Ende(la, and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS ). Inside Nazi 
ruled Poland, the Delegate"s Bureau (Delegatura), appointed by the 
gover=ent-in-exile, held the supreme political authority. It oversaw 
the majority of political parties active in Nazi ruled Poland. The Home 
Army (Armia Krajcwa, AK), commanded by the government-in-exile, 
was the main military resistance force, consisting of different military 
groups originally organised under the authority of individual political 
parties. By 1943 the membership of the AK had reached the number of 
three hundred and fifty thousand members making it the largest 
resistance organisation in Nazi occupied Europe . 
36 
How was the Jewish ethnic minority perceived within the chief 
institutions of the underground state ? And to what extent did the 
ethno-nationahst construction of the Jew as the Threatening Other 
continue to impact on political discourse within the underground ? 
The Government-in-Exile and the Myth 
I begin an examination of these issues with a brief look at the 
government-in-exile. In my opinion, the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other resulted in a dear contradiction in that 
government's policies and practices towards the Jewish ethnic 
minority. The key issue lay in the proposed status of Polish Jews in a 
future sovereign Polish nation-state. On the one hand, the government 
issued a number of declarations and resolutions in which it committed 
itself to a civic model of the nation-state in which Polish Jews would be 
granted political and civic rights equal to ethnic Poles. The first such 
proclamation was made by Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski as 
early as 6 October 1939. Sikorski's declaration was followed by two 
resolutions on 3 November 1940 and 23 February 1942.37 
Here I quote an excerpt from the first resolution of 3 November 
1940, also known as 'Staýczyk resolutioný because it was announced by 
Jan Stanczyk the Minister for Labour and Social Welfare and member 
of the PPS: 
36See, Steinlauf, Bondage. 26-27. 
370n the subject of the policies of the government-in-exile, see David Engel, In the 
Ehadow. and Facing. For polemical views on the same subject see Dariusz Stola, 
NadZjWýýý (Warszawa, 1995). Hereafter Stola, Nadzieja. 
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'The Jews, as Polish citizens, shall in liberated Poland be equal 
with the Polish community, in duties and in rights. They will be able 
to develop their culture, religion and folkways without hindrance. Not 
only the laws of the state, but even more the common sufferings in this 
most tragic time of affliction will serve to guarantee this (pledge 1,38 
In December 1941, in his address to the Jewish Labour 
Committee in New York, Jan Stanczyk confirmed this declaration and 
reassured his audience that Polish Jews living abroad would be able to 
return to a future independent Poland. 
'The question is often raised whether the Polish Jews who are 
not at present in Poland will be permitted to return to a liberated 
Poland. There must be no doubt whatsoever that every Polish citizen, 
irrespective of creed, race or nationality, will be free to return to his 
country. The Polish Government has clearly stated its position with 
regard to the political rights of the citizens of the future Poland. The 
constitutional guarantee of legal equality and equal responsibility 
excludes any possibility of exceptions. The Polish Jew, like any other 
Polish citizen, will be able to return to Poland. ' 39 
On the other hand, politicians officially representing the 
government frequently made contradictory statements to the effect 
that the majority of Polish Jews would have to leave Polish territory 
after the state regained its independence. For example, Ambassador 
Edward Raczynski and Nfinister Stanislaw Kot, in separate 
conversations with representatives of British Jewry in France in early 
1940, presented such a proposal. According to S. Brodetzky, one of the 
members of the British delegation: 40 
'Professor Kot gave a long history of the Jews in Poland, which, 
said, had treated the Jews well for centuries. But the Jews were a 
foreign body in Poland, they did not even speak Polish .... He said that 
there were too many Jews in Poland, Hungary and Romania. About a 
third of them could remain, the rest would have to go elsewhere. '41 
38David Engel, In the Shadow. 80. 
39Declaration presented on behalf of the government-in-exile by the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, Jan Stanczyk, to the Council of the Jewish Labour 
Cominittee in New York, December 1941. Cited in Manfred Kridl, jozef Wittlin and 
Wladyslaw Malinowskiý eds., The Democratic Heritage Of Poland (London, 1944), 
197-198. Hereafter Kridl, Wittlin, Mahnowski, eds., The Democratic. 
40Confirmation of such statements can be found in Polish official letters of that time, 
see Stola, Nadzieja. 73-74. 
41S. Brodetzky, From Ghefto to Israel. Memoirs (London, 1960), 198. 
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Furthermore, in the spring of 1942, the government's 
parliament-in-exile, the National Council (Rada Narodozva), passed a 
National Democrats' resolution endorsing the project of emigration of 
Polish Jews en masse. 42 
Contradictions were also visible in the govenu-nenes comments 
on the plight of Polish Jews in the territory of the GG to various 
audiences during both the pre and on-going genocidal phases. On the 
one hand, in statements directed at the International Free World 
audience or to the National Council in London, leading members of the 
government were able to issue words of solidarity with the Jewish 
ethnic minority and to refer to its plight as a part of Poland's tragedy. 
However, such references, or any positive comments on the Jewish 
minority, tended to be limited or omitted when directly addressing 
Poles in Nazi occupied Poland. 
Cases of omission were closely monitored by representatives of 
Polish Jewry outside Nazi Europe and were noted in the foreign press. 
For example, The East London Observer of 9 March 1942 reported: 
"Considerable comment was caused by the omission from the 
Polish official press of General Sikorski's references to the courage of 
Polish Jews. As reported in our last issue, General Sikorski, at the 
opening of the Polish National Council on the 24 of February, declared, 
'The spirit with which the Jews in Poland bear their sufferings must fill 
us all with admiration. ' This remark of the Polish Prime X4inister was 
not included in the report which appeared in the Polish press on that 
occasion, nor was it quoted in Polish broadcasts. " 43 
The govemmenes official press and broadcasts to occupied 
Poland also avoided directly calling on the ethnic Polish population to 
show solidarity and unity with the Jewish ethnic minority. Instead, 
official resolutions made vague general pronouncements that such 
solidarity and unity were commonly present within the population, 
and that therefore, further such calls were unnecessary. This type of 
response can be found in the records of the communications between 
the Ministry of Information in the government-in-exile and the 
Representation of Polish Jewry (Reprezentacja 
ýydostwa Polskiego), based 
42Stola, Nadzieja. 77. 
43'General Sikorski And The Jews, ', East London Observer 9, March 1942,1. 
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in Tel Aviv - the latter expressing its disappointment and frustration 
with the situation: 44 
'We must record with pain, that in the regular weekly 
broadcasts by the Ministry of Information, we find not even one word 
on the need for a common communal life and mutual help between the 
Poles and the Jews ... We hope that the Government will do everything 
in order to bring to the consciousness of the population how they must 
react to the bestial aims of the enemy, 45 
The Ministry of Information would typically reply: 'An appeal 
to the public in Poland is unnecessary, as it is precisely from those 
circles that the information and vigorous protests are sent., 46 
How can these contradictions be explained ? 
Looking at the four main political parties that constituted the 
government! s coalition one can observe a dear division on the issue of 
the model of the future Polish nation-state and the position within it of 
the Jewish minority. Here, the National Democrats Party was the chief 
unquestionable advocate of an ethnically homogenous model of state. 
Throughout the war, the National Democrats openly and uniformly 
regarded Polish Jews as the enemy of the Polish nation and 
continuously demanded their removal from Poland. In contrast, the 
position of the Labour Party and Peasant Party on this issue was much 
harder to pinpoint than that of the National Democrats on this issue 
because of their general policy of keeping silent in the light of the 
German treatment of the Jewish population. 47 Nevertheless, a dose 
examination of both parties' political programmes and press reveal a 
disturbing ambivalence; support for the official governmental position 
on the Jewish minority is intertwined with the exclusivist ethno- 
national view of the Polish Jews as an impediment to the development 
of the ethnic Polish population. 
It is important to remember here that both parties had already 
endorsed the exclusivist ethno-national position in the pre-1939 period. 
During the war, neither their leaders in exile nor in the country were 
AA- 
I he Representation of Polish Jewry was comprised of Zionist and Orthodox 
members with its headquarters in Tel Aviv and a branch in the United States. 
45See the Representation Report between 1940 and 1945,45-46. Cited in Gutman, 
'The Attitude. ' 410. 
46ibid., 410. 
47See Andrzej Friszke, 'Publicystyka Polski podzienmej wobec zaglady Zydow' in: 
Wojciech Wrzesm'ski, ed., Polska-Polagy-mniejszosci narodowe (Wroclaw, 1992), 
193-213. Hereafter Friszke, 'Publicystyka. ' 
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willing to condemn or dispose of these concepts as they had become an 
intrinsic part of their ideological heritage and political platform 
supported by their respective electorates. I shall illustrate here such an 
ambivalent situation with the example of the Peasant Party which was 
far more influential than the Labour Party in both the pre-war and 
war-time periods. 
On 26 March 1941, at a National Council meeting, the Peasant 
Party issued the following declaration in support of the previously 
quoted resolution of 3 November 1940. The declaration read: 
'The Peasant Party announces its solidarity with this resolution. 
A resolution politically mature, dictated by sound political reason and 
principles of democracy as indicated by the Government of National 
Unity. The fact that we declare our solidarity with this resolution 
should not come to anybody as a surprise, as it has been always our 
attitude, and it is now, that the State"s treatment of its citizens cannot 
be differentiated by reasons of religion, race or origin .... This is a just 
and democratic principle with regard to rights of equality, and 
obligations of all citizens of the State. The Peasant Party is committed 
to the realisation of these principles in a future Poland, 48 
However, just a month earlier on 20 February 1941, a 
contradictory statement had been made in an offidal meeting between 
the leadership of the emigre Peasant Party and Ignacy Schwarzbart, the 
representative of Polish Jewry on the National Council. At that 
meeting Ignacy Schwarzbart strongly criticised the policy of 
emigration for Polish Jews and asked the party's leaders to renounce 
it: 
'This project harms our identity as fuUy-fledged citizens. No 
citizen can commit himself to being a patriot when he knows that his 
own state might make him an involuntary emigrant. Polish politicians 
should be aware that the emigration slogans will not bring sympathy 
for Poland among Jewry. In the past, there was peasant emigration 
from Poland without specific legislation for such an emigration. There 
was also voluntary Jewish emigration free of the notion that there were 
too many Jews in Poland. Emigration results from the economic 
situation. And no state has the right to create economic or political 
48Yad Vashem Archives M2 / 149, Collection of Dr Ignacy Schwarzbart. Declaration 
of Jan Banaczyk, member of the Polish National Council, presented on behalf of the 
Peasant Party at a meeting of the Council on 26 March 1941. Hereafter YVA M2/149. 
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conditions for a particular group of citizens in order to force them to 
emigrate., 49 
In response, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. the leader of the Party stated 
that despite the recent historical changes, the Peasant Party would 
continue to support the emigration project because it had been 
endorsed in the party's programme in 1935. And he added that the 
party's leadership in exile could not revoke that decision. 50 
Continuity of the pre-war Peasant Party's position on the Jewish 
ethnic minority was more explicitly formulated in the party's press 
organs circulated in the GG. For example, on 30 April 1942, the paper 
To Victgry (Ku zwycifstwu) published an article entitled "The Jewish 
Matter' (Sprawa ýydozvska) in which both the arguments and the 
language were simply a repetition of the pre-1939 position. 
Characteristically, the Nazi treatment of the Polish Jews had no effect 
on that position: 
"Concerning the Jewish matter, one thing is sure, that the 
position of Jews in Poland is deteriorating and that a significant 
number of them will have to emigrate from Poland ... The Polish side 
should do everything in its power to help effect this emigration ... The 
Jewish matter is an international matter. The presence of large Jewish 
masses in Poland is the result of the expulsion of Jews from other 
countries. Thus Poland has the right to demand that the world 
participate in a solution to the 'Jewish QuestioW., 51 
Among the four main parties of the governmental coalition, the 
PPS was the only party to oppose outright the integral organic vision 
of a Polish state and to recognise the Polish Jewish community as part 
of a future Poland. Not only were PPS leaders engaged in 
condemnation of anti-Jewish attitudes and actions within the 
underground state and emigre Polish organisations, but they also took 
action against the exclusivist ethno-national policies and practices of 
the government. 52 One of the achievements of the emigre PPS was 
the abolition of the pre-war legislation of 31 March 1938, concerned 
with dispossessing persons of Polish citizenship, and directed in 
49YVA, M2/149, Ignacy Schwarzbart's report from the Conference held with the 
leaders of the emigre Peasant Party. Londyn 20, February, 1941. 50ibid., 6. 
51Yad Vashem Archives 02-25, File No. 202/1[[-11, the Delegate's Bureau: 
Department of Interior Affairs. Local Reports. 1940-1942. Hereafter YVA 02-25. 52A representative record of the PPS position on the Jewish ethnic minority is in the 
Yad Vashem Archives, M2 / 152, Collection of Ignacy Szwarzbart. 
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practice against the Jewish minority. 53 It was the PPS politician 
Herman Lieberman who abolished it on 28 November 1941 during his 
appointment as Minister of Justice to the government-in-exile. Of 
course, the abolition of this legislation took place at a time when the 
National Democrats were temporarily absent from government. 54 
'The Polish Govemment ... even now is doing everything in its 
power to redress all. previous wrongs against any group of citizens. 
The decree of the pre-war Polish Government depriving of their Polish 
nationality persons who had resided abroad for many years without 
maintaining contact with the home country was one such wrong. This 
vicious decree has been revoked by the present Government., 55 
In short, one can see that with the exception of PPS, exclusivist 
ethno-national tendencies were present within the governmental 
coalition, and that they resulted in policies and practices contradictory 
to its officially declared conu-nitment to a civic model of the nation - in 
which Polish Jewry would constitute an integral part. Yet overall, 
because of the proximity of and dependency on Western Allies, and 
the internal fluctuation of power, these tendencies were restrained in 
comparison to the situation within the underground in Nazi occupied 
Poland. 
The Delegate"s Bureau and the AK and the Myth 
Perhaps the most apparent evidence of the impact of exclusivist 
ethno-nationalism on the underground state in Nazi ruled Poland was 
the ethnic homogenisation of its institutions. In contrast to the Polish 
government-in-exile which had two representatives of Polish Jewry 
53From March 1938 up to June 1939, eighty-eight per cent of all persons dispossessed 
of Polish citizenship were Polish Jews. See Jerzy Tomaszewski, 'Wokbkobywatelstwa 
Zydow ch' in Marcin Kula, ed., Narody. Tak 12owstaW* i jak w"bi aty siý na 
nievodl= (Warszawa, 1989), 512. 
54the National Democrats withdrew from the government after the government 
signed the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 1941. One of its factions headed by 
Marian Seyda re-entered the government in early 1942, while the other more radical 
faction headed by Tadeusz Bielecki remained in opposition. According to the 
historian Jerzy Janusz Terej, Bielecki's faction was more popular among supporters 
of the National Democrats in Nazi occupied Poland. Regarding the Jewish Question 
both M. Seyda and T. Bielecki took a similar stance. On the position oft4e National 
Democrats regarding Polish Jews, see Jerzy Janusz Terej, Rzgfzuwistosý i p2h! yka. 
(Warszawa, 1979), 
270- 300. Hereafter Terej, Rzffýzywistoýý. 
55Declaration presented on behalf of the government-in-exile by the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, Jan Stanczyk, to the Council of the Jewish Labour 
Committee in New York, December 1941. Cited in Kridl, Wittlin, Mahnowski, eds., 
ae Democratic. 198. 
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included in its structure, there were no such representatives in the 
network of the Delegate's Bureau and the Home Army. 56 
Membership of these organisations was reserved almost exclusively for 
ethnic Poles. Only those individual Polish Jews who were generally 
perceived rather as Poles could have been included in their framework 
of the underground organisations. 57 Of course, exceptions to this rule 
were the particular underground units under the control of those who 
advocated the inclusive model of civic nationalism. 
Other important evidence of the spread of ethno-nationalist 
ways of thinking in the underground lay in the fact that prominent 
members were themselves critical of the official commitment to the 
civic model of a future Polish state upheld by the government-in-exile. 
Moreover, they were also inclined to disapprove of any positive 
attitudes and actions towards the Jewish minority on the part of the 
government-in-exile. Expressions of criticism and disapproval can be 
found in official reports, dispatches and memorandums sent to the 
government-in-exile from the GG. Here are two illustrations: 
In his well-known report of 25 September 1941, Stefan Grot 
Rowecki the first commander-in-chief of the Home Army stated: 
'All the Government's actions concerning Jews in Poland make 
a dreadful impression and incite anti-governmental propaganda. This 
is the case with the celebration of "Jewish Day, Szwarcbard's speech, 
the appointment of Liberman and the offering of good wishes for the 
Jewish New Year. Please take it as an established fact that the 
overwhelming majority of the population is antisemitic. Even the 
socialists are no exception. There are only tactical differences about 
what to do. Hardly anybody advocates imitating the Germans. 
However, even those underground organisations, under the influence 
of the pre-war executive groups of the Democratic Club or the PPS, 
5( 'The Polish government-in-exile had two representatives of Polish Jewry, Ignacy 
Schwarzbart the representative of the Zionist organisations and Szmuel Zygielbom 
the representative of the Bund. See Gutman, Krakowskiý Unequal. 58-65, and Irwin- 
Zarecka, Neu lising. 46. 
57There is nevertheless a substantial body of records including testimonies of Polish 
Jews and ethnic Poles that reveals that even members of this highly culturally 
assimilated group experienced prejudice and hostility on the part of Polish ethno- 
nationalists. See the discussion 'Polish-Jewish Relations During the Second World 
War' Pohn, Vol. 2,1987,351-353. 
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accept the emigration project for Polish Jews as a solution to the Jewish 
problem.. '58 
In the summer of 1944, in one of his reports, Jan Stanislaw 
Jankowski, the government's last Delegate and a member of the 
Labour Party, conveyed a much harsher and more explicit criticism of 
the government: 
'The Delegate has asked me to state the following. According to 
him the government has exaggerated his 'love towards Jews! 
Although he understands that this is to some extent necessary as far as 
Polish foreign relations are concerned, nevertheless he advises the 
restraining of such a position. Under the premiership of General 
Sikorski and the present premiership [of Stanislaw NEkofajczyk] the 
government has been overtly philosemitic. It should bear in mind that 
inside the country itself Jews are dishked., 59 
Interestingly, Jankowski's criticism of the government for 
allegedly being philosernitic echoed similar criticism of the 
government by the National Democrats, and even by those extreme 
ethno-nationalist groups not subordinated to the Delegate's Bureau, 
such as Rampart group. In the aftermath of the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising of April 1943, the press of the National Democrats and 
aforementioned organisations was often critical of the government as 
well as of left-wing political circles, for being too 'sentimental or 
melancholic' over the German destruction of Polish Jews, and thereby 
failing to represent the Polish national interest. 60 
A close examination of the communications of the Delegate's 
Bureau and AK with the goverrunent-in-exile suggests that an 
ethnically homogenous Poland without Polish Jews was a much more 
popular model than the inclusive civic one. 
Characteristically, the arguments and language used by the 
authors of these communications frequently echoed the pre-1939 
exclusivist ethno-national discourse on Polish Jews with the Jew 
continuing to be perceived as the Threatening Other, the enemy and 
impediment to the development of the Polish people. This trend in 
political thinking can be viewed as steady and continuos throughout 
58Stefan Grot Rowecki's dispatch of 25 September, 1941. Cited in Jan Tomasz Gross, 
Upiorna dekada ( Krakýw, 1988), 46. Hereafter Gross, Upiorna. 
5%Wd., _47. 
600n criticism of the govemment-in-exile and left-wing political organisations, see, 
for example, excerpts of exclusivist ethno-national papers, published by Szapiro in 
319ýn_a. 317-327. 
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the war. The Nazi destruction of Jewry does not appear to have had 
any diminishing effect on it. Here are three examples: 
'In the last few weeks Jewish book-sellers have been given 
permits to open a few book-shops in the Warsaw ghetto. These book- 
shops have attracted huge interest. Thus the hope of Polish book- 
sellers of saving Polish books from Jewish hands has failed due to the 
Nazi regulations., 61 
'Poles have only partially benefited from the disappearance of 
the Jews from industry and businesses as they are now being 
infiltrated by the German element! 62 
'The migrations of Jews to Poland and their high birth-rate has 
resulted in abnormal numbers of Jewish population in the country. 
The huge number of Jews in the cities has prevented the Poles from 
participating in crafts and businesses and is one of the main reasons for 
our peasant population being overcrowded in villages, 63 
What is striking about these references is the distance they 
show towards the Polish Jewish minority as the victims of Nazi 
treatment. Perhaps the most explicit example of this was General 
Stefan Grot-Rowecki! s report of 10 November 1942, contemplating the 
safety of the ethnic Polish population in the aftermath of the Great 
Deportation, a major genocidal action orchestrated by the Nazis in July 
of the same year. 
"Polish society is apprehensive that in the aftermath of the 
current extermination of the Jews, the Germans may proceed to apply 
similar methods of extermination against Poles. I call for restraint and 
for counteracting these apprehensions with reassurances. The 
principal German objective in relation to us could be described as the 
absorption of our nation. Attempts to exterminate the resistant 
segments of our nation by methods applied against the Jews cannot, 
however, be ruled out., 64 
Undoubtedly, in this report, the Great Deportation, which took 
a heavy toll on the population of Warsaw Jewry, is not viewed as part 
61WA, 02-25, File No. 202/1-29, the Delegate's Bureau: the Presidential Bureau, Local 
Reports. 
62WA, 0-25, File No. 202/11-6, the Delegate's Bureau: the Department of Internal 
Affairs. Reports on the situation, 1941-1942. 63YVA, 02-25, File No. 202/l/ 31, Memorandums on the Situation in Poland 11 
October -15 November 1942. The Jewish Population in Poland Overview'. 64General Stefan Grot-Rowecki's report of 10 November 1942. Cited in Gutman, 
Krakowsid, Unequal. 74-75. 
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of the unfolding tragedy of Poland and its people under German 
occupation - The Polish Jews are simply viewed as a kind of separate 
entity for whose well-being and safety the Chief Staff of the AK did not 
feel responsible. 65 The distance towards the Jewish ethnic minority is 
reflected in the language of the report. There is a glaring lack of 
reference to the Jews as members of the same society, as Polish citizens. 
They are presented as 'they, ' not 'us! 
The need for references which would stress the belonging of 
Polish Jewry within Polish society during the war was recognised by 
representatives of the Jewish ethnic minority. Their position was that 
these references might be beneficial in creating a commonly called 
'positive atmosphere' towards Jewish fugitives from the Holocaust, 
and for reducing anti-Jewish actions, mainly blackmail and 
denunciation. For example, in one of its appeals to the underground, 
the intelligentsia of the Warsaw ghetto demanded: 
'To publish statements to make the Polish population aware that 
the Jews are valuable citizens of the Polish Republic and that crimes 
against them will be accountable before the courts of the Republic, and 
that, in particular, any form of collaboration with the Nazis will be 
viewed as high treason against the state. 66 
Similar appeals to the Delegate's Bureau were made by the 
members of the Council for Aid to the Jews (Zegota), an organisation 
set up in December 1942 under the auspices of the Delegate's Bureau. 
For example, the chairman of the Council and a member of the PPS 
-WRN, J6zef Grobelny - nicknamed Trojan - insisted that rescuing the 
Jews was in the interest of a future independent Poland: 
'The most important thing is to provide help to individuals... 
who have no means to save themselves and whose lives would be 
indispensable to a future state. The German extermination of Polish 
citizens will have a grave result on a future independent state. The 
state will suffer from the lack of every human being who could be 
saved today., 67 
The Treasurer of the Council, a member of the Democratic 
Union, Ferdynand Arczynski, nicknamed 'Marek' also insisted that 
'Polish Jews were the most threatened element of Polish society and 
65Bryk, 'The 1--lidden. ' 71. 
66YVA, 02-25, File No. 202 / 11-11, the Delegate's Bureau, the Department of Internal 
Affairs. Local Reports. 1940-1942. 
67 YVA 06/82, Council for Aid to the Jews: Minutes 1/2,3. 
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that their chance of survival depended on the special care they should 
be given. 68 
Of course, this Position of treating the Jewish minority as 
integral part of the society during the German occupation was 
represented only by a minority of the underground's elite, mainly the 
Socialists and Democrats. A study of relations between the Council for 
Aid to the Jews and the Delegate's Bureau and the AK can serve as a 
good illustration of how isolated and marginalised was this Jewish 
minority within the underground elite. 69 
Records of the minutes of the Council attest that silence, 
disapproval and procrastination were the main ways of responding on 
the part of the authorities of the Delegate's Bureau and AK, to the 
demands made by Socialist and Democratic activists of Zegota. Many 
of Zegota's projects that aimed at creating a more positive atmosphere 
towards the dying Jewish community failed as a result. The lack of 
broad support within the underground for 
2egota's 
actions was 
implicitly indicated by the Polish historian of the Zegota, Teresa 
Prekerowa. Although she does not address the issue of the attitudes of 
the DelegaWs Bureau and AK authorities toward the Polish Jews, she 
admits that Zegota's projects were marginalised in the underground: 
The RPZ [Council of Zegotal people were aware that neither 
the council's activists alone, nor a much bigger group including its 
collaborators, would be able to achieve any meaningful results without 
broad social support. Therefore efforts were made to create a climate 
which was favourable to the actions of the relief groups. Members of 
the presidium, in the first instance, pressed the underground 
authorities and the government-in-exile to appeal to Polish society to 
help the hounded Jews in every possible way ... There were attempts to 
offset the opinions of the clandestine nationalistic periodicals which 
persuaded their public that the lot of the Jewish minority 'is not our 
affair'. In order to supply editorial boards of the clandestine 
periodicals with edited materials, in the autumn of 1943, the council 
published three issues of the Press Service News (Komuntkaty Prasowe), 
which reported the liquidation of the Jewish camps in the Lublin 
region and the uprising in the ghetto of Bialystok, along with other 
68YVA 06/ 82, Council for Aid to the Jews, Minutes 1/ 1-34,6. 
69See Joseph Kermish, 'Tbe Activities Of The Council For Aid To the Jews (Zegota) in 
Occupied Poland' in: Rescue Attempts During The Holocaust. Proceedings Of the 
(Jerusalem, 1977), 367-396. 
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important events. The underground press failed to react in any 
significant way to the information published, which perhaps, 
contributed to the closing dovrn of the title., 70 
On the whole, we can conclude that the ethno-nationalist 
perception of the Jews that prevailed within the political and military 
underground authorities was an important variable causing a lack of 
concern over the plight of the Jewish community. And one which 
contributed to the obstruction and procrastination of actions within the 
underground itself that was aimed at providing help to the Jews. 
The Prevalence of the Myth in the Clandestine Press in the GG 
I will now move to an analysis of the presence of the myth in the 
press of various clandestine organisations. Looking closely at these 
press, I have differentiated three main groups within the spectrum of 
prominent clandestine parties and social organisations. The premise 
for this differentiation being based on their two-fold attitude towards 
the Jews - as a minority and as victims of Nazi extermination. In my 
opinion this approach will give a good insight into the intricacies of the 
undergroun&s attitudes towards the Polish Jews. 
In the first of the three groups I indude the left-wing parties: the 
Democratic Party (Partia Detnokratyczna); the PPS - Freedom - Equality - 
Independence Party(PPS - VvRN); and the Polish Sodalists Party (PoIscy 
Socjaliscz) and other small independent organisations. 71 
In this group the position on Polish Jews was characterised by 
the following six elements: lack of reference to the Jews as the 
Threatening Other; a programme of inclusion of the Jewish minority 
within a future Polish nation-state; condemnation of the Nazi genocide 
of Jews; the perception of the Nazi destruction of Polish Jews as a part 
of Poland's tragedy; condemnation of anti-Jewish statements in Polish 
underground circles; and condemnation of anti-Jewish actions within 
Polish society. Importantly, this was the only political group within 
the underground state considering rescue operation of Jews as a basic 
civic duty to fellow citizens and as therefore being critical of the Polish 
underground institutions, as well as society at large, for not 
70Teresa Prekerowa, 'Relief Council for Jews, 1942-1945' in: Abramsky, Jachimczyk, 
Polonsky, eds., The Jews. 173. Hereafter Prekerowa, 'Relief. ' 
710n the subject of small clandestine organisations and their underground press, see 
Lucjan Dobroszycki, 'The Jews in the Polish Clandestine Press, ' in: Paluch ed., The 
Lem. 289-296. 
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recognising the genocide of Polish Jews as a part of the tragedy of 
Poland. 
For example, on 7 February 1944, New Wgys (Nozoe Drogi ), the 
chief press organ of the Democratic Party stated: 
'Within the Polish population there is a lack of understanding 
and recognition that the German extermination of Jews constitutes not 
only a crime against the Jewish community but in fact is a crime 
against the Polish state which is losing millions of its citizens. ' 
Next, commenting on bladunailing activities against the 
remnants of the Jewish minority, the paper called upon the 
underground institutions to take up efficient measures to curtail such 
activities: 
'The conclusion of our reasoning is simple: the Poles have to 
disassociate themselves utterly and unequivocally from the German 
crimes. It is not enough to adopt a passive position and noble gestures 
of shock and disgust. There is an urgent need for a more active stance 
in counteracting the social demoralisation. sown by the enemy [the 
Germans]. At present the Jewish issue concerns the moral well-being 
of the nation., 72 
On 8 January 1943, WRN the press organ of the PPS - VVRN 
stated: 
'Browsing through our political world we see many things 
which show that our nation is not ready [to embrace democracyl. 
After all we are supposed to be a democracy but the ghost of our own 
fascism is still present ... We are supposed to constitute a federation of 
nations but chauvinism and zoological nationalism... still threaten the 
ideal of partnership among nations. Despite the terrible tragedy 
occurring in front of our eyes, antisemitism is still alive in some circles 
of our society., 73 
Such reflections can also be found in the war-time diaries, 
memoirs and literary writings of individual Poles, particularly 
members of the progressive cultural elite. The poem "The Poor 
Christian Looks at the Ghetto" by Czeslaw Mlilosz is perhaps the best 
known literary expression of this position. 
72Excerpt from the Nowe Drog 7 February 1944. Cited in Szapiro, ed., Wojna 342- 
343. 
73YVA 0-25, File No. 202/ Ell/ 80, the Delegate's Bureau: the Department of 
Information and Press. Weekly Reports of the Chairman. 
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In the second group, the ideologically most diverse, I include 
the following: the Labour Party; the Peasant Movement and affiliated 
smaller peasant groups such as Orka and Rac? awice; the main catholic 
organisations, the Front for the Rebirth of Poland (Front Odrodzenia 
Polski, FOP) and the Union (Unia) headed by Jerzy Braun; and the 
Sanacja's Camp Of Fighting Poland (Oboýz Polski Walczqcej). Their 
position was characterised by following: the use of the myth of the few 
as the Threatening Other with differing frequency, and support for the 
exclusion of Polish Jews from a future Polish state. 74 However, their 
stance regarding the German destruction of Polish Jewry was that of 
strong condemnation, accompanied by expressions of sympathy 
towards the plight of Jews on a human level, and condemnation of 
Polish denunciators and blackmailers. The press organs of the 
Delegate's Bureau and the Home Army reflected a similar range of 
perspectives. 75 
Within the third group, I include the following: the National 
Democrats - Endecja - the 'core' ethno-nationalist party; and extreme 
offshoot organisations such as the Rampart Group (ONR-Szaniec); the 
National Party- Great Poland ( SN-Wielka Polska); the Confederation of 
the Nation (Konfederacja Narodu ); Sword and Plough (Miecz and Ptiig; ) 
and the Awakening (Pobudka). Their position on the Jewish ethnic 
minority was characterised by continuous use of the myth of the Jew as 
the enemy of the Polish polity and of its people, and by advocating the 
project of the exclusion of Polish Jews from a future Polish state. With 
regards to the genocide of Polish Jews, their stance varied between a 
rather detached disapproval of genocidal methods of the Nazis, and 
approval of the outcome of the genocide. And it was accompanied by 
the insistent argument that the extermination of Polish Jews was 
outside of Polish considerations and criticism of Poles expressing 
human attitudes of sympathy towards the plight of the Jews. 
74See Friszke, 'Publicystyka. ' 193-214. 
7SChildren of Warsaw (Dzieci Warszawy I one of the chief press organs of the 
Delegate's Bureau and the Bulletin of Information (Riuletyn Infvr"zacyjny) , the chief 
organ of the AK, can be viewed as an exception to that pattern and be classified in the 
first group. On the subject of the representation of Polish Jews in the press of these 
two institutions see Friszke, 'Pubhcystyka. ' 193-214 and Pawel Szapiro, 'Problem 
Pomocy d1a walczacego Getta' in: Daniel Grinberg, Pawel Szapiro, eds.,. Holocaust Z 
Pgraatkjyý61wiecza. Materi* z Konferen! ýi zOrganisowangj 12rzez ZIH w 
daLach 29-31 Marca 1993. (Warszawa, 1993), 291-322. Hereafter Grinber& Szapiro, 
eds., Holocaust. 
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Apart from differing attitudes towards the Holocaust, the main 
difference between the second and the third groups, I argue, lay in the 
degree of intensity and frequency of the ethno-nationalist 
representation of Polish Jews. In the third group, the core of the ethno - 
nationalist camp, the myth of the Jew as an enemy of Poland appeared 
in its most uniform and crude version. Here, Polish Jews were 
typically described as a Jewish plague, a Jewish flood, and as the 
judeo-Bolshevik enemy and malevolent entity, and such concepts were 
widely elaborated. 
Within the second group, the Jews were addressed less 
frequently and there was a greater variation in the expression of the 
myth. In general, more moderate, diffuse and implicit references can 
be found in the central press of the Peasant Party and the Delegate's 
Bureau. Here the tendency was not to refer to the Jews directly but to 
describe relations between the ethnic Poles and the ethnic Jewish 
minority as one of irrevocable political and social conflict and 
antagonism. In this second group, the most explicit and crude anti- 
Jewish expressions can be found in the press of the Camp Of Fighting 
Poland, the peasant groups Orka and Rac&zvice, the Catholic Unia and 
the Labour Party. In my opinion, their references to the Polish Jews 
were very similar to those of the third group. Here are two examples. 
On 15 August 1942 Nation (NarLd) the organ of the Labour Party 
stated: 
'For hundred of years, an alien malevolent entity has inhabited 
the northern sections of our city. Malevolent and alien from the point 
of view of our interests, as well as our psyche and our hearts., 76 
In January 1943, Poland (Polska ), the organ of the Camp of 
Fighting Poland stated: 
'In Poland the Jews had optimal conditioris for development. 
Yet they have always worked to the detriment of our country. They 
have always loathed Poland and the Poles. After the present war, we 
will have to treat them differently, no matter how reduced their 
numbers., 77 
Support for an integral organic vision of Poland without the 
Jewish ethnic minority can be viewed as the only project that the 
parties and organisations, of the second and third groups shared with 
76Excerpt from Narod, 15 August, 1942. Cited in Polonsky, 'Beyond. ' 214. 
77Excerpt from Polska January 1943. Cited in Gutman, Krakowski, Unequal. 115. 
157 
each other. The National Democrats interpreted the wide consensus 
on the exclusion of the Jewish ethnic minority from a future Poland as 
the 'long-awaited victory' of the party. For example, On 13 October 
1943, one of the press organs of the National Democrats, Young Poland 
(Aoda Polska ) stated: 
'... Before the First World War the National Camp regarded the 
Jewish Question as the most urgent internal political issue to be 
resolved. However, on this issue, the National camp was opposed by a 
wide front ranging from the judaised left-wing to the freemasonry 
centres of Sanacja and the hberal'patriots'... And yet before the war 
[WWII], the same political groups ... supported an'economic boycott of 
Jews. ' Today, despite the tears shed over the burned ghetto [Warsaw], 
programmes of all Polish political organisations have agreed on the 
elimination of the Jewish influence. Victory has been achieved., 78 
At the same time, the National Democrats and its extreme off- 
shoot parties were engaged in a propaganda war against those political 
parties which advocated the inclusive civic model of the nation-state. 
In this propaganda war the delegitimisation of political opponents on 
the basis of their positive association with Polish Jews was employed. 
Political opponents were presented as traitors acting in the interest of 
the Jews rather than the Poles. As we already know, this was a long 
established exclusivist eth-no-national strategy going back to the pre- 
1918 period, and particularly prominent in the ethno-national political 
culture of the inter-war period. During WWII, the PPS, as in previous 
periods, was the party most frequently portrayed as representing 
Jewish interests because of its commitment to the civic model of a 
future nation-state and its continuos recognition of the plight of Polish 
Jews as part of the national tragedy. 
On occasions, the government-in-exile was also described as 
disloyal to the Polish national cause, and as representing the interest of 
the left-wing parties and the Jews. Such labelling of the government- 
in-exile as anti-Polish resembled the labelling of the pre-1935 Sanacja 
government as representing Jewish interests. In the war-time period, 
the three reasons for this criticism were as follows: the government's 
official commitment to the civic model of a future Polish nation-state; 
the presence of Jews and persons of Jewish origin representing the PPS 
in the government itself; and the recognition of the Polish Jewish plight 
78Excerpt from NRoda Polska , 13 October, 1943. Cited in Szapiro ed., Wojna. 315. 
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as part of the national tragedy initiated by the PPS in April 1944 on the 
first anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. Here is one 
illustration. On 28 June 1944, the National Press Agen! ýý (Narodowa 
Agencja Prasowa), the press organ of the National Democrats - Great 
Poland, stated: 
'Currently in the Polish government in London, the Jew 
Grossfeld a member of the PPS, was appointed to one of the most 
important positions, Chancellor of the Exchequer .... Various 
Tennenbaumy and Tuwirns are influential in emigre circles. Some of 
them support the government and others are servants of Moscow. 
Nothing has changed there. A similar situation has developed in 
Poland .... Today the international elements and the left-wing parties 
which define themselves as democratic want to throw Poland into the 
hands of international Jewry., 79 
The Myth and Perceptions of the Holocaust: the case of the ZSP and the FOP. 
At this point I am going to look in more detail at the presence of 
the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other within two underground 
organisations which have a record of being ýctually and actively 
involved in the Council for Aid to the Jews (Zegota). These were the 
Union of Polish Syndicalists (Zwigzek Polskich Syndykalistow, ZSP) and 
the Front for the Rebirth of Poland. The ZSP participated in 
preliminary work on setting up the Council for Aid to the Jews in the 
autumn of 1942.80 The FOP was also involved in establishing Zegota, 
and it took part in its workings until the summer of 1943 when the 
group withdrew from the Council. Needless to say, participation in 
Zegota's actions meant risking one's life. 
In my opmion, the presence of the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other in the press even of these organisations proves 
beyond doubt how far the exclusivist ethno-national model of thinking 
about Polish Jews had spread within the political elites, a phenomenon 
perhaps unique to the Polish underground. 
The ZSP was an organisation comprised of various small left- 
wing and trade-union groups which had stayed in opposition to the 
government-in-exile. At the end of 1943, this organisation was 
classified by the AK as one of four among thirteen political parties and 
79YVA, 0-25, File No. 202 / HI / 81. 
80Prekerowa, 'Relief. ' 161. 
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organisations which supported the inclusion of Polish Jews in a future 
Polish state. 81 However, its earlier political programmes speak to the 
contrary. For example, in a programme published in July 1940, the 
Union of Polish Syndicalists proclaimed: 
'The Jews in Poland constitute a foreign element that wants to 
strengthen its position on the body of the Polish state ... the Jews are a 
nation without sovereignty and by maintaining their collectivity they 
have often had a destructive impact on other societies... 
The position of Jews within the sodo-economic structure of 
society makes them a destructive element within the Polish 
organism .... Poland should be politically and economically independent 
and should do everything to make the Jews economically benign... ' 
This prograiTune also exphcitly advocated the exclusion of Jews 
from the future state: 
Jews should leave Poland of their own accord ... Polish 
nationalising policies should not regard Jews as a group to be 
assimilated. Assimilation is neither viable nor desirable., 82 
The notion of the Jews as aliens historically harmful to the Poles 
can also be found in the press organ of the ZSP the SWark (Iskra ), as 
shown by this example published on 28 April 1943 during the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising: 
'We have never been philosemites. Thejewish QuestioW has 
been the most sensitive aspect of our internal politics. There have been 
many reasons that could explain why the Polish masses have disliked 
the Jewish element culturally and psychologically alien to us. The 
'Jewish Questioe has to be solved and without doubt it would have 
been solved in a future independent Poland according to the principles 
of Polish national interest. However, today, at this moment, when the 
remnants of Jews are fighting for their lives, we want to state that the 
whole of Polish public opinion feels deeply for the Jewish tragedy 
regardless of our personal sympathies and antipathies. ' 83 
Here, the pre-war perception of the Jew as the Threatening 
Other is repeated despite the realisation that the size of the Jewish 
community had been reduced as a result of German mass murder. 
A similar attitude towards the Jewish ethnic minority is 
presented in the press of the Catholic Front for the Rebirth of Poland 
81See Gutman, Krakowski, Unequal. 107. 
82The programme of the ZSP, July 1940. Cited in Przybysz, ed., 3yi4e. 43. 
83Excerpt from Iskra. , 28 April, 1943. Cited in Szapiro ed., Wojna. 58. 
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(FOP) founded by Zofia Kossak- Szczucka and Witold Bienkowski at 
the end of 1940. This social organisation, based in Warsaw, defined 
itself as the representation of the Polish Catholic elite and aimed at the 
dissemination of Catholic, national and anti-communist values. 
From 1942 to 1944 the FOP published three papers; two 
monthlies, Truth (Prawda) and Truth of the Youth ýPrawda Mtodych), 
and a bi-monthly Truth of the Dýjy (Prawda Dnia ). Main contributors 
were the writers Kossak- Szczucka and Jan Dobraczynski. Despite the 
fact that both of them were affiliated to the pre-war Catholic Action 
and supported the vision of Poland advocated by the End&ýja, this did 
not stop them from extending their support to the Council for the Aid 
to the Jews. 84 In fact, Kossak-Szczucka was one of the leading 
founders of the 2egota, and was subsequently involved in various of 
Zegota's activities without becoming an official member of the 
organisation. 85 While Dobraczyn's4 employed by the Warsaw 
Municipal Social Department, assisted through his job in finding 
shelters for Jewish children. 86 Another prominent member of the FOP, 
Witold Bieýkowski, editor of Truth of the Dgy, was officially engaged 
in Zegota on behalf of the Delegate's Bureau. 
A good illustration of Bieýkowski's perception of the Polish 
Jews can be found in the FOP's programme which was later rejected by 
the FOPs Council. 87 In this programme, written in the autumn of 
1942, Bieaowski proposed total social segregation of the Jewish ethnic 
minority from the Polish majority for the sake of the Polish national 
interest. According to him, the Jews were a guest nation on the Polish 
territories, were characterised by an -aggressive psyche' and therefore 
could only harm the host nation. Their presence on Polish territories 
was regarded by him as a misfortune, and emigration to Palestine seen 
as a viable solution to the 'Jewish Question' in the post-war future. 88 
CharacteristicaUy, in the FOP's press, the notion that the Jews 
were the enemy of Poles and would have to be excluded from a future 
84According to DobraczyLki's own recollections he was a member of the National 
Military Organisation and Propaganda Section of the National Democrats during the 
War. See his preface to Roman Dmowski's Myýfi nowoczesnego Polaka (Warszawa, 
1989), 5.0 
850n the subject of Kossak-Szczucka's participation in Zegota, see Tec, When Light. 
107. 
86Michal Gtowinski, 'Tajenu-dca Dobraczynskiego' Gazeta Mborcza No. 153,3-4 
July, 1999,22-23. 
87See Przybysz ed., hýzj-e- 149. 
88 Prograrnme of the FOP, September 1942. Cited in Przybysz ed., hýýe. 143-144. 
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Polish nation-state appears comfortably next to statements of 
sympathy for their plight and calls for helping them. Kossak- 
Szczucka's article "Whom do we help' (Komu pomagamy), published in 
Truth in August 1943, is a good illustration of just such a phenomenon: 
"Today the Jews face extermination. They are the victims of 
unjust murderous persecutions. I must save them. 'Do unto others 
what you want others to do unto you. ' This commandment demands 
that I use all the means I have to save others, the very same means that 
I would use for my own salvation. To be sure, after the war the 
situation will be different. The same laws will apply to the Jew and to 
me. At that point I will tell the Jew: 'I saved you, sheltered you when 
you were persecuted. To keep you alive I risked my own life and the 
lives of those who were dear to me. Now nothing threatens you. You 
have your own friends and in some ways you are better off than 1. 
Now I am depriving you of my home. Go and settle somewhere else. I 
wish you luck and will be glad to help you. I am not going to hurt 
you, but in my own home I want to live alone. I have the right. 89 
What this article suggests is that motivation for rescuing Jews is 
chiefly based on the Christian duty of providing help to the needy. 
VVhat is lacking is precisely the civic principle of helping Jews as 
fellow-citizens, members of the same society, a principle advocated 
only by the Democratic Party, the PPS, and other minor socialist 
groups. Here, the rescued Jew is treated as an outsider who had no 
right to remain in the country of the rescuer when the war is over. A 
future Poland was expected to be the polity of, and for, ethnic Poles 
only. Without doubt, this view is nothing less than an exposition of 
the main principles of Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalism. What is 
also characteristic of Kossak-Szczucka's argumentation is a complete 
lack of doubt that her ideological convictions might not be appropriate 
at a time when Jews were being killed by a common enemy - the 
Germans. 
The same lack of questioning of ethno-nationalist convictions is 
manifested in a separate pamphlet of Kossak -Szczucka's authorship, 
Protest circulated in August 1942. The publication of Protest was 
aimed at presenting the official position of the FOP on the plight of 
Polish Jews during the Great Deportation, and at providing written 
89'Komu pomagamy. ' Prawda, August, 1943. Cited in Tec, When Light. 107. 
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proof of Poles' intolerance of and disassociation from the Nazi killings. 
Here is an excerpt: 90 
'This silence can be tolerated no longer ... He who is silent in the 
face of a murder - becomes an accomplice of that murder. He who 
does not condemn - assists. We therefore raise our voices, we Polish 
Catholics. Our feelings towards the Jews have not undergone a 
change. We have not stopped regarding them as the political, 
economic and ideological enemies of Poland. What is more, we are 
well aware that they hate us even more than the Germans, that they 
hold us responsible for their misfortune. Why, on what basis - this 
remains a secret of the Jewish soul, but it is a fact constantly 
confirmed. Our awareness of these feelings does not free us from the 
obligation to condemn the crime... We also protest as Poles. We do not 
believe that Poland can derive any advantage from the German 
cruelties. On the contrary, in the stubborn silence of international 
Jewry, in the efforts of German propaganda attempting to shift the 
odium of the massacre onto the Lithuanians and-the Poles, we sense 
the planning of an action hostile to us. We know also how poisonous 
are the seeds of this crime-He who does not understand this, who 
dares to link the proud, free future of Poland to base joy at the 
misfortune of his neighbour - he is indeed neither a Catholic nor a 
Pole. '91 
Although Protest contains a moving description of the 
sufferings of Warsaw Jewry and strong opposition to the Nazi 
genocidal programme, Jews here are explicitly referred to as'the 
political, economic and ideological enemies of Poland, ' and categorised 
as obsessive Poles-haters who would unjustly plot against and blame 
the Poles for their plight. Protest is a good illustration that the ethno- 
nationalist perception of Polish Jews was left intact - the Jews were 
still the perpetrators and the Poles the victims. The Jews were still the 
ones who could harm the Poles and the Poles were the vulnerable 
group tying to defend their rights. Here is a similar example: 
'We are not afraid of being accused of acting against the 
national interest. We are fulfilling the basic duty of Catholics, our 
responsibility is to take care of the most persecuted and suffering, the 
90The Great Deportation is a term referring to the first phase of the liquidation of the 
Warsaw ghetto and other ghettos by the Nazis, which began in July 1942, and lasted 
until auturnn the same year. 
91Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, Protest, August 1942. Cited in Polonsky, 'Beyond! 212. 
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Jews in our country. Our duty has no connection to our political 
convictions. We demand from the Jews that they respect the Polish 
national interest and not play any political games in which they might 
exploit their suffering. '92 
Moreover, in some of the publications on the destruction of the 
Warsaw Ghetto, the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other takes on 
a more universal form. In Truth April/ May 1943, the Jews are 
categorised as the enemy of all European nations on whose territories 
they have dwelled. Here the modem myth of the Jew as the enemy of 
every nation is intertwined with the Christian medieval anti-Jewish 
concept. Of course, such a fusion of modem ethno-nationalist myths 
with Christian medieval anti-Jewish beliefs was already present in 
catholic writings in inter-war Poland. 
'The last time Jews fought with arms in their hands was one 
thousand eight hundred years ago-Since which time the Jews have 
been parasites living off the bodies of European nations. This is why 
they have been universally loathed and detested. And they have 
fought with everybody cunningly, never openly with weapons in 
hand. They have caused three quarters of all the wars fought in 
Europe ... They have lost all human dignity ... Since last year the 
Germans have begun the extermination of Jews en masse on the 
territory of Poland. Polish society has been watching this terrible 
crime with shock and pity for the Jews who have not attempted to 
defend themselves ... And suddenly the Jewish nation has decided to 
fight .. This is a very important moment. Who knows, perhaps from 
the ashes of the Warsaw ghetto a new spiritually reborn Israel will 
emerge ? Perhaps the Jews will cleanse themselves in this present 
burning and from being a wandering persistent parasite will transform 
themselves into a normal nation again... 
We Catholics understand the importance of present events. We 
cannot remain passive hearing the voices of the murdered ones ... Our 
duty is to provide help. And we do not care if they will reciprocate 
our help now or in the future. Our help cannot be limited to material 
support only. We also have to provide spiritual help. A prayer for the 
dying,.. making them aware that before death they can be redeemed by 
accepting baptism and the true faith93 
92Excerpt from 
-Prawda 
dinia, May, 1944. Cited in Szapiro, ed., Woina, 380. 
93Excerpt from Prawda, April/ May, 1943. Cited in Szapiro, ed., Wojna, 218. 
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The case of the FOP and of Kossak-Szczucka in particular has 
been interpreted by some historians as a proof that pre-war Polish 
ideological antisemitism had'softened, decreased or simply 
disappeared in the face of the Holocaust. 94 What this position fails to 
take into account is that the case of Kossak-Szczucka as the rescuer of 
Jews is representative only of a small group within society - the devout 
Cathohc ehte pohtically active in the underground. 95 Moreover, this 
position altogether avoids addressing the issue of Kossak-Szczucka's 
political views and the impact of such views on the reader. The 
important questions here are: how could the FOP's press make its 
readers want to help a people presented as the enemy of the Pohsh 
nation? and if so, what kind of a treatment might a rescued Jew expect 
from any person holding such convictions? 96 
Jan Blon'ski, who was the first to analyse Kossak-Szczucka's 
Protest in detail, argues that this text 'takes us into the thinking and 
feeling of a significant portion of contemporary Polish society. 97 
Although it is methodologically difficult to provide any exact figures, 
Blonski's estimate appears reliable in the light of other important war- 
time records discussed here and the pre-war legacy of exclusivist 
ethno-nationalism. 
What is possible to establish with certainty, is that during 
WWH, the Catholic elite's way of thinking was heavily influenced by 
the exclusivist ethno-nationalist perspective, while the vast majority of 
ethno-nationalist elites simultaneously identified with the Catholic 
ethos. As in the inter-war period, the dose link between Polish 
Catholicism and exclusivist ethno-nationalism is unquestionable. 
The Catholic principle of providing help to the most needy had 
no mitigating influence over the perception of the Jew as the enemy of 
the nation. In fact, the two perspectives of sympathy and aid for Jews 
94See Madyslaw Bartoszewski, The Warsaw Ghetto (Boston, Massachusetts, 1987), 
30-31. For a contesting position see Tec, When Light. - 
52-69. 
9517he fact that this group represented only a very small section of Polish society is 
documented by Tec, When Light. 184. 
96Michael C. Steinlauf posed another important question: 'Ihe point, rather, is that if 
even a founder of Zegota was an antisemite, what could one have expected of the 
average Pole, lacking, let us assume, Kossak's extraordinary ethical sensibility T 
Steinlauf,, Bondage. 40. 
97jan Blonski, 'Polish-Catholics and Catholic Poles: the Gospel, National Interest, 
Civic Solidarity and the Destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, ' imprint from Yad 
, Vol. 25, Jerusalem, 
1996,184. Vashem. Studies 
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and of perceiving them as the chief enemy of Poland were compatible 
with the Christian ethos within a section of the Catholic elites. 
Condenmation of the Nazi genocide of Jews, and of 
collaborators was also compatible with the perception of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other who would have to leave Poland when the war 
ended. How can we explain such phenomenon ? 
I argue that the majority of Polish ethno-nationalist elites during 
WVVH disapproved of and rejected the Nazi method of exclusion of 
Jews by genocide. As in the inter-war period, they chose to advocate 
the project of emigration as the main means of excluding Polish Jews 
from the future Polish state. 
Why was the Nazi policy of genocide of the Jews rejected by the 
Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalist elites ? Here two facts should be 
taken into account: firstly, that biological racism was not strongly 
intermingled with Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalism as in the 
German case; secondly, that with the invasion of Poland on 1 
September 1939, Nazi Germany had become the actual enemy of 
Poland and of its people, and that therefore collaboration with the Nazi 
occupant was to be regarded as an act of national betrayal. This 
applied to any collaboration with Nazis, including anti-Jewish actions 
by Polish political and military groups. Such collaboration was 
generally met with disapproval on the part of the underground. Thus, 
at the beginning of the war, the National Democrats, the core 
exclusivist ethno-nationalist party, condemned those members of its 
fascist offshoot organisations who indicated a willingness to 
participate with the Germans in the orchestration of a wave of anti- 
Jewish violence. 
"We shaU not do what they [the Germans] expect us to do. After 
the war, we shall be able to solve the Jewish question according to 
Polish mentality and morality. That is why we did not approve of the 
deeds of those members of the [Falanga and O. N. R. ] who tried, at the 
beginning, to co-operate with the Germans in antisemitic activities. 
We have no intention of baldng our bread in this fire. 98 
Of course, it should be noted at this point that the issue of 
collaboration by any section of the Polish political elites ceased to be 
"Archives of Emanuel Ringelblum, No. 1/ 91, Endecja's attitude towards Jews. 
Cited in Joseph Kern-dsh ed., To Live with Honour And Die with Honor! Selected 
Documents from the Warsaw Ghetto Underground Archives "O. S" (Jerusalem, 1986), 
614. Hereafter Kermish, To Live. 
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relevant one, as the Nazi regime had no interest in such collaboration, 
unlike in other Nazi satellite states. 99 
The main reason genocide (as a form of solving the 'Jewish 
Question') was not acceptable to the majority of Polish ethno- 
nationalist elites resided in the strong Catholic tradition. Nazi 
exclusion of the Jews by mass murder was regarded as 'a barbaric anti- 
Christian actioW and alien to the Polish-Catholic ethos. Even the most 
extreme right-wing section of the Polish political elites referred to Nazi 
genocide of Jewry in that way. 
However, as in the inter-war period, the ethno-nationahst elites 
were convinced that their position regarding Polish Jews was just: 
exclusion of the Jews from a future Poland by 'voluntary' or forced 
emigration was not only acceptable but actually considered to be a 
proper way of disposing of an unwanted ethnic minority. Therefore, 
within these elites, there was no critical reflection on the social and 
moral implications of advocating such projects, either before or during 
the Nazi extermination of Jews. 
In their rejection of and non-participation. in the Nazi 
programme of the physical annihilation, Polish exclusivist ethno- 
nationalist elites were able to view the Nazi extermination of European 
Jews as unconnected to their own project of solving the 'Jewish 
Questioný in a future Poland -a historically correct distinction in terms 
of approach. However, in their categorisation of the Jewish minority 
one can see similarities to that of the Germans - the Jew as the polluter 
of national life in all its aspects - political, economic, social and 
cultural. And here, one can argue, that just as in the inter-war period, 
these elites failed to recognise their own conceptualisation of Polish 
Jews as the national enemy, as similar, in many aspects to the Nazi 
perception of German Jews. 100 
One can see here the dangerous and destructive side of 
exclusivist ethno-nationalism, even when it is free of biological racial 
elements and does not advocate genocide as a form of exclusion of an 
ethnic minority categorised as the chief Direatening Other. 
990n the failure of collaboration between Nazis and Polish fascist groups, see 
i Tomasz Szarota, 'Zajscia anty-z'ydowskie i pogromy w okupowanej Europie, ' in: 
Grinberg and Szapiro, eds., Holocaust. 153-175. 1000n elements of the Nazi conceptualisation of German Jewry as the enemy of the 
German polity and its people, see Bartov, 'Defining! 779-785. 
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This takes us on to an important issue, that of the non- 
rationality of the myth and its adaptability to different sets of social 
conditions. As discussed in the second chapter, throughout the inter- 
war period, the ethno-nationalist camp claimed 'objective grounds' for 
the project of mass emigration of Jews from Poland, these being the 
size of the Jewish community and its economic position within Polish 
society. A typically explicit example of such anti-civic reasoning was 
the following statement: 
'We have the right to be antisemites ... in this state in which 
every tenth citizen is a Jew, there are principal grounds for being an 
antisemite. '101 
This reasoning ought to have lost its validity during the war for 
two obvious and logical reasons: the size of the Jewish community 
was undergoing a process of continuous and rapid reduction and its 
economic status had changed drastically under Nazi legislation. Yet 
despite full awareness of these facts, Polish ethno-nationalists 
continued to perceive the Jews as the chief impediment to the 
development of the Polish nation. 
This reveals the non-rational origins and prejudiced nature of 
these types of social constructions, and their easy adaptability to 
different social contexts. And it confirms the pre-war thesis of 
Aleksander Hertz that the mythologisation of the Other as the enemy 
can continue regardless of the actual position within society of the 
mythologised group. 102 
This phenomenon also exposes the prejudiced nature of pre- 
1939 ethno-nationalist argumentation claiming 'objectivity towards the 
'Jewish Question' in Poland and exposes flaws in post-1945 intellectual 
approaches to the history of Polish Jews that apply such an 
argumentation. 103 
The Concepts of Judeo-BolsheviSm and judeo-Communism 
I shall now move on to discuss a particular aspect of the myth - 
that of the Jew as the pre-eminent political enemy supporting the anti- 
national forces of Bolshevism and Communism. 
101 L. Ro; ciszewski, 'No Second Troy. ' The Times, (Czas), No. 79,, 21 March 1938. 
Cited in Mich, Proble 261. 
102AIeksander Hertz, 'Swoi przeciw obcyn-L' 159. 
'()30n the prevalence of the thesis of objectivity in intellectual discourse, on the 
Jewish Question, see h-win-Zarecka, Neutralising. 165. 
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As we know, these ideas functioned as popular 'social truths" in 
inter-war Poland. By the end of that period, the labelling of the Jewish 
minority as the agent of Communism and ideological traitor of Poland, 
was common in the press of various parties, ranging from extreme 
ethno-nationalist and fascist to Catholic and conservative. 
During WWII this notion continued to be employed in political 
debates and was commonly used as a justification for attitudes and 
actions within the underground which both the Jewish minority and 
the left-wing underground defined as anti-Jewish. 104 
Characteristically, political assessments of war-time events 
involving the Jewish ethnic minority were heavily influenced by 
notions of Judeo-Bolshevism. and the Jewish betrayal of Poland. One 
such event was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Eastern Poland 
that began on 17 September 1939, where Ukrainians, Belorussians and 
Jews constituted the majority. According to Jaff Schatz, the record of 
the pre-war Polish government's policies towards these minorities 
helped the Soviet Army's claim that it had come to liberate these 
minorities from Polish national and class oppression. 'rhus, the 
majority of the population - Ukrainian nationalists, Belorussian 
Socialists, the Jewish poor, refugees from the German - occupied 
territories, some ethnic Poles who initially regarded the Soviet Army as 
an ally, and of course, the Communists - enthusiastically welcomed the 
Red Army. ' 105 
In underground circles, the positive reception of the Soviet 
Army, by a segment of the Jewish community during the Soviet take- 
over of the Polish Eastern territories, was interpreted simplistically - as 
a Jewish betrayal of Poland. 106 The diversity of Jewish responses to 
the Soviet invasion, and the subsequently varied treatment of Polish 
Jews by the Soviet authorities, was not taken into account when 
making these assessments. In fact, the pre-conditioned notion of the 
Jews as Bolshevik traitors of Poland provided a paradigm for the entire 
relations between the Soviet Union and that section of the Polish 
104See Pawel Korzec, jean-Charles Szurek, 'Jews and Poles Under Soviet Occupation 
(1939-1941): Coi*cting Interests, ' Pohn, Vol. 4,1989,204-225 and Krystyna 
Kersten, Polagy Zydzi Komunizm. Anatornia 126h), rawd 1939-68 (Warszawa, 1992), 
30-31. Hereafter Kersten, Polagy. 
105Schatz, The Generation. 152. 
106 on the subject of the Jewish ethnic minority under Soviet occupation and its 
relations with the Soviet regime, see Pinchuk Ben-Cion, Shtetl Tews Under Soviet 
Rule. Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust. (London, 1990), 21-38 and Gross, 
F-0-fish. 20,185. 
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Jewish ethnic minority which found itself under Soviet rule during 
WWIEI- Polish politicians often quoted this interpretation of betrayal as 
a historical truth, without any attempt at verifying the facts. For 
example, in his conversation with representatives of Polish Jewry on 5 
December 1942 Minister Stanis? aw Kot stated: 
'Nfinister Kot:.... The atmosphere in Russia was caused by the 
behaviour of the Jews under Soviet occupation. Many Poles suffered 
because of denunciations by Jews. In some places Jews joyfully 
welcomed the entering Soviet troops, helped disarm Polish officers and 
police..., and then collaborated with the Russian regime and brought 
about many arrests and deportations. 
Dr. Stupp: If I may interrupt you, Mr. Minister, you probably 
know that in many areas of the Homeland Polish people, convinced 
the Soviet army had come to help, also welcomed the troops with 
flowers. 
Minister Kot: Well, let us leave aside the welcome, but 1what 
aboutj all the other things that happened later on ?, 107 
The steady development of the new Polish Communist party 
the PPR, and of its military units People"s Guard (Gwardia Ludazva GL), 
from the beginning of 1943, was another war-time event that 
contributed in underground circles to the intensification of the 
categorisation of Jews as Communists and Bolsheviks. 108 The pre- 
warbelief that Jews were equated with Communism and Bolshevism 
was commonly applied with reference to the PPR that had been set up 
on 5 January 1942 with two bases, one in the GG, and the other in the 
Soviet Union. A majority of Polish Communists who found 
themselves in the Soviet Union had been members of the pre-war KPP, 
and many of them were Polish Jews, while in the PPXs branches in the 
GG, the growing number of members were new-comers to the Party, 
and their background was generally ethnically Polish. 109 From the 
start the PPK unlike its pre-war predecessor the KPP, stated its 
commitment to Polan&s independence. 
The link between the PPR and the Soviet Union played an 
important role in the categorisation of the PPR as anti-national. The 
memory of the Soviet invasion and occupation of the Eastern Polish 
107 Cited in David Engel, 'The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Holocaust, ' Polin, 
Vol. 2 1989,280. 
'ý. 310-318. 108Tereý RzffZy]yistoS 
1090n the war-time development of the PPR, see Schatz, The Generation., 179-189. 
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Territories in September 1939 was very fresh within the non- 
Communist underground and could not easily be reconciled with the 
fact that the Soviet Union had joined the Allied Powers in the war 
against Nazism in the summer of 1941, after having been invaded by 
the Germans. Thus, in the non-Communist underground, the PPR was 
viewed both as political opponent and national enemy, posing a 
sin-filar threat to that of the Nazi rulers. Moreover, the perception was 
that the PPR was exclusively created by Jews and for Jews and other 
non-Poles, and that no 'true' Pole would join such an anti-national 
party. Such beliefs had little grounding in reality but persisted 
nevertheless. I shall argue, that in the context of political 
developments during the war, the notion of a Judeo-Communist 
conspiracy aimed at the destruction of Poland, provided a convenient 
explanation for the increasing power of the Communist camp, without 
damaging the good image of ethnic Poles. In a sense, this notion 
sustained the belief thattrue Poles' could not be members or potential 
sympathisers of the Communist party. 110 Such explanations would 
come to play an important role in later assessments of Communist rule 
in post-war Poland. 
References to Jews as Communists and Bolsheviks can be 
commonly found in reports of the Delegate's Bureau and AK Here are 
four such illustrations: 
The Polish population of Brzesc has welcomed the German 
invasion (of the Soviet Unionj as "redemptioW from the Judeo- 
Bolshevik yoke'l 11 
'The partisan units are commanded by Bolshevik officers. The 
vice-commander is often a Jew.... Jewish bandits frequently terrorise 
the local population. '112 
'The 'komuna' is preparing for military actions in October. 
News is spreading that they are planning to begin the disarming of the 
Germans 
... The decision-makers are Jews and bandits. '113 
"OSeetepkowski, Mysh. 37. 
111 YVA, 02-25, File No. 203/111-55, the Home Army: the Headquarters - section 11, 
Report from the Trip to Eastern Poland, 20 November 1941. 
112YVA, 0-25, File No. . 202/1-35, the Delegate's Bureau: the Presidential Office. Correspondence to the Government. 
113yVA, 0-25, File No. 202/ U-25, the Delegate's Bureau: the Department of Internal 
Affairs. 
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'Jews are completely alien to us and are hostile to Poles in 
various areas. They are threatening the local population with 
Bolshevism. " 114 
Fugitives from the Holocaust, including women, were referred 
to as communists, Bolshevik agents and helpers posing a serious threat 
to the ethnic Polish population. Other labels simultaneously associated 
with them were bandits and common criminals. Not only were these 
types of references to be found in the press of the extreme ethno- 
nationalists, but they were also present in the orders of the local and 
chief commanders of the AK 115 For example, in his order of 31 
August 1943, Rowecki! s successor, General Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski 
stated: 
'Well-armed gangs roam endlessly in cities and villages, 
attacking estates, banks, commercial and industrial companies, houses 
and apartments and larger peasant farms. The plunder is often 
accompanied by acts of murder, which are carried out by Soviet 
partisan units hiding in the forests or ordinary gangs of robbers. The 
latter recruit from all kinds of criminal subversive elements. 
Men and women, especially Jewish women, participate in the 
assaults. This infamous action of demoralised individuals contributes 
in considerable degree to the complete destruction of many citizens 
who have already been tormented by the four-year struggle against the 
enemy... 
In order to give some help and shelter to the defenceless 
population, I have issued an order - with the understanding of the 
head of the Delegatura - to the commanders of regions and districts 
regarding local security ... instructing them where necessary, to move 
with arms against these plundering or subversive bandit 
elements... '116 
This record dearly shows that in the context of the political 
struggle against the Communist camp, the Jews were simply viewed as 
an ideological and physical threat to the security of the ethnic Polish 
population. They were the enemy. This of course explains the lack of 
concem for their predicament on the part of the Chief of Staff of the 
AK, an issue often brought up by survivors of the Holocaust. 
114yVA, 0-25, File No. 202/ TH/ 28, Report by Kreton, 28 January 1942. 
115Polonsky, 'Beyond. ' 219. 
1160rder of General Tadeusz Boýr-Komorowski, 31 August 1941. Cited in Polonsky, 
'Beyond. ' 219. 
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Lack of concern for the fugitives has been pointed out by the 
historian Antony Polonsky. According to him "nod-dng in the order 
(which was later withdrawn in the wake of protests from within the 
Home Army) indicates any sympathy for fugitives from the Nazi 
Genocide; no appeal is made to villagers to provide them with the food 
and shelter that otherwise they could only seize by force; and no 
understanding is shown of their predicament. '117 
It is important to note here that Bor-Komorowski"s prejudiced 
assessment of co-operation between fugitives from the Holocaust and 
Communist military forces did not take into account two important 
facts: first, that with the exception of those AK units which were under 
control of the left-wing Sanacja and the PPS, the general policy within 
the AK was to deny membership to Polish Jews; and secondly, that the 
gradual acceptance of inclusion of various military forces of extreme 
political parties under the umbrella of the AK made it unsafe for Jews 
to approach the AK. In fact for fugitives from the Holocaust, the 
consequences of co-operation between the AK and the extreme 
military organisations of the National Democrats, such as the Rampart 
Group or Sword and Plough, were extremely serious, as contact with 
such units could result not only in rejection but also in brutal hostility 
and death. 118 
The obsession with judeo-Bolshevism was manifested in the 
crudest form in the third group of political parties listed in this 
chapter. Characteristically, in this group's press, the issue of Judeo- 
Bolshevism was raised in order to justify the destruction of Warsaw 
Jewry, during both the Great Deportation and the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising of April 1943. Jewish plightat the hands of the Germans" 
was compared to the alleged plight of ethnic Poles 'at the hands of the 
Jews' under the Soviet occupation. In fact, the Jews were presented in 
these press as responsible for the extermination of Poles in the Soviet 
-occupied part of Poland. Therefore, their readers were advised to 
disassociate themselves emotionally from the witnessed plight of the 
Warsaw Jewry. This echoed Nazi propaganda disseminated in official 
press directed at the Polish population. For example, on the eve of the 
117ibid., 219. 
118Gutman, Krakowski, Unequal. 80-97. 
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Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, the Nazi papers propagated false news of 
the 'Jewish murder' of Polish officers in Katyn. 1 19 
Here is one illustration. On 30 April 1943, the Stream of Youth 
(Nurt Mlbdych), one of the press organs of the Sword and Plough, 
wrote: 
'We are aware that the 'chosen people' have chosen the red 
banner.. over the Polish White Eagle. We know how the Jews have 
behaved towards Poles on the territories occupied by Russia. We 
know what immense casualties the Polish Nation has suffered as a 
result of the actions of these Jews. Thus, the fate incurred by these 
Jews now, although appearing terrible from a human point of view, 
seems justified. '120 
Furthermore, the Jews were not only viewed as the servants of 
the Russians but were also accused of co-operating with the Germans. 
The concept of the Jew as long-term supporter of the Germans, the 
long-standing historical enemy of Poland, was extensively elaborated 
by Roman Dmowski in the inter-war period. In the war-time press, 
Dmowski's theory was simply recycled and adapted to the 
contemporary political and social context. This particular process 
confirms the easy adaptability of the myth of the Threatening Other to 
expand and to adjust to different historical contexts. 
For example, on 21 September 1942, "am art (Szaniec), the 
press organ of the Rampart group wrote: 
'The present pogrom of the Jews in Poland orchestrated by the 
Germans is a well organised job... The Jewish writer Szalom. Ash could 
not invent a better version of a pogrom of the Poles I than the German 
pogrom of the Jewsl .... We can imagine what the Jews would do to the 
Poles. In fact we know what they did to us during the Jewish 
occupation of I the Eastern Territories)... The Jews have been the 
servants of the Germans for the last few hundred years. And they will 
always support the Germans and anybody else who is against us. 
Therefore, let us not be sentimental over their tragedy ... Of course we 
advise taking up a philosophical posture of indifference towards the 
fate of the Jews. We should avoid expressions of satisfaction that the 
unpleasant job of destroying one enemy is conducted by our other 
enemy. Such a position, we must stress, would not be Christian and 
f 119Tomasz Szarota, Zycie codzienne w stolicach okul2owanei Europy (Warszawa, 
1995), 179-180. Hereaiter Szarota, 2yde. 
12OExcerpt from Nurt Mlodych, 30 April, 1943. Cited in Szapiro, ed. 3Y9ýna- 76. 
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Polish .... This position could in fact be identified as Jewish and 
German., 121 
The particular concept of a connection between the Nazi and 
Jewish spirit could also be seen as a repetition of the ideas of the 
Catholic historian Feliks Koneczny. Koneczny, who was dismissed 
from his post at Stephen Batory University in Vilnius in the 1920s, was 
one of the chief proponents of the theory that Jewish civilisation 
allegedly threatened the entire Christian-Latin world. 122 In his war- 
time writings, he went one step further, claiming that Nazism, too, was 
penetrated by the Jewish spirit. In the article entitled 'The Judaised 
Flitlerism' (Hitleryzm zaýydzony), Koneczny argued that Nazism was in 
fact a product of Jewish civilisation. 123 
Of course, these crude and extreme versions of the myth as 
discussed in the last two paragraphs, could generally be found only 
within the press of the National Democrats, particularly within its 
extreme off-shoot organisations. However, it should be borne in mind, 
that this political camp published a substantial number of clandestine 
papers. In 1944, of the six hundred continuous titles of the entire 
underground press, one hundred and twenty titles were published by 
thisgroup. 124 According to historical research, the National 
Democrats and its off-shoot radical organisations possessed good 
technical press equipment in comparison to other clandestine parties, 
and their press enjoyed a wide circulation within all parts of Nazi- 
occupied Poland. 125 Many of the titles were directed at particular 
segments of society, including the peasant and working classes, and 
the youth. 
The Myth of the Covert Jew 
Within the press of the same political camp, a new and 
important development can also be detected, namely that of the 
121 WA, 0-25, File No. 202 / III / 80, the Department of Information and Press, 
weekly reports. 1220n Feliks Koneczny, see S. L Shneiderman, "'High" Antisen-dtism Revived, ' 
Midstream, August-September, 1973,76-81. 
! E-Fehks koneczny 
, 
Cywiliza0a kydowska (London, 1974), 389-394. 
124AII Polish political parties that went underground produced clandestine press. 
The numbers of this press increased vastly from forty titles at the end of 1939 to six 
hundred titles by 1944. See Lucjan Dobroszycki, ed., Cenyalny katalog Rglskiej praýy 
ý2n 1939-1945. (Warszawa, 1962), 11-12. "Lracyjne j 
125jerzy jarowied-Li, Jerzy Mys'liýski and Andr-zej Notkowski, Prasa Polska w latach 
L9L39-1945 (Warszawa, 1980), 96-101. 
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expansion of the use of the notion of the covert/ masked Jew hardly 
distinguishable from his ethnic Polish counterpart. By way of note, 
the notion of the covert/ masked Jew had been used with reference to 
the most culturally assimilated Polish Jewish intelligentsia of the pre- 
war period. During that time, it was this group of Polish Jewry that 
was frequently perceived as the most dangerous because of its alleged 
ability to destroy 'the spiritual, cultural and even biological essence' of 
the Polish nation. The core exclusivist ethno-nationalist press, such as 
the Ende0a's National Thought regularly published a list of Polish 
Jews who adopted Polish sounding names. According to the paper, 
Jews who had adopted Polish names were 'covert Jews' pretending to 
be Poles. Furthermore, by so doing, they were committing a type of 
'crime' against the Polish nation. 126 
During the war this notion of covert Jews came to be employed 
in describing the Jews, not only as the cultural, but also as the political 
enemies of Poland. Furthermore, its potential was to be used against 
any individual whose ethnic identity was suspect. The expansion of 
the use of this notion synchronised with the time of the destruction of 
the majority of Polish Jewry, and with the fact that Polish Jews living 
on the Aryan side in the GG needed to appear Polish in their physical 
and cultural make-up in order to survive. So who were the masked 
Jews ? 
On 16 May 1943 the Manager (Kiermvnik), the press organ of 
the National Democrat's National Nfilitary Organisation, presented the 
following profile of the covert Jew: 
'The Jewish hand is turning against us and blames the Polish 
nation for all the miseries that have befallen and for the lack of help 
from our side. Yes, a majority of the Jewish nation is destroyed, but 
the remnants have not changed their attitude towards us. They are 
doser to a Russian or German Communist than they are to us Poles. 
They are waiting to take control over our economic life. They are 
plotting against us along with other ethnic minorities. In our conflict 
with Soviet Russia they support the Bolshevik side. They would do 
anything in order to weaken us and to prevent the emergence of a 
Great Poland. We are fully aware that a few hundred thousand Jews 
are enough to take control of our economy and to infiltrate the centres 
126 See, for example, 'Ochrona Nazwisk Polskich' (In Defence of Polish Names), No. 
32,1922,6-7. 
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of our political and cultural Iffe. These particular Jews are even more 
dangerous than the Jews en. masse. There are many signs that covert 
Jews in Poland and Jewish emigre circles are now preparing to take 
control over Poland.. '127 
As we can see, wid-dn the extreme ethno-nationahst camp the 
covert Jew was defined as the most threatening element in a future 
Poland, and categorised as an ideological enemy nursing a particular 
hatred for everything Polish and conspiring with all other enemies of 
the state. Different elements were interlocked in this particular version 
of the myth: the Jew as ideological enemy, the Jew as traitor of Poland, 
and the cunning and powerful Jew always aiming at harming the 
Polish nation. 
127Excerpt from Kierownik, 16 May 1943. Cited in Pawel Szapiro ed., Woina. 179- 
180. 
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Society and the Myth 
Having established the impact that the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other had on the way the significant segment of 
underground elites related to Polish Jews, I shall now look briefly at 
the impact of this myth on the Polish ethnic community at large during 
VVWH. I shall focus on two issues: public support for a Poland without 
Jews, and reactions towards the German destruction of Pohsh Jewry. 
Public support for exdusivist ethno-nationalism during the war 
was an embarrassing issue for the Polish officials of the time. The 
already established and strong emphasis on national honour and 
reputation in Polish culture and fear of being accused of collaboration 
with Nazis in the extermination of the Jews, contributed to 
considerable distortions and contradictions in the presentation of this 
issue. 128 
In order to save national honour and secure Polandýs place 
among the Allied Nations, Polish officials frequently engaged in the 
suppression of information that might reveal the extent of negative 
attitudes on the part of ethnic Poles towards Jews, from the 
international public eye and representatives of Polish Jews abroad. 
Moreover, positive aspects of the ethnic Polish populationýs interaction 
with Polish Jewry were emphasised, and their extent exaggerated by 
ascribing them to the entire Polish population. Looking at the 
historical material one can detect a huge discrepancy between the 
official government position that stressed the solidarity and unity of 
the entire ethnic Polish population with the Polish Jewish minority, 
and the information actually received by the government from Nazi 
occupied Poland. 
Public Support for a Future Poland without Jews 
Underground reports and dispatches sent to the govenunent-in- 
exile show that its commitment to the inclusion of the Jewish minority 
in a future Poland, one that brought it credibility in the eyes of the 
Western powers, gained a low public acceptance in Nazi occupied 
Poland. This trend can be viewed as steady and continuous 
throughout the war. The Nazi destruction of Polish Jews does not 
1280n the importance of the notion of national honour and reputation in Polish 
national discourse, see hwin-Zarecka, Frames. 81- 82. 
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appear to have had any mitigating influence over it. Here are four 
illustrations: 
According to a dispatch sent by Janusz Radziwill to Minister Jan 
Kot, there was opposition against the inclusion of the Jewish ethnic 
minority in a future Polish nation-state even within the electorate of 
the PPS, Party. The resolution of 3 November 1940 'made a disastrous 
impression in Poland, even among workers belonging to the Polish 
Socialist Party. '129 
An official report of the Department of Internal Affairs of the 
Delegate's Bureau, covering a period between 15 November 1941 and 1 
June 1942, also spoke of popular support for the emigration of the 
Polish Jews from a future Poland, despite the shock and horror caused 
by the Nazi treatment of Jews: 
'German bestiality towards Jews has brought about sympathy 
for them and condemnation of Nazi methods within the Polish 
population. And it has also caused a decrease of aggressive [Polish] 
antisemitism. Nevertheless, there is a general expectation that the 
Jewish matter will be sorted out by voluntary or forced emigration 
after the war. Present economic changes (laws regarding Jewish 
business and properties) indicate a future rise of political 
antisemitism. - 130 
In the summer of 1943 the government received a memorandum 
from Roman Knoll, a senior official in the Delegate's Bureau. 
According to Knoll, the return of Polish Jews to their homes after the 
war would not be acceptable to the ethnic Polish population and could 
in fact erupt into violence which would be justified by ethnic Poles as a 
means of self-defence. He also emphasised that the future 
disappearance of antisemitism in Poland was purely conditional upon 
the disappearance of the Jews themselves. 
'In the Homeland as a whole ... the position is such that the 
return of the Jews to their jobs and workshops is completely out of the 
question, even if the number of Jews were greatly reduced. The non- 
Jewish population has filled the places of the Jews in the towns and 
cities; in a large part of Poland this is a fundamental change, final in 
character. The return of masses of Jews would be seen by the 
population not as restitution but as an invasion against which they 
129 Cited in Engel, In the Shadow. 80. 
130 YVA, 02-25 / 6, the Delegate's Bureau: the Department of Internal Affairs. Reports 
on the situation 1941-1942. 
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would defend themselves, even with physical means ... The 
Government is correct in its assurances to world opinion that anti- 
semitism- wifl not exist in Poland; but it will not exist only if the Jews 
who survive do not endeavour to return en masse to Poland's cities 
and towns., 131 
A report of 27 March 1944 of the Department of Information and 
Press of the Delegate's Bureau states that the goven-tment's 
commitment to the inclusion of Jews into a future state was simply 
received with shock and mistrust by the Polish peasantry. In fact, the 
peasants doubted that such a pledge could have been made by Polish 
state authorities. Moreover, the report indicates that the peasants 
classified the Jews, together with the German and Ukrainian ethnic 
minorities as unwanted peoples within a future state. The fact that 
Jews and Poles were common victims of Nazi aggression was 
dismissed as irrelevant in the context of support for an ethnically 
homogenous polity. 
'In general the prevalent mood of the peasant population is that 
a post-war Poland has to be purely ethnically Polish and that the 
return to the pre-war situation, where Jews, Germans and Ukrainians 
had more rights and better work opportunities and enjoyed a wealthier 
life than Poles, is not acceptable. All the government's promises 
regarding ethnic minorities published in the [underground] press 
have been received with shock and mistrust. In fact, the population is 
convinced that these promises are simply propagated by German 
sources., 132 
The conclusion to be drawn from these records is that the level 
of support within the ethnic Polish population for the exclusion of 
Polish Jews from a future Poland was similar - if not higher to - that 
within the Polish underground pohtical ehtes. 
Even if one takes into account the possibility of exaggeration in 
some of these records, as argued by the Polish historian Krystyna 
Kersteri, one cannot ignore the fact that the exclusion of Jews from a 
future Poland was one of the most popular political projects to be put 
forward in Poland since the regaining of its independence in 1918.133 
131 Memorandum by Roman Knoll, Head of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the 
Office of the Delegate's Bureau. Reprinted in Ringelblum, Polish-lewish. 257. 
132YVA, 02-25/ 22, the Delegate's Bureau: the Information and Press Bureau. 
Reports. 
1-13Kersten, Polagy. 3. 
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Furthermore, there are no accounts of any visible public criticism of 
this project during the Nazi occupation. On the contrary, public 
support for the project was estimated as high. After all, as I have 
already mentioned here, even the Communists used the concept of an 
ethnically homogenous Poland in their political programmes in order 
to gain public acceptance during the last two years of the war. 
Furthermore, as argued by the historian Jerzy Terej, the 
popularity of the National Democrats, the core ethno-nationalist party, 
was on the increase during the war. 134 The National Democrats 
succeeded in reaching segments of the Polish population which prior 
to the war did not vote for the Endecja. This was due to its strong 
ethno-national, Catholic and anti-German ethos; values, which in the 
Polish case, constituted an important part of identification under 
conditions of war and German occupation. 135 
Of course, throughout WWII, the National Democrats and its 
extreme offshoot organisations engaged in disseminating the message 
that the plight of 'Jews is not a Polish matter! TI-ds takes us to the issue 
of a positive correlation between Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalism, 
and lack of concern for the predicament of the Jews, on the part of the 
ethnic Polish population. 
The Myth and the Witnessing of the Holocaust 
The first comprehensive report on Polish reactions towards the 
plight of Polish Jewry under the Nazi occupation, composed by the 
Polish courier Jan Karski in February 1940, reveals that exclusivist 
ethno-nationalism had considerably impacted on the way the ethnic 
Poles reacted towards the plight of Polish Jews. In fact, the nature of 
this impact on inter-ethnic relations between these two populations 
under German occupation, was so destructive that the report was 
subsequently amended. In its second version information concerning 
negative attitudes towards Polish Jews were omitted and the Polish 
population was depicted as 'united in its revulsion toward German 
anti-Jewish actions. ' According to David Engel, the second version 
was prepared because 'Polish officials realised that Karski's original 
statements regarding the extent and nature of Polish anti-Jewish 
1340n the subject of the increased influence of the National Democrats on the 
underground and population in the GG, see Terej, Rzffzy3ýj§tos'L 108-109. 1350n the issue of general identification of Poles during WWIJ, see Antonina 
Moskowska, Kultgjýý Narodowe U Korzeni (Warszawa, 1996), 299-321. 
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feeling could potentially, if discovered, discredit the Polish cause in the 
eyes of Poland's two chief allies, Britain and France'. 136 
Here are two excerpts from the original report: 
'Usually one gets the sense that it would be advisable were 
there to prevail in the attitude of the Poles toward them the 
understanding that in the end both peoples are being unjustly 
persecuted by the same enemy. Such an understanding does not exist 
among the broad masses of the Polish populace. 
Their attitude toward the Jews is overwhelmingly severe, often 
without pity. A large percentage of them are benefiting from the rights 
that the new situation gives them. They frequently exploit those rights 
and often even abuse them... ' 
'The solution of the 'Jewish Question' by the Germans -I must 
state this with a full sense of responsibility for what I am saying - is a 
serious and quite dangerous tool in the hands of the Germans, leading 
toward the 'moral pacificatioe of broad sections of Polish society. It 
would certainly be erroneous to suppose that this issue alone will be 
effective in gaining for them the acceptance of the populace. However, 
although the nation loathes them mortally, this question is creating 
something akin to a narrow bridge upon which the Germans and a 
large portion of Polish society are finding agreement... 
Furthermore, the present situation is creating a two-fold scl-dsm 
among the inhabitants of these territories -first, a schism between Jews 
and Poles in the struggle against the common enemy, and second, a 
schism among the Poles, with one group despising and resenting the 
Germans" barbaric methods [conscious of the danger in this], and the 
other regarding them [and thus the Germans, too !] with curiosity and 
often fascination, and condemning the first group for its 'indifference 
toward such an important questioe 137 
These excerpts inform us that a broad segment of the ethnic 
Polish population in the GG perceived the Polish Jews as an unwanted 
entity existing outside of the fabric of Polish society. Furthermore, 
they also reveal how this perception impacted on the way the Poles 
136David Engel, 'An Early Account of Polish Jewry under Nazi and Soviet 
Occupation Presented to the Polish Government-in-Exile, February 1940' in: Norman 
Davies, Antony Polonsky, eds., Jews in EasteM Poland and the USSR, 1939-46 
(London, 1991), 259. Hereafter Engel, 'An Early! Hereafter Davies, Polonsky, eds., 
Lews. 
137jan Karski's report 'rhe Jewish Problem In The Homeland'. The entire document 
cited in Davies, Polonsky, eds., Jews. 269. 
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were evaluating the outcome of German anti-Jewish actions; with one 
segment of the population unequivocally condemning the Nazi anti- 
Jewish actions and the other expressing ill-concealed joy that the 
Germans were solving the 'Jewish Questioný for them. This division 
was similar to the perspective concerning the Nazi extermination of 
Polish Jews within the underground political elites, an issue discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Thus one can see that the indifference and 
acquiescence caused by the ethno-nationalist perception of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other was a serious social problem. This also suggests 
that the attitude of many ethnic Poles towards the Jewish victims of 
Nazi treatment can be explained in terms of 'the egoism of 
victimisationý, in which there can be no real empathy for suffering 
experienced by a group's traditional enemy. 138 
Similar observations to those of Jan Karski were often made by 
members of the Jewish ethnic minority. Reading Jewish records of that 
time it is clear that regardless of both the level of assimilation into 
Polish culture, and political affiliation, a noticeable segment of the 
community was profoundly shocked by the realisation. that they were 
excluded from Polish society and that their own tragedy was not 
embraced in the tragedy of Poland. The expectation was that their 
fellow citizens - ethnic Poles - would sympathise with the plight 
inflicted by the common enemy - the Germans and would not 
acquiesce in Nazi anti-jewish actions. As this expectation fell 
disappointment and bitterness took over in many cases. This suggests 
that during the war period, different sections of the Jewish minority 
continued to view Poland as their homeland. 139 Without that sense of 
civic affiliation to Poland and belief that they were members of Polish 
society and equal in rights and duties to those of the ethnic Polish 
population, they would not have been so shocked by their exclusion 
138The term egoism of victimisation was introduced by John E. Mack This was cited 
by Vamik D. Volkan in The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental 
Approach, ' Political Paychology, Vol. 6, No. 2,1985,222. 
39The issue of Polish Jewry's civic affiliation to Poland is beyond the scope of this 
work. However I would indicate that the participation of Polish Jews in the war of 
Polish defence against the Nazi invasion of September 1939 provides evidence that 
different sections of the Jewish ethnic minority identified with Polish state. See 
Shmuel Krakowski, 'Jews in the Polish A-rmy in the Campaign of Septemýer 1939' in: 
Mendelshon and Shmeruk eds., Studies. 149-172, and Stefan Zwolii6ký'Zydzi w 
Rolskich regularnych formacjach wojskowych podczas 11 wojny SWiatowej. ' in: 
Zydzi w obronie Rzeczvposl2olitej 139-152. On the identification of Polish Jewry with 
the Polish state in the pre-war period, see Mendelsohn The Jews. 23,29. 
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from the fabric of Polish society from the outbreak of the war onwards, 
as illustrated by the following: 
'The Polish people, suffering perhaps more than any other 
nation from the yoke of misfortune together with the Jewish people, 
should have, above all, and at every opportunity, demonstrated 
sympathy, solidarity and brotherhood with the Jews. Alas, this is but a 
dream... ' 
'We know we must not generalise: there is often a 
compassionate silence, horror in the eyes, a mute expression of 
solidarity ... but what the rabble, youngsters, peasant women, idlers, 
rascals, scoundrels and outcast ... express in words, sets the tone, 
wounds the heart, hurts the dignity of the Jews who have not been 
granted the satisfaction of having friends and comrades among the 
Poles. '140 
The lack of concern over the fate of Jews on the part of a 
noticeable section of the Polish population was also registered by 
members of the Polish intelligentsia. In their war-time and post-war 
writings, including literary as well as non-literary forms, they boldly 
discuss the issue of indifference towards the fate of the Jewish minority 
during the Holocaust, and show how ethno-nationalist ways of 
thinking impacted on the way members of society related to the 
Holocaust. Here is an excerpt from a little - known short story 'Twigs 
of Acacia' (Galazki akacji) , by the theatre critic Edmund Wiercinski, 
published in Poland in 1947. 
"What happened to the Jewish orphanage T-I asked the maid 
Marysia. `17hey said that the Germans threw a shell in there. Maybe a 
group of children was saved, maybe somebody was rescued. Marysia 
however, was mostly perturbed by the fact that according to rumour 
many of us Poles had been shot down in the ghetto. - Why did they go 
there ?-I asked Marysia. - 'For the goods the Jews left behind' - she 
rephed'. 141 
Witnessing the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising 
Another good illustration of the influence of the myth on the 
way ethnic Poles related towards the Holocaust can be found in 
14OArchives of Emanuel Ringelblum, No. 1/ 91, Polish-Jewish Relations. Cited in 
Kermish ed.. To Live. 615-616. 
141Edmund Wierciýski, 'Galazki Akacji. ' Tworczosc No. 1,1947,47. 
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attitudes towards the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April 1943, an event 
which marked the final destruction of Warsaw Jewry. 142 
Historical records show that neither the underground military 
authorities nor the Warsaw civilian population was in a position to 
alter the course of the German destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. 
However, the city's general attitude toward the plight of Warsaw 
jewry can be summarised as one of striking lack of concern or interest. 
This lack of concern stood in sharp contrast to the attitude 
towards tragic events inflicted by the Germans on the ethnic Polish 
population. A case in point was the attitude of the Warsaw population 
towards the plight of two thousand Polish peasant children whose 
transport arrived at Warsaw in January 1943. The Germans had taken 
these children by force from their parents from the Zamosc region in 
South - Eastern Poland. According to Tomasz Szarota, the city was 
very much moved by the news of the childrees dying of cold and 
hunger in trains at a Warsaw train station. 143 Furthermore, despite 
the German announcement that spreading news about the childrens 
transport would be punishable by prison, all social classes made an 
effort to collect money to save them. Clearly, the plight of these 
children was recognised as a part of the Polish national tragedy. 
In contrast, the plight of Warsaw Jewry was not recogrdsed as 
part of Polands tragedy. This was dearly visible in the attitudes of the 
underground towards the Uprising. Although most of the clandestine 
press praised the Uprising as a courageous Jewish revolt against the 
Germans, and condemned the Nazi destruction of the ghetto, the 
underground authorities and the majority of the political elites, with 
the exception of the Socialists and Democrats, viewed the event as 
outside of the Polish national effort at fighting the Nazi regime, and as 
outside of the Polish national tragedy. In fact, the Uprising was 
referred to as the German-Jewish War. 144 
This lack of recognition of the plight of Warsaw Jewry as a part 
of Poland's tragedy was even more visible in the reactions of the 
142Yisrael Gutman, Resistance. The Warsaw Ghetto UpdýýM& (Boston, New York, 
1994), 2-28-235. Hereafter Gutman, Resistance. 
I 1430n the reactions of the Warsaw population towards the children from the Zamosc 
region, see Tomasz Szarota, Okupowanej WarszaAy Dzieh Powszechni (Warszawa, 
1973), 485-487. 
1440n Polish reactions towards the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, see Gutman, 
Re-siatance. 228-235; Szapiro, 'Problem. ' in Grinberg, Szapiro, eds., Holocaust. 291- 
322. 
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Warsaw population itself. The general attitude towards events taking 
place inside the ghetto was of indifference. Of course, I recognise that 
this indifference cannot be attributed only to the myth of the Jew as the 
chief Threatening Other, but to various psychosocial. factors - such as 
powerlessness and fear caused by the severe conditions of the 
occupation, as well as by German legislation which decreed the death 
sentence for Poles rescuing Jews. 145 Still this does not prevent us from 
looking into how the myth influenced the attitude of the population. 
After all, such indifference both disturbed, and was unacceptable to 
some ethnic Poles at the time. 146 Moreover, evidence that exclusivist 
ethno-nationalism contributed to a great extent to this indifference can 
still be found in post-war Polish recollections: 
'On the other hand my conscience is burdened with much 
heavier guilt ... I have in mind the indifference bordering on cruelty to 
the fate of the Jews which amounted to saying: I could not care less 
about the people dying in the ghetto. They were `themý notus'. I saw 
the smoke rising from the burning ghetto, I heard about what was 
going on inside, but they were "them. '147 
The most visible sign of indifference towards the plight of 
Warsaw Jewry was the participation of a segment of the population in 
entertainment activities at Krasinski Square in Warsaw, where the 
Germans set up a merry-go-round in the spring of 1943. 'When the 
fighting [inside the ghetto] broke out, the merry-go-round did not stop; 
children, youngsters and passers-by crowded around it as before'. 148 
Furthermore, ill concealed joy at seeing the remnants of Warsaw 
Jewry being murdered was expressed among the Warsaw population, 
both in private and in public. Evidence concerning this phenomenon 
can be found in war-time Jewish and Polish diaries and reports, as well 
as in post-war testimonies. Here are three examples: 
In his work on Polish-lewish Relations, Emanuel Ringelblum 
reports that these remarks were made even among people engaged in 
the rescuing of Jews. Here is one such case in which the rescued 
145Barbara Engelking, ZagLada i parniec (Warszawa, 1994), 55-56. Hereafter 
Engelking, ZagLada. On Nazi legislation against Poles rescuing Jews, see Ruta 
Sakowska, Ludzie z dzielnigy zamkniýtgj (Warszawa, 1993), 235-236. 146 Moral discomfort in this respect was expressed by Czeslaw Milosz in his well- 
known poem 'Campo Dei Fiori' written in Warsaw in April 1943. SeeCzeslaw 
Mitosz, The Collected Poems 1931-1987 (London, 1988), 33. 
147janinaWalewska, 'In A Sense I Am AnAnfi-semite, ' Cited inShmuelKrakowski, 
'Jews and Poles in Polish historiography, ' Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. 19,321. 
148BIon'ski, 'The Poor. ' 322. 
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Jewish child is exposed to an atmosphere of festivity over the burning 
Warsaw Ghetto within the circle of his rescuers' friends: 
'Though the boy was very much liked, he had to leave this flat, 
since the landlor&s antisemitic relatives did not acquiesce in hiding a 
Jew, and considered it a sin against the Polish nation. The boy had 
been through the 'the hottest' time for the Jews, the April 'actioe. 
When the Ghetto where his father lived was burning and the 
explosions reverberated as walls were dynamited, the boy had to listen 
to antisemitic conversations, with the talkers frankly expressing their 
great satisfaction at the Nazi solution of the Jewish problem ... I know 
an eight-year-old boy who stayed for eight months on the Aryan side 
without his parents. The boy was hiding with his father's friends who 
treated him like their own child. The child spoke in whispers and 
moved as silently as a cat, so that the neighbours should not become 
aware of the presence of a Jewish child ... He often had to listen to the 
antisernitic talk of young Poles who came to visit the landlord's 
daughters ... On one occasion he was present when the young visitors 
boasted that I-Etler had taught the Poles how to deal with the Jews and 
that the remnant that survived the Nazi slaughter would be dealt with 
likewise. '149 
In his memoirs, Edward Reicher who lived on the Aryan side 
passing as a Pole in Warsaw during the war recollects: 
'At Krasinski Square we were passing the market stalls. Near 
the merry-go-round people were in a jolly and playful mood. There 
was loud music and a few couples were dancing. It looked as though 
the rabble was celebrating the fall of the Warsaw Ghetto. A drunken 
man embraced me and said; "What a joy, the Jews are burning... In 
those days as a part of the ghetto was turning into ashes, life appeared 
so jolly on the Aryan side'150 
One of the Holocaust survivors interviewed by the sociologist 
Barbara Engelking also recollects: 
'For me this was the most painful experience on the Aryan side. 
This was simply shocking. Crowds of people were on the way to visit 
their families and friends during the Easter Festival. And I myself with 
friends was also walking towards Zoliburz [one of the suburbs of 
149Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish. 141. 
150 WA, Memoirs No. 033 / 2824, Edward Reidier, Za Niepol2ehiione WiLn2y. 
WS12onu-tienia kydowskiego Lekarza 1939-1945 178. Hereafter Reicher, Za 
NkP-Oýý 
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Warsaw]. Among the passing pedestrians I heardthe Jews are 
burning and are spoiling our festival'... I felt as if I was on Golgotha. 
People were dying and yet they were saying that their Festival was 
being spoiled. Not one person remarked how terrible it was. '151 
Although it is impossible to establish what exact percentage of 
the Warsaw population perceived the Nazi destruction of the Warsaw 
Ghetto as a solution to the Jewish Question, one cannot escape the 
conclusion that such remarks were made openly and without 
embarrassment by members of different social classes. This indicates 
a level of public acceptance of an attitude expressing joy at the 
disappearance of the Jews. The repetitive character of these remarks 
also suggests that such an attitude could not have been limited to a 
marginal segment of the population but was rather more wide-spread. 
The Myth and the Rescuing of lervs 
The final issue which I shall now address is the impact of 
exclusivist ethno-nationalist belief-systems on the undertaking of 
rescue actions of Jews by individual Poles during the Holocaust -a 
subject, in my opinion, deserving a separate in-depth analysis. 152 My 
general position here stands in agreement with the two scholars Jan 
Tomasz Gross and Nfichael. Steinlauf who were the first to argue that 
the fact of a low societal approval for the rescuing of Jews cannot be 
explained solely on the grounds of fear of German reprisal, that such 
reasoning is misleading, and that the legacy of pre-war exclusivist 
ethno-nationalist perceptions of Jews has to be taken into account as 
one of the crucial factors determining the scope and nature of rescue 
activities. 153 
Undoubtedly, the rescuing of Jews in Poland was a high risk 
activity, since providing shelter for Jews was classified by the German 
occupier as a crime punishable by death, a sentence, frequently 
announced by central and local German authorities between 1941 and 
1943-154 However, in the light of other important historical data, the 
151 Interview with H. M.. Cited in Engelking, Za&Lada. 58. 152According to the Polish historian Teresa Prekerowa, the number of Poles 
invol 
, 
ved in rescue activities constituted one per cent, out of fifteen million ethnic 
Poles living in the GG. See, Teresa Prekerowa, 'The 'Just' and the'Passive" in 
Polonsky, MX Brothers. 75. 
153See Gross, Upýiorna. 25-60 and Steinlauf, Bondage. 30-42. 
1-'ý40n the frequency of announcements of the Nazi decree of death for sheltering 
Jews, see, for example, Sakowska, Ludzie. 235. 
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fear of Nazi reprisal cannot be treated as the only cause of low societal 
approval of these activities. Firstly, during the war there was a 
noticeable discrepancy between the relatively low societal approval for 
the rescuing of Jews and the high societal approval for a range of 
underground activities also classified by the Nazi as illegal and 
incurring severe penalties, including death. This discrepancy was 
discussed by Nfichael Steinlauf : 
'What limited Polish aid to the Jews was not just fear of the 
death penalty. In occupied Poland, death was mandated for a host of 
transgressions great and small, and was sometimes merely a result of 
being on the street at the wrong time. Nor did the fear of death keep 
hundreds of thousands of Poles from joining the underground. '155 
This discrepancy has also been noted by war-time survivors of 
the Holocaust who lived on the Aryan side in the GG. Here is one 
illustration; 
'Hiding Jews was a very dangerous activity and no-one could 
expect from people such heroism. Nevertheless there was no need for 
denunciation of one"s neighbour because he was hiding a Jew. I 
myself lived in constant fear that the Germans would kill me but I was 
even more afraid of Poles who were able to recognise that I was a Jew. 
Living on the Aryan side in occupied Poland I could have told 
strangers without any hesitation that my father worked for the 
underground or that he was engaged in sabotage of German military 
factories. The likelihood that these strangers would betray me to the 
Germans was quite low. However, telling a stranger or even an 
acquaintance that I was a Jew living on the Aryan side with false 
documents, would simply mean committing suicide. An act of 
denunciation of underground activities was regarded as socially 
unacceptable, whereas the denunciation of a Jew was acceptable! 156 
Secondly, it is important to keep in mind that ethnic Poles were 
generally much better able to recognise a Polish Jew passing for a Pole 
than German soldiers unfamiliar with the Polish cultural environment 
and language. By comparison with ethnic Poles, the Germans were 
less able to distinguish between cultural norms and phenotypes of 
different minority groups that they encountered on Polish terTitory-157 
155Steinlauf, Bondage. 41-42. 
156Emanuel Tanay, 'Passport to Life, ' in Marian Turski ed., LoV gydowskie. 
Swiadectwo ýých (Warszawa, 19%), 66. (in Polish) 
"'See Engelkin& Za&da. 51-52. 
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Thus, were the Jews dependent on Poles for successful concealment of 
their identity. 
Thirdly, there is evidence that low societal approval of the 
rescuing of Jews continued even after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 
the early post-war period between 1945 and 1947. During this period 
the newly set up organisation of Jewish FEstorical Commission in 
Poland began to publish records of Jewish survival, including the 
names of Polish rescuers. In many cases these rescuers would ask the 
local Commissions not to make their names public out of concern over 
potential negative reactions by their neighbours and acquaintances. 
This points to the societal isolation of Polish rescuers of Jews - even 
after the war had ended. 
This fact was first raised by Maria Hochberg-Mariaýska in her 
introduction to the testimonies of Polish Jewish Children, published in 
1946. Hochberg-Marianska, who survived the war on the Aryan side 
and herself participated in the rescuing of other Jews, wrote: 
'In this book, in many testimonies, the names of the people who 
saved the Jewish children are given; in others, only initials are used. 
Why is this, if their names are known ?I do not know if anyone 
outside Poland can understand the fact that saving the life of a 
defenceless child being hunted by a criminal can bring shame and 
disgrace upon someone, and can expose them to harassment. '158 
The request for non -pubhcation of names in fuH, and concerns 
over negative reactions on the part of a rescuer's neighbours, was also 
noted by the historian Michal Borwicz, Director of the Jewish 
Historical Commission in Cracow in the early post-war period: 
The Provincial Jewish Historical Commission in Cracow, of 
which I was then Director, was collecting among other things, accounts 
concerning the numerous Poles who had helped Jews during the Nazi 
occupation, very often at risk of their own lives. Within the context of 
the experiences of our witnesses, we began to publish these in journals 
quite early on. Many of those mentioned by names (and portrayed in 
especially good light) came to us with the accusation that by naming 
158Maria Hochberg-Marianska's introduction to Maria Hochberg-Marianska and Noe 
Gruss, eds., The Children Accuse (London, 1996), 24. Originally published in Polish 
by the Jewish Historical Commission in Cracow in 1946. 
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them we were exposing them to unpleasant situations and even 
revenge. '159 
Evidence of low societal approval for such rescue activities can 
be found in the war-time and early post-war testimonies of both Polish 
rescuers of Jews and rescued Jews themselves, including those of 
children. 160 The consistent picture that emerges from these 
testimonies is that the actions of Polish rescuers of Jews were 
frequently met with disapproval or condemnation on the part of their 
neighbours, acquaintances, and even members of their families. These 
categories, referred to by the rescuers as 'unreliable' people (niepewnz 
ludzie), unreliable neighours (niepezvni sqsiedzi) and unwanted people 
(niepotrzebni ludzie), were responsible for harassing and pressurising 
the rescuers to cease their rescue activities 161 These testimonies point 
out explicitly - or more frequently implicitly - that the societal 
disapproval of rescue activities was not limited to the fear of German 
reprisal, but also included the legacy of the exclusivist ethno- 
nationalist evaluation of the Jews as existing outside of the fabric and 
concerns of the Polish nation. 
Here are five illustrations: 
In September 1945, Wanda Chrzanowska who sheltered two 
Czech Jewish children for over a period of two years in Warsaw, 
stated, that at the end of the war she experienced disapproval of her 
rescue activities on the part of some individuals in the bomb shelter 
where she and the rescued girls were hiding from the bombing. 
'The conditions of hygiene were dreadful in the shelter but what 
was worse were the comments of some bad people who were saying 
'the moment the Germans leave the Jews come back. '162 
159MichatBorwicz, 'Pohsh-Jewish Relations, 1944-1947. ' in: Abramsky, Jachimczyk, 
Polonsky eds., The Jews. 193. Hereafter Borwicz, 'Polish-Jewish. ' 
160 My observations here are primarily based on the reading of sixty-four early post- 
war testimonies of Polish rescuers of Jews, and of rescued Jews, held in the collection 
of the Jewish Historical Institute of Warsaw, and the above mentioned Maria 
Hochberg-Marian'ska's collection of Polish Jewish childreWs testimonies The 
QiLdm-ren Accuse. Since this subject of the link between low societal approval of 
rescue actions and the legacy of exclusivist ethno-nationahsm constitutes just a small 
section in this chapter, I provide only a small sample of illustrations. 161 See, for example, YVA, No. 06 / 546, The Diary of Adela Domanus (Historia jednej 
dziewczynki z czasow hitlerowskiej okupacji Warszawy), 42. (in Polish) 162Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute, in Warsaw: File No. 301/5127, 
Testimony of Wanda Chrzanowska, 9 August 1945. Hereafter Archives of ZIH. 
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J6zefa Krawczyk, the rescuer of a Jewish woman with a child 
who had escaped from the Warsaw ghetto at the time of the outbreak 
of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, stated in her testimony of 1945: 
'Events in the ghetto were moving so fast that we did not have 
much chance to think things over. On Monday 19 April 1943 Sara 
Lewin arrived at our place with her little boy. Things were really bad 
because she did not have any clothes or money with her. What could I 
have done ? Throwing her out would have definitely meant her death, 
therefore [we decided that] she would stay with us. My son-in- 
law... arranged a false Kmnkarte for her [the required identity 
document]. Our first action was to separate ourselves from the rest of 
the world. Anyone who wanted to visit me was told that I had gone 
away for a short while. And in fact I had to go a way for a while in 
order not to raise suspicion. Even members of our own family were 
left in the dark about 'our matter, ' as you never knew if someone 
intended to cause harm and call the Gestapo. '163 
Mrs A. Konarska, a care-taker in a Warsaw block of flats, who 
with her husband looked after a young Jewish girl Sabina Indych, 
stated in 1946: 
'During the German occupation I was constantly afraid of my 
neighbours who threatened me with denunciation to the police 
because I was looking after a Jewish child. '164 
Feli(4a Bolak, who with her husband was engaged in black 
market activities in war-time Warsaw, and was assisting two Jewish 
boys stated: 
'With shrewd eyes people saw [the Jewish boys] and betrayed 
us to the Gendarmie, and then the hell began. '165 
Zygmunt Assmart, the rescuer of Lusia Kampf a Jewish woman 
with a daughter, stated: 
'When my neighbours began to speak openly that they would 
hann us if we continued to keep Jews in our place, we spoke to my 
brother-in-law and decided to move them somewhere else for a 
while. "166 
Sabina Kryszak, a Jewish woman whose child was saved by a 
Polish woman, described the problems of sheltering her son. He was 
163Archives of 
ýIH, No. 301/4200. Statement of Jozefa Krawczyk (in Polish) 
164Archives of ý]H, No. 5284. Statement of A. Konarska. (in Polish) 165Archives of 21H, No. 5119. Statement of Felicja Bolak- (in Polish) 166Archives of Z21H, No. 4437. Statement of Zygmunt Assman. (in Polish) 
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not able to remain in the first shelter with her family's pre-war 
domestic help Genia, who intended to rescue him, because of the 
hostile attitude of Genia's friend towards the child: 
'My sister ... took my boy to our ex-servant Genia who was very 
friendly with the child. However he only remained with Genia for one 
day because of the arrival of Genia's friend ... He told her that if she did 
not get rid of the 'Jewish bastard' he himself would sort him out. On 
the day of my soWs departure, Genia behaved very well towards him 
and provided him with money. '167 
Szlama Kutnowski, bom in 1929, stated that his rescuer Mr 
Ciemierych from the village of Zambska, was harassed by neighbours 
on his account. 
'I had to work at Ciemieryc]Ys place but he provided me with 
enough to eat. He was very good to me. At first when he did not 
know that I was a Jew he used to send me to the Church to take Holy 
Communion ... When he became aware that I was a Jew he remained 
good to me .... People tried to persuade him to get rid of me but he 
insisted that his conscience would not allow him to do this and leave 
me without a roof over my head in the frosty winter., 168 
Conclusions 
The general picture that emerges from the analysis in this 
chapter is that the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other did not 
undergo re-evaluation during and after the German destruction of 
ninety per cent of Polish Jewry. 
Instead, the myth persisted and had an impact on ways in 
which a significant segment of underground political and military 
elites related to Polish Jews throughout the war. As in the inter-war 
period the Endecýa and its offshoot radical organisations used the myth 
in its most elaborated and intensified form. 
With the exception of the PPS and the Democratic Party, and 
other smaller left-wing groups in the non-communist underground 
camp, a significant segment of the clandestine political parties and 
organisations used the myth as a main reference point for their 
discourse on the Jewish ethnic minority and the future Polish nation- 
state and nationhood. The model of an ethnically homogenous future 
167Archives of ZILH, No. 1424. Statement of Sabina Kryszak. (in Polish) 
168YVA, No. M-49/273-279. Memoir of SzIama Kutnowski. (undated, written 
approximately one or two years after the end of WWH) 
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Poland without Jews, who were categorised as the chief impediment to 
the development of the ethnic Polish population, was seen as the Most 
desirable vision of a future Polish nation-state. The prevalence of this 
ethno-nationalist perspective, which contradicted the official stance of 
the government-in-exile, can be seen as conducive to the process of 
excluding the Polish Jews from the structure of the underground 
Polish state, and from the fabric of society in Nazi-occupied Poland, 
from the very start of the war. 
The exclusivist ethno-nationalist perspective also had a 
noticeable impact on the way a significant segment of underground 
political and military elites related to the Jewish ethnic minority as 
victims of Nazi extermination. As a result, Polish Jews were perceived 
as a group of suffering human-beings, but as being outside of the 
'universe of Polish national obligations, ' and in many cases as deeply 
inimical to Polish values, interests and existence. At the same time, it 
must be stressed, that the greater majority of the Polish underground 
disapproved of the Nazi extermination of Jews and condemned it as a 
barbaric and anti-Christian practice. At no point did the Polish 
Underground collaborate with the Nazis in the Holocaust 
On the level of daily interaction between the majority and 
minority groups, the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other can be 
seen as contributing both to a lack of concern over the plight of the 
Jews and to indifference towards the Holocaust. Next to fear of 
German reprisal, the myth can be seen as conducive to a low societal 
approval for the rescuing of Jews. In some cases, the myth can also be 
seen as conducive to an approval of the outcome of the Nazi genocide 
of Jews, and to hostile actions towards fugitives. 
On the other hand, it must be stressed that the rescuing of Jews 
by individual Poles, and also in a more organised form (by the Zegota) 
took place, despite the Nazi decree of death issued against rescuers of 
Jews, and despite the disapproval of rescue activities by members of 
the Polish community. Furthermore, the underground Polish state 
condemned any form of anti-Jewish activities. The PPS and the 
Democratic Party, and members of Polish cultural elites, including 
writers such as Jerzy Andrzejewski and Czeslaw Milosz, expressed in 
various ways their concerns over negative and indifferent attitudes 
towards Jews by a section of Polish society, and pointed to the grim 
moral implications of such phenomena. 
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In general terms, the example of the continuity of the myth of 
the Jewish minority as the Threatening Other within the Polish ethnic 
majority during the Holocaust, suggests that even the physical 
elimination of a large proportion of the minority group by an external 
social actor - the enemy of both the majority and minority groups, 
does not necessary affect the myth. Under conditions of continuous 
support for exclusivist ethno-nationalism on the part of the dominant 
nation, these social constructions show persistence and adaptability to 
different sets of historical and social contexts, and continue to be an 
important part of exclusivist ethno-nationalist mythology. War-time 
conditions generally lead to an increased focus on the suffering of a 
dominant nation, and to a detachment from the suffering of other 
minority groups subjugated to the same or even harsher treatment, 
which under conditions of thriving exclusivist ethno-nationalism 
become further intensified and exaggerated. 
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Chapter V. 
Old Wine in a New Bottle: the Jews as Perceived in the Early Post- 
War Period, 1945-1949. 
'It would seem that with barely one hundred thousand Polish Jews [three 
hundred thousand] remaining alivefrom among three million, a nation of 
more than twenty million, if it does not wish to blatantly contradict common - 
sense, cannot continue to feed itself tales of the Jewish Menace. ' 
Jerzy Andrzejewski, 7agadnienie polskiego antysemityzmu, ' Odrodzenie, 
28, lune, 1946. 
Introduction 
In the previous diapter. 1 examined the presence of the myth of 
the Jew as the Threatening Other in Polish society during the Second 
World War. In this chapter I analyse the presence of this myth in 
Polish society in the early post-war Communist period. 
First, I shall look at the presence of the myth among the elites, 
and secondly, I shall focus on the impact of the myth on anti-Jewish 
violence - since exposure to violence, and a lack of physical safety was 
the common social experience of Polish Jews returning home during 
this period. 1 My main argument is that during the early post-war 
years, the myth, in various degrees of intensity, continued to play an 
important role in how Polish Jews were perceived among a significant 
segment of various elites, including the Catholic Church, and non- 
elites. The myth was evident in public statements by the anti- 
Communist elites, and its presence was particularly detectable in the 
reactions of these elites and their supporters to anti-Jewish violence. 
As in inter-war Poland, the myth was still used as a means of 
mandating, rationalising and justif3ring anti-Jewish violence. This 
violence was still perceived, by its perpetrators and supporters, as 
national self-defence. Thus, the myth played a similar role in this 
period to that of the in inter-war period, although a serious attempt at 
debating and challenging anti-Jewish attitudes and actions by a 
'On the subject of the lack of safety and violence affecting the remaining Jewish 
community, see Borwicz, 'Polish-Jewish. ' 191-193; Cala and Datner-Spiewak, Dzieje. 
15-22; David Engel, 'Patterns of Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1944-1946. ' Yad 
Vashern Studies, Vol. 26,1998,43-86. Hereafter Engel, 'Patterns. '; Gross, U12ioma. 93- 
113; and j6zef Andelson, 'W PoIsce Zwanej Ludowp, ' in Jerzy Tomaszewski, ed., 
Nainowsze Dzieje 2ydoýv W PoIsce (w z! 21: ysie do 1950 roku) (Warszawa, 1993), 400- 
404. Hereafter Andelson, 'W Polsce. ' 
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segment of Polish cultural elites of progressive, liberal, and also 
Catholic provenance can be observed in this period. 2 
Before moving into the analysis I shall provide a brief outline of 
the socio-political context of the period under discussion. 
Poland of the early post-war years was a mined polity and one 
that had in many ways changed beyond recognition. Firstly, six 
million of its citizens - three million ethnic Poles and three million 
Polish Jews had died in WWH - the highest figure of any natiort 
Material losses were also high - many industries and cities, including 
the capital Warsaw, were heavily destroyed. 3 
Secondly, the state's pre-war western, eastern and northern 
borders had changed dramatically. As a result of the agreement of the 
Big Powers at Teheran (1943) and Potsdam (1945), Poland had lost 
territories in the East, including cities such as Uviv (Lwozv) and Vilnus 
(Wilno), and gained territories in the west and north-west including 
cities such as Breslau (Wroc&7v), Szczecin (Stettin) and Danzig (Gdansk). 
The new Polish eastern border with the Soviet Union was settled on 
the Curzon line, and the new western border with the newly created 
Socialist German state was along the Oder-Neisse line (Odra and Nysa 
Luiycka). 
Thirdly, as a result of the war and the ensuing territorial- 
political changes, the pre-war multi-national Polish state, with one 
third of its population comprised of minorities, was transformed 
almost entirely into a homogenous nation-state. By the end of 1949, 
when the first major post-war migrations, transfers and repatriations 
had been completed - with two million nine hundred thousand 
Germans transferred to Germany, five hundred thousand Ukrainians, 
Belorussians and Latvians repatriated to the Soviet Union, and 
approximately one hundred and forty thousand Polish Jews emigrated 
(only between 1944 and 1947) - Poland had become ninety-eight per 
cent ethnically Polish. 4 
2An analysis of this debate is outside the subject of this thesis. Therefore I will limit 
my comments on this issue to very brief observations. 
30n the subject of losses suffered by Poland in WWH and on territorial and ethnic 
changes, see, for example, Paczkowski, Zdol2ycie. 10-15; Bardach, Lesnodorski, 
Pietrzak Historia. 632-635; and Schatz, The Generation. 199-201. 
4The figure of one hundred and forty thousand Polish Jews, is not a complete figure. 
It represents only the number of Jews who emigrated with the help of Zionist 
organisations, see Andelson, 'W PoIsce. ' 414. 
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Ap roximately three hundred and eighty thousand Jews Pp 
survived the war, a figure constituting ten per cent of the entire pre - 
war Jewish population. Seventy per cent of these people survived in 
the Soviet Union, and the remaining thirty per cent had survived in 
Poland - in concentration and death camps and on the Aryan side. 5 
Finally, the state's political system had also changed 
dramatically. Assisted by and under the control of the Soviet Union, 
the Communists (PPR) began to consolidate power in the second half 
of 1944. The establishment of the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKVVN) in Moscow 
on 21 July 1944, and its creation of the state administration on the 
Polish territories, marked the first major steps in the Communist take- 
over of political power from the London based government-in-exile. 6 
In June 1945, when the Temporary Goven-Lment of National 
Unity (Tymczasowy Rzqd Jednosci Narodowej, TRIN) was established, the 
First Secretary of PPR, VWadys-raw Gomulka (1905-1982) - nicknamed 
Wie-Aaw - made it clear that the Communists were not going to share 
political power with anyone. During a political meeting of the 
Provisional Government of National Unity taking place the same 
month, Gomulka, known for his bold and expressive linguistic 
expressions, stated: 'Once we have taken power, we shall never give it 
UP .7 This became evident in the PPWs actions against the 
constitutional opposition PSL - chaired by Stanislaw Mikofajczyk. PSL, 
which enjoyed the support of the majority and was regarded as the 
party of Poles (our party'), was crushed by PPR in 1947, through 
intimidation, arTests, terror, and a number of political murders. 8 The 
left-wing parties such as PPS and the Democratic party, a part of the 
coalition with PPR, were also forced to be subordinate to it. 9 
5Arieh Joseph Kochavi, 'Britain and the Jewish Exodus from Poland following the 
Second World War, ' Polin, Vol. 7,1992,162. Hereafter Kochavi, 'Britain, ' 
60n the PPR methods of consolidating power, see, for example, Paczkowski, 
Zdol2ycie. 28-33, and Krystyna Kersten, Miqdzy wyzwoleniem a zniewoleniem: 
Polska 1944-1956. Hereafter Kersten, Miedzv. 5-27. For a concise history of the G; -. _ - PKWN, see Bardach, Lesnodorski, Pietrz4k, Historia. 623-633. 
7Archives of the Workers' Movement. Vol. 9,110. Gomulka's statement cited in 
Paczkowski, Zdo! 2ycie. 5. 
80n the constitutional opposition, see Andrzej Friszke, QpoKyda 12oliiyczna w PRL 
(London, 1994), 23-44. Hereafter Friszke, Qpozyýja. 
9Socialists leaders such as Kazimierz Puiak and Tadeusz Szturm de Szterm, among 
others, were arrested, others such as Zygmunt Zaremba left Poland. See, Friszke, 
Qj2ogy! ja. 25-26. 
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At the same time PPR launched action against the illegal 
political and military opposition, whose intention was to bring down 
the Communist government and take power. The most active among 
these organisations, were the National Democrats (the Endecýa), the 
NSZ, and the Freedom and Independence movement (Wolnos'ci 1 
Niepodleglo c, WiN). This last was the successor to the dissolved AK, 
and like AK, was comprised both of right-wing and left wing 
groups. 10 
By the end of 1947, Communist power was firmly established. 
Poland was moving under the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. 
The Communist Take-Over of Power and the Perceptions of the Jews by the 
Opposition 
Historians agree that the illegal opposition - the core ethno- 
nationalist party Endecja, the radical NSZ, and a significant segment of 
WiN - frequently categorised the Communist take-over of power as the 
rule of Judeo-Communism. 11 The majority of the illegal press 
circulating in Poland - newsPapers, brochures and leaflets 
disseminated this belief - which in its most extreme version was 
categorised as the actualisation of judeo-Poloniaý. 12 
Of course, sudi categorisation was not new. As I have already 
demonstrated the notion of the Jew as the creator of Communism and 
the executor of the policies of the Soviet Union, was widely advocated 
by Polish ethno-nationalists of various kinds and intensity during the 
previous inter-war and war-time periods, when Jews as a collectivity 
were categorised as Communists and Bolsheviks. The survivors of the 
Holocaust were also perceived in this way. Here is one typical 
illustration of post-war labelling of all members of the Jewish 
community as servants of the Soviet regime whose aim was to destroy 
the Polish nation: 
'Every Pole is fully aware that every Jew works for the NKVD 
[the Secret Soviet police], belongs to PPR, and plays a crucial role in 
enslaving our nation. " 13 
100n the illegal opposition, see Friszke, OpoZyoa. 45-66 and Kersten, ýftdzy. 28- 
36. 
IlSee Paczkowski, Zdgbycie. 58; Friszke, Q12oZycja. 62; and Kersten, Nfiýdzy- 37-46. 
12just such a statement was made by Feliks Koneczny in October 1945. Cited by 
Giertych, Polski. 34. 
13Yad Vashem Archives, Collection of Antisernitic Leaflets in Poland 1945-1946, No. 
06/91, WiN's publications, 2. Hereafter, YVA, No. 06/91. 
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The fact that a section of these remaining Polish Jews were 
Communists and that some of them held visible and highly ranked 
positions within the Communist party, and the state apparatus 
reinforced the notion of the rule of judeo-Communism. 14 Jewish 
Communists such as Hilary Minc, Minister for Industry (1944-1949), 
and jakub Berman, Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(1945-1952), were categorised as enemies of Poland and of the Poles, 
and as servants of a foreign power - the Soviet Union. 15 In anti- 
Communist propaganda their names were set in the plural in order to 
emphasise the enormity of the Judeo-Communist take-over. 16 Such 
linguistic manipulation was also to be used by the anti-Communist 
opposition in later periods: 
'ff Poland had regained its independence, everything wotdd 
have developed differently-But Poland did not regain its 
independence and the fact that among the Communist elite there were 
so many Nfincs, Bermans, Katz-Suchys, Rozanskis and Feigs, had to 
weigh badly upon the future... '17 
The fierce political struggle between the Communist and non- 
Communist political camps, sometimes described as civil war, and the 
use of terror and intimidation by the Communists against their 
political opponents intensified the main theme of the myth - the 
destructiveness of Jews. A typical illegal message circulating around 
the country went thus: 
'Fellow Poles ! Do you know who is in charge of the trials 
against us? Jews! Do you know who is murdering us? Jews! Do you 
know who is ruling over us ? Jews - and Bolsheviks! 
18 
Furthermore, the idea was disseminated that any ethnic Poles 
who joined or supported the Communists were simply puppets in the 
hands of cunning Jews, coming as they did from very disadvantaged 
backgrounds - poor, uneducated, peasant, and working class, and thus 
14For an analysis of Jewish Communists and patterns of their positions and careers, 
see Schatz, The Generation. 211-230. 
15ibid., 725. 
16This fact was first pointed out by Schatz, The Generation. 206. 
17Statement by Andrzej Lobodowski cited in Barbara Toporska, ' Wybieram watek 
najmniej popularny, ' Wiadomo; ci. No. 47,1970. This article was reprinted in: Jan 
Mackiewicz and Barbara Toporska, Droga Pani (London, 1984), 121. 
18Message written at the back of a illegal leaflet circulated in Kieke in August 1945, 
published by Danuta Blus-WFgrowska, 'Atmosfera pogromowa, ' Karta, No. 18,1996, 
101. Hereafter Blus-Wegrowska, 'Atmosfera. ' 
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unaware of the 'true' political reality. Even ethnic Polish members of 
the Central Committee of PPR were portrayed as having no power 
over decision making. 19 
Consequently in 1947, in some circles, the Jews were categorised 
as responsible for Polish losses on both sides - Communist and anti - 
Communist between 1945 and 1947.20 In this interpretation the Poles 
were the victims and the Jews the perpetrators - the basis of the myth 
of the Jew as the Threatening Other. The expression of such belief can 
be found in an illegal leaflet signed by the Committee Against The 
Jewish Influence, circulated in Bydgoszcz in October 1947: 
'What a disgrace! A disgrace! A handful of degenerate Jews 
have taken over the state and are ruling over millions of stupid Slavs... 
Forty-five thousand Poles from the AC, the NSZ and WiN have been 
shot or hanged, and thirty thousand Poles from the PPR and the Secret 
Police (UB) have been killed between 1946 and 1947. TI-ds is the result 
of the bloody regime of the Jewish clique, Jews are our mortal 
enemy., 21 
The chief leadership of the constitutional opposition - PSL - 
abstained from any remarks concerning the Jewish minority and was 
careful not to raise the subject just as during WMI. Nevertheless, 
elements of the myth of Judeo-Communism can be found in the 
comments of the rank and file of the peasant movement. Here are 
three illustrations: 
During a local meeting of PSL in Cracow on 19 August, 1945 
Lesniak, a PSL activist from Limanowo stated thus: 
'The Poland that we have is not the Poland we have been 
waiting for. This is a Jewish Poland. Jews are occupying all high 
19This phenomenon was first pointed out and analysed by Krystyna Kersten. See 
Kersten, Polaýy. 78-80. 
20According to estimated data, approximately six thousand members of the 
opposition were killed between 1945 and 1946 and another forty-five thousand 
arrested. The losses on the Communist side were ten thousand, the majority killed 
between 1945 -1946. In 1947, another two thousand members of the opposition were 
killed and twenty five thousand arrested. Paczkowsid, Zdo! 2yde. 44,74. 
21This illegal leaflet was published in the Bulletin of the Ministry of Public Security 
No. 17,1947. Cited in the published collection of the Bulletins of the Ministry of 
Public Security, entitled Biulftny lnformaýýne Ministerstwa Bezl2ieczenstwa 
Archiwurn Ministerstwa Spraw WewnEtrznych. Seria C. Vol. 1, (Warszawa, 1990), 
182-183. Hereafter Biulelyny. 
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positions in the Public Security Office. They should be arresting Jews 
not the Poles. '99 
In its resolution, made in the autumn of 1945, the young peasant 
movement 'Wici' stated the following 
'We demand the ehmination of 'International Jewry' from the 
state apparatus. Happiness, for the Jews, is the destruction of all other 
nations. '23 
During the PSL Congress of 19-21 January 1946, a Warsaw 
correspondent of the Tewish Chronicle a weekly published in London, 
received the following statements from his interviews with peasant 
activists: 
'Charges [against Jews running the secret police] were repeated 
at the recent Peasant Congress in Warsaw where some three thousand 
delegates met to listen to NIr N4ikoiajczyk - N4ikolajczyk condemned 
excesses against workers and peasants but did not say anything about 
the Jews. Some peasants told me th at the reason the security policy 
often took 'drastic measures' in areas where outrages occurred was 
'because there are a lot of Jews in the police and these Jews are taking 
revenge on us., 24 
How many Jews were members of the infamous civilian security 
service, commonly known as Bezpieka ? 
Bezpieka was a part of the Polish security apparatus which 
during the early post-war period was totally controlled by the Soviet 
secret police. According to available data -a record prepared in the 
autumn of 1945 for Bolestaw Bierut (1892-1956) the future President of 
Poland(1947-1956) - Bezpieka numbered twenty-eight thousand 
employees with Jews numbering four hundred and thirty-eight 
persons equal to one point three per cent of its total employees. 
Among its five hundred managerial cadre were sixty-seven Jews, equal 
to thirteen per cent of this strata. 25 
At the end of 1949, Bezpieka was increased to fifty thousand 
employees operating through a network of approximately one 
hundred and fifty thousand informers. 26 The whole of its insitution, 
22YVA, No. 06/ 91. Anti4ewish Propaganda within PSL, 5. 
23YVA, No. 06 / 91, Anti4ewish Propaganda within PSL, 5. 
24'Jews and Polish Government. Vicious Campaign of Slander, ' lewish Chronicle 1 
March, 1946,1. 
25Data 
cited by Kersten, Polagy. 83-84. 
26 Data cited by Schatz, The Generation. 223. 
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including its head Stanistaw Radkiewicz, an ethnic Pole, was 
categorised as Jewish in the anti-Communist press. Even if one 
assumes that the percentage of Jews had increased between 1946 and 
1949, this institution cannot be viewed as Jewish since the total Jewish 
population in Poland at the beginning of 1949 was only one hundred 
and ten thousand. Thus, the probability that all the remaining Jews 
were employees of the Bezpieka is very unlikely if not impossible. 
Furthermore, the size of the Jewish population continued to shrink 
between 1949 and 1951. Thirty thousand left Poland between 1949 and 
the end of the following year, and by 1951 the Jewish community was 
reduced to fifty-seven thousand. 27 
Were all the remaining Jews Communists ?A dose look at the 
early post-war Jewish community shows this not to be the case. 
Between 1945 and 1949 there was a short-term re-birth of Jewish 
religious institutions and political organisations - as in the inter-war 
period, the Jewish community was characterised by a diversity of 
political affiliation. In the Central Committee of Jews in Poland 
(Centralny Komitet ýydozv w Po1sce, CKZP) - the "umbrella' institution, 
established in November 1944 - the following organisations were 
active: the Socialist Bund, all Zionist organisations, (except for the 
banned revisionists who were active illegally), and the Jewish section 
of PPR, which existed between 1945 and 1949. This diversity lasted 
until 1949, when the state began to put an end to all Jewish 
organisations except for the Communist one. Support for Communism 
was not high. In 1946, the Jewish section of PPR numbered three 
thousand members, expanding to seven thousand the following year, 
while the membership, for example, of just one Zionist organisation - 
Ichud - was estimated in 1947 to be between seven and eight 
thousand. 28 
The subject of the self-identification of Communist Jews is 
outside the scope of this thesis, but it is worth noting that Communist 
Jews active in the Jewish section of PPR were viewed by their own 
270n the subject of the demography of the Polish Jewish community in the early 
post-war period, see Andelson, 'W Poisce. '389-390,417 - 420. 
280n the activities of various Jewish political parties and organisations, and their 
membership, see Andelson, 'WPolsce. '433-450. 
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community as the 'Jewish Jews', while Jews in the PPR party were seen 
as 'non-Jewish Jews' ('Aryan Jews'). 29 
In the latter group, many had a long-standing record of 
membership in the pre-war KPP, disbanded by Stalin in 1938. As in 
the KPP, these Communists played an influential role in the central 
apparatus of the PPR in the early-post war years. 
However, PPR cannot be viewed as a Jewish party run by Jews 
for Jews in order to oppress ethnic Poles. Two facts - the size of the 
party, and of the Jewish community itself, contradict such a view. In 
late 1945, PPR numbered two hundred and thirty thousand members - 
already sixty-one per cent of its rank and file had working class 
backgrounds and twenty-eight per cent were peasants. In the autumn 
of 1946, the membership of the party increased to four hundred 
thousand, and by 1947 had reached the figure of eight hundred 
thousand. 30 Given the fact that between 1946 and 1947, the highest 
figure for Polish Jews on Polish territories can be estimated at two 
hundred and fifty thousand, the perception of the PPR as a Jewish 
party established in order to oppress ethnic Poles is simply 
incongruent with reality. 
Thus, one can see that the myth of the rule of judeo- 
Communism in early post-war Poland, as disseminated within the 
anti-Communist opposition, was a powerful social construction, which 
offered a simplistic and comforting explanation for the contemporary 
political and social upheaval. And one which prevented the realisation 
that the Communist regime was not a Jewish invention, but a Soviet 
imposed goverru-nent in which both Communist Jews and Poles had 
actively participated, and that the increasing number of ethnic Poles 
29The categorisation. of Jewish Communists by the sociologist Percy Cohen can be 
useful in understanding the problem of the self-identification of Communist Jews in 
Poland. Cohen differentiates between two categories of Communist Jews: Jewish 
Radicals - and Radical Jews. The former are those Jewish Communists purely 
committed to the Communist cause and for whom their ethnicity is of no importance. 
The latter group are those, who, while Communists, are also affiliated to Jewish 
organisations, see Percy S. Cohen, Jewish RadicAl and Radical Jews. (London, New 
York, Toronto, 1980), 85-88. On the self-identification of the Polish Jewish 
Communists, see Schatz, The Generation. 236-242; and interviews with such 
Communists in Teresa Toran'ska, Them. StaliWs Polish Pu. 1212ets. (New York, 1987). 
30Data concerning the membership of the PPR is cited in Paczkows4 Zdobycie. 34, 
79. 
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joining the rank and file of the Communist Party reflected a desire for 
the normalisation of life after five years of experience of war . 
31 
This again confirm the aptness of the pre-war thesis of 
Aleksander Hertz that the mythologisation of the Other as the enemy 
can continue, regardless of the actual social position of the 
mythologised. subject. 32 
Perceptions offews within PPR 
I shaH now briefly discuss perceptions of the Jews within the 
Communist party and state apparatus -a more complex and less 
obvious case than that of the anti-Communist opposition. 
A perusal of the policies and practices of PPR and the 
Communist state shows a number of clear contradictions regarding 
equality of rights for Polish citizens. On the one hand, PPR officially 
declared recognition of equality of rights for all citizens -a declaration 
already part of the PKWN manifesto of July 22 1944, which was 
expressed thus: 
'... the restoration of all democratic liberties, the equality of all 
citizens, regardless of race, creed, or nationality' [and that] 'Jews who 
have been subjected to inhuman tortures by the occupier are 
guaranteed full rehabilitation, and legal, as well as actual equality of 
rights., 33 
On the other hand, in various addresses to the Polish 
population, leading Communists such as Alfred Lampe, Boleslaw 
Bierut and Wladyslaw Gomulka emphasised the PPR's commitment to 
the creation of a homogenised [ethno-national ] model of the Polish 
state. 34 Such statements, as previously indicated, had already been 
made during VVWII and were to continue in the post-war period. In 
fact, this development led some historians to conclude that the chief 
goal of the pre-war nationalists [exclusivist ethno-nationalists] had 
31According to Paczkows4 in 1947, one in ten Poles actively supported the new 
Communist regime, including financial donations. Paczkowski, Zdohycie. 79. 
32Hertz, 'Swoi. ' 159. 
3-ýThe PKWN manifesto of 22 July 1944. Cited in Bernard. D. Weinryb, Toland, ' in: 
Paul Meyer et al., The Tews in The Soviet Satellites. (Syracuse, N. Y. 1953), 258. 
Hereafter, Weinryb, 'Poland. ' 
34The use of national and religious ceremonies, and the emphasis on creating a 
homogenised Polish nation-state in Communist propaganda was pointed out and 
discussed by Kersten, Miedzy. 12-13; and Marcin Zaremba, 'Partia i narocL PRL: 
intemacjonahsmwcudzy'stowie, ' PojLt[yka, No. 48,1995,72. 
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been advocated and paradoxically attained by the Communist 
regime. 35 
Of course, this development had been noted and criticised by 
some members of both the Jewish and ethnic Polish communities of the 
time. For example, as early as 1945, members of the Jewish section of 
PPR had raised their concerns over the emphasis in creating 'a 
homogenised nation-state of one people' [ ethnic Poles]' and the 
negative effect of such a notion on equahty of rights for ethnic 
minorities. 36 They argue, furthermore, that there was a noticeable link 
between the advocacy of the notion of a homogenised nation-state and 
the on-going displacement of other minorities and increase in anti- 
Jewish hostihties. 37 Records of the meetings of CKZP contain 
statements expressing such concerns. Here is one example: 
'National consohdation is increasingly growing and following 
the hne of ousting national minorities from the Iffe of the state. ' 38 
Stanishw Ossowski, a leading post-war Polish sociologist, was 
perhaps one of the first members of the Polish intellectual ehte to share 
such concerns. In an article entitled 'The Background to the Events at 
Kielce' [the Kielce pogrom] (Na fle wydarzen' kieleckich), pubhshed by 
the left-wing monthly Ku2nica in September 1946, he expressed 
criticism of the manipulation and channelling of nationalist 
resentments by the Communist press. Moreover he argued that this 
practice was an important factor in the increasing intolerance and 
hatred towards ethnic minorities, particularly the Pohsh Jews. 39 
3-5ThLs general conclusion has been made by Norman Davies, The Heart of Europe. A 
Short History of Poland. (Oxford, 1986), 325-326; Jerzy Jedhcki, 'Nationalism and 
State Formation/ in Andrea Gerrits and Nanci Adler, eds., Vampires Unstaked. 
National Images, StereoUes and Myths in East Central Europe. (Amsterdam, 
Oxford, 1995), 130; tepkowski, U12arte. London, 1989; Steinlauf, Bondage. 43. 
360ne hundred and twenty thousand Ukrainians dwelling within the territory of 
post-war Poland were uprooted from their homes and dispersed all over the state. 
This was part of the Communist action against the Ukrainian nationalist movement 
(UPA). See Paczkowski, Zd&ycie. 74-75. 
37This problem of critical reactions of the Jewish section of PPR towards the 
advocacy of a homogenised Polish nation-state for Poles, and the negative effects of 
such a notion on ethnic minorities has been noted by Krystyna Kersten, 'Me Polish 
Stalinism and the Jewish Question, ' in: Leonid Luks, ed., Der sl2atstahnismus und die 
'judische Frage: ' zur antisemitischen Wendung des Kommunismus (Weimar, 1998), 
222-223. Hereafter Kersten, 'rhe Polish. '; and Maciej Pisarski, W Nowej Polsce, ' 
Karta, No. 18,1996,114. Hereafter Pisarski, 'W Nowej. ' 
38Statement of Marek Bittner made at a session of the Jewish faction of the PPR in the 
autumn of 1945. Cited in Kersten, The Polish. ' 222. 
39Stanis4aw Ossowski, 'Na Tle Wydarzeii Kieleckich, ' Kuýnica, No. 38,1946,123- 
125. 
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Major contradictions can also be detected in the perception and 
treatment of Polish Jews by ethnic Polish Comrades within the Party 
and Communist-run state apparatus. PPR was generally viewed, 
including by the West, as the party that fully committed to fighting 
antisemitism, since its predecessor, the pre-war KPP, had a strong 
record of condemning all anti-Jewish activities. Nevertheless, there 
was a dearly noticeable discrepancy between its theory and practice. 
Although PPR issued declarations of fighting against 
antisemitism no substantial measures, such as legislation to make 
antisernitism a state-crime, were introduced. 40 Moreover, historical 
records suggest that members of local PPR committees and officials of 
the state apparatus themselves expressed negative attitudes towards 
the remaining Jews, and did not in fact treat them as equal citizens 
with the same civic rights as ethnic Poles. This situation was 
particularly evident in South-Eastern and Central Poland, including 
the province of Kielce. 41 Here are two such illustrations: 
Firstly, on 23 February 1945, the Voivode of Kielce province 
issued the following letter to members of Municipal Councils: 
'The Minister of Public Administration has been informed that 
citizens of Jewish nationality living in the [Kielce] province are not 
properly treated by our institutions and offices. Therefore an 
instruction has been issued that aH citizens have to be treated correctly. 
Officials who breach this instructions will face penalties. '42 
Secondly, at the meeting of 14 May of 1945, the Jewish 
Committee of Kielce province made the following observations: 
'Ostrowiec [Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski] - the size of the Jewish 
community - one hundred and ninety-three members. State of safety 
very poor - there are cases of assaults and robberies. Recently, some 
local officials have stated that German legislation still applies to the 
Jews. There are cases of common hooliganism - Jews are beaten up 
and policemen present at these assaults have said: 'Beat him up I do 
not see anything! Jews are arrested for corruption, while the 
murderers of four persons go free - just before the Red Army entered 
4OSee Weinryb, 'Poland, ' 258-263. 
41See, Andelson, 'W Polsce. ' 400 -403; Cata and Datner Spiewak, I)zigje. ' 16-18; and 
Blus-Wýgrowska, 'Atmosfera. ' 87-99. 
42Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem, HN4 2/ 8112 -8134 
/ No. 2, Letter of 23 February 1945 of the Voivode of Kielce Province, signed by M. 
Lewaniewski. Hereafter CAJP, HM 2/ 8112 - 8134. 
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this province, a certain Polish family murdered a Jewish family. They 
were arrested, but later released. In the Ostrowiec area leaflets are 
circulated, saying 'death to any remaining jews'., 43 
According to an analysis of historical records by Blus 
-Wq, growska, many local PPR committees failed to take any 
preventative measures against the anti-Jewish violence spreading in 
1945 in Poland. 44 In some cases, PPR committees ignored Jewish 
petitions for help to put an end to anti-Jewish hostilities. In other 
cases, local Communist authorities discontinued investigations into the 
inurders of individual Jews despite sufficient evidence, including 
witness testimonies. In yet other cases, representatives of the state 
apparatus, the army and particularly the police (the militia), not only 
allowed anti-Jewish hostilities to take place but themselves 
participated in such events. 
Additionafly, an increase of negative attitudes towards Jewish 
Communist comrades, who constituted ten per cent of all the 
employees of the state, can also be detected within the rank and file of 
the PPR and state apparatus during this period. 45 Records of such 
attitudes, which clearly point to a breach of the Communist principles 
of internationalism, brotherhood and friendship, can, for example, be 
found in the Boleslaw Bierut Archives, held in the Archives of New 
Documents (ANN) in Warsaw. 46 They can be summarised by the 
simple statement 'There are too many Jews among us and we do not 
want them. '47 
43CAJP, HM 2/ 8112-8134, Minutes of the Meeting of the Jewish Committee of Kieke 
Province, 14 May 1945. 
44See Blus-Wegrowska, 'Atmosfera. ' 87-88 and 98-99. 
45Data cited in Cata and Datner-Spiewak, 'Dzigje. 171. 
461 express my gratitude to Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski of the Institute of Political 
Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences for proving me with access to a sample of 
Bierut's notes. Access to these archives was made to historians only after the political 
changes of 1989. 
47jonathan Frankel discusses the general pattern of replacing Jewish Communists 
with members of (territorially based) majority nations during the period of 
Comm unist consolidation of power, in his article The Soviet Regime and Anti - 
Zionism, ' in: Ezra Mendelsohn, ed., Essential Papers On lews And The Left. (New 
York and London, 1997). 449-451. Hereafter Frankel, The Soviet. ' 
It is worth mentioning here that some historians argue that Jewish Communists were 
used by Stalin in the Sovietisation of Poland and that they constituted the 
reinforcement, qualitatively and numerically, of the meagre Polish Communist cadre 
available to him in 1944. See Davies and Polonsky, fews. 51-52; and Schatz, The 
Generation. 180-181. 
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Perhaps the most important evidence of such attitudes is a 
conversation between the First Secretary of PPR, Wladyslaw Gomulka, 
and the head of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State, Joseph 
Stalin (1879-1953). This conversation, which took place on 9 December 
1948 - the day before PPR and PPS was merged into the United Polish 
Workers' Party (Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), was confirmed in 
writing in Gomulka's letter to Stalin of 14 December 1948. 
Addressing the membership of the PPR and state apparatus, 
Gomulka indicated that there was a need for "regulation of the cadre 
along national [ethno-nationall lines' - meaning a reduction of Jews 
and increase in numbers of ethnic Poles, particularly within the high 
rank of the PPR. Furthermore, GomiAka made a particularly negative 
evaluation of Jewish Comrades - accusing them of 'national nihilism' - 
an accusation which was to play an important role in anti-Jewish 
propaganda within the Communist party in the 1950s and 1960s. 
"Basing my views on some observations, I can state with 
certainty that a segment of Jewish Comrades does not have a strong 
attachment to the Polish nation and therefore cannot have a strong 
attachment to the working class. In fact, their position can be defined 
as national nihilism. I have plenty of evidence, that their present 
employment situation within high levels of the party and state 
apparatus, causes bitterness and discontent [among ethnic Polish 
comrades], Furthennore, a particular atmosphere ... in which no-one is 
allowed to criticise this issue openly, has been created since the Eighth 
Plenum of the Party took place. Nevertheless, discontent is expressed 
covertly .... In my opinion, it is important to put an end to the increase 
in numbers of Jewish Comrades both in the Party and state apparatus. 
In fact, the number of Jewish Comrades should be decreased, 
particularly at the higher level. 48 
One can argue here, that Gomu&ds position on the 
constituency of the PPR and state apparatus, resembles the pre-war 
ethno-nationalist argumentation for the polonisation of the cities and 
provision of jobs for ethnic Poles (the peasants) at the expense of the 
Jewish population, as I have discussed in the second chapter. In both 
cases, Jews were categorised as an impediment to the development of 
48Gomu&a's letter of 14 December 1948 to Stalin. Published in Dzis, No. 6,1993, 
108-109. (with an introduction by Andrzej Werblan). 
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ethnic Poles -a claim central to exclusivist Polish ethno-nationalism 
(Gomulka's position representing a moderate form of sudi daim). 
One should ask here what do the above contradictions between 
the PPR ideology and official Party line, and some of its actual policies 
and practices indicate. In general one can see that PPR presented two 
different images of itself - first declaring its adherence to the principles 
of equality for all citizens of Communist Poland, and secondly 
emphasising the homogenisation of the Communist Polish nation-state 
-a process already taking place as a result of the war and the ensuing 
transfers of populations and changes of borders. 
The first image can be seen as particularly directed at the 
Western powers, which paid attention to such declarations, given the 
pre-war Polish record of the negative impact of exclusivist ethno- 
nationalism on policies and practices concerning ethnic minorities - 
particularly the Jewish minority. 
The second image was directed at the ethnic Polish population - 
the majority over whom the Communists wished to exercise political 
power. In its efforts at seeking legitimacy in the eyes of ethnic Poles, 
PPR used the core ethno-nationalist notion, 'Poland for [the ethnic] 
Poles'- a strategy, arguably brought by the Party's awareness of the 
wide-spread support within the ethnic Polish population for ethnic 
nationalisation of Poland. Of course, in resorting to this strategy the 
Party can once again be seen as contradicting the core Communist 
principle of internationalism and brotherhood. Was this strategy a 
purely instrumental means of achieving legitimacy ? 
Reactions towards members of the Jewish community suggest 
that an ethno-nationalist perspective with dearly anti-Jewish 
overtones, had been internalised /absorbed within the ethnic Polish 
rank and file of the PPR and Communist state apparatus. This 
perspective, noticeable in contacts between members of the Jewish 
community and members of the PPR and state apparatus, particularly 
on the local level, can be seen as leading to the following 
developments: unequal treatment of Jewish citizens by institutions and 
offices, prejudiced attitudes towards Jewish petitions concerning their 
safety, and in some cases - participation in anti-Jewish hostilities. 
The same perspective was noticeable in attitudes of some ethnic 
Poles within the Party and PPR and state apparatus towards their 
fellow Jewish Communist Comrades - as manifested in employment 
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and promotion. Ethnic Polish Comrades were to be given preference 
in employment and promotion over Jewish Comrades, whose number 
within the Party and state apparatus was to be drastically reduced. 
Thus, one cannot deny that the so-called process of the ethno- 
nationalisation of Communism, here with strongly anti-Jewish 
elements, was beginning to take place within the ethnic Polish segment 
of the PPR and state apparatus. 49 In my next chapter, I shall discuss 
in detail the problem of the further development of the ethno- 
nationalisation of Polish Communism with its anti-Jewish elements in 
the late 1960s. 
The Myth and the Rationalisation and Justification of Anti-jezvish Violence 
I shall now move on to a discussion of the impact of the myth of 
the Jew as the Threatening Other on anti-Jewish violence in the early 
post-war period. As in my analysis, in chapter three, of anti-Jewish 
violence in inter-war period, by the term 'violence' I understand here 
the following types of actions: inflicting damage on Jewish properties, 
verbal and physical harassment, assaults and murder. 
As previously mentioned, a lack of safety, fear of assault and 
robbery, and fear for one's life constituted the salient aspect of social 
experience of Polish Jews returning home in the early post-war period. 
A good illustration of the presence of such fear within the 
Jewish community of the period are the Minutes of the Meeting of the 
Jewish Committee of Kielce Province of 14 May 1945, in which the 
following observations were registered: 
'Town of SzydIbwiec - size of the Jewish community one 
hundred, personal safety very bad. 
Zwolen - size of the Jewish community forty-seven - they all 
wish to leave the town. 
Radom - size of the community four hundred and two - they 
are depressed and live in fear. Attitude of local Polish population 
hostile and raises concerns., 50 
Accounts of hostility, ranging from verbal harassment to 
robbery, beatings and even murder were frequently recorded in 
49 On the subject of the link between Communism and nationalism/ ethno- 
nationalism, see, for example, the introduction by Klein and Reban, in Klein and 
Reban, eds, Thg. Politics. 1- 7. 
50CAJP, HM 2/ 8112-8134, Minutes of the Meeting of the Jewish Committee of the 
Kielce Province, 14 May, 1945. 
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individual statements, diaries, and official records of the CKZP and 
PPR. A typical phenomenon of this period was the circulation of 
anonymous letters and leaflets directed at the Jewish communities, 
ordering them to leave under threat of punishment. Here are two 
examples of such communication: 
1. 'To the Jewish Community of Jedlin'sk, 9 July 1945, 
It has been observed that many of you work in intelligence in the 
service of government brutally imposed on us and that therefore you 
are acting against the well-being of Polish society. As a representative 
of the Polish people, I order all Jews to get out of Radom city and 
province by 15 August 1945.1 warn you that if you do not leave by 
this date or if you attempt to ask the local government for help, you 
will be punished., 51 
2. 'Jewish hordes, if you do not leave the city by 15 May, we 
will take appropriate action!, 52 
In the summer of 1945, the CKZP became alarmed by the 
frequency of anti-Jewish attacks in Central and Eastern parts of Poland 
where one hundred people had been murdered over a period of only 
two months. The following year with the repatriation of Jews from the 
Soviet Union that started on 8 February 1946, anti-Jewish hostilities 
spread allover the country. 53 Even in the Western 'Recovered 
Territories' (Ziemie Odzyskane), where both ethnic Poles and Polish 
Jews were new-comers, anti-Jewish hostilities had become noticeable 
by the spring of 1946.54 By the end of 1947, the overall death toll had 
reached an estimated figure of between one thousand arA five 
hundred and two thousand individuals, including two hundred 
51CAJP, HM 2/ 8112-8134. No. 5,11, A leaflet of 29 July to the Jewish community of 
Jedhnsk, 1945. 
52This leaflet is cited in Blus-W7growska, 'Atmosfera. ' 98. 
531t is estimated that among the two hundred and fourteen thousand two hundred 
and ten repatriates from fhe Soviet Union, between 8 February and 31 July 1946, one 
hundred and thirty -six thousand five hundred and seventy-nine were Jews, see 
Andelson, 'W Polsce, ' 397-398. 
r, 4According to Blus-WVgrowska, the new influx of Polish- Jewish repatriates from 
the Soviet Union contributed to the spread of anti-Jewish propaganda in Lower 
Silesia and Pomerania in the spring of 1946. Blus-Wegrowska, 'Atmosfera, ' 97-98. 
On anti-Jewish hostilities in the Western Territories, see also Ossowski, 'Na tle. ' 124 
and Albert Stankowski, 'En-dgracja 2ydow Z Pomorza Zachodniego W latach 1945 - 
1960. ' in: Jerzy Tomaszewski ed., Studia z dzi4w i kuljgiýý ; ýydow w PoIsce Vo 1945 
roku (Warszawa, 1997), 83-102. 
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persons killed in the so-caRed 'train actions' (akcie pociqgowe), 
orchestrated by units of the illegal military group NSZ. 55 
The anti-Jewish violence of the early post-war period has been 
evaluated by scholars as the most severe in the history of hostilities in 
Poland and, the most severe of this period for the entire region of East- 
Central Europe. 56 The Kielce pogrom of 4 July 1946 was the worst 
such case, when ordinary civilians, together with soldiers and 
militiamen, murdered forty-two members of the Jewish community 
and injured another more than one hundred persons. 57 This event 
also stands out as the only case of post-war anti-Jewish violence to 
have been widely discussed in both scholarly and popular works in 
Poland. 58 
One of the main features of this violence in comparison to the 
inter-war period was the extreme intensification of brutality, and the 
high number of people killed in individual attacks - including women 
and children. 59 These phenomena can be attributed to factors such as 
the impact of the war, in particular the familiarity with the Nazi 
Holocaust, and the ongoing civil war type situation, and the 
Communist take-over. 60 
5-"'I'his is an estimated figure. For other estimates, see Cala and Datner-gpiewak, 
DzLeje. 15.1 
56See Cala and Datner-Spiewak, DzLeje. 15; Steinlauf, Bondage. 51; and Kersten, 
Polagy. 135. 
57For a detailed historical description of the Kielce pogrom, see Bozena Szaynol(, 
Pogrom w Kielcach 4 LiRca 1946 (Wrodaw, 1992). Hereafter Szaynok, PoMrn. 
58Polish discussion of the Kielce pogrom has been limited to two aspects: 
description of the event itself, and an investigation into ' forces' responsible for the 
master-minding of it. Concerning this latter aspect, two main historical theories 
have been put forward by Polish historians: first, that the pogrom was orchestrated 
by Soviet security forces -a stance mostly supported in Polish historiography; and 
secondly, that the pogrom was a spontaneous grass-root event - as advocated by a 
minority of historians such as Andelson, 'W Polsce. '. There is also a theory that 
claims that the pogrom was orchestrated by Zionists themselves in order to force the 
Jews to emigrate from Poland, and that the Poles, not the Jews, were the Main 
victims of the Kielce pogrom, as advocated by Jozef Orlicki, Szkice z dzie' 
stosunkýw 12olsko-ZYdowskich 1918-1949 (Szczecin, 1983). On the subject of 
different approaches to the anti-Jewish violence of 1945 and 1947, in Polish and also 
Jewish historiography, see Daniel Blatman, 'Polish Antisemitism and 'Judeo- 
Communism, ' East European lewish Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 1,1997,35-41. 
59For a comparison of anti-Jewish violence for these periods 1945-1947 and 1918- 
1939, and a more detailed description of casualties in post-war period, see Joanna 
Michlic-Coren, 'Anti-jewish Violence in Poland, 1918-1939 and 1945-1947, ' 
Forthcoming Pohn, Vol. 13,2000,34-61. Hereafter Michlic-Coren, 'Anti-Jewish. ' 
60See Engel, 'Patterns! 84-86 and Nfichlic-Coren, 'Anti-Jewish. ' 61. 
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Yet, despite differences in intensity and in political and social 
contexts, it is possible to point out two important features common to 
both the inter-war and early post-war periods: firstly, the myth of the 
Jew as the Threatening Other as provider of grounds for the 
rationalisation and justification of anti-Jewish violence; and secondly, 
the use of post-war violence as primarily a means of forcing out the 
remaining Jews, and thus purifying the polity. 61 In fact, this violence 
contributed, to a high degree, to the emigration of the remaining Polish 
Jews from Poland. In August of 1946 alone, one month after the Kielce 
pogrom, approximately thirty-three thousand Jews left Poland. 62 
A close look at anti4ewish leaflets circulated in early post-war 
Poland, shows the use of the same vocabulary as that of the inter-war 
period. Jews as a collectivity are once again continuously refer-red to as 
a 'menace, "plague' and 'curse'. Some of these leaflets are extremely 
aggressive and can be seen as incitement to violence in the name of 
national self-defence against the alleged subjugation and destruction 
intended for the Poles by the Jews. Here is one such example, a leaflet 
in rhyming verse circulated in the towns of the Western Territories - 
Frydland and Walbrzyk in May 1948: 
'Attention! 
.... A Jewish plague has swamped our town 
each of the townsmen agrees... 
that Jewish faces and deceitful eyes 
look at us as if to say: We will show you Poles! 
.... however we are not afraid 
and we are going to beat the Jews back on each and every street 
until this Jewish plague is gone'. 63 
Cases such as the Kielce pogrom reveal that hostile anti-Jewish 
sentiments prolfferated among members of the non-ehtes and that they 
were not afraid to repeat expressions of such to representatives of the 
Communist regime at public meetings held with the purpose of 
condemning the Kielce pogrom. Here is one example, a report, 
prepared by one of the special teams of Comrades sent by the leaders 
610ther reasons for emigration were: wanting to join families living abroad, Zionist 
conviction, strong negative attitudes towards Communism. See Schatz, The 
Generation. 203-204; and Borwicz, 'Polish-Jewish. ' 190. 
62For data on the emigration of Jews from Poland 1945- 1947, see Yehuda Bauer, 
ýght and Rescue: Brichah (New York, 1970), 7-10. Fh 
63BIus-Wggrowska, 'Atmosfera. ' 98. 
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of the Party and state to investigate anti4ewish hostilities after the 
Kielce pogrom, about their meeting with workers of the Deblin railway 
factory on 11 July 1947: 
'The meeting lasted two hours and was very stormy. Comrade 
Chodkiewicz and I both made our statements. During the speeches 
people shouted back 'Get rid of the Jews ! It's a disgrace that they have 
come to defend Jews !' Those shouting received a big round of 
applause from the workers ... We did have control over the meetin& but 
I knew that the prepared resolution would not be accepted because of 
the hostile atmosphere so I didn! t bother to read it out. After the 
meeting the workers spoke among themselves. I heard them saying: 
'They are servants of the Jews, fuck them all ! 64 
The notion of Jews as a physical threat to the Polish nation can 
also be seen as triggering heated and spontaneous violent reactions 
against members of the Jewish minority, and, in fact, as responsible for 
the most brutal beatings and killings - such as in the Kielce pogrom of 
4 July 1946. 
Importantly, in the early post-war period, the notion of the Jew .v 
as physical threat to the Polish nation acquired a particular dimension, 
hitherto uncommon in the anti-Jewish violence of the inter-war period 
- namely the accusation of ritual murder. In fact this accusation 
became the prime cause triggering anti-Jewish hostilities in the early 
post-war period. 65 
How can one explain such a willingness to believe in an old 
medieval myth dating back to the twelfth century? Without doubt, the 
myth of ritual murder grew on psychologically well-prepared soil, 
after all the whole of Polish society had been exposed to cruelty 
beyond any human understanding over five years of war and German 
occupation. Moreover, the experience of war had generated a 
profound sense of insecurity among many Poles which was only 
64 Report of Stefan Tomaszewski, head of the Warsaw Department of 
Communication, Deblin 10 and 11 July 1946. First published in Puls with an 
introduction by Andrzej Paczkowski. Andrzej Paczkowski, ed., 'Raporty o 
pogromie', Puls, No. 50,1991,109-110. Hereafter, Paczkowski, 'Raporty, '. English 
translations of these reports, with an introduction by Joanna Michlic-Coren, will be 
published in the forthcoming Pohn, Vol. 13,2000,253-267. It must be stressed that 
these reports were prepared only for a very limited circulation among the most high 
ranking leaders of the PPR. 
6-'r'The ritual murder allegation (blood libel) was a medieval religious belief which 
asserted that Jews were required by their religion to murder Christian children in 
order to use their blood to bake the Passover bread (matzoz). 
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reinforced by the terror, arrests and murders orchestrated by the new 
Communist regime. Historians stress that during the early post-war 
period, the population felt a deep fear not only over material goods but 
over health and life itself. 66 This fear was sometimes manifested in the 
most incredible rumours, circulating around the country. 67 Given the 
openness, at the time, to superstitious beliefs, and to the myth of the 
Jew as the new ruler of the Polish nation-state, it becomes even more 
clear how a psychological fear of losing one's life could find its 
ultimate non-rational expression in the ritual murder accusation. 
What also needs to be taken into account here is that the ritual 
murder accusation as a belief was persistently upheld by a segment of 
the Polish Catholic Church both in the pre-modem and modem 
historical periods which includes the inter-war period. 68 This 
situation somehow persisted into the early post-war period when the 
Catholic Church enjoyed a particularly high moral authority. 69 
Ffistorical. records of this period show that the belief in ritual murder 
continued to be detectable not only among lower clergy but also 
among high ranking ones, with the dear exception of clergymen such 
as Dr Bishop Teodor Kubina of Czestochowa. 70 
For example, records of the British Embassy in Warsaw contain 
information concerning the belief in ritual murder among high clergy. 
Here is one illustration. One and a half months after the Kielce 
pogrom, Victor Cavendish -Bentinck, British Ambassador to Poland, 
wrote the following telegram: 
66Andrzej Paczkowski, P6kwieku PRL (Warszawa, 1996), 149. 
670n the subject of rumours circulating in the early post-war period, see Dariusz 
Jarpsz, Maria Pasztor, W KggyLvym Zwierciadle. Poli! yka WIhdz Komunis! yczLnych 
w Swietle Plotek i PogAbsek z Lat 1949-1956 (Warszawa, 1995), 132-135. 
68For a summary of the presence of ritual murder belief in the Polish Catholic 
Church from the sixteenth century up to 1939, see Modras, The Catholic., 194-198, 
203-207. 
69According to a survey conducted by Ahna Cala, belief in ritual. murder persisted 
among peasants even in the 1970s. Among the sixty peasants she interviewed during 
her field-work, only twelve firmly rejected the concept of the ritual murder 
accusation, see Alina Cala, The Image of the Jew in Polish Folk Culture. (Jerusalem, 
19950-5. 
70Bishop Teodor Kubina issued an appeal to the population of his diocese in which 
he refuted the accusation of ritual murder. 'no Christian, either in Kielce, 
Czestochowa, or anywhere else in Poland has been harmed by Jews for religious or 
ritual purposes... We therefore appeal to all citizens of Czestochowa not to be 
influenced by criminal ru-mours, and to counteract any excesses against the Jewish 
population. ' Appeal of 9, July 1946. This appeal broadcast by Warsaw Radio in 
Polish. Poland's Radio for Overseas. Archives of the Wiener Library, PC. 8189.22. 
A. 
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'Dear Rubin, 
Bishop Bienik, Auxiliary Bishop of Upper Silesia, astonished 
me yesterday by stating that there was some proof that the child 
[Henryk Blaszczyk] whose alleged maltreatment by Jews had 
provoked the Kielce pogrom, had in fact been maltreated, and that the 
Jews had taken blood from his arm. If a bishop is prepared to believe 
this, it is not surprising that uneducated Poles do so too. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Holy See., 71 
There is also evidence that some Catholic churches of this early 
post-war period held religious artefacts commemorating alleged 
victims of ritual murder. For example, in the church of the Jesuits in 
Leczyca, a little coffin with a skeleton of a child allegedly killed by the 
Jews in 1639 was exhibited with an accompanying manuscript 
describing the event and a painting depicting a group of religious Jews 
actually conu-nitting the murder on the child. In November 1946, 
during the re4ocation of the Jesuits from the church, the artefact and 
the painting disappeared. 72 
Thus, the psycho-social and political contexts of the early post- 
war period, together with the long tradition of ritual murder 
allegations within a segment of the Catholic Church, can be seen as 
conducive to the outbreaks of anti-jewish violence. The ritual murder 
allegation in the national context of this period reinforced the belief in 
a Jewish enemy who murdered Christian Polish children and who 
plotted Polish servitude. In such a way were the Jews perceived as a 
powerful Other with the ability to destroy future generations of Poles. 
This theme of ritual murder was to repeatedly emerge during 
the many attempts at creating panic and anti-jewish pogroms before, 
during and after the Kielce pogrom. On 11 August 1945 rurnour 
spread in Krakow that the bleeding corpses of Polish children were 
lying in the Kupa synagogue at Nfiodowa Street. Instantly a crowd 
broke into the synagogue and started to beat up members of the Jewish 
congregation who were praying at the Saturday morning Sabbath 
service. The synagogue was demolished and violence spread to other 
71Telegram of 28 August 1946 sent by Victor Cavendish -Bentinck. Cited in Aryeh 
Joseph Kochavi, 'The Catholic Church And Antisemitism In Poland Following World 
War 11 As Reflected In British Diplomatic Documents, ' Gal-Ed, Vol. 11,1989,123. 
72Three documents concerning this matter were published by Danuta Blus- 
Wegrowska in Karta No. 18,1996,120. 
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parts of the city. Among the many injured were four dead - induding 
two women. 73 
A similar situation occu-rred in Kielce during the infamous 
pogrom of 4 July 1946. Mojiesz Cukier, an eye-witness who lived at 7 
Planty Street remembered thus: 'At about nine o'clock, on 4 July, 
crowds started to surround the building. I heard voices from the 
crowd: 'You Jews have killed fourteen of our children! Mothers and 
fathers unite and kill all the Jews! 74 The rumour that a nine-year old 
boy Henryk Blaszczyk had escaped from Jewish captivity and that 
other Polish children had been killed led to the pogrom. Records of 
the CKZP show that thirty more Jews were murdered in several trains 
on that day as the result of the spreading of this nnnour . 
75 
Referring to the public mood in Kalisz after the Kielce pogrom, 
an official report, prepared by one of the previously mentioned special 
Communist teams, stated the following: 
"The rumour grew. People were talking about four, eight and 
twenty-four boys being killed. One woman, who was not identified, 
said that she had seen fourteen boys' heads, and that their flesh had 
been taken by Ukrainians or Soviets, and their blood drunk by the 
jews., 76 
Recent research reveals that even in 1949, in cities like 
Czestochowa and Krakow, there were attempts at inciting anti-Jewish 
hostilities by spreading rumours that Polish children had already been 
killed or were being targeted by Jews. 77 
As in the inter-war period, some individuals actively involved 
in anti-Jewish hostilities, were categorised by a section of society as 
73The Krakow pogrom was the first major anti-Jewish riot of the Vost-war era. 
tiowever very little has been written on this event. Tomasz Polanski, 'Pogrom 
Zydow w Krakowie, ' Echo Krakowa, 10/ 12, August, 1990. The Stalin files also 
contain information about the Krakow pogrom, see Siergiej Kriwienko, 'Raporty z 
Polski, ' Karta, No. 15,1995,30-32. 
74Mojiesz Cukier, eye-witness account cited in: Stanislaw Meducki and Zenon 
Wrona, eds., Anb*dowskie ! Yydarzenia Kieleckie 4 U12ca 1946 roku. (Kieke, 1992), 
113. Hereafter Meaucki and Wrona, AMiydowskie. - 
75 Statement by Itzhak Cukierman from the minutes of the CKZP, 10 July 1946. 
Document. published in Marian Turski, Yogrorn Kielecki w Protoko4Ach Centralnego, 
KomitetuZyd6wwPolsce, 'Ahnanach4dowski, 1996/1997,57. 
76Paczkowski ed., 'Raporty. ' 107. 
77See Dariusz Jarosz, 'Problem antysernitizmu w PoIsce w latach 1949-1956 w s; wietle 
Ot niektorych centrainych instytucji paýstwowych i partyjnych, ' Biule 
Zydowskiggo Instvtutu ffistorycznego, No. 2,1997,49-52. Hereafter Jarosz, 
Troblem! 
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national heroes and martyrs. Such was the case of the nine persons 
sentenced to death on 11 July 1946 at the first trial of the Kielce 
pogrom. 78 Their execution took place on 12 July 1946. 
A perusal of historical records reveals that a segment of the 
population was against the executions of these nine persons and that 
they were in fact categorised as patriots fighting for the dejudaisation 
of the Polish nation-state. Such a position can be found in statements 
made by members of the uneducated classes and among the clergy. 
Here is the first illustration of such a position in an anonymous priest's 
letter sent to the Prime Minister Edward Osýbka-Morawski in July 
1946. In this letter he explicitly describes the people involved in the 
pogrom as patriots committed to the national cause and warns the 
government about the potentially hostile mood of the nation should 
executions take place. Moreover, it appears that such an execution 
would be seen as a crime directed against the entire Polish nation. 
'On behalf of the entire nation I warn you that the sentencing to 
death of these great Polish patriots [the nine people sentenced to death 
] who acted only in seff-defence and despair after six years of fighting 
for their lives .... will be the beginning of your ruin and will cause harm 
to the whole nation. Instead of getting rid of the Jews from Poland 
now when there is a good chance, you are instead murdering your 
own brothers. In any case, you should protect this eight-year-old hero 
[Henryk Btaszczyk - the child allegedly kidnapped by Jews], otherwise 
the Jews will try to poison him as an inconvenient witness 79 
In the second illustration of such a position, in big cities, factory 
workers launched protest actions against the sentences. In some cases, 
these actions were transformed into sit-down strikes. Such a situation 
occurred in Radom where railways workers went on strike, and in 
Lodz in all the textile factories. One of the previously mentioned 
special reports states the following: 
'The social situation in Lýdi is very bad. The strikes have 
moved swiftly from one factory to another and the women are very 
aggressive ... Women are calling for revenge if the death sentences are 
carried out ... Their antisernitic arguments are as 
follows: 'a pregnant 
Jewess gets sixty thousand zlotys and I get nothing! The Jews are 
78For the records of the trial of 11 July 1946, see Meducki and Wrona, eds. 
Anjyjydowskie. 192-205. 
79This anonymous letter was cited by Kersten, Polagy. 113. 
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running Poland! The Jews of ; Lodý insist that there is an atmosphere 
of pogrom in the city. In trams people spread rumours that Jews have 
killed a child in Baluty [the poorest suburb of L6dý]. The Provincial 
Party Committee organised a meeting ... It was decided to mobilise the 
whole Party to take counter-action against reactionary movement 
[according to the official Communist interpretation it was the 
reactionary forces that were responsible for the Kielce pogrom] that is 
spreading anarchy in the factories. 80 
The tendency of shifting responsibilities for anti-Jewish violence 
onto the victims themselves - the Jewish minority - even among 
institutions that in principle condemned this violence, can also be 
detected in the early post-war period. The most salient example of this 
phenomenon was again the Polish Catholic Church. 
The general position of the Church on anti-Jewish violence in 
the early post-war period can be seen as similar to its position taken on 
the same issue in the inter-war period; on the one hand condemning 
physical violence and on the other hand blaming Jews themselves for 
anti-Jewish incidents and reinforcing the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other. The only significant difference was the use of 
different elements of this myth. In the inter-war period, the Church, as 
discussed in chapter three, accused Jews of a variety of 'crimes" against 
the Polish nation; that of spreading atheism, Communism and 
permissiveness, and of destroying the culture, economy, and morale of 
the Polish population, while, in the early post-war years, the Church 
focused on just one issue; Judeo-Communism and Jewish 
responsibility for enforcing the Communist regime upon the Polish 
nation. Here are three illustrations of such a position: 
After the Kielce pogrom, in July 1946, the Jewish delegation of 
the Lublin district met Bishop Stefan WyszyAski of the Lublin 
diocese. 81 A report of this meeting, prepared by two members of the 
delegation M. Szyldkraut and S. Stuszny, states the following: 
'The delegation presents its analysis of the political situation in 
the country that is contributing to anti-Jewish excesses. Bishop 
8OReport of Comrades Doliýski, Domagala, Krych and Fir, cited by Paczkowski, ed., 
'Raporty. ' 111. 
81Bishop Wyszyn'ski's position on the anti-Jewish violence of 1945 to 1947, was first 
raised by MichatBorwicz, see Borwicz, 'Polish-jewish. ' 195. It is worth adding here 
that in the 1960s Wyszyn'ski, then Primate of Poland, was to protest against'the 
events of 1968, ' including general protest against the anti-Jewish campaign of that 
period. 
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Wyszynski disagrees with this analysis, stating that the reasons behind 
anti-Jewish excesses are far more complex, and are based on the 
populationýs anger against Jews who take a very active role in the 
present political system, and that the Germans murdered the Jewish 
nation because the Jews were the propagators of Communism .... The 
Bishop stresses that the Nazi [concentration] camps had their roots in 
the Soviet [labourl camps which were the first schools of barbarism for 
the Germans. 
According to the Bishop, the contribution of the Jewish 
community to Polish life is minimal .... The Bishop condemns all kinds 
of murders from the perspective of Christian ethics, and regarding the 
Kielce incident has nothing particular to add or condemn, as the 
Church has always condemned evil .... [He states that] in Poland, not 
only are Jews murdered but also Poles. Many Poles are in 
[Communist] jails and camps. '82 
In the aftermath of the Kielce pogrom, a similar statement was 
issued on 11 July by Cardinal August Mond to foreign journalists who 
were surprised by the Primate's views that anti-Jewish violence was a 
reaction of the frustrated Polish population against the rule of the 
Communist Jews. 83 It went thus: 
'Secondly, the course of the highly regrettable events in Kielce 
shows that they did not occur for racial reasons as they grew up on a 
totally different, painful and tragic foundation-Numerous Jews in 
Poland are alive today because of the help of Poles and Polish priests. 
The fact that this condition is deteriorating is to, a great degree, due to 
Jews who occupy leading positions in Poland's government and 
endeavour to introduce a governmental structure that a majority of the 
people do not desire. 84 
82 Archives of the Jewish I-Iistorical Institute in Warsaw, File No. 248, CKZP, Legal 
Department, Sprawozdanie z audiencji u Jego, Eksqelero ksiFdza biskupa 0d Wyszynskiego delegacji wojewbdzkiego Komitetu Zydow w PoIsce w Lublinie, 1. 
83This position has been proved to be biased. According to an analysis conducted by 
David Engel, there were significant differences in gender and age in casualties 
between the members of the Jewish community and the non-Jewish Communist 
political camp - twice as many Jewish youths under the age of seventeen were killed 
than Polish youths of the same age group and twenty per cent of the overall 
casualties were Jewish women as opposed to seven per cent ethnic Polish women- 
This discrepancy indicates that Jews were not killed because of their Communist 
affiliation but because of their ethnicity, see Engel, 'Patterns! 69-70. 
84press Archives of the Wiener Library. No. 2B, 208, Cardinal August Mond's 
statement from W. H. Lawrence 'Cardinal Puts Blame on Some Jews for Pogrom' 
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The most elaborated example of such a position can be detected 
in a statement signed by Reverend R. Zalek, found in Kielce Cathedral 
on 12 January 1952.85 The following excerpt is taken from its 
conclusions: 
'Our impression of the incident [Kielce pogrom] is that the Jews 
have become an embodiment of the present political oppression, and 
of the hated government. The crowd was often heard to shout, 'Get rid 
of the Jewish government! " during the incident. 
The actions of the Kielce population during the incident of 4 
July was an unusual reaction of an oppressed nation against a new 
regime dominated by Jews.... 
The entire incident was not directed against Jews as a different 
religious or ethnic group, but against Jews as rulers over the country. 
This is the opinion of the whole of society after the Kielce incident., 86 
One can see here that anti-Jewish violence is justified on the 
grounds of national self-defence and that in fact the Kielce pogrom is 
thus seen as a 'guilt free event. ' 
This takes us to the final issue, namely the use of the myth of 
the Jew as the Threatening Other as a means of minimising of the 
unethical and criminal nature of anti-Jewish violence. 
In the case of the chief apparatus of the Communist regime, 
anti-Jewish violence was dearly condemned. Yet it is important to 
keep in mind that such violence was officially categorised as one of the 
elements of anti-state activities that was orchestrated and perpetrated 
by the so-called reactionary forces and the enemies of the working 
class - the political opposition and its supporters. Thus, in official 
Communist statements condemning this violence, stress was placed on 
fighting the opposition, thereby categorised as solely responsible for 
the anti-Jewish hostilities. Furthermore, this approach was always 
intertwined with accusations against the opposition of slandering the 
good name of the Polish nation. 
and'Poles to Be Hanged, ' New York Times, 12 July 1946. See also 'Cardinal Mond, ' 
Manchester Guardian, 17 July 1946. 
85Four documents were found in the offices of Kieke Cathedral on 12 January 1952. 
According to Dr Boiena Szaynok of University of Wrockaw, they all are deposited in 
a private archives in Poland. 
86Rev. R. Zalek, 'Uwagi i ostrzelenia na temat zajscý kieleckich z dnia 4 lipca. ' 
(Comments on the Kielce Incident of 4 July 1946). 1 would like to express my 
gratitude to Doctor Bozena Szaynok for giving me a copy of this document. 
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Characteristically, issues around the Polish Jews themselves 
were carefully omitted. No reflections were made on the spread of 
anti-Jewish hostilities among society at large, and no serious attempts 
were made at questioning and challenging anti-Jewish propaganda. 
The topic of anti-jewish hostility within the rank and file of the Party 
and the state apparatus was also entirely omitted. Here is one typical 
example of this official position: 
"The incidents of the 4 July in our town [Kielce] have been 
caused by irresponsible elements of society and have tarnished 
Poland's reputation. Our nation has always been well-known for its 
tolerance. Irresponsible individuals have exploited the crowd, which 
gathered as a result of false and biased news spread by hired servants 
of the aristocracy.... 
In the name of the innocent blood shed on the paving stones of 
our town, we appeal for calm and urge you to resist those elements 
within society which incite hatred and deliberately attempt to 
sabotage the rebuilding of Poland. ' 87 
As already mentioned, a tendency to play down anti-Jewish 
violence as directed against Jews was clearly noticeable within the 
Party and state apparatus on a local level, including institutions of law 
and order. Cases of the discontinuity of investigations into anti-Jewish 
violence were common as were lenient sentences concerning anti- 
Jewish hostilities. 88 The third trial of the Kielce pogrom, which took 
place in December 1947, can be seen as a good example of such very 
lenient treatment as received by two men responsible for the 
development of the pogrom - Major W. Sobczyýski, Chief of Kielce 
Public Security and Colonel W. Kuýnicki, Chief of the Provincial 
Police. Both men were simply acquitted of any responsibility. 89 
In the case of the constitutional opposition PSL, any 
condemnation of anti-Jewish violence was ambiguous. The chief press 
organ of PSL, People's Gazette (Gazeta Ludozva) avoided any clear 
condemnations. 90 Of course, the reason for this was the prominence 
within PSL itself and among its supporters (including right-wing 
political elites excluded from official public Iffe) of the myth of the Jew as 
87official appeal of 4 July 1946 to the Kielce public. Document cited in Szaynok, 
PogLom. 112. 
88See Blus-Wpgrowska, 'Atmosfera. ' 88. 
89See Szaynok, PoUom. 90-93. 
900n the reactions of PSL to anti-Jewish violence, see Borwicz, 'Polish-Jewish. ' 197. 
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a highly 'rationalised" vision of reality, any condemnation of anti- 
Jewish violence was impossible. 
Of course, this position was most noticeable in the case of the 
illegal opposition itself. Here the Jew was most commonly and in 
unspokenly categorised as an enemy. Thus, anti-Jewish violence was 
clearly perceived as an element of political conflict rather than an 
unethical and criminal activity. The most extreme version of this 
position was represented by the NSZ forces, which themselves 
perpetrated acts of anti-Jewish violence in the name of national self - 
defence. 
Perhaps the most interesting interpretation of this position is the 
reaction of the illegal opposition to the Kielce pogrom, a reaction 
which can be seen as uniform for the various illegal political and 
military groups. Statements made by this opposition accused the 
Communist government of master-n-dnding the pogrom in order to 
turn international attention away from the results of the rigged 
Referendum of 30 June, and to destroy the reputation of the anti- 
Communist political camp in the eyes of the Western democratic 
world. 91 Furthermore, the pogrom was chiefly categorised as a ruse of 
to defame the good name of Poland. Unsurprisingly, no reflection was 
made about the Jews as victims of crime. 
Here is an excerpt of such a typical statement, published in the 
issue No. 8 August, 1946 of the chief press organ of WiN, Honour and 
Homeland (Honor i Oiczyzna): 
'This anti-Jewish pogrom was neither the first such event, nor 
an isolated incident. We should not deceive ourselves. It was neither 
the first nor the last incident in a chain of murders conu-nitted by 
Public Security. The Kielce pogrom is a classic example of 
provocation... 
The fol1owing are the facts which shed some light on the 
methods of the NKVB and the UB, and on the secret tactics of 
Bolshevicks in Poland. 
91 The referendum of 30 June was regarded as the pivotal political event of 1946 
Polish society was supposed to decide on three key issues: agrarian reform, the 
Polish-German border on the Oder-Neisse line, and a single-chamber parliament In 
general, the Polish opposition insisted on voting 'No' on all three issues, whereas the 
Communists insisted on voting 'Yes' on all three times. 'flie official results of the 
referendum were falsified. See Krystyna Kersten, Narodzft §ystemu whidU. 
Polska 1943-1948 (Poznaý, 1990), 249. 
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The Kielce incident should be considered as part of a broader 
issue: Communism - Jews - reactionary movements 
Among the small numbers of Jews in Poland, the majority of 
them, four out of five, are employed by Public Security... Thus, the 
Warsaw government has created perfect conditions for the spread of 
anti-Semitism and racism, which in turn has led to the West's hostile 
attitude towards Polish nationalism, and has finally given Moscow the 
excuse it has been waiting for - to provoke the Polish population, and 
then to repress it., 92 
The same point of view, presenting Poles as the actual victims of 
the Kielce pogrom, can be found in leaflets and anonymous 
correspondence addressed to local Jewish communities in the 
aftermath of the Kielce pogrom. Here is one such example -a letter 
sent to the Chairman of the Jewish Community in Wloszczow: 
'As I know you personally from our village I would have 
feelings of remorse if I were not to warn you. Something bad might 
happen to your people. No-one is going to forgive you for Kielce. 
Revenge is on its way for you have treated Poles badly. Nothing can 
help your people, not even Public Security. A terrible revenge against 
you is coming from the entire country. I advise you to leave for the 
Promised Land, otherwise there will be bloodshed in the spring. -93 
On the other hand, it must be stressed that a segment of the 
Polish cultural elites unambiguously condemned anti-Jewish violence. 
Left-wing journals such as Kuýnica and Rebirth (Odrodzenie), and the 
Catholic Common Weft (Tygodnik Pozvszechny) - the main 
representative of the so-called 'open church' in the post-1945 period, 
published articles addressing and questioning some aspects of the anti- 
Jewish perspective within Polish society. 94 
Also, Rights of Human Beings (Prazvo Cz? owieka), the montbly 
journal of the All -Polish Anti-Racist League (Polska Liga do Walki z 
RaslZmem), set up in the spring of 1946, published articles questioning 
anti-Jewish prejudices and actions in Poland. 95 However, only three 
92'Kielce', Honor i QjgUzna, No. 8, August, 1946. Cited in Krystyna Kersten, 
'Pogrom Kielecki- znaki zapytania, ' in: Wrzesin'ski, ed., Polska. 158-159. 
93Letter published in the Bulletin of the Ministry of Public Security, No. 1,30 March 
1947. Cited in the published collection of these bulletins, BiulebLny. 16. 
940n the issue of the Polish cultural elites opposing anti-Jewish actions and prejudice 
in the early post-war period, see, for example, Borwicz, 'Polish-Jewish. ' 196. 
950n the issue of the All -Polish Anti-Racist League and its activities and 
publications challenging anti-Jewish perspectives within Polish society, see the article 
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issues of the Rights of Human Bejp&s were allowed to be published by 
the Communist regime. Furthermore, in 1948, the All -Polish Anti- 
Racist League was ordered by the Communist authorities to drop the 
issue of anti-Jewish hostihties and prejudices in Poland altogether, and 
instead to concentrate on racism in the Capitahst world - such as the 
situations of the Blacks in the USA. 
Overall, one can also interpret the situation of the Polish Jews in 
the early-post-war period in terms of 'moral panic' as the Jewish 
minority was perceived as a threat to the rest of society. 96 As in the 
inter-war period, all five essential elements of 'moral panic' can be 
detected in the early post-war period: expressions of concern over the 
behaviour of the Jewish minority - with the Jews allegedly responsible 
for the Communist take-over of Poland and Communist crimes against 
the anti-Communist opposition and Polish society at large; wildly 
exaggerated claims of this threat - the Jew as ultimate destroyer of 
Poland and its people; a wide consensus among the illegal political 
opposition, a segment of the constitutional opposition, the Catholic 
Church and society at large on the threat posed by the Jewish minority; 
an increased level of hostility towards members of the Jewish minority 
and outbursts of violent attacks; and a sense of the self-righteousness 
of such a position. 
Conclusions 
My main aim in this chapter was to demonstrate that the myth 
of the Jew as the Threatening Other, in varying degrees of intensity, 
continued to persist within a significant segment of Polish society in 
the early post-war period. In its most elaborated form, the myth was 
present within the illegal political and military opposition where it 
served both as a source of information on the Jewish minority and as a 
point of reference in interpreting the contemporary political and social 
reality - particularly the Communist take-over of Poland. 
Furthermore, major dynamic developments within the 
Communist Party and state apparatus, led to the emergence of anti- 
Jewish perspectives of an ethno-nationalist type within its lower and 
middle levels. 
by Mady4aw Bartoszewski one of its Prominent members, 'The Founding of the All - 
Polish Anti-Racist League in 1946, ' Polin, Vol. 4,1989,243-254. 
960n the subject of 'moral panic, see chapter three. 
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I have also demonstrated that the myth played an important 
part in outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence between 1945 and 1948. In 
fact, as in the inter-war period, the myth constituted a salient factor in 
both rationalising and justifying this violence. 
On a more general level, the continuity of the myth of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other in the early post-war period shows once again 
the persistence and adaptability of such a myth to different set of 
historical, political and social contexts. The emergence of an anti- 
Jewish position within the Communist Party can be viewed as a good 
example of such processes. 
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Chapter VI. 
'Party Free of Jews, Poland Free of Jews. ' The Fusion of 
Communism and Exclusivist Ethno-Nationalism, 1%7-1968. 
'Antisemitism persists within us as a vestige of old prejudices and not as a 
phenomenon typical of Socialist countries. Comrade Werblan very 
interestingly said that the moment we come to face toface with the 
construction of Socialism, each Marxist Party finds itselffaced with the 
responsibility for its own nation. On these grounds our internationalism has 
gone through defined evaluations. Now we too are trying to unite two 
phenomena: responsibility for one"s nation and our internationalist 
obligations. These matters are not as simple as they had appeared in theory. ' 
Comrade Modzimierz Sokorski, in a discussion on Adam Schaffs work 
Marxism and the Human Individual. Cited in Nowe DrQgýi No. 12,1965, 
Ill. 
One of the popular beliefs about the post-1945 Communist 
regimes in Poland and other Eastern European polities was that they 
suppressed all expressions of ethnicity, nationalism and national 
traditions and sentiments throughout the region. In the last two 
decades, this belief has been successfully contested by various scholars 
researching links between Communism and nationalism. These 
scholars have concurred that a particular process - the so-called ethno- 
nationalisation of Communism - took place in all Communist states. 
Thus, while in theory Communist regimes preached the Marxist 
ideology of internationalism, working-class brotherhood and 
friendship, in practice they used eflu-dcity, national traditions, and the 
sentiments and myths of the dominant nation to legitimise their rule. 
'Nationalism, in its particular Communist form, was a 
constituent part of the post-war experience. All Communist regimes 
attempted to legitimise their rule by placing it in the framework of 
lThere is a fast growing body of literature on links between Communism and 
nationalism, see, for example, Benedict Anderson, Ima&Lned Communities. 
Reflections on the OrigLn and Spread of Nationalism (London, New York, 1990), 11- 
14; Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List 
(New York, Oxford, 1988), 223-240. Hereafter Szporluk, Communism.; introduction 
by George Klein and Milan J. Reban to Klein and Reban, eds., The Politics. Gerrits, 
'Paradox. '88-109; and Elerner Hankiss, 'In Seardi of a Paradigm. ' Daedalus, No. 119 
(1), 1990,183-214. 
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national history and tradition. The fact that these endeavours largely 
failed does not in itself diminish the relevance of nationahsm. 2 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed the process of the 
crystallisation of the ethno-nationalisation of Communism with anti- 
Jewish elements in the early post-war period, 1945-1949, when these 
elements emerged within the rank and file of the Party and state 
apparatus, but were not officially endorsed as part of political 
propaganda by any factions within the Party. In this chapter, I shall 
focus on the further development of the ethno-nationalisation of 
Communism with anti-Jewish elements in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
and on the apogee of this process which took place in the late 1960s. 
My three main questions are: What are the similarities and 
differences between the ethno-nationalist Communist version of the 
myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other and the original version of 
the myth disseminated by the non and anti-Communist ethno- 
nationalist political elites ? In what ways was the ethno-nationalist 
Communist version of the myth manifested; And what social functions 
did it have in political culture of the mid 1950s and late 1960s? 
My main argument here is that firstly, in the ethno-nationahst 
Communist version of the myth, the original notion of the Jew as the 
Communist and therefore ideological enemy of the Polish state and its 
people was supplanted by the notion of the Jew as an anti-Communist 
and therefore ideological enemy of the Polish state and its people. This 
was the major difference between the two versions of the myth. 
Secondly, that the myth was disseminated to varying degrees and 
intensities by different factions within the PZPR in the 1950s, the early 
1960s, and particularly in the late 1960s. In the last period, the myth 
was expressed in political culture in the most elaborated and 
aggressive way. Thirdly, that the myth was used by the Party in order 
to raise its popularity in the eyes of society, and to purify both the 
Party and state apparatus, and mass media and various scientific and 
cultural institutions, from the presence of the remaining Polish Jews, 
who, at the time, numbered thirty thousand -a figure constituting one 
tenth of one per cent of the population. 
The year 1968 is considered to be one of the most dramatic 
moments in the post-war Communist period in Poland. Apart from 
the purge of the majority of Jews from the Party, cultural and scientific 
2Gerrits, 'Paradox. ' 100. 
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institutions, and the state, it was also marked by a deep ideological and 
political crisis within the Party and by student demonstrations against 
state censorship and the lack of democratic reforms. The leading 
participants of these demonstrations were to become, in time, 
prominent members of the political opposition to the Communist 
system. 
Over the last two decades, the events of 1968 have been the 
subject of academic conferences, and had been widely discussed in 
scholarly literature, particularly in Poland, where collections of secret 
Party and state documents and press of that period have also been 
published. 3 The most detailed descriptive historical work on the 
events of 1968 has been written by the historian Jerzy Eisler. 4 The 
most important works on the anti-Jewish aspect of 1968 have been 
written, among others, by Josef Banas, Zukasz Hirszowicz and Paul 
Lendvai. 5 Michal Glbwiýski, a historian of Polish literature, has 
conducted a valuable analysis of the language of official anti-Jewish 
propaganda within the Communist press of 1968, revealing its 
repetitious and schematic character. 6 
Given the repetitious character of such anti-Jewish propaganda, 
and being confined in this thesis by limits of space, I shalI cite only the 
main illustrations of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other of 
the period. 
3Among published works on the outcomes of conferences, see, for example, Marzec 
68. Sesja na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim 1981. (Warszawa, 1981), (samizdat 
publication). Hereafter Marzec 68. Stýja I and Marcin Kula, Piotr Ostka and Marcin 
Zaremba, eds., Marzec 1968. Tgydziesci lat 12diniej. Vol. 1- RefeLaty. (Warszawa, 
1998). Hereafter Kula, Osjka and Zaremba eds., Marzec. Among works includin4 
publication of historical material, see Marcin Zaremba ed., Marzec 1968. Trzvdziesci 
* gamzaMnMo lat v6z'M*ej. Vol. 2- Dzien po dniU w ral2ortach SB oraz Mdzi Or ** 
KC PZPR (Warszawa, 1998). Hereafter Zaremba, ed., TlZydzies'ci.; Grzersz 
Soltysiak and J6zef StEpien', eds., Marzec'68. ý*dzy Tragedia A PO&OScia 
(Warszawa, 1998); and Piotr Ostka, 5yjon9ci, insjýi orgy, wicy1myciele. Obraz ? 1rat 
wroga w prol2agandzie Marca 1%8 (Warszawa, 1999). Hereafter Os2ka, SYjorusci. 
4jerzy Eisler, Marzec 1968. Geneza, PrzebieS, Konsekwende (Warszawa, 1991). 
Hereafter Eisler, Marzec. 
5See Paul Lendvai, Antisemitism in Eastern Europe (London, 1971). Hereafter 
Lendv4 Antisemitism.; Josef Banas, The Scapegoats. The Exodus of the Remnants of 
Pghý (London, 1979). Hereafter, Banas, The Scapegoats. Lukasz Hirszowicz, 
'The Jewish Issue in Post-war Polish Communist Politics, ' in: Abramsky, jachirnczyk 
and Polonsky, eds., The Jews., 199-208. Hereafter Hirszowicz, 'The Jewish. ' 
6NUchat G(owin'ski, Nowomowa 12o Polsku (Warszawa, 1991), 63-67 and Pismak 1863 
i inne szkice o rýinvch brZydkich rzeczach (Warszawa, 1995), 60-94. Hereafter 
Growinskiý Nowomowa. and Pismak. 
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Prelude to 1968 : the Jews as Perceived within the Party between 1956 and 
1966. 
1956 saw the end of the Stalinist era, officially announced in 
Moscow by the Soviet Party leader Nikita Khrushchev, in February of 
the same yearý at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union. The end of the Stalinisation period began in Poland 
with the dismissal from the government and the Politburo of the most 
discredited of the Stalinist politicians, such as Jakub Berman, major 
changes within the infamous security apparatus, and with the 
announcement in April of a mass amnesty for prisoners of the Stalinist 
era. 7 These developments were followed by the events of October 
1956 which constituted the starting point of a political thaw(odwill) 
lasting one year and which resulted in some important political, social 
and economic changes in Poland - such as the abolition of any further 
collectivisation of farms, the establishment of a new relationship 
between the State and the Church, the introduction of Catholic religion 
in schools, and the lifting of censorship on publishing. 8 
The politician given credit for all these changes was Wladyslaw 
Gomu4ka, re-elected as First Secretary of the Party in October 1956 to 
the applause of the majority of the population. He was seen, at that 
time, as a national hero, and the only Communist leader able to 
conduct in-depth reform of the political and economic system, and 
thus introduce the Polish version of socialism - the so-called socialism 
with human face (socjalizm z ludzkq twarzq). 9 The policies and practices 
implemented by him from late 1957 were to prove how wrong were 
such estimates of Gornulka as the true reformer of the Communist 
system. Factors which contributed to his high popularity in 1956 were 
his ethnic Polish and working-class origin, and his record of having 
been removed from the Party in November 1949 and of having been 
placed under home arrest between 1951 and 1954 by the Stalinists. 
One of the accompanying features of the end of the Stalinist era, 
and the period of political thaw between October 1956 and October 
7See Schatz, The Generation. 264-267. 
80n political, social and economic changes brought about by the political thaw of 
October 1956, see, for example, Marian K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Pa; V-of 
Poland. An Outline of Histgjy (Cambridge Massachusetts, and London England), 
1976,282-293. Hereafter Dziewanowski, The Communist. 
90n the popularity of W-radyslaw Gomulka in October 1956, see, for example, 
Dziewanowski, The Communist., 286 and Pawet Machcewicz, PolsId Rok 1956 
(Warszawa, 1993), 184-191. Hereafter Machcewicz, Polski. 
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1957, was the overt public presence of anti-Jewish attitudes and 
sentiments simultaneously emerging within the rank and file of the 
PZPR and state apparatus and some segments of society at large. 10 
Within some segments of the inteffigentsia and working-dass, 
such sentiments were particularly high in April, May and October of 
1956 in t6dz' and Lower Silesia where there was a high concentration 
of members of the Jewish minority. These sentiments and attitudes 
were sometimes manifested in anti-Jewish hostilities both verbal and 
physical on the part of adults and school-children. 11 Frequently, 
personal animosities and conflicts between ethnic Poles and Polish 
Jews were evaluated in collectivist way - as antagonism between 
suffering Poles and Jewish perpetrators - an important aspect of the 
exclusivist ethno-nationalist position on Jews rooted in late nineteenth 
century discourse. 12 
Significantly, clear similarities existed between anti-Jewish 
positions within some segments of society at large and anti-Jewish 
positions within some segments of the rank and file of the Party and 
state apparatus. 13 Among, both groups were shared similar 
convictions that 'Jews ruled over Poland' and constituted an 
impediment to the development of ethnic Poles, and both groups made 
similar demand for the removal of Jews from the Party, the state 
apparatus, and even from the Polish polity. This indicates the 
continuity of the pre-Communist ethno-nationahst perception of the 
Jews. 
1956 saw another important development, when for the first 
time, an anti-Jewish position was endorsed by a faction. within PZPR as 
part of its programme and strategy to delegitirnise its internal 
10 On anti-Jewish sentiments and attitudes within society at large and in the rank 
and file of the PZPR and the Party apparatus in 1956, see Machcewicz, Polski. 216- 
231. Machcewicz's findings concerning the scale of the anti-Jewish position within 
society in 1956 challenges the popular proposition that such sentiments were 
confined only to some factions within the Party. 
11For a description of cases of anti-Jewish disturbances in 1956, see Machcewicz, 
Rolski., 217-222; Schatz, The Generation. 273; and Jarosz. 'Problem. ' 52-55. On anti- 
Jewish hostilities among youths, see Jadwiga Siekierska, '0 sprawach draz'liwych 
46w kilka, ' Nowe Drogi, No. 6,1956,3-4. 
120ne such illustration is the following example. In Lodz, the mother of a child who 
had been fighting with his Jewish class-mate, made a public outcry that' Jewish 
children beat up Polish kids and no-one takes any action! This case, described in the 
documents of the Archives of New Acts (VI, 237/VII -3835) is cited in Machcewicz, 
Ro-Iski., 219. 
13ýýs phenomenon is also shown in Machcewicz, Polski. 220-224. 
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opponents, a phenomenon, dearly in breach of the Communist 
ideology and the ethos of equality and brotherhood. This faction, the 
so-called Natolin group appeared on the political scene approximately 
around late Mardi 1956, simultaneously to its main opponent the 
faction so-called Putawska group. 14 
The Natolin group consisted of strongly pro-Soviet, mostly 
second-rank, and purely ethnically Polish Party leaders 'who wanted 
to replace the old discredited leadership but were opposed to any 
reforms of doctrine and political methods which could exceed the 
political reforms of the Soviet Party. '15 Its members were known for 
their dogmatism and, support for authoritarian rule, and anti- 
intelligentsia position. 
In contrast, the Pufazvska group was internaRy much more 
diverse than the Natolin faction and was comprised of both ethnic 
Polish and Polish Jewish Comrades. The group advocated a more 
independent stance in relation to the Soviet Party and enjoyed the 
support of the Party's intelligentsia. It was regarded as the reform- 
oriented faction, since many of its members 'out of ideological 
disillusionment or for opportunistic reasons" were in favour of 
conducting the liberalisation and democratisation of the political 
system. 16 Some of its members were also to become the main 
revisionists of institutionalised Marxism in the early 1960s. 
In general, both groups competed for political power within the 
Party and state between 1956 and 1960. October 1956 brought about a 
short-term defeat for the Natolin group and a short-term victory for the 
Pulawska group but Gomulka's departure from the course of reform in 
late 1957 changed this situation. In the political realities of the early 
1960s both factions lost their prominence. 
The rivalry and animosity between these two factions was 
reflected in the names the groups called each other. "Boors' (Chamy) -a 
pejorative term meaning slow-witted peasants, was used by the 
Putazvska group to describe members of the Natolin group, and "Yids' 
(Zydy) -a pejorative form of the word Jews (Zydzi), was used by the 
14The Natolin and Pulawska groups were named after places where these factions of 
the Party used to hold their meetings. On the history of these groups and their 
membership, see Eisler, Marzec. 27-30. See also Hirszowicz, 'The Jewish. ' 201-203; 
and Schatz, The Generation. 267-269. 
15Schatz, The Generation. 267. 
16ibid., 268. 
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Natolin group to describe the Pu? awska group -a good example of 
imitation of the long-lived ethno-nationalist strategy of the labelling 
political opponents as Jews. 
Although within both groups there were Comrades with dear 
records of a "Stalinist past, ' members of the Natolin group emphasised 
that the Jews as a group were responsible for the errors of the 
Stalinisation. era and called for their removal from important positions 
within the Party and the state apparatus. 17 
A good illustration of such a position is Zenon Nowak "s speech 
of July 1956 at the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
PZPR. Nowak, (1905-1970), who was at the time deputy Premier of 
State and member of the Politburo, introduced the theme of Judeo- 
Stalinisation. into the vocabulary of the Party by placing sole blame on 
the Jewish apparatchiks for the Party's past failures, errors and 
repressions-18 Neither Stalinist Soviet apparatchiks in Poland 
between 1945-1956, nor the Stalinist ethnic Poles were held responsible 
for the crimes of the Stalinist period. Furthermore, Nowak accused the 
Jews and 'other alien powers" of responsibility for another and more 
recent event, namely the workers' demonstrations in Poznan on 28 
June of the same year. 19 Nowak also called for 'national (ethno - 
national) regulation of the Party and state apparatus cadres, arguing 
that the presence of Jews within the Party and state apparatus had 
generally had a bad affect on the popularity of the Party among the 
people. At the same time he insisted that his position was not 
antisemitic. 
The Natolin group's project of purification of the Party from the 
Jews was not realised in 1956. In April 1957, the Central Committee of 
the Party issued a letter to all Party committees condemning 
antisemitism. 20 This letter also urged Jewish Comrades to persuade 
members of the Jewish community not to leave the state. The presence 
17This point, the presence of members with a 'Stalinist past' within both the Natolin 
and Puftavska groups is raised by Jerzy Eisler, see Eisler, Marzec. 25; and also Cara 
and Datner-gpiewak, Dzieje. 91. i 18For excerpts of Nowaks speech, see CaFa and Datner-Spiewak, Dzieje. 145-147. On 
Nowaks speech, see, for example, Schatz, The Generation. 268; and Lendvai, 
Antisemitism. 221. 
19During the Poznan demonstrations conducted under the slogans of 'more bread, ' 
and 'more freedom and Catholic religion in public life, ' fifty-three workers were 
killed by soldiers on the orders of the Party. See Machcewicz, Polski. 77-111. 
20Schatz, The Generation. 273. 
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of anti-Jewish sentiments and attitudes within society at large and 
within the rank and file of the PZPR was undoubtedly one of the main 
factors which contributed to the further emigration of Polish Jews 
during the late 1950s. It is estimated that between 1956 and 1958 
approximately forty thousand Jews left Poland, including twenty 
thousand Jews, who had returned to Poland from the Soviet Union in 
1956.21 By the early 1960s, the remaining Jewish community in 
Poland numbered thirty thousand members. 
The first six years of the 1960s, described by the Polish poet 
Tadeusz Rozewicz as the time of 'small stabihsationý (mala stabilizacja), 
were characterised by a growing stagnation of reforms in political, 
economic and cultural matters, and by social opportunism and petty 
compromise. The Party establishment led by Gomulka, launched a 
major campaign against any interpretations of Marxist doctrine, 
different from the official institutionalised version. 22 And thus 
revisionism of Marxist thought became one of the main enemies of the 
Party, which, by the middle of 1960s, had increased to one and a half 
million members, and which, in 1967, reached a figure of two 
million. 23 This was the result of the Party's new recruitment policy 
which offered new opportunities for social advancement. 
Although there was a decrease in the level of overt anti-Jewish 
statements within the PZPR at that time, anti-Jewish sentiments and 
attitudes did not disappear from political culture. Public utterances of 
anti-Jewish statements by important members of the Central 
Committee of the Party took place and were immediately covered up. 
A good illustration of such a development is Zenon Kliszko's lecture at 
a meeting of historians in Cracow in 1966 -a meeting described by 
Lendvai in his work Antisemitism in Eastern Eur2Re. In this lecture, 
Kliszko, one of the closest associates of Gomulka and one of the 
theoreticians of the Party, 'praised the patriotic spirit of the pre-war 
Endecja (National Democrats) and hinted at the "diabolic role' of 
Jewish intellectuals. '24 The full text of this lecture was never 
published and IGiszko himself ordered the destruction of the tape 
recording. 
21For datý concerning the size of the Jewish community in the 1950s and 1960s, see 
Cata and Spiewak-Datner, Dzieje. 175-176; and Schatz, The Generation. 273. 
22See Eisler, Marzec. 83-85; and Schatz, The Generation. 283-286. 
23For data on membership of the PZPR, see Schatz, The Generation. 286. 
24Lendvai, Antisemitism. 796. 
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In general, during the first half of the 1960s, it is possible to 
-3 1 re durerentiate two main developments concerning anti-Jewish positions 
within the PZPR: 
Firstly, denial of the presence of any anti-Jewish positions 
within the Party, and the use of charges of 'bogus antisemitism" against 
any members of the Party who raised the issue of the presence of such 
sentiments and attitudes within the Party and society at large. 
The best Mustration. of the use of such a charge, during the first 
half of the 1960s, was the response of the Central Committee of the 
Party to Adam Schaff's work entitled Marxism and the Human 
Individual (Marksism a jednostka ludzka), published in 1965. Schaff, a 
Jew, was at the time a member of the Central Conu-nittee and Director 
of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences. He enjoyed the reputation as one of the chief theoreticians of 
Marxism in Poland. His work, Marxism and the Human Individual, 
raised a heated discussion within the Party, one which was published 
in New Ways (Nozve Drogi), the main theoretical and political press 
organ of the Central Committee of the PZPR. His work was evaluated 
by a majority of Comrades as revisionist and thus dangerous. In some 
of the negative evaluations, dear anti-Jewish overtones were present. 
For example, Comrade Andrzej Werblan called it 'a tahnudist 
approach to the theory of the classics of Marxism. '25 Schaff s general 
argument that antisemitism was a serious social problem in 
Communist states including Poland, and that it had not been not 
properly tackled by Communist governments, met with general 
condemnation. Though there were some exceptions such as Comrades 
AARodzimierz Sokorski and Jerzy Wiatr. For example, by way of 
condemnation, Comrade Wincenty Kras'ko stated: 
"Comrade Schaff sharply flays the alleged absence of the 
struggle with antisemitism in our Communist countries... 
Undoubtedly, antisemitism, is a very painful and revolting 
phenomenon, but equally painful and revolting is the charge of 
antisemitism -a charge that is both unjust and groundless., 
26 
Denial of the presence of antisemitic views, frequently 
accompanied by the advocacy of anti-Jewish positions, can be viewed 
25Andrzej Werblan in'Discussion of Adam Schaff s book Marxism and the Human 
Individual', Nowe Drogi. No. 12,1965,59. 
26Wincenty Kras'ko in 'Discussion of Adam Schaff s book Marxism and the Human 
Individual', Nowe Drogj, No. 12,1965,76. 
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as an important feature of ethno-nationalist Communism with strong 
anti-Jewish elements, found not only in the Socialist Polish Republic, 
but also in other polities of the Soviet Bloc, including the Soviet Union 
itself. 27 In Poland, this feature, which was already present in the 
1950s among members of the Natolin group, was to become an 
important aspect of the use of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening 
Other in political culture between 1967 and 1968. 
Secondly, the unprecedented preparation and collection of data 
on remaining Jews active in public life, indudi-ng also converts to 
Catholicism, their spouses Jewish and non-Jewish, their children and 
even in-laws. The index cards of Jewish members of the Party and of 
the government were prepared by a section of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs that dealt with Jewish matters. A similar system of index cards 
of names of Polish Jewish officers remaining in the Army was 
prepared by military counter-intelligence for the Ministry of 
Defence. 28 These index cards, which were completed by the end of 
1964, were to be used in the anti-Jewish purge of 1968. 
Simultaneously, there was a gradual demotion and forced early 
retirement of some of the Polish Jewish Comrades from the Central 
Committee of the PZPR, of Polish Jewish personnel employed at the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs, and of some Polish Jewish military men 
serving in the Army. 29 This new personnel policy, conducted in a 
discreet and unpublicised manner, was supported by the Soviet 
leaders, and sometimes also affected ethnic Poles married to Jews, or 
ethnic Poles accused of revisionism. 30 
The Rise of the Partisans - the Chief Disseminator of the Ethno-nationalist 
Communist Myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other. 
The faction of the Party, most actively involved in preparations 
of index cards of Jewish names and in orchestrating the removal of 
270n the same problem within the Soviet Union, see Frankel, 'The Soviet. ' 441. 
28See Schatz, The Generation, 290. 
290n the practices of discreet and unpublicised removal of Jewish personnel from the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs and from the Army, see, for example, Schatz, The 
Generation, 289-294; and Tadeusz Pioro, 'Czystki w Wojsku Polskim, ' Biulejyn 
Zydowsldegolnstvtutuffistoiyczne&OLNo. 2,1967,61-63. Hereafter Pi6ro, 'Czystki. ' 
30Soviet leaders' encouragement of the policy of 'dejudaisation' of the Party, the 
state apparatus, and the Army is briefly discussed in Schatz, 'The Generation. ' 290; 
Pioro, 'Czystki. ' 64; and Dziewanowski, The Communist. 298-299. 
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Jewish personnel, was the informal Partisan group which emerged in 
the early 1960s as the most dynamic faction of the PZPR. 31 
The Partisan group (Partyzanci) was comprised of former members of 
war-time Communist military forces based in German occupied 
Poland, who were placed in secondary political positions from 1949 to 
1956. In a short span of time it succeeded in taking control of all 
important positions within the Nfinistry of Internal Affairs, the security 
apparatus and the police. The Partisans, like the Natolin group of the 
1950s, was characterised by strongly authoritarian, anti-intellectual, 
and anti-Jewish positions. Unlike the Natolin group, the Partisans did 
not advocate complete subservience to the Soviet Union -and in fact 
portrayed themselves as anti-Soviet in a subtle and covert manner 
designed to gain them public -support. 32 
The driving force of the Partisan faction and its unquestioned 
leader was Mieczysl4aw Moczar (1913-1986) - head of the local security 
apparatus in Lodz from 1945 to 1948 when he was dismissed from this 
position as a result of accusation by Stalinists of holding "right-wing 
nationalistic position! In 1956 he returned to his job in the security 
apparatus in as vice-Minister of Interior Affairs. In 1964 he was 
nominated as Minister of Interior Affairs. That same year he was also 
elected President of the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy 
(Zwifýuk Bojowni" o Wolnosc i Demokracjf, ZBOWO) - an 
organisation, which, according to Moczar himself, was 'the guardian of 
patriotism, love and of service for ones homelan&. 33 
From its origins as a small ir-relevant Communist organisation, 
ZBOWiD was transformed by the Partisans, in the early 1960s, into a' 
body uniting all those who fought for Poland, irrespective of their 
political conviction or former affiliations, including some members of 
the former AK'34 Given the fact that Moczar was, after all, a former 
head of the infamous security apparatus, and had remarked in 1948 
that'a good member of the AK is a dead one', this was a remarkable 
success. 35 In the first two years of the 1%Os ZBOWiD reached 
310n the history of the Partisan group and its leader MiecZystaw Moczar, see, for 
example, Eisler, Marzec. 39-70; and Lendvai, Antisemitism. 227-230. 
32Lendvai, Antisemitism. 726. 
33Nfieczystaw Moczar's speech of 4 May 1968 at the Executive meeting of ZBOWiD. 
Za Wolnos'ý i Lud , 16-31 May 1968,4. Cited in OsEka, . 53jonisci. 
46. 
34Dziewanowski, The Communist. 291. 
35Moczar's saying of this in 1948 is cited in Eisler, Marzec. 44. 
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approximately- a quarter of million members. 36 NEchael C. Steinlauf 
accurately notes: 
"The support of ZBOWiD, in turn, gave Moczar and his 
associates popular legitimation to appropriate the entire heritage of 
anti-Nazi resistance .... ZBOWiD, which hinted that it represented, 
better than the Party, the interests of all Poles, became Moczar's 
ideological base, the driving force of anti-Jewish campaign of 1968. "37 
Another organisation supportive of Partisans" anti-Jewish 
campaign of 1968, was the government-sponsored Catholic 
organisation Pax, chaired by Boleslaw Piasecki, a former pre-war 
leader of the extreme ethno-nationahst group Falanga and later a Soviet 
agent in post-1945 Poland. 38 The main role of Pax was to neutralise 
the influence both of the Catholic Church and of groups of progressive 
Catholic intelligentsia concentrated around the two previously 
mentioned papers - Common WetUy (Tygodnik Powszechny) and Sign 
(Znak). 39 Piasedd's Communist-Catholic world-view was promoted 
in Pax's own papers such as the daily Common Word (Srozvo 
Pozvszechne), the Catholic Weekly of Wroclaw (Wroctazvski Tygodnik 
Katolidý), and the monthly Directions (Kierunki). In 1968, these papers 
were to play an important role in disseminating the myth of the Jew as 
the Threatening Other. 
Importantly, among those who supported Moczar were forrner 
members of Endecia and its offshoot radical organisations, groups, 
which, as discussed in chapter four, had propagated the extreme and 
elaborated version of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other 
during WWIL The dose links between individuals such as Czeslaw 
Pilic-howski -a former member of the pre-war ONR, and the Partisans 
resulted in their promotion to high positions in important institutions 
such as the High Commission to Investigate Nazi Crimes in Poland 
(Komisja do Badania Zbrodnz Hiflerozvskich w Po1sce), where they assumed 
the role of 'the guardians of national history and national 
36Dziewanowski, The Communist. 291. 
37Steinlauf, BQnda&e. 79. 
380n Boleslaw Piasecki's pre-war and post-war political affiliations and activities, 
see the important political biography by Antoni Dudek and Grzegosz Pytel, BoleAaw 
Piasecki. Proba biogjafii 12oftcznje-. (Londyn, 1990). Hereafter Dudek and Pytel, 
Proba. 
39ibid., 158-189. 
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traditions., 40 The year 1968 was to show that these individuals 
excelled also in the dissemination of the ethno-nationalist Communist 
version of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other. Their 
presence among Communist political elites both before and after 1968, 
points out how porous was the border between some factions of Polish 
Communist movement and the Polish pre-war core and extreme 
ethno-nationalist parties, and how easily this border could be crossed 
in the so-called "climate of national unity' of the time. 
The Ethno-nationalist Communist Myth of the Jew as the Threatening 
Other and Zionism, in the late 1960s. 
One of the problems of analysing the ethno-nationalist 
Communist version of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other, as 
propagated in Poland in the late 1960s, is the fact that during that 
period the tenn'Jew' was, as a rule, substituted with the berm'Zionist. 
Popular slogans of that time were 'Purge the Party of Zionists" 
(Oczyýck Partie z SyjonistO'W), 'Zionists, go to Zioný (Syjonzs'ci do Syjonu) 
and "Zionist represent Israel and not Poland' (SyjoniSci reprezentujq 
Israel nie Polakow). 41 
The reason for the substitution of the term 'fev/ by the term 
'Zionist' can be explained by the reluctance of the Party's leadership at 
that time to openly express anti-Jewish position, knowing that it would 
breach the Communist ethos and be contradictory to the Party's official 
position of opposing antisemitism. -a position, which, it must be 
stressed here, was held throughout the entire period of the anti-Jewish 
campaign of the late 1960s. 42 
The other problem in analysing the myth lies m the fact that 
during the period in question, the term 'Zionismý carried two other 
meanings in PZPR propaganda - Zionism understood as an 
instrument of imperialism and thus an enemy of Communism, and 
Zionism as the 'source' of the Israeli campaign against the Arab world 
4OFor a discussion of the case of Czestaw Pilichowski as Director of this Commission, 
aTosition he held between 1968 and 1984, see Steinlauf, Bondage. 82-83. 
4 For other slogans of that time, see The Anti-fewish CAP! RaigLi In Present-L)AY 
Poland. Facts, Documents, Press Reports, published by the Institute of Jewish 
Affairs in London (London, 1968), 21. Hereafter The Anti-Tewish CampAjgp. 
42This point is also raised by (AoWU'lSld, Pismak. 76-78. 
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which at that time was the official ally of all the states of the Soviet bloc 
- including the Polish Socialist Republic-43 
The two meanings cited above can be seen to correspond with 
the use of the term 'Zionism' in official Soviet propaganda of the late 
1960s, whereas the use of the myth of the Zionist/ Jew as the enemy of 
the Polish state, its people and the people's spiritual essence can be 
seen as having domestic roots in Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalist 
traditions, which were integrated into Polish ethno-nationalist 
Communism. 44 
Importantly, all three strands were intertwined and interplayed .v 
to varying degrees and intensities within PZPR propaganda, 
particularly within the Partisan faction. Of course, Zionism as a 
movement and ideology was non- existent among the Jewish minority 
of the 1960s in Poland, since all Polish Zionist organisations, as 
indicated in the previous chapter, had been dosed down by the 
Stalinists between 1949 and 1950. Furthermore, any remaining Jews of 
Zionist political affiliation had almost certainly left Poland in the 
various post-war waves of emigration between 1945 and 1957. Thus it 
was that the Party's 'hunt! for Zionists was conducted in a reality in 
which no Zionists were present. 
The criteria for singling out a person as Zionist were not openly 
stated. However, it is possible to differentiate two ways in which this 
was done. The first criteria was of biological and racial origin and was 
advocated by the Partisan group, which treated all remaining Polish 
Jews, including individuals of partly Jewish origin as the biological 
polluters of the Polish state. This explains the reference to the 
Partisans as 'fascists' by those who condemned their anti-Jewish 
actions at that time. 45 The second criteria was the subjective notion of 
belonging and of love for one's country -Poland, as stated by Gomulka 
in his speech of 19 March 1968 to three thousand Party activists in 
A'Ay 
in differentiating between these meanings, I have drawn on an important analysis 
of various uses of the term Zionism within official Soviet propaganda, provided by 
Jonathan Frankel. See Frankel, The Soviet. ' 440-441. 
441n accordance with Michael Steinlauf, I reject the proposition that the anti-Jewish 
campaign of 1967-1968 in Poland was Soviet organised - as, for example, put forward 
by Dziewanowskiý The Communist. 296-298. For a critical analysis of this 
ploposifion, see Steinipuf, Bondage. 78. 
4-ýSee Jerzy JedlickL Zle urodgeni ggyli o doswiadczeniu histo1yunym. scrir)ta i 
120stscril2ta (Londyn-Warsaw, 1983), 65-72. 
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Warsaw and broadcast on radio and television. 46 Gomulka divided 
Polish Jews into three categories: those persons attached by "reason or 
emotion to Israel', who would leave Poland; that group of 
cosmopolitans and national nihilists who considered themselves 
neither Polish nor Jewish; and those persons who regarded Poland as 
their sole homeland. 
One should ask which criteria was the most popular and 
accepted within the Party ? Records of various reactions to Gomulka's 
speech which was criticised as not being strong enough in terms of 
dealing with the Zionists, indicate that the Partisan criteria, of singling 
out Zionists on primarily biological grounds, was the one most 
popular among significant segments of the rank and file of the Party. 47 
Interestingly, the fact that the term 'Zionise was understood to 
be the equivalent of term JeW within the Party, was somehow 
admitted by Comrade Zenon I<Iiszko in his speech of 8 July 1968 at the 
Twelfth Conference of the Central Committee of the PZPR. 48 This 
speech was a mixture of references to Zionism as a dangerous ideology 
of the recent past, while at the same time suggesting that this danger 
was no longer relevant. 
'The anti-Socialist actions in March of this year were the work of 
the alliance of various reactionary forces. The common denominator of 
these forces was revisionism. Zionism, as one of the reactionary 
tendencies, also joined this struggle. This is a tendency, which in 
recent times has been particularly vicious in its hostility towards our 
Party ... At present, when this problem [Zionism] has been explained, 
we should remove it from the Party's agenda... In some Party 
organisations, especially in offices, an atmosphere of struggle against 
Zionism is artificially maintained. This atmosphere sometimes 
becomes tense, preventing a calm analysis of the real sources of the 
current difficulties and problems and the recognition of the true 
opponent of our Party... and the real enemies of Socialism and our 
nation. A Jew is identified as Zionist, and thus a justified suspicion of 
46Gomulka's speech of 19 March 1968 is cited in The Anti-Tewish Campaiv-1.30-32. It 
is of interest here that Gomu&a's wife Zofia. Gomulkowa was herself a highly 
culturally assimilated Polish Jew. This perhaps explains why Gomulka did not use 
the same criteria as the Partisan group in singling out Zionists . 47Such disappointed and negative reactions to Gomulka's speech of 19 March can be 
found in secret Party reports. See Zaremba, ed., Marzec. Vol. 2, Ral2oM. 179-175. 
See also Mieczystaw Rakows1d, 'Caka wladza w RFcp. ' Gazeta borcza, 6 March 
1998,20-21. 
48KIiszko's speech was in accord with Gomu&a's thesis circulated at the Conference. 
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a concrete individual case turns into generalised suspicion of all 
persons of Jewish origin. Particularly severe measures are applied in 
cases of minor offences committed by persons of Jewish origin, 
offences which are ignored when committed by non-Jews. 149 
This speech can be viewed as a sign of retreat from the use of 
the term 'Zionism" in political culture, and of attempting to put an end 
to the intense anti-Jewish campaign initiated by Madyslaw GomuAka 
the head of the Party, twelve months earlier on 19 July 1967, at the 
Sixth Congress of Polish Trade Unions. On this occasion, broadcast 
over radio and television, Gomu3ka had first made reference to 
Zionists as an internal enemy. Referring to the subject of IsraeYs 
victory over the Arabs in the Six-Day War of June 1967, Gomulka 
condemned all those in Poland, who allegedly supported "the Israeli 
aggressor and politics of imperialism, ' labelling such people 'a Fifth 
Columnýý 
'We cannot remain indifferent towards people, who in the face 
of a threat to world peace, that is, also, to the security of Poland and 
the peaceful work of our nation,. support the aggressor,. the. wreckers of 
peace and imperialism ... We do not wish a Fifth Column to be created 
in our country., 50 
The expressionFifth Column, ' which was used, for example, 
during VVVVU to descxibe collaborators with the Germans, suggested 
the presence of an intemal enemy within the state- Moreover, it closely 
resounded to popular pre-1939 anti-Jewish. expressions of core ethno- 
nationalists slogans such as 'the Jews as the Fourth Partition! 
Although, this reference was completely removed from any 
further publications of Gomu&a's speech, it reappeared as a popular 
slogan of the time "Down with the New Fifth Column' (Zniszczyc nOWq 
piqfe kolumne), displayed by workers at meetings condemning Zionist 
activities, organised by the Party all over the country. 
Gomu&ds speech of 19 June 1967 paved the way to the 
emergence of the myth of the Zionist / Jew as the enemy of the Polish 
AQ. 
Archives of the Jewish Institute for Policy Research, File No. 323.0 (180), Zenon 
Kliszko's Speech of 8 July 1968 at the Twelfth Conference of the Central Committee of 
the PZPR, 8. Hereafter AIJPR- 
5OWladyslaw GomuEka's speech of 19 July 1968 at the Sixth Congress of the Polish 
Trade Union. Cited in The Anti-Jewish Caml2gio. 11. For the background to and 
description of this speech, see, for example, Eisler, Marzec. 134-136. and The Antiz 
Jewish Caml2gign-- 10-12. 
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myth was in fact disseminated in the majority of mass media, both on a 
national and local level, which at that time were controlled to a great 
extent by the Partisan faction. Among those leading papers which 
propagated the myth were the People's Tribune (Trybuna Ludu) the 
PZPFs central ideological press organ; the Banner of the Youths 
(Sztandar Nkodych) the official youth paper; Warsaw Life (2ycie 
Warszawy) the most popular Warsaw daily; the weekly Law and Life 
(Prazvo i Zycie), and the previously mentioned Pax's papers. 
The Structure and Functions of the Ethno-nationalist Communist Myth of the 
Z10nist1jew as the Threatening Other 
As in previous periods, the ethno-nationalist Communist 
version of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other was versatile 
and many faceted, although the myth was repetitious and limited in 
expression in comparison with previous periods. The reason for this 
was two-fold - official denial of the advocacy of anti-Jewish position, 
and official Socialist language which itself put constraints on 
vocabulary and expression. 52 Nevertheless, an examination of the 
press of the time reveals the narrative of the destructive presence of the 
Zionists within the Pohsh polity. 
As in previous periods, the Zionist enemy was linked with other 
extemal enemies of the Polish state, in this case, 'the imperialist USA! 
the most powerful ideological enemy of Socialism, and Israel, and 
West Germany - the latter state which did not then recognise the post- 
1945 Polish western border. 53 Here is one typical example of such a 
linkage in an article published in Masovia Tribune (Trybuna 
AUzowiecka), on 25 March 1968, in which members of the Social and 
Cultural Society of Jews, one of the few Jewish organisations still in 
existence, were accused of representing foreign interests, slandering 
the good. name of Poland, and of spreadingbogus antisemitis&. 54 
52See Qowinski, Nowornowa. 63. 
531n December 1970, West Germany recognised the post-1945 western borders in its 
treaty with Poland. See Dziewanows4 The Communist. 303-304. 
54The concept of a campaign of slander of the good name of Poland refers here to the 
portrayal, in the western media of Polish attitudes towards the Jews during WW11 
and the Holocaust. On this particular subject, which is outside the scope of this 
analysis, and on reactions of Polish official historiography at that time, see Steinlauf, 
Bondage. 75-88. 
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'The Zionists seem to forget that the Poles are in their own 
home and they are not They would like to impose on the people of 
Poland the policies of Israel, the German Federal Republic and of 
imperialism. And as they are failing to so do and will continue to fafl, 
they have begun to clamour about the antisemitic traditions in Poland. 
While they impute to us all kinds of barbarism and crimes, they 'smile' 
at the German henchmen of their relatives in West Germany ... We 
would like to know whom we are living with under the same roof. 
And what is to be the attitude of Society towards these slanderous and 
hostile attacks against Poland, 155 
Characteristical1y, in this text the Polish [effinic Polish] nation is 
portrayed as the host nation from which members of the Jewish 
minority are excluded. This shows the application of an ethno- 
nationalist interpretation of the concept of nationhood taking place 
under conditions of Communism. 
As in previous periods, contemporary developments and events 
were incorporated into the myth. The first such event was the 
ideological crisis of doctrine and the presence of revisionist theories 
opposing the official version of Marxism -a problem previously 
discussed in this chapter. Among leading revisionists of that time 
were some Polish Jews such as Adam Schaff, Zygmunt Bauman and 
Jerzy Morawski, and non-Jews such the philosopher Leszek 
Kolakowski -a representative of the so-called humanistic school of 
Marxism. In official PZPR propaganda, these individuals were 
accused of being Zionists, or, in the case of non-Jews, of being Zionist 
sympathisers. Consequently, their intellectual work and positions on 
Communist doctrine was evaluated as anti-Polish. -6 
The second event incorporated into the anti-Jewish narrative 
was the student demonstrations at the University of Warsaw of 8-9 
Marr-h 1968 against censorship and suppression of individual 
freedoms. 57 These demonstrations were brought about by the ban on 
31 January 1968, of Adam Nfickiewicz-s national drama Forefathers 
55AIJPR, File No. 323.0 (180), The Situation in Poland, excerpts of the article 'Who 
Are you ? 'Tzybuna Mazowiecka. 25, Marchl968,3. 
560n the presentation of revisionism as Zionist activity, see the Anti-fewrish 
Campaign 42-44, At the Conference of the Central Committee of 9 July 1968, 
Gomulka himself admitted that an equation had been made by the Party between 
Zionism and Revisionism. See AIJPR, File No. 323 0 (180), Polish Facts and Figures, 
Gomulka's Thesis, 4. 
570n the student demonstrations, see Eisler, Marzec. 224-320; and Banas, The 
Scapegoats. 123-132. 
245 
(Dziady), from the stage of the National Theatre in Warsaw, and the 
subsequent suspension from the university of two Jewish students 
from university, both Jews Adam Nfichnik and Henryk Szlajfer, for 
organising a peaceful protest against the ban. 
The first student demonstration, which took place in Warsaw on 
8 March was brutally suppressed by the police. News of this 
suppression spread around the country and led to a new wave of 
student demonstrations in other major universities In official PZPR 
propaganda, these demonstrations were attributed to the destructive 
impact of Jews on the youth and intelligentsia. This was done in a 
subtle and implicit way without direct reference to Zionists or Jews. 
Instead, well-known names of Jewish students as Adam Michnik, J8zef 
Dojczgewant, Aleksander Smolar, Wiktor (7.6reddand Irena Lasota 
were cited as the 'ring-leaders' of the demonstrations. Additionally, 
the names of Jewish individuals such as Adam Zambrowski and Ewa 
Zarzycka - who had not taken part in the demonstrations - but were 
siblings of well-known remaining high ranking Jewish Comrades, 
were added to the list of demonstrators. Such individuals were 
referred to as 'Commandos, ' "banana youths, "infant -revisionists who 
worshipped 'the revisionist sky on which stars of the first magnitude 
such as Prof. Adam Schaff, Prof. WIodziemierz Brus and Kolakowski, 
Bauman, Baczko, Morawski were glittering. ' 58 They were frequently 
described as representing foreign interests and of being 'hostile, 
aggressive, anti-Pohsh, anti-Socialist, as , in revolt against the Socialist 
law. '59 Here are two examples: 
On 14 March 1968 Edward Gierek, the then First Secretary of the 
PZPR in Silesia and future First General Secretary of PZPR made a 
speech addressed to one hundred thousand people gathered in 
Katowice. Although Gierek was not a Partisan man, but the leader of 
his own faction within the PZPR - the so-called Technocrats, his speech 
was similar in content to typical comments on the student 
demonstrations issued by members of the Partisan faction. 60 
58AIJPR, File No. 323.0 (180), excerpt from a translation of Ryszard Gontarzs article 
entitled 'Shut up or Lie', Prawo i 7, ycie, No. 23, November, 1968,1. 
59AIJPI; ý File No. 323.0 (180), excerpt from a translation of 'Alliance of Hatred' by 
Alina Reutt and Zbigniew Andruszkiewicz, published in Walka Ngodych, No. 47, 
November, 1968.12. 
6()The Techncwrat group, like the Partisan group, emerged in the early 1960s . It was 
characterised by the advocacy of professionalism and pragmatism over ideological 
zeal, and by the representation of middle-class values and attitudes. See Schatz, The 
Generation. 227. 
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... It is a fact that Nfidu-dks, Szlajfers, Grudzinskis, 
Werfels ... and 
the like have found themselves through the logic of events 
automatically outside the boundary of the general mass of students. 
But we would be short-sighted if we ascribed these excesses only to 
that hair -raising group among students whose names I have 
mentioned ... One should ask oneself the following questions: whose 
interest would best be served by leading youth astray? Who has an 
interest, for example, in incitement against the Soviet Union ? Who has 
an interest in slowing down the pace of work for the people of 
Poland ? The answer to all these questions is not difficult to find ... It is 
a matter of old political speculators who act without any scruples, it is 
a case of people who wish to slide on stage by devious means. The 
cause of Socialism has no meaning for them. Whom do these people 
serve ? What kind of people are they ? These Zambrowslds, 
Staszewskis, Slonimskis and their cohorts, and men like Kisielewski, 
jasienica and others have irrefutably proved that they serve foreign 
interests., 61 
What is noticeable in this speech is the use of the plural form in 
the listed names who with the exception of Kisielewski - were known 
in some circles of society as Jewish or of Jewish origin. A strategy 
which was used by the anti-Communist political elites in the early 
post-war period to emphasise the scale of Jewish participation in the 
introduction of the Communist system into the state. And a strategy 
that was very common in PZPR propaganda of the late 1960s, when it 
was used to give an impression of a large scale internal enemy. 
The second example of presenting the student demonstrators as 
the Zionist enemy is an official statement on student demonstrations 
issued by the ZBOWD on 12 March 1968. The characteristic element 
of this statement is its accusations against 'the enemy for perfidiously 
misleading our you& and for causing 'the painful incidents' - an 
accusation frequently voiced in commentaries on student 
demonstrations. This can be seen as an attempt by the Party to shift 
responsibility for the brutal suppression of these demonstrations onto 
the Jewish students and away from the police. 
'The constant development of our country and our 
achievements have caused an increase in the ideological -political 
61AIJPR, File No. 323 0 (180), Situation in Poland, Edward Giereks speech of 14 
March 1968,3 This speech was published in ! Wbuna Ludu, on 15 March 1968. 
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campaign conducted by the imperialist and revanchist centres of the 
USA and West Germany-In tbisslande-rous, campajQgn against Poland 
and Scxnalism, a particularly active role isbeing played by 
international Zionism and its agencies. The enemy employs 
propaganda and lies. -Recent, incidents in Warsaw [student 
demonstration] supply evidence of this. We know the instigators of 
t 'he . -, e painful incidents ... they are-, principally, the very same people 
who have been known for a long tirne for their national nibilism. 
Today they -operate under the slogans, of freedom and patriotism ... we 
are convinced that they will be punisbed;. irrespective of whatever 
position they occupy,. and diat-they will meet-with general 
condemnation, not only for inspiring painful incidents, but first and 
foremost, for perfidioUSly misleading our youths 162 
Importantly the notion of Judeo-Communism had undergo-ne a 
major transformation in its ed=-nationalist Communist-versioninto. 
d 'Ke. notion of the Jew as, the ideological enemy of the Polish. Socialist 
system and. therefore- once. again as. the- e-neany of, Pola--nd and i tsý 
people. As a rule, the Jew was evaluated as the polluter responsible 
for all the ideological and political erron. of the. Party. F-Luth-ermore, 
the notion of the Jewish Comrade as, the polluter of the. PZPR was 
Ln. variably accompanied by. the ba, 4c- ethno-nationalist notion of the 
Jew as a polluter of the-Polish polity in general- The important 
message- conveyed was that. if it were not f or the Jewish Comrari e-,, 
Poh sh Com-T-nAtnism could develop in an agreement with Pori ! -; 
h 
national traditions, and would thus be a popular people's ideology and 
that Poland would be a prosperous country for all its citizens -a notion 
that resembled-the-belief propagated by the. coreethno-nationalist--, in- 
the, inter-war period- This, can be viewed as the Party's attem-pt to 
presentitself as theppeople's Party,. and to achieve a liigher popularity 
within a highly ethnically'homogenous society. 
Here are two typical examples of presenting Zionist/ Jewish 
Comrades as element% both and-Gommunist. and anti-national wid-dn 
the Party- The f irst example- is. an exr-erpt f rom- rarepersonal public 
iteme w of 12 April, . given to aj ou m al is, t of statement by Moczar in a ir * 
ple is excernt-, frow, the Palish Prc-..;. s Agency, PAR. The. second exama ., 
the artide 'A Ccaitfibubiop- ta the Genesis of the Cmnflict, ' (Przyorzynek 
62Statement by ZBOWiD on student demonstrations, Lrybuna ludu 13 March 1968. 
Cited in Anti-fewish Campaign. 22. 
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do genezy konfliktu) by Andrzej Werblan, published in the June 1968 
edition of the Litergy Monthly (Miesiýcznik Literacki). In his 
presentation of the history of the Communist movement in Poland 
from its beginnings until 1968, Werblan - political secretary to the 
Stalinist politician Boleskaw Bierut in the early 1950s and Chief of the 
Department of Science and Learning in the PZPR in the late 1960s, 
went as far as to claim that with regard to the Jews their qualities and 
ethno-cultural make-up rendered them incapable of being good Polish 
Communists. 63 Moreover, his perspective on the membership of the 
Polish Communist movement can be viewed as one of ethno - 
nationalist orientation and as exclusionary in respect of Jewish 
Comrades. According to Werblan, a purely ethnically Polish 
composition of the Party in post-1945 Poland would have guaranteed 
the proper development of Communism, with no deformations. 
1. 'Ihe arrival in our country - together with the heroic soldiers 
of [the Kosciuszko Division - the first Polish military group to be set up 
in the Soviet Union [under the Communist patronage], of certain 
politicians masquerading in officers' uniforms, who later were of the 
opinion that it was they and only them - the Zambrowskis, the 
Radkiewiczs, the Bermans - who had the right to leadership, who had 
a monopoly on deciding what was right for the Polish nation... from 
that moment, that arrival, began the evil that was to last until 1956. 
Although their mouths were full of phrases of unity, they did not like 
it that our Party was disseminating beautiful policies on a broad-based 
front, a front in which there would be room for every Polish patriot 
who wanted to raise up his fatherland, make it more prosperous, wiser 
and more beautiful ... for that reason men such as Radkiewicz, 
Romkowski. R6Zaýski, ýwiatlo, and Feigin persecuted spokesmen of 
the broad-based patriotic, national front, calling it a swamp. To these 
men Polish patriots were nothing but a swamp., 64 
2. 'A group of activists . Afith sectarian cosmopolitan tendencies 
sought to dominate the Party through a specific cadres policy... One of 
the peculiar characteristics of this pohcy was to give people of Jewish 
origin particular responsibihties in certain organs of the power 
630n this article by Werblan, see, for example, Anh-fewish Campaign. 40-51; and 
Adam CioWosz, 'Anti-Zionism in Polish Communist Party Politics, ' in Robert S. 
Wistrich, ed., The Left Agginst Zion Communism, Israel and the Middle East 
(London, 1979) 145-147. 
64Nfieczyslaw Moczar's interview of 12 April, 1968. Cited in The Anti-Jewish 
! h-- 1.39. .. ýaigL 
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apparatus, in propaganda, the Foreign and Home Nfinistries .... the 
majority of whom [people of Jewish origin] no longer had anything in 
common with the leftist movement of the pre-war period, and who 
were frequently derived from among well-to-do city dwelling strata of 
the Jewish bourgeoisie, who during WWH had sought asylum from 
Thtlerism! in the Soviet Union .... The participation of these people in 
the ranks of the 1st Polish Army in the fight against "Elitleris& was 
their duty as Polish citizens. But it did not explain why people like 
Brus , Baczko, Bauman, and. many others made such swift political 
careers ... Objective circumstances meant that these activists 
[Communists who spent VVVVH in the Soviet Union] did not undergo 
the renewing and refreshing ideological therapy of underground work 
in German occupied Poland, in which new Party cadres grew up and 
became politically educated, in which the Party's bonds with the broad 
masses became established, in which the Party of the working-class 
became the Party of the people. ' 65 
T-r- 
flure, the accusation against Jewish Comrades of responsibility 
for the 'errors' of the Party during the Stalinist period had its roots in 
the non-Communist ethno-nationalist notion of Judeo-Communism 
and Judeo-Stahnisation. The first group within the PZPR to have 
integrated this notion into Party political discourse was the Natolin 
group in the 1950s. However, this notion did not cease to be advocated 
by some segments of the anti-Communist political elites of Endeýja 
origin, and was to continue in the post 1968 reality. 66 Thenotionof 
Jews as agents of Stalinist crimes committed against the Polish nation 
can still be found to some degree in public discourse, where it is used 
as justification for the anti-Jewish violence of the early post-war 
period. 67 
In the late 1960s, not only were the Jews portrayed as polluters 
of the PZPR, but also as polluters of Polish culture. As in the pre-1945 
period, Jews - or people of Jewish origin active in cultural life - were 
evaluated as carriers of values spiritually alien to Polish national 
65Andrzej Werblan, 'Przyczynek do genezy konfliktu, ' Miesipnik Literacki, June 
1968. Cited in Anti-Jewish CampaigLi. 47-48. 
660n the presence of this notion among some segments of anti-Communist pohfical. 
elites of the 1970s and 1980s, and within intellectual discourse, see Irwin-Zarecka. 
Neutrahsing. 172. 
67A good example of such a position can be found in the writings of the respectable 
popular historian and journalist Jerzy NIicewski. See Andrzej Micewski, hEoa 
Dwiema Orientaýjami. Warszawa, 1990.11-28. 
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traditions. Their contribution, particularly in areas of literature, 
history, and film was portrayed as cosmopolitan and lacking in 
national values, and. additionally as having a negative and 
demoralising influence on Polish youth. Next, their works were 
accused of polluting public morale and of spreading eroticism - an 
accusation regularly voiced against Polish Jewish artists in the Catholic 
press of the inter-war period. The fact that the same accusation could 
be imitated by the Communist press of the 1960s shows how the same 
elements of the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other coulcIbe 
present in political and social groups otherwise ideologically 
opposed. 68 
Here is one such representative illustration, presenting the Jews 
as polluters of Polish national culture. In a resolution of 16 March of 
the Congress of the Association of Polish Journalists, the following 
statement was made: 
'These are forces ideologically alien to Polish culture which in 
their nihilism and cosmopolitanism are capable of sowing unrest and 
poisoning the minds and hearts of our youths., 69 
What social functions did the myth of the Zionist /Jew as the 
Threatening Other have in the political culture of the 1960s in 
Communist Poland ? 
As in previous periods, the myth was characterised by its poly- 
functionality. The ethno-nationalist Communist elites used it in four 
main ways. Firstly, the myth was used. as rationale and justification for 
the purification of the Party from all remaining Jewish Comrades of 
differing political orientations - such as revisionism or liberalism. This 
purification also induded non-Jewish Comrades who were accused of 
Zionist and revisionist sympathies, or who protested against the 
dismissal of their Jewish colleagues. 70 Individuals from both groups 
were dismissed from positions within the Party, the state apparatus, 
the Army and various other institutions, and were expelled from the 
Party. 
Secondly, the myth was used as rationale and justification for 
the purification of scientific and cultural institutions, publishing 
6817or an analysis of press articles on the immoral, cosmopolitan and anti-Polish 
nature of works by Polish Jewish artists, see Osýka, 5. sýonisci. 47-51. 
69AIjpR, File. No. 380.0 (180), Situation in Poland, the Resolution of Polish 
Journalists of 16 March 1968,28. 
70See Eisler, Marzec. 378-390. 
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houses, press, and radio and television stations of the remaining Polish 
Jews employed by these institutions, the majority of whom were 
members of the middle class and intelligentsia. These people were 
removed from their positions of employment and replaced by those 
members of society faithful to the PZPR. 
Thirdly, the myth was used as a rationale for the purification of 
the Polish polity from the remaining Polish Jews. Both Jewish 
Comrades and Polish Jewish members of the middle class and 
intelligentsia comprised a large part of that group of people who were 
forced to relinquish their Polish nationality and leave the country. 71 
The majority of these emigrants were highly assimilated into Polish 
culture, and, in many cases, to use an expression of Paul Lendvai, they 
were 'Jews by force' and 'not by choice. ' 72 This emigration lasted until 
the end of 1970 and totalled approximately twenty thousand people 
out of a community numbering thirty thousand. 73 
Fourthly, the myth was used by ethno-nationalist Communist 
elites as a means of cleansing the PZPR of its 'dark past! and thereby 
raising its popularity among society at large. Historians of 1968 have 
divided opinions on the issue of public response to the anti-Jewish 
campaign and purge orchestrated by the Communist state. According 
to Jerzy Eisler, society at large watched the events from a distance 
without being engaged, whereas Marcin Zaremba claims that the anti- 
Jewish campaign was received in a positive way by a significant 
segment of society, and that in the sphere of national values, the Party 
was perceived as the 'people's Party at that time. It is worth adding 
here that Zaremba's proposition is based on research on secret reports 
of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Party Committees dealing with 
711 am aware that at the Twentieth Anniversary of March 1968, the Polish 
government passed a law in which the forced emigrants resulting from the anti- 
Jewish campaign of 1968 have a right to claim back their Polish nationality. See, for 
example the editorial 'Obywatelstwo polskie/ in Gazeta ftborcza, 16 March, 1998, 
2. 
72See Lendvaiý Antisemitism, 3. On the sociological position of the Polish Jewish 
emigrants of 1968, see Banas, Scal2goats. 122-123,163-165. As a background to the 
sociological position of post-1945 Polish Jewry, see important study conducted in the 
early post-war period by Irena Hurwic-Nowakowska, A Social Analysis of Post-War 
Polishlewly Uerusaleffi, 1986). 
73()n the purge of Polish Jews from the state, and the ways in which the policy of 
emigration was enforced, see, for example, Banas, The Scapggoats. 133-150; and Anti - 
Jewish Camp4o_- 59-69. 
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the mood of society in 1968, material which in previous decades was 
not available to historians. 74 
Fragmentary data concerning the membership of the PZPR 
during March 1968 - the peak of the anti-Jewish campaign - can be seen 
as supportive of Zaremba's claim that the Party enjoyed social 
legitimacy at that time. For example, six hundred and seventy new 
members joined the local Warsaw PZPR organisation during that 
month, in comparison to one hundred and seventy-nine new-comers 
in January 1968.75 However, it is difficult to establish whether such a 
dynamic increase in membership was caused exclusively by PZPWs 
anti-Jewish campaign or whether other social and 
economic factors were involved. 
On the other hand, it must be stressed that a significant segment 
of the intelligentsia was against the anti-Jewish campaign and purge of 
1968. Among those against these events were some segments of 
academic youths, liberals, and also Catholic intelligentsia concentrated 
in the group Znak. Furthermore, a segment of Communist elites 
concentrated around the weekly Politics (Polityka), edited by Comrade 
ý&eczyslaw Rakowski, refused to participate in the anti-Jewish 
campaign. 
It is also worth noting here, that in the post-1968 realities, the 
myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other did not disappear from 
political culture, but continued to be used, in a very basic form, and 
with varying intensity and frequency. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Communist regime used the myth, to some extent, against the political 
opposition - the Committee for the Defence of the Workers (Komitet 
Obron'cýw Robotnikoýv, KOR) and the Solidarity movement 76 Leaders 
and prominent figures of these organisations, regardless of their ethnic 
origin, were 'portraye& as 'non-Polish' and "anti-Polish elements who 
wanted to take over power in order to use it against the Polish nation'. 
The collapse of Communism in 1989 witnessed another short-term 
intense re-occurrence of the myth this time within a segment of the 
74See Eisler, Marzec. 389-399; and Marcin Zaremba, 'Biedni Polacy 68. 
Spo4eczer6two polskie wobec wydarzen' marcowych w ýwietle raportow KW i MSW 
dla kierownictwa PZPR, ' in: Kula, Oseka and Zaremba, eds., Marzec 1968. Vol. 1 
Referaty. 144-170. 
75fiýý data is cited in Eisler, Marzec, 398. 
760n the portrayal of the political opposition as Jewish and anti-Polish, by the 
Communist elites in the 1970s and 1980s, see, for example, Hirszowicz, 'Me Jewish! 
206-207. 
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anti-Communist political elites and within a segment of society at 
large, a phenomenon which I briefly cover in the second chapter. 
Conclusions 
My aim in this chapter was to demonstrate the development of the 
myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other in the Communist political 
culture of the 1950s and 1960s - particularly of late 1960s. I have 
shown that the ethno-nationalist Communist version of the myth was 
characterised by the transformation of the original notion of the Jew as 
pro-Communist and therefore as the ideological enemy of the Polish 
state and its people into the notion of the Jew as anti-Communist and 
therefore the ideological enemy of the Polish state and consequently of 
its people. Apart from this adjustment, the ethno-nationalist 
Communist version of the myth did not differ much from the version 
advocated by non and anti-communist political elites. 
I have also shown that the ethno-nationalist Communist version 
of the myth was present to varying degrees and intensities within 
significant segments of the PZPR in all periods under discussion. In 
the last period of 1968, the myth was expressed in its most elaborated 
and aggressive form, particularly by the Partisan faction and by those 
affiliated to its organisations. 
The late 1960s was a period most significant for the impact of 
the myth both on the remaining Jewish minority and on the political 
culture. During this period, the myth was the driving force of the anti- 
Jewish campaign and purge which lasted a year and resulted in a wave 
of forced emigration of two thirds of the remaining Polish Jewish 
minority. During that time, the myth was successfully used as a 
rationale and justification for the purification of the Party, the state 
apparatus, and various scientific and cultural institutions and mass 
media from the remaining members of the Jewish minority. It was 
moreover, used as rationale for the purification of the Party and state 
apparatus from its internal critics and opposition. The myth was also 
used as means of improving the Party's image and popularity within 
society at large, since all past errors of the Party and inadequacies of 
the political system could be attributed to the presence of Jewish 
Comrades. 
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In general terms, the myth of the Jew as the Tbreatening Other 
can be seen as an important indicator of the ethno-nationahsation of 
Polish Communism- 
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Overall Conclusions 
I have demonstrated that the myth of the Jew as the Tbreatening 
Other has had a profound and long-lasting impact on modem Polish 
political culture and the Polish collective mind. It has had a similar 
impact on inter-communal relations between the dominant Polish 
nation and the Jewish minorityý from the late nineteenth century when 
the myth emerged in its fully-fledged form, up to the year of 1968 - 
when a majority of the remaining Jewish minority was forced to leave 
the polity by the ethno-nationalist Communist groups in power at the 
time. 
Throughout this entire period the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other was used by ethno-nationalists of all kinds and 
varying degrees of intensity as the background of all discourse on 
national life. In its most explicit, aggressive and elaborated form, the 
myth had always been applied most consequently by the core ethno- 
nationalist party Endeýa and by those organisations and movements 
with strong adherence to its political ethos. 
Overall, within the context of political culture, the myth has had 
two important social functions. The first was to raise national cohesion 
and thereby unify opposing strata of society, through the general 
message that everything negative in Poland and in Polish society was 
the result of the pernicious pollution of the Jews who were to blame for 
all political, social and economic problems. 
This indeed has been a dangerous and counter-productive 
strategy which injured inter-communal relations, and led in practice to 
the exclusion of the Jewish minority from the fabric of society. 
Furthermore, far from providing actual benefits to the ethnic Polish 
community it retarded the development of Polish society along the 
lines of a modem inclusive civic nationalism advocating values of 
pluralism. 
The second function of the myth has been as a means of 
discrediting political opponents, individuals and groups as 
representative of Jewish rather than Polish interests. Here the word 
'JeW has simply become a term of political abuse and has not required 
the actual presence of Jews for its use in political propaganda, as 
dearly revealed in the post-1968 reality. 
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The presence of the myth in political culture has generafly 
reflected a lack of political sophistication and an uncritical approach to 
the exclusivist ethno-nationalist heritage of the late nineteenth century. 
In terms of its impact on the Jewish minority, I have 
demonstrated that the myth has had two important consequences. 
Firstly, the myth provided a rationale for the project of the purification 
of the Polish polity by means of mass emigration of the Jews, a project, 
which despite the wishes of ethno-nationalists, was not successfully 
implemented by the state up to 1939. During the Second World War, 
the German occupier achieved this project by means of extermination 
of ninety per cent of Polish Jews, a means never contemplated by 
Polish exclusivist ethno-nationalists, with the exception of marginal 
political groups. In the post-1945 period, the project of purification of 
the polity from the Jews by means of emigration was, in fact, taken up 
by the ethno-nationalist Communist elites, and finally realised in 1968 
against the then numerically insignificant Jewish minority -a minority 
moreover characterised by a high level of assimilation into Polish 
culture. 
Secondly, the myth served to rationalise and justify anti-Jewish 
violence in the inter-war and early post-war periods. In both these 
periods, such violence contributed to the departure of many members 
of the Jewish community from Poland. 
Yet, this is not to say that the whole of the political and cultural 
elites (and non-elites) have always accepted the myth. Indeed, as I 
have indicated in each of the chapters, the myth was not accepted by 
an important segment of the political elites of liberal and democratic 
provenance, particularly of PPS and Democratic Union origin, nor was 
it accepted by some members of the cultural elites which included 
prominent public figures and weH -known intellectuals. These above 
groups expanded in the post-1945 period as members of the Catholic 
intelligentsia and clergy representing the so-called 'open Churchý 
joined in opposition against the use of the myth. 
In my opinion, there is a need for a detailed analysis in a 
historical context of that trend in Polish political culture whidi 
advocated a positive evaluation of the Jews within society and treated 
them as part of the Polish nation in a civic sense. This analysis could 
form part of a broader study of Polish civic nationalism and its failure 
to establish itself as the main matrix of the nation. 
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A significant obstacle in chaRenging the myth of the Jew as the 
Threatening Other within the political (and popular) culture of all the 
historical periods under discussion has been the high degree of 
rationalisation. of the myth as a social truth. As a result the myth 
manifested itself in political and social institutions and groups, such as 
the Catholic Church, which had traditionaffly condemned and 
dissociated itself from violent forms of antisemitism. This 
phenomenon also shows a clear qualitative distinction between the 
perception of the Jews as the Threatening Other and the advocacy of 
violent anti-Jewish actions. This reveals the failure by such groups to 
realise that the myth itself represents in principle a form of anti-Jewish 
discrimination. It is disturbing that such a position can also be found 
in Polish intellectual discourse on the history of the Jewish minority, 
up to the recent period. 
I have included some examples of Jewish responses to the myth, 
which show that some of their representatives had a good 
understanding of Polish exdusivist ethno-nationalism and its 
damaging consequences. An examination of these responses would be 
worthwhile - as would a comparative analysis of the use of the myth of 
the foremost Internal Threatening Other in various national 
communities. Both subjects, however, are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
My findings reveal that constructions such as the myth of the 
Jew as the Threatening Other can be powerful and emotive. The 
persistence of the myth during the Second World War and in the post- 
1945 period dearly exposes the crucial aspects of such constructions - 
namely their prejudiced and non-rational nature and easy adaptability 
to varying historical, social and political circumstances. Such 
constructions have proved to be long-lived and extremely resistant. 
Whether the myth of the Jew as the Threatening Other can be 
successfully challenged and deconstructed in contemporary Poland 
remains to be seen. 
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Abbreviations 
AK Home Army (Annia Krajozva) 
CKZP Central Committee of Jews in Poland (Centralny 
Komitet 2ydoiv w Po1sce) 
GG Generalgouvemement (Generalna Gubernia) 
FOP Front for the Rebirth of Poland (Front OdrodzenW 
Polski) 
KPP Communist Party of Poland (Komunistyczna Partia 
Polski) 
NPR National Workers' Party (Narodowa Partia 
Robotnicza) 
NSZ National Arms Forces (Narodozve Sýy Zbrojne) 
ONR National Radical Camp (Oboz Narodowo- 
Raýykalny) 
OWP Camp for a Greater Poland (Obýz Wielkiej Polski) 
OZON Camp of National Unity (Obýz Zjednoczenia 
Narodozvego) 
PKWN Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski 
Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodozvego) 
PPR Pohsh Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza) 
pm 
AA I-j Pohsh Sociahst Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna) 
PSKL Polish Catholic and People's Union (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Katolicko-Ludowe) 
PSL Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludozve) 
PZPR Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona 
Partia Robotnicza) 
WiN Freedom and Independence (Wolnosc i 
Niepodleglogc') 
Ww1i Second World War 
ZBOWiD Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy 
(Zwiqzek BoJOWnikýw o Wolnoýc i Demokracje) 
ZSP Union of Polish Syndicalists (Zwiquk Polskich 
Svndvkalistýw) 
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